He 111 given more production capacity 1939

[Deleted member 1487]

What if the He 111 was given production equality with the Ju 88 bomber in 1939? In that year the Ju 88 'Wunderbomber' was given vast resources (some sources claim over 50% of aircraft production capacity) to be Germany's main bomber, but due to various technical problems during initial construction only a handful were built in 1939 before ramping up significantly in 1940.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Design_and_development

Production was delayed drastically by developmental problems. Although planned for a service introduction in 1938, the Ju 88 finally entered squadron service (with only 12 aircraft) on the first day of the attack on Poland in 1939. Production was painfully slow, with only one Ju 88 manufactured per week, as problems continually kept cropping up.

The He 111 was a proven design by 1939 and had reached its definitive H-series by early 1939; it had better range than the A1 version of the Ju88 and a larger bomb load; later it was to have lower losses than the Ju88 during the Battle of Britain and had heavier defensive armament.
So if in 1938-9 the decision was made to have a 'balanced' air force by balancing bomber production equally between the He111 and Ju88, what would that mean for production and the Luftwaffe's combat potential? Let's assume some of the great capacity for the He111 comes from phasing out the Do17 in 1938, so that by 1939 that capacity has been shifted over to the He111 and Heinkel also doesn't produce any Ju88s, which he did historically. Instead his factories focus entirely on the He111.

As far as I can tell the He 111 was pretty easy to produce compared to more other aircraft in Germany's inventory, especially compared to the early Ju 88. It also had a lower airframe weight than the Ju88 by 1000kg.
So by increasing the He 111's production capacity in 1938-9 instead of just building up enormous Ju 88 capacity, which wasn't utilized until 1940, the overall number of Germany's bombers going into 1940 would be significantly higher than historical numbers. They would either have greater reserves of aircraft and parts or higher front line strength. Also during the BoB and Blitz there would be more aircraft in the air thanks to either larger reserves and spare parts or more formations in service. Potentially the extra He 111s would have greater survivability than the Ju88s considering the historic loss rates of the types during the BoB.

The LW would have more aircraft with longer range and bigger bomb load in 1940-1 until the Ju88A4 came online and improved the Ju 88's range and bomb load. In the long term the cost would be fewer Ju 88s, which would have its consequences for night fighter and heavy fighter units, but as far as bombers went the He 111 soldiered on well into 1944 on the Eastern Front. I imagine eventually the He 111 would be phased down and out in favor of the Ju 88 airframe; still in the short term for the Western Campaigns and in the first two-three years of Barbarossa the extra He 111s would come in handy, as the extra aircraft in the sky, even if of inferior type, would be at a time when the Luftwaffe mostly managed to achieve air superiority, so it would be a boon rather than a hinderance.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_aircraft_production_during_World_War_II
Given these historical numbers, let's say the following changes are made:
The Do17 is not produced in 1939. Instead some 1000 He111Hs are made, which is slightly more than double the historical number, thanks to no Do17s AND some of the Ju88 capacity being shifted to the He111.

In 1940 there are about 1800 He111s produced and 1500 Ju88 bombers (fighter version still produced).

In 1941 there are 2000 He111s and 1800 Ju88 bombers.

In 1942 there are 2200 He111s and 2000 Ju88 bombers.

In 1943 there are around 2000 He111s and 2000 Ju88s, with Ju188s entering production.

In 1944 production drops off with 900 He11s and 1000 Ju88/188 bombers.

What do you all think? Would the extra He 111s and fewer Ju88s make a difference? Would the extra bomber output make difference in 1939-44?

 

[Catspoke]

It seems Barbarossa is where the Luftwaffe really needed the extra planes in the air and the HE111 is more than adequate for 1941.

Those extra aircraft would really be handy over Leningrad August-December 1941 time frame, with decent bases in the Baltic states you should be able to deploy the extra aircraft there. It might well be enough to bring about the fall of the city which was pretty close OTL.

Also in the Soviet Winter 41 counterattack, when the OTL attrition was really hurting Luftwaffe numbers the extra numbers of planes flying from decent bases in the Baltic would help and if you can keep Demansyk from getting encircled, its double bonus time for the Luftwaffe in terms of numbers.

Also in the med in June 41-November 1942, when all you really needed was just a few more planes over the convoys to north africa, to keep the subs down and throw of the aim of any bomber attacks to really reduce losses.

