Harsher Prague Peace?

[Eurofed]

From France? Louis-Napoléon will look to rebuild his ties to Italy; after all it was the French who essentially gave the Italians their independence from the Hapsburg Austrians during the Campagne d'Italie. French recognition of Italian influence in Tunisia isn't out of the question, though 1860s-1870s would seem to be a bit premature for this, but the idea of the French handing over Corsica to the Italians, or further that the Italians deserved the island, isn't something that's going to be accepted under any regime in Paris. Most likely you're going to get some trade deals, French recognition of Italian colonial claims (if the Italians can prove they can enforce them), and likely some sort of agreement, just short of an alliance, regarding defensive cooperation; whether that's against the Turks in the Mediterranean and North Africa, against the Hungarians along the Dalmatian coast, or against the Germans. Once Austria is absorbed into greater Germany Paris will have a much easier time playing off Germany as another incarnation of the Reich; with all that that implies for Italy.

Unfeasible in the late 1860s. Napoleon III cannot afford to lose the support of the French Catholics by dropping the Pope, and Italy won't make any alliance with France as long as Paris props up the Papal State. Rome acts as a wedge between France and Italy, spoiling any good will Italy may still feel for the the Second War of Independence that the "betrayal" of Villafranca has not spoiled already.

ITTL full success in 1866 makes Prussia and Italy mutually willing to continue an alliance which works (and proved more successful than the previous one with France). Everything else you mention that France may offer to Italy, Rome may get just as better through the partnership with Prussia/Germany. ITTL the demise of Austria removes any potential antagonism from an Italo-German alliance, which otherwise has complementary strategic interests (while France and Italy are rivals in the Mediterranean). Moreover, Italian annexation of Nice, Savoy, and Corsica shall create a revanchist-irredentist antagonism between the two nations, just like A-L between France and Germany.

 

[wolf_brother]

Bismarck is a pragmatist. If events in 1866 force him to impose an harsher peace on Austria, he's going to comply and adapt his plans to that. He's certainly not going to fall from power because he's overruled on such a relatively minor issue. After all, he was overruled over Alsace-Lorraine nad his prestige was not harmed in any significant way. If Italy performs well in 1866 and remains an ally, Prussia/Germany needs a detente with a weaker Austria much less, so less reason for Otto to advocate a lenient peace.

As it concerns France, we have to look at the broader picture. Napoleon III's whole strategy in the 1860s was to favor a partial and limited victory of Prussia and Sardinia-Piedmont, and of German and Italian nationalism, that would destroy Austrian supremacy in Germany and Italy, replacing it with a system where France would be the dominant influence. But those forces have turned out to be much more successful than expected (ITTL even more so than IOTL) and are apparently evolving towards the creation of strong united Germany and Italy which would end French supremacy in Western Europe. ITTL, Prussia and Italy remain allied, which makes the strategic threat to French interests even worse.

Napoleon III cannot afford this to happen. In a few years, a series of diplomatic crises are going to arise (Luxemburg, Rome, the Spanish Succession) where Napoleon cannot afford to compromise, and due to the success of 1866, Prussia and Italy shall be less willing to compromise than OTL. The French support to the Pope makes a satisfying compromise between France and Italy impossible (and ITTL, the alliance with Prussia looks more advantageous to Italy anyway). Napoleon is such a (poor) statesman that he can be expected to blunder, overreact, and miscalculate in a crisis, he's overestimating French military power, and he has even more temptation than OTL to try and and solve this strategic gordian knot with war.

Which one of the potential flashpoints (Rome, Luxemburg, Spanish Succession) becomes the pretext for war is ultimately irrelevant, even if there may easily be no Ems Dispatch ITTL. Last but not least, if Prussia and Italy remain allied, the Savoia candidature to the throne of Spain is just as threatening to France as the Hohenzollern one, which makes the Spanish Succession crisis even more likely to end in a war, if it has not already happened over Rome and/or Luxemburg.

An earlier war will favor France though, with less time for the monarchists Senate to reduce France's war footing through deep budgetary cuts and office corps pruning. Hell, ITTL Louis-Napoléon may began to move back towards enlightened despotism and the Senate may never be given the reigns of power, meaning France's military is significantly larger and better prepared by the time one of your flashpoints goes off. With a more threatening Hohenzollern Prussia and Italy wavering in her allegiance Louis-Napoléon likely never embarks on his Mexican Adventure, so that's another 40k troops, material, financial assets, and international prestige in his pocket.

I'm not saying that a war isn't likely, but its wrong to simply assume it happens, even wronger to assume it happens as per OTL, and finally its flat-out dead wrong to assume that ITTL follows IOTL completely parallel for parallel. If there's a war its not going to be the Franco-Prussian War or an analogue, and you're not going to see some sort of great Germano-Italian union dominating the continent and vanquishing France without lifting a finger.

