The meeting was tense. The Prime Minister, Winston, David Margesson and I sat across from each other, in the office of 10 Downing Street. The Prime Minister, fully aware that his time was up due to the Norwegian fiasco leaned across and asked Winston directly and asked Winston if he had any objections, in this day and age to a member of the Lords becoming Prime Minister? Winston, being the statesman he was remained silent, looking out over Horse Guards Parade, when Neville pushed him for an answer. He turned around; looking directly at the Prime Minister, with a resigned look on his face giving the immortal words ‘No, I don’t believe I can object.’ Neville smiled and said; in that case I will send word to the Palace to appoint Edward as the new Prime Minister.
And thus, began my term as leader of our great nation.
The situation was grim. Southern Norway was effectively a lost cause with our forces holding grimly to the north and that very day, the Germans began marauding through France at a frightening rate, despite our best hopes in the bravery and professionalism of both ours and the French Army, defeatism hung in the air like the stench of death. In addition to this, our reserves, estimated at some £4,500 million were being spent almost entirely on new weapons from the Americans. Our position, to say the least was difficult.
My first difficulties however were domestic. My first act as Prime Minister was to appoint Winston as War Secretary and place Anthony Eden in the Foreign Office. I did this consciously in the knowledge that Winston would be able to throw himself into the task of defeating the Nazi menace and Anthony had more of the diplomatic touch about him. The next aim, which took much persuasion, was to include David-Lloyd George in the Cabinet, giving him a joint responsibility of the Admiralty and Deputy Prime Minister. This, I believe gave the Government more gravitas.
Having made the necessary changes to the Cabinet, the next task was to get a bill pushed through the Commons, allowing me to speak, if not vote in the chamber. Despite opposition from the Labour Party and elements of our own backbenchers, we managed to get the bill through by the end of May.
Within a fortnight of becoming the Prime Minister, the first major challenge of my authority came. It was obvious that France was falling. Our forces were trapped in a pocket in North East France, and the pocket was getting smaller.
General Ironside contacted me to inform me he believed the only course of action remaining was for evacuation of British Forces from France. This in itself was a big measure, but one that we had no choice in the matter owing to the fact that the French forces around us were collapsing. In that we were in a position where we had to remove our troops from the theatre was not one which was taken lightly, but one which had to be done. The position was critical.
Over the next week (26 May-June 4th) we did everything in our power to get as many allied, British, French, Belgian and Dutch troops back to England as we possibly could. We even enlisted the help of the local fishing crews, whose gallantry in saving British soldiers with fishing boats whilst being strafed by Nazi Dive Bombers cannot be underestimated. By June 4th, we had managed to evacuate 200,000 British Soldiers alongside 150,000 French troops. During the evacuation, 30,000 servicemen, mainly of the Highland Regiments who fought an excellent rearguard action were killed in action. Were it not for them, it is my conviction that we would not be here today.
Following the evacuation, an assessment of our position took place and defences began to be prepared along the southern coast of our land. Invasion was a real possibility, and were it not for the strength of the Royal Navy, may well have actually happened.
During June, the position in France became even more critical, to the extent that its fall was expected. On June 6th, I went to Bordeaux, to visit Reynaud in the hope that there be someway in which the French could carry on the fight. His pessimism was the most frightening thing that I had witnessed up until that point. He stated he, personally was willing to fight on, from North Africa if needs be, but was convinced that the anti-war party within his cabinet was now too strong to hold and that France would fall within the next couple of weeks. To this end, he begged that I allow the French to make a separate peace with the Nazis. It broke my heart that I could not do so, but I promised to bring the matter of a peace deal up with the Cabinet the next day.
Following my return to London, which included a close scrape, where a Me110 attacked my aircraft, which only narrowly escaped due to a Hurricane being in close proximity, the decisive cabinet meeting was held.
The meeting was packed, with an atmosphere which was electric. I put it to the Cabinet the following points, which I feel need being made clear.
1) That we request at midnight 8/6/1940 a ceasefire with German Forces on Land, Sea and air.
2) That we enter negotiations with Nazi Germany ensuring a peace deal is reached.
3) That we would only accept a deal this preserves the independence and territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and the British Empire.
4) That should no such deal be reached, then war would be resumed between the belligerent powers.
The Cabinet sat in silence as I read the points out to them. I made clear my belief that France was lost, that we should continue to rearm and defend the south coast as talks took place. Thus even should talks break down, we would be safe from attack and in a stronger position than we were currently in.
The War faction of the Cabinet was led by Churchill, who insisted that this would look like abject surrender, and that he would campaign against the move, to which L-G replied he would oppose Churchill, and he would let the people decide if the victor of the Great War or the ideologue behind the Dardanelles to believe. I looked Winston in the eye at this point and made the point that I appointed him as War Secretary due to the fact I believed he had the drive and motivation to do the job, and that he would be able to begin work on the Southern Wall in case talks fail. Despite his unhappiness with such a policy, he fell in line with good grace, as did most of the cabinet.
Following the meeting, I telegrammed the four points to Raynaud, who accepted them on behalf of the French without so much as a cabinet meeting. Anthony then went straight to the Swedish Embassy where he passed the terms over, to be given to the Germans. Within an hour, a positive response had been gathered from Berlin. At midnight on the 8th June 1940, the German Forces stopped on the front line, most strikingly, at one point, just beyond Verdun.