All you have to do make sure the percentage of JU88s that are the Ju88C fighter variety are higher to not hurt your night fighting capability.

Some questions though:
In the Battle of Britain I was thinking that the total number of bomber sorties had to be limited to the number of fighter sorties (need escorts), so numbers of extra bombers don't do much good.

Also in BOB, Did the Ju88 fly more dangerous mission leading to the loss rate or is that really because the HE111 had better defensive armament and durability.

How much use is those extra strategic aircraft in the east when you really need ju87s, hs123s and me110s for tactical support. (at least in Leningrad there are strategic targets worth bombing, barge docs, supply stockpiles, rail yards, etc.)

 

[BlairWitch749]

well that would beget a crippling pilot shortage unless you have Goering die AND have Jeschonek fall down the stairs... repeatedly

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Some questions though:
In the Battle of Britain I was thinking that the total number of bomber sorties had to be limited to the number of fighter sorties (need escorts), so numbers of extra bombers don't do much good.

Night bombing over Britain started in June, so if there are too many bombers and not enough fighters, then night bombing in greater numbers is the answer. Hit RAF bases at night with Knickebein guidance, which was working and not yet jammed during the BoB. Hit London, radar stations, sector stations, anything valuable really.

Besides the longer range of the HE111 would really help during the Blitz (1500 miles), especially if there are more of them to deploy more bombs against British cities. One of the things the LW had trouble with was getting enough bombers against single targets during the Blitz. Greater concentration matters with things like firebombing. As it was there was about a 50% serviceability rate for bombers during the Blitz, so having reserve HE111s for idle crews whose normal aircraft is down for service would mean many more aircraft dropping bombs.

Also in BOB, Did the Ju88 fly more dangerous mission leading to the loss rate or is that really because the HE111 had better defensive armament and durability.

According to the wikipedia article about HE111 operational service, it was greater defensive armament and durability:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_111_operational_history#Battle_of_Britain

During the Battle of Britain the Heinkels ability to take heavy punishment was one of its strengths and it suffered less losses than the Ju 88. The battle highlighted the need for heavier defensive armament and effective fighter protection by the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Messerschmitt Bf 110 units if losses were to be kept to sustainable levels.[29]

Mackay, Ron. Heinkel He 111 (Crowood Aviation Series). Ramsbury, Marlborough, Wiltshire, UK: Crowood Press, 2003. ISBN 1-86126-576-X.

How much use is those extra strategic aircraft in the east when you really need ju87s, hs123s and me110s for tactical support. (at least in Leningrad there are strategic targets worth bombing, barge docs, supply stockpiles, rail yards, etc.)

The HE111 served as a tactical bomber for 1941-2 quite well. It wasn't the best CAS aircraft, but it was very good in the area the LW needed: operational interdiction. They often in 1942 and on neglected the need to interdict the battlefield, attacking concentrations of enemy troops and logistic hubs; this was very pronounced in 1943 at Kursk where only one attempt to bomb the sole rail line heading into the pocket was made. Part of the problem might have been lack of fighter cover...

well that would beget a crippling pilot shortage unless you have Goering die AND have Jeschonek fall down the stairs... repeatedly

Considering how many pilots were idle at the front for lack of spare parts, having the extra aircraft would ensure higher sortee rate for existing aircrews, instead of having them sit around waiting for spare aircraft of the parts to come in. This was a problem from 1940-2 especially, when serviceability of aircraft was 50% or lower. Hell, if it helps prevent the Luftwaffe Field Divisions that would be a massive improvement.

 

[Catspoke]

Here is my best case Axis:

Leningrad falls December 30 1941 to a tightened siege (aircraft bomb docks, assembly points, warehouses and occasional tactical bombing which allows the Germans to take Volkov and cut Ladoga supply to the city completely).

The 18th army reserves released and the extra aircraft available for AGN keep Deymansk form being encircled.

So 1942 rolls around and you have lots of extra medium bombers and transport aircraft for the eastern front.

So in 1942, you have the 18th army (and the 11th army after Sevastopol) as extra reserves (for flank support??), the extra aircraft and better forward supply with the extra JU52s helps maintain the advance and so you take Stalingrad earlier, take Grozny and maybe find away to take more of the black sea coast, there are more German reserves so the soviet November 1942 counter attack is slower, the Germans have time to think and get out of Stalingrad, avoiding yet another Luftwaffe air supply fiasco.