That's not even taking into consideration butterflies and how things are affect in Britain, Russia, Turkey, hell how Hungary develops as an independent entity. Italy at least is going to continue to maintain her irredentist claims on the now Magyar Dalmatian coast. A Berlin-Rome axis could very possible be countered by a Paris-Budapest one.

And five years, or so, is more than enough time for butterflies to spread outside of Europe, affect something elsewhere, and have butterflies from that event spread back into Europe and change things even further. As I've been saying, you can't assume that ITTL will be IOTL+.

 

[wolf_brother]

Unfeasible in the late 1860s. Napoleon III cannot afford to lose the support of the French Catholics by dropping the Pope, and Italy won't make any alliance with France as long as Paris props up the Papal State. Rome acts as a wedge between France and Italy, spoiling any good will Italy may still feel for the the Second War of Independence that the "betrayal" of Villafranca has not spoiled already.

ITTL full success in 1866 makes Prussia and Italy mutually willing to continue an alliance which works (and proved more successful than the previous one with France). Everything else you mention that France may offer to Italy, Rome may get just as better through the partnership with Prussia/Germany. ITTL the demise of Austria removes any potential antagonism from an Italo-German alliance, which otherwise has complementary strategic interests (while France and Italy are rivals in the Mediterranean). Moreover, Italian annexation of Nice, Savoy, and Corsica shall create a revanchist-irredentist antagonism between the two nations, just like A-L between France and Germany.

Granted; however Louis-Napoléon could accept a Pope who maintained his spiritual powers while his temporal ones were subsumed to the Italian state; as most liberal nationalists in 1866 were clamoring for. Though French arbitration Rome, and possibly a reduced Latium, could receive some level of autonomy within Italy as long as a) the metropolis was the Italian capitol, and b) the Pope swore off his temporary powers outside of Rome. Both of these things are well within reach in 1866; Pius' level of control in the Papal States had largely been reduced to the metropolis by that late of a date as is, and Rome as the capitol of Italy was a purely non-debated items; conservatives, moderates, liberals, and radicals all agreed on that point, and had since even before the 1848 Revolutions.

That's but one option on the table still in 1866. Again, you can't and really shouldn't simply assume that everything ITTL will happen as per IOTL. Things happen in history for a reason, and if you make a sudden, large, change - like destroying the Hapsburg empire - then everything that had relied on pressure from that fact historically now has that pressure removed, and suddenly other options are far more likely to occur than those that happened in our timeline. Some things are apart of larger movements; Franco-German antagonism as the two fought for mastery of Europe was too set by the 1860s to change with one event, but that doesn't mean an out-and-out conflict must take place, or take place immediately, or result in the same results as per OTL. You make far too many assumptions with incomplete data.

 

[Eurofed]

An earlier war will favor France though, with less time for the monarchists Senate to reduce France's war footing through deep budgetary cuts and office corps pruning. Hell, ITTL Louis-Napoléon may began to move back towards enlightened despotism and the Senate may never be given the reigns of power, meaning France's military is significantly larger and better prepared by the time one of your flashpoints goes off. With a more threatening Hohenzollern Prussia and Italy wavering in her allegiance Louis-Napoléon likely never embarks on his Mexican Adventure, so that's another 40k troops, material, financial assets, and international prestige in his pocket.

Conceded about the quite possible (but not certain by any means) butterflies in the French political system. About the Mexican Intervention, sorry, but you are wrong. A PoD in the Seven Weeks' War or slightly earlier won't significantly affect it. It was already coming to an end, with the French pulling out, in 1866, so its effects on France have already unfolded.

 

[Eurofed]

Granted; however Louis-Napoléon could accept a Pope who maintained his spiritual powers while his temporal ones were subsumed to the Italian state; as most liberal nationalists in 1866 were clamoring for. Though French arbitration Rome, and possibly a reduced Latium, could receive some level of autonomy within Italy as long as a) the metropolis was the Italian capitol, and b) the Pope swore off his temporary powers outside of Rome. Both of these things are well within reach in 1866; Pius' level of control in the Papal States had largely been reduced to the metropolis by that late of a date as is, and Rome as the capitol of Italy was a purely non-debated items; conservatives, moderates, liberals, and radicals all agreed on that point, and had since even before the 1848 Revolutions.

ROTFL. No compromise of this sort is remotely possible with ultra-reactionary Pope Pius IX of Syllabus fame at the helm. The guy could not even accept Italian rule in the territories liberated in 1859-61, much less making a compromise that would threaten his autocratic rule in Latium and Rome itself. He never accepted any kind of compromise with liberalism or Italian unification movement. He would not be driven to give up any inch of his temporal power short of armed force, and Napoleon III can't politically afford to let him be forcibly overthrown.

