Hawker Hurricane thin wing
- Thread starter Just Leo
- Start date
Was the Vulture really all that pleasant? I was under the impression that its early development ran into a number of problems such as the cooling system airlocking and ceasing working, bearing and con-rod failures, and a disturbing tenancy for it to overheat and the coolant to catch fore. Now the first was an easy fix, the latter was more down to Avro's engine nacelle design but the middle required some work and was eventually fixed by drilling some large extra bolts through to connect the two halves. I can understand why Freeman might back the Sabre since to begin with you don't want to bet the farm on just one option hence the two competing designs, and although the Vulture was eventually fixed, but not before picking up a rather bad reputation, at the time it looked as though the Sabre was the easier option.
Been doing some reading on the various British engines to try and figure out the various design and development paths and see if there was anywhere the British development programme could be rationalised. The three main companies seem to be Rolls-Royce, Napier & Son, and Bristol.
- Rolls-Royce were apparently looking around for a replacement for the Vulture, it was essentially old Kestrel technology of two of them being bolted back to back around a common crankshaft, as early as 1937 so what if they stopped working on it at the end of 1938? With the Sabre being favoured the Air Ministry tells Rolls-Royce to continue with developing the Merlin into further variants and put all the rest of their attention on the Griffon. IIRC Hives started developing the 'new' Griffon at about this time but now it would have full official backing.
- Napier's Sabre is something of a bugger. The best I can come up with for it is to somehow encourage English Electric to take the company over sooner to help deal with the production issues and to lean on Bristol to get them to share their solution for the sleeve valve problem, centreless grinding, sooner. IIRC the Air Ministry asked nicely only for the Bristol to refuse as they considered it a company secret. Only way I can see to beat some sense into them is for the Ministry to play hardball and threaten to blacklist the company with never getting any more government work again as long as they live, which considering how the Air Ministry could hold a grudge wouldn't be seen as an idle threat.
- For Bristol themselves the largest improvement that I can see would be to stop working on the Taurus and concentrate solely on the Hercules. Then if you can get that out the door as quickly as possible turn to developing the Centaurus. Considering that it first ran in mid-1938 and type-tested at 2,000 hp in 1939 it seems the perfect fit for Hawker's Hurricane replacement and any of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm aircraft.
Not from what I've seen. It seems to have mostly been introduction of a simple flow restrictor in the form of Miss Shilling's orifice, IIRC a slight re-design of where fuel entered the carburettor, and then later on the use of the Bendix-Stromberg pressure carburettor.
After you've read hundreds of reports, and sifted through facts and opinions based on interpretation of facts, and just opinions based on feelings, you get to feeling like you almost know something, but will never know why, because you never get the whole picture from everyone's perspective, and never will.
Now, my opinion. The Merlin was a great engine, wholeheartedly developed by some of the greatest engineers using some of the latest in engineering and materials technology, with a few critical lapses which took time. The Griffon followed the same course, and took benefit from the Merlin's success. The Vulture seemed to come from a different planet, being two Peregrines, Kestrels reborn. Bearings failed because of, not poor materials, but not extra special materials, unable to be cooled by lack of cooled lubricant capacity, fixable only with greater capacity pump and oil passages allowing for increased volume. This failure was exacerbated by its use on the Manchester aircraft, which greatly stressed the engines carrying a bombload to altitude, which took too long for an engine with thermal limitations. The engine, when installed on the Tornado, showed no such problem, because the stress wasn't there. The only lack was sufficient power to meet the specification for speed.
Bristol did lend technical assistance in the design of the Sabre, and lent Taurus tooling for its manufacture. It was a great and largely wasted effort in the end. The Sabre was capable of hyper performance, but the finale always was a giant fireball in the sky. Somewhere on google, there is a anti-diver comparison of Tempest V, Spitfire XIV and Mustang III aircraft. Considering the hoopla about the Tempest's performance with Sabre powerplant, it seems to justify its replacement by Tempest II with Centaurus. Did the Centaurus really type-test that early? They were also readily burning until very late in the war. The lethargic development of the Hercules was another disappointment, considering its post-war performance, post exposure to a FW-190's BMW engine. The Bendix-Stromberg carb was available in the mid-1930s. Bosch direct injection turned a few heads. British industry held on to old, poor tradition in a few critical fields just a little too long.
