Following the armistice with the Germans, events took a turn for the chaotic. The French were having all kinds of arguments with the Americans over defence contracts, which by the treaty they could not receive, and we in our attempts to intervene, accepted that we should buy some of the French ordered equipment, but that we could not take the entire order ourselves for the simple reason we did not require all of the equipment simply pushed the Americans into the position of acting as a salesman who attempts to push people into buying goods to people who do not want them.
On this issue, I had a vigorous exchange of views with the American Ambassador, Joe Kennedy, who stated in quite open terms his belief that the French had reneged on deals on which they had agreed with which the United States Government had entered into in good faith. At the end of the discussion, I had to ask him whether or not he would rather if France had fallen wholesale to the Nazis, extinguishing the light of democracy in continental Western Europe.*
Despite it all, we left on good terms, with the strength of our understanding with the US position enhanced.
On the issue of national security, it was at this point in August, where Churchill brought to my attention the workings of the MAUD committee. He stated that should they succeed, we would have a bomb of such power, that it should be able to wipe out an entire city. With this bomb, we would guarantee our national security for our lifetimes. As such, at Winston’s command, with my blessing, the funding of the committee was almost quadrupled overnight. I need not say of what high importance to our national security that this committee was kept top secret, and as such only few people outside me, Churchill, L-G, John Simon and members of the upper echelons of the intelligence community knew of the existence of MAUD.
It was during this period that another highly secret joint Franco-British committee was formed, which was involved in the causes of our defeat earlier in the year, and how we may change matters for future engagement with the enemy. The importance of this committee cannot be overplayed as it played a major role in the second war with the Nazis. It included views from both sides, many frank and critical of many areas of the conduct of the last campaign. I have to say, as the year went on, the policy of our nation and France was as one. Even during this difficult time, our entente or special relationship as you will burned brighter than ever.
We also agreed upon a new alliance was needed around this time, with which to defend against tyranny. The prime policy aim was to build support against dictatorship. To this end, we managed during the month of August to gain the support of the Greek and Norway.
On the matter of National Service, the need for its maintenance whilst the Nazi menace was still hanging over us was the most sensible option. It was agreed though, that this would be reviewed in twelve months time, should we still be in office. Also, it was at this stage that following discussion with the Cabinet, I had decided to ask the King for a dissolution of Parliament and an October General Election.
It was no small matter, as a peer to ask to continue to remain Prime Minister, but I felt the situation was still serious enough to warrant it. As such, it was agreed that whilst I should not personally stand for the Commons, should the party lose the General Election, then I should resign as leader of the Conservative Party. This was only fair. In a sense, a vote for the Tory or Unionist candidate was also a vote for myself.
The matter of our position to put towards the British people was clear. We would enhance the rights of people to healthcare, improving education and attempting to help increase efficiency in both the matters of agricultural and industrial production, which had begun to hit us with the German U-Boats prowling the Atlantic during the previous war. Primarily though, our position was to be one of increasing the defence of the realm.
It was made clear that we should never be caught in the position of not being ready again. It was vital that our message was made clear in the outmost. In this, I, and my party were clear.
* Diaries of John Simon said:
Went to Number 10 to discuss increase in funding for MAUD with PM, who was in a frightful strop. Shouted out about the US ambassador and his use of undiplomatic language. Apparently he(Kennedy) was of the opinion that democracy had nothing to do with the previous conflict, that he was of the opinion that an embargo be placed upon France should they not fulfill their contractual obligations, and whether the French fell was not his concern, his concern was solely the US national interest, to which the PM replied that France being destroyed was very contrary to the US national interst. The PM stated he had telegrammed his anger to the President in Washington over the issue. I would not in the least be surprised if Kennedy was recalled within the month.