 

[Eurofed]

More in general, I cannot share your apparent trust that Napoleon III, and France under his helm, can avoid the catasthrophe coming their way with any kind of 'easy' butterflies. He was a deeply flawed statesman, prone to diplomatic blunders, overconfident, hapzard projects, overreactions, and mistaken assumptions. The PoD and event sequence I proposed stakes the deck against him and his regime, and when faced with a greater challenge than OTL, they may be most likely expected to screw up more or at least as bad, not less, than OTL.

Moreover, to plead that butterflies can still cause more or less everything we fancy whatever the PoD is effectively to say that we can't predict anything about alt-history, and for the record I do not give any serious credence to the theory that history is higly chaotic, since there are always background grand trends that limit the effect of butterflies, and parallels do happen. Can a vast number of 1860s PoDs cause Napoleon III to win the Franco-Prussian War, or prevent the war from happen, or keep Italy more friendly than OTL towards the end of the decade ? Certainly. However none of them seem especially likely to arise as butterflies from this scenario. E.g. if ITTL Napoleon keeps enlightened despotism longer, he may cause a greater build-up of domestic discontent, driving him to seek popularity from further military adventures. Of he may blunder in even more diplomatic mishaps, e.g. a more blatant land-grab attempt on Belgium, which alienates Britain even more than OTL, and forces France to divert some forces to ward against possible British hostility.

 

[wolf_brother]

Conceded about the quite possible (but not certain by any means) butterflies in the French political system. About the Mexican Intervention, sorry, but you are wrong. A PoD in the Seven Weeks' War or slightly earlier won't significantly affect it. It was already coming to an end, with the French pulling out, in 1866, so its effects on France have already unfolded.

Agree on the uncertainty of the matter, which is why I feel so strongly that its wrong to assume that a Franco-Prussian War must happen, and that it must happen as per IOTL.

Thank you for the correction; I don't know why I thought otherwise. This brings up an interesting point; what is the affect in Mexico, and perhaps inadvertently in post-Civil War America due to the POD and butterflies emigrating (sometimes quite literally) out of Europe.

ROTFL. No compromise of this sort is remotely possible with ultra-reactionary Pope Pius IX of Syllabus fame at the helm. The guy could not even accept Italian rule in the territories liberated in 1859-61, much less making a compromise that would threaten his autocratic rule in Latium and Rome itself. He never accepted any kind of compromise with liberalism or Italian unification movement. He would not be driven to give up any inch of his temporal power short of armed force, and Napoleon III can't politically afford to let him be forcibly overthrown.

Pius' reactionary streak is over-played, IMHO. As well our POD is before the 1867 republican attempts to storm the city, so the hope of a reconciliation is still there.

More in general, I cannot share your apparent trust that Napoleon III, and France under his helm, can avoid the catasthrophe coming their way with any kind of 'easy' butterflies. He was a deeply flawed statesman, prone to diplomatic blunders, overconfident, hapzard projects, overreactions, and mistaken assumptions. The PoD and event sequence I proposed stakes the deck against him and his regime, and when faced with a greater challenge than OTL, they may be most likely expected to screw up more or at least as bad, not less, than OTL.

I agree, in general, with your assessment of Louis-Napoléon; however once again depending on the exact sequence of events, which are highly unlikely to be as per OTL or even paralleling OTL, his empire could endure.

Moreover, to plead that butterflies can still cause more or less everything we fancy whatever the PoD is effectively to say that we can't predict anything about alt-history [...]

This is not what I am saying at all.

What I am stating is that you are wrong in your assumption that history will continue on unchanged from the POD, and, ignoring all butterflies and different possibilities, come to the same or near-enough to be the same outcome.

Can a vast number of 1860s PoDs cause Napoleon III to win the Franco-Prussian War, or prevent the war from happen, or keep Italy more friendly than OTL towards the end of the decade ? Certainly. However none of them seem especially likely to arise as butterflies from this scenario. E.g. if ITTL Napoleon keeps enlightened despotism longer, he may cause a greater build-up of domestic discontent, driving him to seek popularity from further military adventures. Of he may blunder in even more diplomatic mishaps, e.g. a more blatant land-grab attempt on Belgium, which alienates Britain even more than OTL, and forces France to divert some forces to ward against possible British hostility.

Granted, but at least now we are discussing alternate history and weighing the likelihood and pros/cons of various interactions and results instead of playing the well-worn record of OTL.

With that being said Louis-Napoléon, for all his faults, had the unique and highly helpful ability to charm anyone, and everyone, he encountered. The liklihood of a British-German alliance of convenience against France in some Belgium affair is highly unlikely considering Louis-Napoléon's strong and personal relationship with Queen Victoria.

 

[victoria944]

A) Corsica - Napoleons birthplace - Napoleon III cant hand it over to Italy.