The Finns with more reserves and more German pressure cut the Murmansk railway in August 1942 (doesn't hurt the Soviets too badly, but butterflies away the Battle of Barents sea and Hitlers resulting scrap the fleet order, with the "zone of destiny in better shape", Hitler lets Raeder do a January 1943 raid with Lutzow to attack allied whaling fleets (this has to end badly).

1943 rolls around and there is less obvious stuff to do in the east, Leningrad is controlled, the Germans still control the Kursk Bulge and Demansyk and might be tempted to hold on the Rzev bulge (lets say they do). and hold a bigger pocket in the Kuban. With less losses and less obvious stuff to do the Germans don't do Kursk waiting on a Soviet counter attack and doing secreteive peace negotiations with the Soviet (that don't lead anywhere mainly because the Soviets can't figure out how to live without Lend Lease and the Allies keep making bigger promises to keep him them in). Germans try to get some HE177s in the air to attack Soviet strategic targets like the power plants.

However without a Stalingrad airlift and with lots more aircraft available. Hitler and Mussolini decide to double down in Africa and fly in more troops and supplies.... This has to end badly...

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Won't there be an effect earlier against Britain? The extra aircraft would cause more damage that would take the British longer to recover from and impede their build up depending on how it was used. You might even see larger damage to industry when the LW hits workshop cities like Manchester and Conventry.

 

[Catspoke]

Won't there be an effect earlier against Britain? The extra aircraft would cause more damage that would take the British longer to recover from and impede their build up depending on how it was used. You might even see larger damage to industry when the LW hits workshop cities like Manchester and Conventry.

Yeah I would imagine assuming you could inflict some more damage at night, those British planes not built probably wouldn't be "out of the pipeline" until after September 17th-ish where the immediate loss of the BOB was in danger.

British would be a little more nervous through the fight I bet though. Might change a few a production priorities.

I still think this helps the east front more.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Yeah I would imagine assuming you could inflict some more damage at night, those British planes not built probably wouldn't be "out of the pipeline" until after September 17th-ish where the immediate loss of the BOB was in danger.

British would be a little more nervous through the fight I bet though. Might change a few a production priorities.

I still think this helps the east front more.

Most likely the Eastern Front would see the biggest changes, but even with more bombers operating over Britain, the changes may take effect early on, even for the Soviets.
If the LW is able to wear down the RAF more by night attacks during the BoB and smash up production more, then during the later stages of Barbarossa the Brits won't be able to send the major amounts of Lend-Lease aid, which was critical around Moscow (1000 planes and 1000 tanks).

Edit:
Not to mention more pilots surviving in the HE111s during the BoB.

 

[phx1138]

Given the aircrew training issues are addressed, this appears to make it possible for Luftwaffe to attack Sov oil production around Baku, without needing to sever the Don Bridge.

 

[KACKO]

Most likely the Eastern Front would see the biggest changes, but even with more bombers operating over Britain, the changes may take effect early on, even for the Soviets.
If the LW is able to wear down the RAF more by night attacks during the BoB and smash up production more, then during the later stages of Barbarossa the Brits won't be able to send the major amounts of Lend-Lease aid, which was critical around Moscow (1000 planes and 1000 tanks).

Soviet received 361 (466 different source) tanks till the end of 1941, so it is hard to imagine 1000 of them aroun Moscow.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Soviet received 361 (466 different source) tanks till the end of 1941, so it is hard to imagine 1000 of them aroun Moscow.

I misremembered the numbers, but the overall proportion of the equipment and machine tools sent in 1941-2 made a substantial difference to the Soviets.

http://www.historynet.com/did-russi...ase-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm

According to research by a team of Soviet historians, the Soviet Union lost a staggering 20,500 tanks from June 22 to December 31, 1941. At the end of November 1941, only 670 Soviet tanks were available to defend Moscow—that is, in the recently formed Kalinin, Western, and Southwestern Fronts. Only 205 of these tanks were heavy or medium types, and most of their strength was concentrated in the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the Southwestern Front two tank brigades (30 tanks).

Given the disruption to Soviet production and Red Army losses, the Soviet Union was understandably eager to put British armor into action as soon as possible. According to Biriukov's service diary, the first 20 British tanks arrived at the Soviet tank training school in Kazan on October 28, 1941, at which point a further 120 tanks were unloaded at the port of Archangel in northern Russia. Courses on the British tanks for Soviet crews started during November as the first tanks, with British assistance, were being assembled from their in-transit states and undergoing testing by Soviet specialists.

