Happier 2nd Happy Time

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Deleted member 1487

I did a thread a while back about a reinforced 'Operation Paukenschlag' which was a what if Hitler hadn't held back at least 20 Uboats to defend against a non-existent potential invasion of Norway:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/paukenschlag-reinforced.370756/

I've been reading about British Operations Research recently and it focused heavily on the Battle of the Atlantic, citing numerous German mistakes that saved the Allies from major problems in 1942; since I've already covered some of the aspects of getting Britain to do better, this thread is about fewer mistakes on the German side.

What if instead of diverting to the Mediterranean the German navy kept it's Uboats in the Atlantic, so had their entire operational force ready for the first 'beat' in 'operation drumbeat'?
IOTL there were about 12 operational Type IX long range Uboats available for the operation along the US East Coast, but only 5 were able to be sent due to half of what was available being in the Mediterranean and 1 having a mechanical failure at the last moment. I'm counting 29 Uboats sent to the Mediterranean, including the 6 Type IXs. Considering 5 Type IXs sank about 157,000 tons of shipping in less than 1 month, more than doubling their number should at least double their kill total given the enormous missed chances due to how limited their numbers were in the very rich shipping area and needing to focus on only the richest of targets as a result. That's not even counting the potential impact of the 23 extra Type VII Uboats (though they would all be forgoing their historical kills in the Mediterranen, which weren't that great AFAIK).

IOTL the US didn't really respond quickly at all and Admiral King was focused on sending all escorts and aircraft to the Pacific. Would greater losses much earlier arrest that shift West? What would the consequences of that be? If not then the Uboats would run riot it would seem, they sank over 3 million tons of shipping with their limited numbers during the operation. What impact on the Allies would it have had to suffer say double the historical losses in 1942? As it was the US launched something like 11 million tons of new shipping that year, but they still had a major shortage of shipping until 1943 IOTL. Thoughts?
 
From what I understand, the decision to invade Italy was partly made as a result of not having enough shipping to go for France but yet having enough that they could do something (And such was being rather insistently requested by Stalin). With another three million in reduced shipping (Double the OTL three, if I'm understanding correctly), it's very likely you not only butterfly the Italian operation, but possibly move back Torch all together as well as reduce the Arctic Convoys to Russia (I'm assuming with greatly reduced available shipping, such costly endeavors would be viewed as losses too great to sustain).
 

Deleted member 1487

From what I understand, the decision to invade Italy was partly made as a result of not having enough shipping to go for France but yet having enough that they could do something (And such was being rather insistently requested by Stalin). With another three million in reduced shipping (Double the OTL three, if I'm understanding correctly), it's very likely you not only butterfly the Italian operation, but possibly move back Torch all together as well as reduce the Arctic Convoys to Russia (I'm assuming with greatly reduced available shipping, such costly endeavors would be viewed as losses too great to sustain).
It wasn't quite the lack of shipping, though things were tight, they could have made shipping available for it if they really wanted, but likely in early 1943 rather than in 1942, it was British reluctance due to having the majority of trained divisions ready to go having to bear the brunt of any early invasion of France, their example of not being ready from the Dieppe raid, and the desire to free up shipping by opening up the Mediterranean by knocking Italy out of the war (plus thinking that the Mediterranean was an easier theater and they could squeeze Rommel from the West rather easily thanks to the British effort in Egypt). They needed action to help Russia, who was getting angry at the lack of a second front. Stalin had some really insulting things to say in August 1942 when Churchill came to Moscow, but loved the Mediterranean plan when told (though would later say it wasn't good enough). Perhaps you're right that the lack of shipping would curtail a 1942 Mediterranean operation, but in 1943 it would happen probably no later than Spring. I don't think the Arctic Route would have reduced shipping, likely the much longer but safer Persian route is curtailed, which screws up the build up of infrastructure there...which would have serious consequences in mid-summer 1942 when Arctic convoys are halted temporarily after PQX-17. The Arctic route was just so short compared to the rest and was the preferred route for the Russians because it was so close to active fronts that curtailing it when it was the most efficient (in terms of shipping hours) route is probably not possible. The Allies might slow down their plans for the Pacific in the meantime to free up shipping.
 
The maximum potential impact of this would be that the window of time to reach some kind of resolution on the Eastern Front is extended into 1943. Perhaps Hitler wouldn't throw away the opportunity to take Stalingrad if he was feeling less desperate than historically to gain control of the oilfields rapidly as the time the US would make its full weight felt in Europe would be farther away. Delayed Wallied ground operations would also probably strain Wallied-Soviet relations somewhat, especially if things weren't going well for the USSR by 1943 in contrast to OTL.
 