B) "The demise of Austria removes any potential antagonism from an Italo-German alliance", if Italys ambitions regarding Austria are satisfied, Italy has less reason for alliance with Prussia. In the real time line Italy was no longer interested in an alliance with Prussia after 1866.

C) Italy without Rome as its capital is unthinkable, this is a stumbling block to a French Italian alliance.

D) However, Italy and/or France may well be tempted by rich pickings in the Eastern Meditteranean. They may find some sort of cooperative stance unavoidable, v Britain, v Ottomans.

E) Napoleon III has an over blown sense of French capabilities, and he has to dominate the Rhine area, it's strategically Frances most important concern. Whatever happens to Austria, whatever Italy does or doesn't do, whatever the alliances, he has at some point to challenge Prussia on the Rhine, and assert French dominance there, or France can never again be the dominant power in Europe. Napoleon III is likely to want to do it sooner than later.

F) "The liklihood of a British-German alliance of convenience against France in some Belgium affair is highly unlikely considering Louis-Napoléon's strong and personal relationship with Queen Victoria". Well strong personal relationships didn't stop WW1. If N apoleon III is drawn into siezing Belgium, Britain is definately going to be concerned. True that doesn't mean an alliance with Germany/Prussia, but it is going to at least be a wedge between Anglo-Franco cooperation.

 

[LordKalvan]

A worse Austrian defeat, leading to a military collapse and a harsher Peace of Prague is most likely going to start an event chain that causes the political collapse and partition of the Habsburg empire. However it is in all likelihood going to happen in a few years since the war (say within a decade) rather than immediately during the conflict. In 1866, conditions are not yet fully conductive: Germany has not formed yet, the serious obstacle of France has not been removed yet, and Prussia-Italy could not or would not afford a two-front war.

Picture this broad event sequence:

1866: Prussian victory at Sadowa, Italian victory at Custoza. Emboldened Prussia and Italy make maximum demands (all Irredentist claims for Italy; Saxony and Bohemia-Moravia for Prussia). Napoleon III makes pro-Austrian diplomatic pressures (backed by threat of military intervention), Prussia and Italy, unwilling to face a two-front war, accept a compromise. The Peace of Prague awards Prussia OTL gains, Saxony, Austrian Silesia, and northern-eastern Sudetenland, and gives Italy Veneto, Trento, and Gorizia-Gradisca. Prussia and Italy are satisfied with the outcome of the war, pissed off with France, and reaffirm their alliance. The peace allows Austria to avoid immediate political collapse, but the humiliation destabilizes the Empire. Prussia creates the North German Federation.

1867-70: growing tensions between Prussia-Italy and France lead to war, out of various possible issues (Luxemburg, Rome, the Spanish Succession) where compromise proves impossible. The Italo-Prussian alliance wins a decisive victory. Destabilization of Austria deepens: Austrian Germans experience a massive upsurge of Pan-German feelings (heightened by the Franco-Prussian/Italian War), the Hungarians make bold demans that make the Ausgleich compromise insufficient or impossible, the Czechs, Croats, and the remaining Italians get restive, too.

1871-74: The German Empire is created. defeated France is forced to make peace: the treaty of Frankfurt cedes Alsace-Lorraine to Germany; Nice, Savoy, and Corsica to Italy. France recognizes Tunisia in the Italian sphere of influence and pays heavy reparations. Further cessions of French colonies to Germany-Italy are possible. Internal tensions in the Austrian Empire reach the tipping point: the Hungarians secede, there is a Pan-German uprising in German Austria. The neighbor great powers organize the partition of the Habsburg lands: Germany gets German Austria, South Tyrol, Czechia, and Slovenia; Italy gets istria and Dalmatia; Russia gets Galicia and Bukovina; independent Hungary keeps the Lands of St. Stephen and a confederal union with Croatia-Slavonia.

In principle, I do agree with the timetable: with a better Italian performance in 1866, it is almost a given that the Italo-Prussian alliance will be continued.
I am quite sceptical on the real possibility of harsher Prussian demands at the peace table in Prague: first of all, Prussia has already gotten very significant land advantages out of the war (Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein and other minor territories annexed outright, and Saxony forced into the North German Confederation), and has to digest them without creating too many ripples. Taking Bohemia-Moravia (even if possible) might be more of a problem than an opportunity, at least in the immediate: there is no "German Empire" in 1866 and I would be at a loss to imagine a political frame where it could be put in; even annexing the Sudetenland might be too much. In second place it is important for Bismarck to get a peace signed as soon as possible, and while all other players are still stunned by the quickness of Prussian victory: Nappy has clearly misjudged the duration of the war and is just trying to muddle his way along (while it would have been in his interest to mobilise as soon as the declaration of war became public, if not even earlier than that - the Italo-Prussian diplomatic dance was not really an impenetrable secret: if one wants a proof that the guy was a wannabe this is it), Russia was friendly to Prussia (in particular after the support received during the Polish insurrection) but if the Austrians really implode, the czar might be tempted to take a bite and this would open a different can of worms. IMHO the benefits of a quick peace are much greater than the risks of going for some other not-so-significant annexations. Therefore I do believe that Bismarck made the right call for the particular moment. Btw, the short duration of the war works also against a sudden implosion of the Habsburg's domain: it would take time for the centrifugal forces in the empire to organise and act and, as far as the German nationalist component is concerned, they lack focus.