The tanks reached the front lines with extraordinary speed. Extrapolating from available statistics, researchers estimate that British-supplied tanks made up 30 to 40 percent of the entire heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941, and certainly made up a significant proportion of tanks available as reinforcements at this critical point in the fighting. By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of the 750 promised.

The British Military Mission to Moscow noted that by December 9, about ninety British tanks had already been in action with Soviet forces. The first of these units to have seen action seems to have been the 138th Independent Tank Battalion (with twenty-one British tanks), which was involved in stemming the advance of German units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow in late November. In fact the British intercepted German communications indicating that German forces had first come in contact with British tanks on the Eastern front on November 26, 1941.

The exploits of the British-equipped 136th Independent Tank Battalion are perhaps the most widely noted in the archives. It was part of a scratch operational group of the Western Front consisting of the 18th Rifle Brigade, two ski battalions, the 5th and 20th Tank Brigades, and the 140th Independent Tank Battalion. The 136th Independent Tank Battalion was combined with the latter to produce a tank group of only twenty-one tanks, which was to operate with the two ski battalions against German forces advancing to the west of Moscow in early December. Other largely British-equipped tank units in action with the Western Front from early December were the 131st Independent Tank Brigade, which fought to the east of Tula, south of Moscow, and 146th Tank Brigade, in the region of Kriukovo to the immediate west of the Soviet capital.

While the Matilda Mk II and Valentine tanks supplied by the British were certainly inferior to the Soviets' homegrown T-34 and KV-1, it is important to note that Soviet production of the T-34 (and to a lesser extent the KV series), was only just getting seriously underway in 1942, and Soviet production was well below plan targets. And though rapid increases in tank firepower would soon render the 40mm two-pounder main gun of the Matilda and Valentine suitable for use on light tanks only, the armor protection of these British models put them firmly in the heavy and medium categories, respectively. Both were superior to all but the Soviet KV-1 and T-34 in armor, and indeed even their much maligned winter cross-country performance was comparable to most Soviet tanks excluding the KV-1 and T-34.

A steady stream of British-made tanks continued to flow into the Red Army through the spring and summer of 1942. Canada would eventually produce 1,420 Valentines, almost exclusively for delivery to the Soviet Union. By July 1942 the Red Army had 13,500 tanks in service, with more than 16 percent of those imported, and more than half of those British.

Lend-Lease aircraft deliveries were also of significance during the Battle of Moscow. While Soviet pilots praised the maneuverability of the homegrown I-153 Chaika and I-16 Ishak fighters—still in use in significant numbers in late 1941—both types were certainly obsolete and inferior in almost all regards to the British-supplied Hurricane. The Hurricane was rugged and tried and tested, and as useful at that point as many potentially superior Soviet designs such as the LaGG-3 and MiG-3. There were apparently only 263 LaGG-3s in the Soviet inventory by the time of the Moscow counteroffensive, and it was an aircraft with numerous defects. At the end of 1941 there were greater numbers of the MiG-3, but the plane was considered difficult to fly. The Yak-1, arguably the best of the batch, and superior in most regards to the Hurricane, suffered from airframe and engine defects in early war production aircraft.

A total of 699 Lend-Lease aircraft had been delivered to Archangel by the time the Arctic convoys switched to Murmansk in December 1941. Of these, 99 Hurricanes and 39 Tomahawks were in service with the Soviet air defense forces on January 1, 1942, out of a total of 1,470 fighters. About 15 percent of the aircraft of the 6th Fighter Air Corps defending Moscow were Tomahawks or Hurricanes.

British and Commonwealth deliveries to the Soviet Union in late 1941 and early 1942 would not only assist in the Soviet defense of Moscow and subsequent counteroffensive, but also in increasing Soviet production for the next period of the war. Substantial quantities of machine tools and raw materials, such as aluminum and rubber, were supplied to help Soviet industry back on its feet: 312 metal-cutting machine tools were delivered by convoy PQ-12 alone, arriving in March 1942, along with a range of other items for Soviet factories such as machine presses and compressors.

