A selling point for the Australians could be that should HMAS Melbourne be out of commission for some reason, they could in a pinch put the Harriers on HMAS Sydney.
Harriers for HMAS Melbourne
- Thread starter Peg Leg Pom
- Start date
The Harrier has advantages for Oz...
...Particularly flying from jungle strips/clearings as well as from small carriers in its STOL role using a 'ski-jump' takeoff. A rapid reaction fighter-bomber, far faster than flying in from RAAF Butterworth. Again, ask the USMC. Could be useful in the North of Queensland, Northern Territory, Papua New Guinea and East Timor.
...Particularly flying from jungle strips/clearings as well as from small carriers in its STOL role using a 'ski-jump' takeoff. A rapid reaction fighter-bomber, far faster than flying in from RAAF Butterworth. Again, ask the USMC. Could be useful in the North of Queensland, Northern Territory, Papua New Guinea and East Timor.
I agree, in the early 60s it has few advantages in the Australian context over the Skyhawk, but is costly and a hassle to operate. However the RAAF did glance at it in the late 60s, while we were fighting in Vietnam and the Harrier was a mature aircraft actually in production, but that was more about inter-service rivalry and the CAF not wanting to buy AH1Gs for Army support.
The Sydney in the 60s wasn't really suited as a through deck carrier as it had 1000s of eye-bolts welded to the deck to tie down Army trucks etc and deck edge cranes to unload Army gear. The 4 Wessex ASW helicopters it used on its trooping runs to Vietnam were operated from the aft deck only, Sydney would require work to strip that sort of stuff out to operate Harriers. In any case the RAN expected to operate as part of a larger RN or USN force which would slot in Melbourne's availability with their own carrier availability cycles.
The Caribou was purchased for that job, the Army also purchased small amphibious ships for supporting their operations in the undeveloped north.
However the limitations that drove the RAAF and Army to buy gear for the ultra-austere conditions of the north would limit Harrier operations because of the requirement for bulk fuel, spares and ordnance. If the Harrier was operating anywhere where its unique STOVL capability is actually needed it wouldn't be able to be supported. In addition the hot and high condition of the north would likely limit the Harrier's STOVL ability.
On a more personal note, the Harrier has been one of my favourite planes ever since I was a kid; but now that I look at Air Force Capability from a procurement decision point/whole of government/fleet management perspective I spend all my time slagging off at it. It's like lamenting the loss of youth.
All I can do...
...Is lament your loss of innocence.
My favourites were (and remain) the Hawker Hunter and the English Electric Canberra.
...Is lament your loss of innocence.
My favourites were (and remain) the Hawker Hunter and the English Electric Canberra.
POD early 1960s.
Instead of the HS.681 the Government approves the BAC (Filton) 222 proposal. That is a licence built C-130 Hercules with Tyne engines. One prototype and 72 production aircraft built instead of 7 cancelled HS.681 aircraft and 66 C-130K Hercules built IOTL.
Instead of the Hawker P.1154 saga the Royal Navy is allowed to buy the Spey Phantom (built under licence by Hawker Siddeley) and the RAF is forced to buy the P.1127 to replace the Hunter.
The prototype Spey Phantom flies 2 years earlier and enters service on HMS Eagle in the late 1960s. This is because the decision to buy Spey-Phantom was taken early enough to allow "Phantomisation" to be included in her 1959-64 refit.
Or more radically an indigenous Twin-Spey fighter called the Spectre is built using the £120 million spent P.1154 and R&D of the Spey-Phantom. As the Spey-Phantom is reputed to have cost 3 times as much as the standard aircraft the production cost would be the same or even less. Furthermore as it was designed around the Spey the Spectre might have better all-round performance than the Spey-Phantom.
Bringing the Harrier forward 3 years means that it overlaps with the Kestrel. 18 Kestrels were planned IOTL but only 9 were actually built. ITTL I think there would be 24 Harrier prototype and pre-production aircraft including the 6 of OTL aircraft brought forward by 3 years and 18 instead of the Kestrel. The Harrier GR Mk 1 enters RAF service in 1966 instead of 1969. This opens up the possibility of the USMC buying the AV-8A 3 years earlier and it seeing action in Vietnam.
However, the RAN would still buy Skyhawks instead of Harriers. The best that can happen is that as the Harrier enters service with the RAF early enough to have a squadron or two in the Far East Air Force before the "East of Suez" pull-put at the end of 1971 it's possible that RAF Harriers operate from Melbourne in flight strength during exercises. IIRC she spent 3 months a year at Singapore in the 1970s as part of Australia's commitment to ANZUK and SEATO. I don't know, but suspect that it was a commitment that went back into the 1960s.
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The Melbourne was assigned to the Far East Strategic Reserve and was part of SEATO war plans from the late 50s so spent most of her time in South East Asia. So much so that when she did a cruise in the Indian Ocean in 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it was her first ever deployment to the IO in 25 years of service.
During the Indonesian Confrontation Melbourne conducted a number of SEATO exercises, escorted Sydney on the first 2 major deployments to Vietnam in 1965 & 66 and various proposals to deploy her to Vietnam, including at least 1 from the USN in April 1967, were put forward. This environment of years of cruising around limited-war operational areas on hair-trigger alert as a deterrent to escalation isn't one that makes the option of taking on an unproven capability with delayed introduction into service at all appealing to the RAN.
I have the same problem. But anytime the environment is different from Tactical Nuclear Western Europe or Carrier Aircraft Without Aircraft Carriers then Harriers start to look a lot like a solution desperate for a problem.The Caribou was purchased for that job, the Army also purchased small amphibious ships for supporting their operations in the undeveloped north.
However the limitations that drove the RAAF and Army to buy gear for the ultra-austere conditions of the north would limit Harrier operations because of the requirement for bulk fuel, spares and ordnance. If the Harrier was operating anywhere where its unique STOVL capability is actually needed it wouldn't be able to be supported. In addition the hot and high condition of the north would likely limit the Harrier's STOVL ability.
On a more personal note, the Harrier has been one of my favourite planes ever since I was a kid; but now that I look at Air Force Capability from a procurement decision point/whole of government/fleet management perspective I spend all my time slagging off at it. It's like lamenting the loss of youth.
Specifically for AU the range aspect is also problematic. Skyhawks are very short-legged in that environment but still have more reach than the harrier.