IMHO, a war between France and Prussia/NG Confederation is also a given, and cannot be delayed too long. In the 15 odd years since Nappy took the French crown the European situation has changed dramatically, and certainly not to the benefit of France. In Italy the Habsburgs have been expelled, but instead of a scenario where France could play a significant role as mentor and protector of mid-sized kingdoms a single unitary kingdom not only has been established, but has also proven that they could go forward and complete the unification process without French support and even against French desires. Even worse the Roman question is preventing him from gaining at least the benefit of a grateful Italy: Nappy's power base is among the catholics, so he cannot ditch the pope, but at the same time he cannot convince Pius IX to make a step back and compromise, much less convince Italy to renounce to Rome. In the Germanies the previous scenario featuring two major powers at odds with each other and a handful of other independent states has been wiped away, and replaced by a North German Confederation fully controlled by Prussia, with Austria removed as a player and the still independent southern German states cowed by the Prussian victory. Once again this has happened against his wishes and it is a monument to the failure of his diplomacy, in particular the repeated attempts to forge an alliance with Austria. His diplomatic space has also been restricted by the bad relations with Russia - the repression of the Polish insurrection was once again carried out notwithstanding the protests of France. He'll certainly try to purchase Luxembourg TTL too, but there is no reason why Prussia would wish to be more generous than OTL, nor there is any reason why the conference of Powers should be more sympathetic to France. The Roman question is not going away: if anything, Italy has come out significantly better from the 1866 war, so they will be more proactive toward this final acquisition. The Spanish succession is also an issue which cannot be postponed: ITTL the choice between a Hohenzollern or a Savoia on the throne of Madrid is not an acceptable one for France. In a few years Nappy's back will be against the wall: either he rolls up and shows his belly or he has to go for a war. My feeling is that 1867 and 1868 will be mostly taken up by the Luxembourg shenanigans, the Hungarian Ausgleich (or at least an attempt to patch up the relations between Austrians and Hungarians - but ITTL there is no guarantee this will work) and the diplomatic negotiations about the Spanish throne. By late 1868 Nappy will have lost the chance to buy Luxembourg, and will have to harden his position on the other issues (don't tell me he'll try and invade Belgium: if there were a remote possibility to make the French position worse this would be it). In the meantime he'll have tried to forge an alliance with Austria and Italy against the NCG: Italy will refuse, and most likely the same will be the Austrian answer (unless von Beust prevails against all odds, but the Hungarians would certainly be very unhappy). On the Prussian side, the peace treaties and reassurances with Bavaria etc. would be the same as OTL, and the Russian counterguarantee would be in place. The war has to come either in late spring 1869 or late spring 1870, and ITTL the spark might be an Italian occupation of Rome.

There is really no reason to anticipate a different outcome: while I do not expect major breakthrough on the Franco-Italian border, given the constraints of geography, at least France will have to keep some troops there. There is also no real reason to expect a faster French mobilization than the did in 1870. So the war will end up in a French defeat, the German empire will be proclaimed and Italy will get some (or all) of their claims.

The problem with this scenario is that now the German-speaking component of A-H has a lodestar, and the pan-German nationalism will surge. There can be different ways to play the end game, including some forays into Bosnia to create support for the Habsburg regime, but I would not bet my money on A-H surviving past 1875.

 

[Max Sinister]

There were some thoughts to take some areas from Bavaria (Ansbach, Bayreuth, the Palatinate), but Bismarck used this only as a threat because Bavaria as an ally was worth more.

 

[victoria944]

The problem with this scenario is that now the German-speaking component of A-H has a lodestar, and the pan-German nationalism will surge. There can be different ways to play the end game, including some forays into Bosnia to create support for the Habsburg regime, but I would not bet my money on A-H surviving past 1875.

Apologies if i've not followed this thread with enough attention. But what is the lodestar you are reffering to. I can see A-H coming apart in a longer war with Prussia and Italy, with better Italian victories, tensions in Hungary. But what causes A-H disintegration in a short war. And why cant you see A-H surviving past 1875, Where does the surge in pan German Nationalism powerful enough to push German Austria to become part of Germany come from. The Prussian victory over France in 1870, isn't going to be any more astounding in a scenario where theres a harsher peace in 1866, than it was in the real events.