Once again, raw figures do not tell the whole story. Although British shipments amounted to only a few percent of Soviet domestic production of machine tools, the Soviet Union could request specific items which it may not have been able to produce for itself. Additionally, many of the British tools arrived in early 1942, when Soviet tool production was still very low, resulting in a disproportionate impact. The handing over of forty imported machine tools to Aviation Factory No. 150 in July 1942, for example, was the critical factor in enabling the factory to reach projected capacity within two months.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Given the aircrew training issues are addressed, this appears to make it possible for Luftwaffe to attack Sov oil production around Baku, without needing to sever the Don Bridge.

It would have been very difficult considering the distances involved, even with extra fuel and reduced bomb load.

 

[Chris Triangle]

Could the He-111 have been improved or was its design pretty much maxxed out?

 

[MUC]

Some of the He111s could also be converted as torpedo bombers. That should make life harder for the Murmansk convoys.

 

[LHB]

It would have been very difficult considering the distances involved, even with extra fuel and reduced bomb load.

Even if they only impact production and refinement capacity by, say, 10-20% that's going to have serious impact on the Soviet war effort and could buy the Germans more time. It won't be a war-winner by itself but with the right circumstances could force a stalemate.

 

[Catspoke]

Most likely the Eastern Front would see the biggest changes, but even with more bombers operating over Britain, the changes may take effect early on, even for the Soviets.
If the LW is able to wear down the RAF more by night attacks during the BoB and smash up production more, then during the later stages of Barbarossa the Brits won't be able to send the major amounts of Lend-Lease aid, which was critical around Moscow (1000 planes and 1000 tanks).

Edit:
Not to mention more pilots surviving in the HE111s during the BoB.

More pilots surviving is a good thing for the Luftwaffe. I can see more night attacks in August 40 - September 41 when the Luftwaffe is trying to tip things their way. After that I thought the Luftwaffe was capping their sorties anyway to build up fuel reserves for Barbarossa. It seems like there would be some other limitation, fuel, bombs. (but at least there must of been an excess of ground personnel to work with if their turning them into field divisions).

I like some of your other Luftwaffe PODs better, like better replacements for the Condor, focusing on Liverpool etc.., because the bang for the buck seems so much better that it doesn't seem to hurt so much resource wise to achieve the better results.

The Lend Lease part might hurt the Soviets in the Winter counter attack (and beyond), many of the Matlildas were used in the Caucasus. Its just hard for me to wrap my head around a force of HE111s really reducing British production, and if they did it seems the British would reduce their own home build up, even precious bomber command, before reducing Lend Lease.

Keep the Luftwaffe threads coming. If I had the time and books I would write a Luftwaffe POD where Wever lives, helps develop an air dropped torpedo solution early, and while testing, it is figured out that all German torpedo firing pistols and depth keeping are faulty early enough to fix by the Norway campaign, kind of a two in one POD. I think it would two major PODs to give the Axis a chance at winning.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

More pilots surviving is a good thing for the Luftwaffe. I can see more night attacks in August 40 - September 41 when the Luftwaffe is trying to tip things their way. After that I thought the Luftwaffe was capping their sorties anyway to build up fuel reserves for Barbarossa. It seems like there would be some other limitation, fuel, bombs. (but at least there must of been an excess of ground personnel to work with if their turning them into field divisions)..

Do you have some sourcing on the capping of sortees for fuel build up? I haven't seen that as an issue during 1940-1.

I like some of your other Luftwaffe PODs better, like better replacements for the Condor, focusing on Liverpool etc.., because the bang for the buck seems so much better that it doesn't seem to hurt so much resource wise to achieve the better results..

Agreed, but I like to explore other options to, as taken together perhaps they would have had a bigger effect.

The Lend Lease part might hurt the Soviets in the Winter counter attack (and beyond), many of the Matlildas were used in the Caucasus. Its just hard for me to wrap my head around a force of HE111s really reducing British production, and if they did it seems the British would reduce their own home build up, even precious bomber command, before reducing Lend Lease..

Perhaps you are right, but I highly doubt they would reduce bomber command because it was their only offensive weapon in the war for years and they wanted payback for the Blitz.

Keep the Luftwaffe threads coming. If I had the time and books I would write a Luftwaffe POD where Wever lives, helps develop an air dropped torpedo solution early, and while testing, it is figured out that all German torpedo firing pistols and depth keeping are faulty early enough to fix by the Norway campaign, kind of a two in one POD. I think it would two major PODs to give the Axis a chance at winning.