On the question of supercharging, Hooker was the man. Not only brilliant, but also willing and able to take foreign ideas of great merit and adopt and adapt. He should have graduated sooner.
According to Bill Gunston's World Encyclopaedia of Aero Engines it did. Didn't know about the burning part. What if anything got in the way of their working on the Hercules and from that Centaurus? Was it just working on the Taurus, lack of Ministry support, or something else?
That early? Don't know why but I thought it was much later around the start of the war. Why no-one looked into it I don't know, guess it was just general industry conservatism and no-one - be it the Air Ministry, the RAF, or the manufacturers - seeing much of a need.
Agreed, I read his autobiography Not Much of An Engineer a few months back. It's surprising how much of the improvement of the Merlin was down to the supercharger and associated kit that he delivered.
Taurus was one of the early engines to see service and needed development. With the loss of some tooling and availability of P&W engines of superior performance and reliability, such need vanished overnight. For what it's worth, the Perseus was an original sleeve valve entry, and seems to have been the Cinderella with regard to improvement, until it was fitted with Centaurus cylinders, long after anyone wanted it. The Bristol cousins, none technically oriented, were in charge, and never wrote a tell-all book that I know of.
As for why no pressure carbs, why no constant speed props? Rolls Royce was originally against direct injection because they believed the carb provided charge cooling which was deemed an advantage. That the most powerful Merlins had direct injection leads me to believe there are mitigating factors.
La Rouge Beret
Donor
The wing span appears to be significantly larger... I wonder how this improved Hurricane would fare against the Me - 109 E?
Appearance may be deceiving, since the span is less. The size of the wing overall is greater, at this point, than is required for optimal performance, being based on the much heavier Sea Fury, but I wouldn't presume to impose too much on Sir Sydney to design a smaller wing. The large wing would prove beneficial, as did the Spitfire's wing, to the adapting of larger and heavier engines, as well as the carriage of various war-related equipment.
I would suspect that its performance against the Bf-109 would be much improved, all other things being equal, and capable of being a bit superior if further improvements, done later, were done sooner. If the Hurricane is still considered the Colonial Fighter of choice, the performance advantage would be even more telling in places like Singapore and Ceylon, Malta, Greece and the Western Desert. I can improve performance considerably against the Bf-109 in France by using modern propellers, mixed glycol and 100 octane fuel, but the POD is limited to proper wind tunnel data, not wishful thinking.
I would suspect that its performance against the Bf-109 would be much improved, all other things being equal, and capable of being a bit superior if further improvements, done later, were done sooner. If the Hurricane is still considered the Colonial Fighter of choice, the performance advantage would be even more telling in places like Singapore and Ceylon, Malta, Greece and the Western Desert. I can improve performance considerably against the Bf-109 in France by using modern propellers, mixed glycol and 100 octane fuel, but the POD is limited to proper wind tunnel data, not wishful thinking.
Nice illustration of your proposal.
Why not improve the canopy as well, for better visibility? Structurally, maybe, you may not get it to Spitfire levels, but surely there's wiggle room for change? (I've looked at cutaway illustrations of the Hurricane).
The illustration of the Hurricane is the prototype, approximately, including some immediate changes. The drawing was based on a later version, with modification. This later version will be released some time, depending on how much trouble I wish to go to for replicating original colours. A preliminary bubble canopy is in place on a subsequent version. The original installation was very ugly, and I can't have that.
Structurally, the Spitfire wing level of complexity in structure gave a 2% advantage in performance at a cost of building difficulty and impaired serviceability. The all-metal Hurricane wing was a part of most Hurricanes by the BoB, and was not at variance in ease of construction with the new wing, although the blisters over the Hispano cannons will be larger. Re-arranging the rear fuselage construction will come as a natural factor in the installation of heavier engines, both two-stage Merlins and single-stage Griffons. As it is, metal coverage is extended farther to the rear for servicing the relocated radio, and flare tube, moved to allow increased fuel tank volume.