 

[LordKalvan]

Apologies if i've not followed this thread with enough attention. But what is the lodestar you are reffering to. I can see A-H coming apart in a longer war with Prussia and Italy, with better Italian victories, tensions in Hungary. But what causes A-H disintegration in a short war. And why cant you see A-H surviving past 1875, Where does the surge in pan German Nationalism powerful enough to push German Austria to become part of Germany come from. The Prussian victory over France in 1870, isn't going to be any more astounding in a scenario where theres a harsher peace in 1866, than it was in the real events.

It's not so much a "harsher peace" - which I find very unlikely - but rather the fact that ITTL the Austrains have been defeated on both fronts in 1866, and there is no fig-leaf for them (Venetia and what else they loose to Italy will have to be handed over directly, not through the intercession of Nappy).
This will have a very good effect on Italian self-esteem, and an equivalent bad effect on Austria's.

The Hungarians will ask a steeper price for the Ausgleich under these circumstances, and the Ausgleich may or may not be signed.

Then a few years later France is despatched with relative ease, and the German Empire is reborn. While in 1866 there was no reason for the German-speaking component of Austria to revolt, now there is an alternative, and possibly a very attractive one. So there will be a surge of pan-Germanism. The pan-Germanists can be suppressed with force by the police, but this would be likely to cause widespread riots, which could give the Hungarians some ideas. Alternatively the Habsburg might look for glory in Bosnia, and end up badly in different, interesting ways (and in any case the Hungarians will be unhappy). Throw in the economic crisis of early 1870 and you have all the ingredients for a big mess.

 

[victoria944]

Well those Habsburgs were messy eaters LOL

Are you talking of Hungary being a seperate kingdom, if not Austria may cling to Hungary more.

Not wishing to throw a spanner in the works.

But Bismarck excludes Austria from Germany. This was a Prusso centric goal rather than a Nationalist German goal.

I always feel that this muted Austro German nationalists to some degree, as they have no where to go, once Austria is excluded from Germany.

But what if part of the harsher peace is that Prussia demands the Austrian German lands join closer to a German Confederation. obviously jettisoning Galicia and Dalmatia. This could be the demand that lights Austro German nationalism.

 

[Eurofed]

A) Corsica - Napoleons birthplace - Napoleon III cant hand it over to Italy.

Well, if Italy is in a position to ask Corsica, Nizza, and Savoia, and Prussia/Germany to ask Elsass-Lotharingen, it means that France has been thoroughly defeated, the Italo-Prussians are besieging Paris, Lyon, and Marseilles, and Napoleon III is surely not emperor anymore.

B) "The demise of Austria removes any potential antagonism from an Italo-German alliance", if Italys ambitions regarding Austria are satisfied, Italy has less reason for alliance with Prussia. In the real time line Italy was no longer interested in an alliance with Prussia after 1866.

The reasons why the alliance between Prussia and Italy withered after 1866 are entirely related to OTL Italy's poor battlefield performance. After it, Italy did not dare risk being involved in another European war, and Prussia was not interested in keeping a weak ally. An Italian victory makes everything different: now Prussia shall be strongly interested in keeping a valuable ally, and Italy shall be emboldened to enforce its own irredentist claims in Rome, and the alliance with Berlin works fine to this scope.

I have to remember that IOTL, in a couple decades, Italy did join an alliance with Germany that was largely motivated by Franco-Italian stategic rivalry, last a long time, and only ultimately faltered because of the antagonism with Austria, the other member of the alliance. All instability within the Triple Alliance came from the Austro-Italian enmity, the relationship between Germany and Italy worked fine.

Honestly, I can't really grasp why some people assume France would be an especially good ally for Italy or the two powers should be expected to cozy up in this scenario. If anything, the two powers were strategic rivals and historical enemies, just like Austria and Italy. The two best potential alliances for 19th century Italy were Germany and Britain. There are certainly plenty of 19th century PoDs that may lead to a solid Italo-French alliance despite these starting conditions, but in all evidence this PoD is bound to have an opposite effect.

D) However, Italy and/or France may well be tempted by rich pickings in the Eastern Meditteranean. They may find some sort of cooperative stance unavoidable, v Britain, v Ottomans.

Well, it's always possible that two rivals in the same theater might agree to a mutually acceptable compromise to divide the spoils. But it defies reason to see why this ought to happen more likely than the alliance with another power that has different, complementary strategic interests that don't mess in the same theater. The Italo-German alliance may easily end up reaping the same benefits you imply by turning the Ottoman Empire in its own client, opening it up to their economic penetration, and earning British support and benevolence in the process.

 

[Eurofed]

But Bismarck excludes Austria from Germany. This was a Prusso centric goal rather than a Nationalist German goal.

I always feel that this muted Austro German nationalists to some degree, as they have no where to go, once Austria is excluded from Germany.