I liked the option of sending the subs from the Barents to the East Coast of USA in the last thread (really it seems like the Allied invading Norway is the least thing the Germans need to worry about, i.e a good place for the Allies to waster their time)

This one seems less likely as Hitler was probably legitimately worried the British could just win in North Africa and what that could potentially mean (Italy dropping out, Turkey joining the Allies, Vichy colonies joining the Allies etc., plus by mid 41 the submarines were becoming less effective against the British only and in OTL they did sink some big warships in the med (Barham, Eagle, Ark Royal????)

The basic premise is sound though that if you sink enough shipping the Allies can't invade anywhere.

You might want to throw in as another ATL, that the Japanese don't do Midway and continue to raid the Indian Ocean to sink even more shipping.

Question though:
At some point do the Americans just say, crap, in the Atlantic all shipping just stays in port, until we figure something out. If we don't don't do this it all gets sunk anyway. We just have to deal with the loss of production until we do.
 

Deleted member 1487

There is a school that considers this a positive thing for the Allies. If they are correct then this means things go worse for the Germans in later 1943 & 44
I know you've advocated for that position, but if they slow down their plans in the Pacific in 1942 to be able to launch Torch on time or at least only a few months later, in 1943 they will have to shift resources to the Pacific to make some moves there, because the US public demands action and the Australians need their supply lines from the US secured. It's kind of hard to imagine that Guadalcanal doesn't happen given the pressure to do something in the Pacific in 1942.

Of course Admiral King was the originator of the Solomon Campaign and if he gets discredited because of a more successful German Uboat campaign on the East Coast perhaps the Pacific becomes a side show for a while? It is still hard to imagine given the public anger at Japan at the time that the US would just sit on the defensive in the Pacific for 1942, especially considering the threat to Australia-US communications:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomon_Islands_campaign

You might want to throw in as another ATL, that the Japanese don't do Midway and continue to raid the Indian Ocean to sink even more shipping.
That does raise a question, if butterflies from a greater Uboat success in the Atlantic prevent the US Midway success somehow and US carriers are lost, but the Japanese ones get away, does the US then have to leave Europe alone for a while to shore up the Pacific?

Question though:
At some point do the Americans just say, crap, in the Atlantic all shipping just stays in port, until we figure something out. If we don't don't do this it all gets sunk anyway. We just have to deal with the loss of production until we do.
They can't do that, it would mean the loss of Britain and potentially the USSR offering a separate peace to the Germans given that LL would be cut off. Keeping shipping in port would destroy much of the US economy on the East Coast and starve Britain of vital resources. Loses in shipping even double OTL's would still be 'only' about half of 1942's shipping production just in US ports. It would certainly arrest the transfer of anti-submarine and escort vessels to the Pacific, plus probably force both the US and UK to commit a lot more aircraft to the Battle of the Atlantic.
 
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Good point on this:

"Keeping shipping in port would destroy much of the US economy on the East Coast and starve Britain of vital resources. Loses in shipping even double OTL's would still be 'only' about half of 1942's shipping production just in US ports."

So given the extra losses: What not to do?

1) I would give up the Murmansk convoys first (losses were heavy anyway, and from the viewpoint of January 42 the Soviets are doing ok)
2) I would delay Torch second (while important, establishing American presence in Persia and securing the Suez canal are most important)
3) I would give up Persian Lend Lease 3rd (A secure route, Americans set up a truck assembly plant here OTL, oil can be refined in gulf and shipped, too important as a base/resource area)
4) Malta convoys 4th, British are convinced of its importance protecting canal.
4) I would delay giving Shermans as Lend Lease to 8th army 5th. (A June decision, but securing canal now is more important than Torch)
5) I would give up anything in the Pacific last (January 42 viewpoint US doesn't know how far the Japanese are going to push and these are American interests at stake, need to reassure the Australians that they can keep divisions in Egypt).

So lets say as a result: March, July and September and December Murmansk convoys are cancelled (with just a few individual sails)
Torch is delayed 3 months.

Net result is:

1) The Germans relieve the Stalingrad pocket (extra German forces on east front, some loss of Soviet strength). What that means long term?????
2) Maybe clearing of Africa is delayed 6 weeks: Sicily delayed too.
3) 1 and two above means are larger/longer east front offensive for Germans in 1943 is possible.
 
What if instead of diverting to the Mediterranean the German navy kept it's Uboats in the Atlantic, so had their entire operational force ready for the first 'beat' in 'operation drumbeat'?

if forced to choose would agree but it would not take massive construction program to have done both?

my understanding the boats sent to the Med were a mismatch anyway? that the KM would have benefited from updated Type II coastal boat. my scenario is always pre-war plan to be able to move smaller u-boats and S-boats overland (something that was planned for with later coastal Elektroboot)
 
I know you've advocated for that position, but if they slow down their plans in the Pacific in 1942 to be able to launch Torch on time or at least only a few months later, in 1943 they will have to shift resources to the Pacific to make some moves there,....