I had an idea for that, but the attempt to shoehorn both effects from one POD is too tortured to make work. I've looked at it as many ways as possible, but unless you make some serious leaps it very unlikely.
I think with Wever alive you could get the Italian Fiume air torpedoes in service in numbers by 1939 without any issue, but also getting the navy to play along with anyone and open up their torpedo office to outside services is not going to happen. Also AFAIK the issue with the German aerial torpedoes was not the same as with their submarine ones, so fixing one would not help the other necessarily.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Could the He-111 have been improved or was its design pretty much maxxed out?

Good question...I think by 1941 it was about maxed out, as it needed greater speed or more armor and guns. It turns out that the more armor and guns weighed it down too much, so that in turn they became a liability as fighters became faster. By 1942 they were really only useful on the Eastern Front.
Of course what was needed by that point was a strategic four engine bomber that had the speed, range, payload, armor, and defensive armament, which was supposed to have been the He177. Had it been in service without the engine problems by 1942 then it would have filled the roll of the He111 perfectly, as it could attack strategic and operational targets, leaving the Ju88/188 for CAS and tactical attacks, with some operation bombardment if necessary. Of course the HE177 wasn't ready, so the He111 soldiered on past its prime. Nevertheless the unique circumstances of the Eastern Front meant they were useful up until 1944, so I don't see the investment in them as wasted.

 

[Catspoke]

Fuel build up links:
(this is where your light fast Ju88 as level bomber helps, less weight, less fuel, of course higher speed = more fuel usually, would the HE111 use less fuel than a Ju88????)

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/AAF-Luftwaffe-7.html

Unexpectedly high stocks captured in Italy in 1943 also helped in early 1944.[SIZE=-1]35[/SIZE] In fact, over the winter of 1943-44, the Germans built up aircraft fuel reserves for the first time since 1941. From a reserve of 33,786 tons in November 1943, the special reserve had grown to 119,738 tons by May 1944.

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-c/2012/2012-3/2012_3_11_parramore-E.pdf

Fuel scarcity became
evident when Germany rationed fuel from late 1940 through the​

spring of 1941 to build up stocks for Operation Barbarossa.

5 Concerned

about the lack of fuel, Gen Walter Warlimont, head of the German military’s
operations staff, in June 1941 wrote “War Potential 1942,” a paper
in which he declared that the “oil supply will be one of the weakest points of our economy;​

​

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Fuel build up links:
(this is where your light fast Ju88 as level bomber helps, less weight, less fuel, of course higher speed = more fuel usually, would the HE111 use less fuel than a Ju88????)

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/AAF-Luftwaffe-7.html

Yes, the He111 used less fuel to bring the same bomb load the same or greater distance than the Ju88.

Unexpectedly high stocks captured in Italy in 1943 also helped in early 1944.[SIZE=-1]35[/SIZE] In fact, over the winter of 1943-44, the Germans built up aircraft fuel reserves for the first time since 1941. From a reserve of 33,786 tons in November 1943, the special reserve had grown to 119,738 tons by May 1944.

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-c/2012/2012-3/2012_3_11_parramore-E.pdf

Fuel scarcity became
evident when Germany rationed fuel from late 1940 through the​

spring of 1941 to build up stocks for Operation Barbarossa.

5 Concerned

about the lack of fuel, Gen Walter Warlimont, head of the German military’s
operations staff, in June 1941 wrote “War Potential 1942,” a paper
in which he declared that the “oil supply will be one of the weakest points of our economy;​

​

Thanks for the links. Looking at them though they all seem to be later in the war, that is later than the period in which you state they were cutting sortees to build up fuel stocks. I'll read them carefully when I get some more time, but I'm not sure if they have a bearing on 1940-1.

Still the comments about rationing oil to build up for Barbarossa still doesn't indicate that they were limiting Luftwaffe sortees to do so. The build up of fuel reserves of the Luftwaffe prior to Barbarossa may have been achieved by increasing output relative to consumption, as output was constantly going up until the Allies bombed Germany's fuel production, and the huge amounts of fuel captured in 1940 in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, some of it from what the British left behind when they fled the continent. Italy too also gave Germany much of her fuel stocks in 1940-1 as they increased their cooperation so could jointly dole it out as needed, which had the effect of incapacitating the Italian fleet.