But what if part of the harsher peace is that Prussia demands the Austrian German lands join closer to a German Confederation. obviously jettisoning Galicia and Dalmatia. This could be the demand that lights Austro German nationalism.

Bismarck can certainly oppose the creation of Grossdeutchsland as long as the Habsurg empire remains a seemingly vital polity. Once it's clearly collapsing, though, and German Austrians are publicly petitioning to join the German Empire, he cannot politically afford to turn them out in the yes of the German public, when complete unification of the Fatherland looks so close at hand.

 

[TheNordicBrit]

While the idea of the Austrian Empire collapsing and being 'partitioned' between Russia, Italy, Germany and the new Hungarian Kingdom, how would Bismark have reacted to an Austrian collapse? As has been said in this thread before both Austria and Germany feared Slavic nationalism, might we see a German intervention to prop up Austria? Or would this not be an option etc?

 

[Eurofed]

While the idea of the Austrian Empire collapsing and being 'partitioned' between Russia, Italy, Germany and the new Hungarian Kingdom, how would Bismark have reacted to an Austrian collapse?

Sigh, smirk, and recognize that despite his personal misgivings, Grossdeutchsland is now inevitable; adapt to the new circumstances by organizing the international conference that shall organize and sanction the Habsburg partition; pretend to the German public that this was all part of his long-staged, cleverly-designed grand plan to unify the Fatherland (as he did IOTL, although he actually often reacted and adapted to events).

As has been said in this thread before both Austria and Germany feared Slavic nationalism, might we see a German intervention to prop up Austria? Or would this not be an option etc?

It may be an option, but only as long as Slav unrest is the main cause of the Habsburg internal instability. Not an option once Magyar separatism and moreso Pan-Germanism are a recognizable substantial element of the collapse. Bismarck cannot afford to be identified as an opposer of German unification. The German public may fairly easily accept an intervention in the Habsburg empire to suppress Czech or Croat separatism (especially the former). Not really if the Hungarians are the ones tho rebel (everyone can recognize that an independent Hungary paves the way to the union of Austria and Germany). Absolutely not if the uprising is Pan-Germanist.

Once Hungarians secede and/or Pan-Germans take over in German Austria and Bohemia-Moravia (one event shall surely cause the other after the German Empire exists) the empire is finished, and the partition is the only realistic option. At that point, to contain Slav nationalism shall become the job of the partitioning powers (and they shall be rather more effective at it than the Habsburg).

 

[wolf_brother]

There is really no reason to anticipate a different outcome: while I do not expect major breakthrough on the Franco-Italian border, given the constraints of geography, at least France will have to keep some troops there. There is also no real reason to expect a faster French mobilization than the did in 1870. So the war will end up in a French defeat, the German empire will be proclaimed and Italy will get some (or all) of their claims.

I agree with you up until the quoted passage and your analysis of a different outcome. The defeat of the Hapsburgs is going to have butterfly affects; namely Louis-Napoléon is less likely to relinquish his power over day-to-day affairs to the monarchists Senate. This has several affects. Firstly, the French military is likely to be in a much better position come the war between France and Germany; this won't be the Franco-Prussian War of IOTL, and even with Italian entrance into the war it won't be a cake-walk for the Germans. Secondly, without the Senate to fall back upon as Louis-Napoléon becomes older and weaker (his illness stemming from bladder stones isn't going to go away), the day-to-day running of the country will increasing fall to Eugénie as Regent. Now this could mean many things; Eugénie was a hardliner on both the Roman Question and vis-à-vis Germany. With that being said however she was also, ultimately, far more shrewd and wiser than Louis-Napoléon. This could mean a rather lighter touch in foreign affairs for France until Eugénie the moment was ripe, at which point France would strike. On the other hand her hand could be forced by events elsewhere, especially if Cairoli's or Garibaldi's republicans are able to capture Rome in either the '67, '68, or '69 attempts.

 

[LordKalvan]

I agree with you up until the quoted passage and your analysis of a different outcome. The defeat of the Hapsburgs is going to have butterfly affects; namely Louis-Napoléon is less likely to relinquish his power over day-to-day affairs to the monarchists Senate. This has several affects. Firstly, the French military is likely to be in a much better position come the war between France and Germany; this won't be the Franco-Prussian War of IOTL, and even with Italian entrance into the war it won't be a cake-walk for the Germans. Secondly, without the Senate to fall back upon as Louis-Napoléon becomes older and weaker (his illness stemming from bladder stones isn't going to go away), the day-to-day running of the country will increasing fall to Eugénie as Regent. Now this could mean many things; Eugénie was a hardliner on both the Roman Question and vis-à-vis Germany. With that being said however she was also, ultimately, far more shrewd and wiser than Louis-Napoléon. This could mean a rather lighter touch in foreign affairs for France until Eugénie the moment was ripe, at which point France would strike. On the other hand her hand could be forced by events elsewhere, especially if Cairoli's or Garibaldi's republicans are able to capture Rome in either the '67, '68, or '69 attempts.