Following discussions between ourselves and the Germans through the Swedes, we agreed that the peace conference would take place in the Palace of Versailles. Upon my visit of the historic Palace, I wondered how the negotiations would go. My intention was clear, to gain time to rearm in case the talks faltered and at the same time, save France from some level of humiliation.
With the Swedish and Italian officials present as mediators, we entered discussions which would decide the fate of not only France and Europe, but the World.
And thus, began my term as leader of our great nation.
The situation was grim. Southern Norway was effectively a lost cause with our forces holding grimly to the north and that very day, the Germans began marauding through France at a frightening rate, despite our best hopes in the bravery and professionalism of both ours and the French Army, defeatism hung in the air like the stench of death. In addition to this, our reserves, estimated at some £4,500 million were being spent almost entirely on new weapons from the Americans. Our position, to say the least was difficult.
My first difficulties however were domestic. My first act as Prime Minister was to appoint Winston as War Secretary and place Anthony Eden in the Foreign Office. I did this consciously in the knowledge that Winston would be able to throw himself into the task of defeating the Nazi menace and Anthony had more of the diplomatic touch about him. The next aim, which took much persuasion, was to include David-Lloyd George in the Cabinet, giving him a joint responsibility of the Admiralty and Deputy Prime Minister. This, I believe gave the Government more gravitas.
Having made the necessary changes to the Cabinet, the next task was to get a bill pushed through the Commons, allowing me to speak, if not vote in the chamber. Despite opposition from the Labour Party and elements of our own backbenchers, we managed to get the bill through by the end of May.
Within a fortnight of becoming the Prime Minister, the first major challenge of my authority came. It was obvious that France was falling. Our forces were trapped in a pocket in North East France, and the pocket was getting smaller.
General Ironside contacted me to inform me he believed the only course of action remaining was for evacuation of British Forces from France. This in itself was a big measure, but one that we had no choice in the matter owing to the fact that the French forces around us were collapsing. In that we were in a position where we had to remove our troops from the theatre was not one which was taken lightly, but one which had to be done. The position was critical.
Over the next week (26 May-June 4th) we did everything in our power to get as many allied, British, French, Belgian and Dutch troops back to England as we possibly could. We even enlisted the help of the local fishing crews, whose gallantry in saving British soldiers with fishing boats whilst being strafed by Nazi Dive Bombers cannot be underestimated. By June 4th, we had managed to evacuate 200,000 British Soldiers alongside 150,000 French troops. During the evacuation, 30,000 servicemen, mainly of the Highland Regiments who fought an excellent rearguard action were killed in action. Were it not for them, it is my conviction that we would not be here today.
Following the evacuation, an assessment of our position took place and defences began to be prepared along the southern coast of our land. Invasion was a real possibility, and were it not for the strength of the Royal Navy, may well have actually happened.
During June, the position in France became even more critical, to the extent that its fall was expected. On June 6th, I went to Bordeaux, to visit Reynaud in the hope that there be someway in which the French could carry on the fight. His pessimism was the most frightening thing that I had witnessed up until that point. He stated he, personally was willing to fight on, from North Africa if needs be, but was convinced that the anti-war party within his cabinet was now too strong to hold and that France would fall within the next couple of weeks. To this end, he begged that I allow the French to make a separate peace with the Nazis. It broke my heart that I could not do so, but I promised to bring the matter of a peace deal up with the Cabinet the next day.
Following my return to London, which included a close scrape, where a Me110 attacked my aircraft, which only narrowly escaped due to a Hurricane being in close proximity, the decisive cabinet meeting was held.
The meeting was packed, with an atmosphere which was electric. I put it to the Cabinet the following points, which I feel need being made clear.
1) That we request at midnight 8/6/1940 a ceasefire with German Forces on Land, Sea and air.
2) That we enter negotiations with Nazi Germany ensuring a peace deal is reached.
3) That we would only accept a deal this preserves the independence and territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and the British Empire.
4) That should no such deal be reached, then war would be resumed between the belligerent powers.
The Cabinet sat in silence as I read the points out to them. I made clear my belief that France was lost, that we should continue to rearm and defend the south coast as talks took place. Thus even should talks break down, we would be safe from attack and in a stronger position than we were currently in.
The War faction of the Cabinet was led by Churchill, who insisted that this would look like abject surrender, and that he would campaign against the move, to which L-G replied he would oppose Churchill, and he would let the people decide if the victor of the Great War or the ideologue behind the Dardanelles to believe. I looked Winston in the eye at this point and made the point that I appointed him as War Secretary due to the fact I believed he had the drive and motivation to do the job, and that he would be able to begin work on the Southern Wall in case talks fail. Despite his unhappiness with such a policy, he fell in line with good grace, as did most of the cabinet.
Following the meeting, I telegrammed the four points to Raynaud, who accepted them on behalf of the French without so much as a cabinet meeting. Anthony then went straight to the Swedish Embassy where he passed the terms over, to be given to the Germans. Within an hour, a positive response had been gathered from Berlin. At midnight on the 8th June 1940, the German Forces stopped on the front line, most strikingly, at one point, just beyond Verdun.
Following discussions between ourselves and the Germans through the Swedes, we agreed that the peace conference would take place in the Palace of Versailles. Upon my visit of the historic Palace, I wondered how the negotiations would go. My intention was clear, to gain time to rearm in case the talks faltered and at the same time, save France from some level of humiliation.
With the Swedish and Italian officials present as mediators, we entered discussions which would decide the fate of not only France and Europe, but the World.
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