Half-way measure. The Miles M.20 was my inspiration, but not exactly as is. Timely and with available technology, and not requiring an exterior rear-view mirror.
Driftless
Donor
Your next assignment, Mr. Phelps, should you choose to accept it: bring the Miles M.20, or if you prefer the Martin-Baker MB.3 to life.
The improved Hurricane was an nifty idea.Your next assignment, Mr. Phelps, should you choose to accept it: bring the Miles M.20, or if you prefer the Martin-Baker MB.3 to life.
The M.20's weakness was a less than developed wing. I have previously released somewhere a wing designed by De Havilland using a perfunctory Yak undercarriage because it used neat inner doors. A fine alternative would be to borrow the wings from the Gloster F5/34, which I haven't done, although I have mated them to the Hurricane. It's a shame to waste a very good wing. There is insufficient construction detail to determine their adaptability to wing folding.
I contacted Mr. Phelps, and he sent me a doodle of the MB4, shown here. He could have sent me more, but he said he was busy putting out some kind of fire. Had the MB.4 with Griffon engine, precluded the MB.3, Capt Valentine Baker might have grown old enough to retire to a Yorkshire cottage.
The Hurricane went to war. It shot down a handful of aircraft over the North Sea, and it went to Norway aboard a Glorious carrier, where it failed to change history, and landed back on deck. Although all the aircraft were lost, as well as most of the crew, this ability was found to be significant in the course of events.
In France, the Hurricane was found to be amenable to operating out of pastures, although their fixed-pitch props weren't the best thing for rapid take-offs under enemy attack with no warning. Communications were poor and the early warning system non existent. The public telephone system could be counted on to get a warning through as a raid was passing over. Where radios existed, generators to charge batteries did not. At least, no structures could be attacked, since there were none. Missions were arranged, and some successes were achieved against enemy aircraft. The first trials of cannon armed Hurris were good and bad. On May 12, Hurris of 87 squadron jumped some Bf-109E-1s near Liege and shot down two piloted by some unknown Germans named Galland and Rodel. Another two were shot down May 20, green pilots just learning the ropes, named Rall and Barkhorn. Over Neufchatel, on June 8, Klaus Mietusch was downed and killed by a 20mm shell. It was a losing battle, since there seemed no purpose and direction, with nobody knowing what was going on. The Battle and Blenheim squadrons were decimated and ceased to exist, since there was no co-ordination with massed fighter cover. Those escort fighters which were there were too busy maintaining close vic formations, too busy to spot the hun in the sun. Some pilots, not too pissed off about having to crap into a hole in the ground back at the "base" began to think about tactics, and formations. If they mentioned proposed revisions to their commanders, they would be told that the book on tactics and formations has been written and they should learn it. With the loss of their commanders in battle using the old tactics, some of these men became the new acting commander. It was a start.
In France, the Hurricane was found to be amenable to operating out of pastures, although their fixed-pitch props weren't the best thing for rapid take-offs under enemy attack with no warning. Communications were poor and the early warning system non existent. The public telephone system could be counted on to get a warning through as a raid was passing over. Where radios existed, generators to charge batteries did not. At least, no structures could be attacked, since there were none. Missions were arranged, and some successes were achieved against enemy aircraft. The first trials of cannon armed Hurris were good and bad. On May 12, Hurris of 87 squadron jumped some Bf-109E-1s near Liege and shot down two piloted by some unknown Germans named Galland and Rodel. Another two were shot down May 20, green pilots just learning the ropes, named Rall and Barkhorn. Over Neufchatel, on June 8, Klaus Mietusch was downed and killed by a 20mm shell. It was a losing battle, since there seemed no purpose and direction, with nobody knowing what was going on. The Battle and Blenheim squadrons were decimated and ceased to exist, since there was no co-ordination with massed fighter cover. Those escort fighters which were there were too busy maintaining close vic formations, too busy to spot the hun in the sun. Some pilots, not too pissed off about having to crap into a hole in the ground back at the "base" began to think about tactics, and formations. If they mentioned proposed revisions to their commanders, they would be told that the book on tactics and formations has been written and they should learn it. With the loss of their commanders in battle using the old tactics, some of these men became the new acting commander. It was a start.