The OTL war was decided by the swifness of the Prussian mobilization, as well as by the fact that the Prussian General Staff was superior to anything the French had. I do not see any of these elements change over the 2-3-4 years between 1866 and the new war.
IIRC, the opposition gained ground in the elections of 1869, so again Napoleon cannot antagonise the ultramontanes.
He might be more cautious on Luxembourg (which might have been another trap set up by Bismarck), but certainly cannot accept a Hohenzollern or a Savoy on the Spanish throne.
Italy has gained most of the irredent claims on the eastern border, therefore I would believe that the "left" will likely break up between moderates and hard-liners, and the elections of March 1867 might return a government based on a "connubio" of Cavourian memory (right wing and left wing moderates governing together to the exclusion of the far right and far left).
Such a government would be more willing to capitalise on the alliance with Prussia, and at the same time more decisionist on the Roman question. IMHO the Roman question is the most likely spark of the new war: the Italian government might take a harder line about their presence, and - for whatever need - there is always a Garibaldi willing to stick his neck out.

Maybe late 1867 is too early: ITTL the famous speech of Garibaldi comes one year later, but this time the insurrection in Rome and the violation of the borders of Latium come right after it, so there is no time to send French troops to Latium. The insurrection is successful, and Garibaldi's irregulars rout the Papal troops and the French volunteers - no zouaves are on the scene.
The pope either holes up in the Vatican or is taken to Ostia and put on a French ship. The time is too late for a major campaign, so there is time for a few rounds of diplomatic talks. No result, though: the pope is not accepting any compromise, and the provisional government in Rome holds a referendum and asks for annexation to Italy. Now all the bets are off, and Nappy will send an ultimatum, and then declare war. The NCG declare war on France on the strength of the defensive alliance with Italy, and the war starts in late April or May 1869.

 

[wolf_brother]

The OTL war was decided by the swifness of the Prussian mobilization, as well as by the fact that the Prussian General Staff was superior to anything the French had. I do not see any of these elements change over the 2-3-4 years between 1866 and the new war.
IIRC, the opposition gained ground in the elections of 1869, so again Napoleon cannot antagonise the ultramontanes.
He might be more cautious on Luxembourg (which might have been another trap set up by Bismarck), but certainly cannot accept a Hohenzollern or a Savoy on the Spanish throne.
Italy has gained most of the irredent claims on the eastern border, therefore I would believe that the "left" will likely break up between moderates and hard-liners, and the elections of March 1867 might return a government based on a "connubio" of Cavourian memory (right wing and left wing moderates governing together to the exclusion of the far right and far left).
Such a government would be more willing to capitalise on the alliance with Prussia, and at the same time more decisionist on the Roman question. IMHO the Roman question is the most likely spark of the new war: the Italian government might take a harder line about their presence, and - for whatever need - there is always a Garibaldi willing to stick his neck out.

Maybe late 1867 is too early: ITTL the famous speech of Garibaldi comes one year later, but this time the insurrection in Rome and the violation of the borders of Latium come right after it, so there is no time to send French troops to Latium. The insurrection is successful, and Garibaldi's irregulars rout the Papal troops and the French volunteers - no zouaves are on the scene.
The pope either holes up in the Vatican or is taken to Ostia and put on a French ship. The time is too late for a major campaign, so there is time for a few rounds of diplomatic talks. No result, though: the pope is not accepting any compromise, and the provisional government in Rome holds a referendum and asks for annexation to Italy. Now all the bets are off, and Nappy will send an ultimatum, and then declare war. The NCG declare war on France on the strength of the defensive alliance with Italy, and the war starts in late April or May 1869.

The question now is how has the Hapsburg empire progressed (regressed?) in that time. Are we facing Austria within Germany and independent Hungary with a Hapsburg monarch, or has a fairly shaky Ausgleich passed? If we're looking at an independent Hungary it might take the opportunity to strike against Italy before the Italians become powerful enough to make good on their irrendentalist claims on the Dalmatian coast. If we're looking at a still shaken Austria-Hungary the Germans in Austria and Bohemia are going to be clamoring to join the war effort, while the Magyars will refuse. Either way there's more than likely going to be an eastern theater.

Also, regarding OTL, the war was decided not for anything particularly great the Germans were able to do, it was due to the lacklaster, and quite honestly downright clusterfuck, of a response on the part of the French due to the weaknesses in officers, in training, in mobilization, and in number of recruits. None of those are going to be present though ITTL if we're looking at a weaker Senate and Eugénie as Regent. The one weakness France has going into this fight is the possibility of a monarchist insurrection, and that's fairly unlikely unless the empire has already fallen apart, which, for the reasons listed above, is not going to happen simply because the Germans say 'boo.'