Not really, the question for the Pacifc revolves around the addition of the South Pacific offensive. That was neither part of WP Orange or the Rainbow plans prewar. Raids, aiding the DEI, and low cost diversions were the only actions contemplated in that region. Adding in the s Pacific offensive in 1943 disrupted Allied shipping across the globe and diveerted considerable resource originally intended for elsewhere. The Central Pacific offensive had been allowed for in the earlier war plans. The naval and ground forces needed for the Central Pacific were identified and scheduled far back & updated at the Quebec confrences and related joint planning from 1941.

If the proposals for a S Pacific offensive are shelved at the end of 1942 the argument is considerable saving are available for use elsewhere.
 
...

my understanding the boats sent to the Med were a mismatch anyway? that the KM would have benefited from updated Type II coastal boat. my scenario is always pre-war plan to be able to move smaller u-boats and S-boats overland (something that was planned for with later coastal Elektroboot)

The Type IX were larger long range deep water boats. Deployed to the Med they had some of the same problems as the larger class Brits subs designed for Pacific operations. They did not do well in the predominatly shallow regions of the Med.
 

Deleted member 1487

If the proposals for a S Pacific offensive are shelved at the end of 1942 the argument is considerable saving are available for use elsewhere.
Sure, but politically could the Solomon islands campaign be shelved given the fears of having supply lines to Australia severed?
 
Sure, but politically could the Solomon islands campaign be shelved given the fears of having supply lines to Australia severed?

You are unclear on the dates.

The Japanese threat, as far as it went, was settled between the 20 Febuary 1942 massacre of the IJN 4th Air Group over the Coral Sea & the Krishima sinking 15 November 1942. The raids & defensive battle in the SE Pacific of 1942 fit in the concepts of WP Orange & the Rainbow plans, & were capitolized within the Quebec confrences & related joint Brit/US planning of 1941-42. The unplanned expendenture of resources started in 1943 with MacAurthurs initial offensives to isolate & retake Rabaul & after with the S Pac offensive to the Phillipines. The 1943 & later offensive had nothing to do with 'saving' Australia. The The ability of the Japanese navy to support stratigic offensives ended in 1942 & was halted with resources already allocated for that.

So scratch the US S Pac offensive of 43 & nothing changes in terms of a Japanese threat to isolate Australia. That was done with before the end of 1942.
 

Deleted member 1487

You are unclear on the dates.

The Japanese threat, as far as it went, was settled between the 20 Febuary 1942 massacre of the IJN 4th Air Group over the Coral Sea & the Krishima sinking 15 November 1942. The raids & defensive battle in the SE Pacific of 1942 fit in the concepts of WP Orange & the Rainbow plans, & were capitolized within the Quebec confrences & related joint Brit/US planning of 1941-42. The unplanned expendenture of resources started in 1943 with MacAurthurs initial offensives to isolate & retake Rabaul & after with the S Pac offensive to the Phillipines. The 1943 & later offensive had nothing to do with 'saving' Australia. The The ability of the Japanese navy to support stratigic offensives ended in 1942 & was halted with resources already allocated for that.

So scratch the US S Pac offensive of 43 & nothing changes in terms of a Japanese threat to isolate Australia. That was done with before the end of 1942.
Pre-planned or not the Solomons campaign hinged on access to Allied shipping that was needed for multiple tasks at once, so would have drawn on the shipping needed for Torch if shipping losses are double OTL in 1942. Guadalcanal was launched in August 1942 because of the threat to Allied supply lines to Australia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guadalcanal_Campaign
On 7 August 1942, Allied forces, predominantly United States (US) Marines, landed on the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida in the southern Solomon Islands, with the objective of denying their use by the Japanese to threaten Allied supply and communication routes between the US, Australia, and New Zealand. The Allies also intended to use Guadalcanal and Tulagi as bases to support a campaign to eventually capture or neutralize the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain.
My grandfather was a CB there, so got to hear about that campaign growing up. Supporting it requires shipping that would compete with any moves to invade North Africa, especially if an additional 2-3 million tons of shipping had been lost in the Atlantic in the first 7 months of 1942.
Whether or not the Japanese could have continued to attack is not at issue, what is is the Allied perception of the need for the Guadalcanal campaign and the use of shipping to sustain it and that IOTL came before Torch was settled on. Post-Guadalcanal pushes in the Pacific would likely have been halted as you suggest until Torch then could be launched, but that puts it back around 1943, a delay of several months.
 
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