Let’s consider what past reasons had motivated Great Britain to consider going to war and/or issuing of ultimatums that might have led her into fighting a war. And what also deterred her from going to war. I think Riain summed it up well:
Riain said:
The difference between TTL and OTL is while the PoD is smaller than the invasion of Belgium it will be a direct action against Britain, her colonies or ships.
In 1861, in the
Trent Affair , Great Britain got very angry when the United States removed two Confederate passengers from a British ship. The United States backed down and released the two men. Lesson: Don’t mess with the British Navy.
In 1870, during the
Franco-Prussian War, France had a much larger navy than Prussia but France treaded carefully so as to not affect British trade:
Wikipedia said:
But the main reason for the only partial success of the naval operation was the fear of the French command to get political complications with Great Britain. This deterred the French command from trying to interrupt German trade under the British flag.
Great Britain sent an
1890 ultimatum to Portugal ordering them out of trying to acquire a land link between the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, land that Great Britain wanted for herself.
In 1893,
Siam became a potential flashpoint between France and Great Britain:
Wikipedia said:
In France, many were calling for a protectorate to be imposed upon Siam. But the events of July 13, followed by the blockade, which harmed British interests far more than French (British trade accounted for 93% of Siam exports), alarmed the British, who put pressure on both the Siamese and French governments to reach a negotiated settlement.
In 1896, the
Kruger Telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm II angered the British who viewed it as interference in their dealing with the Boers in South Africa.
In 1898, in the
Fashoda Incident, Great Britain ordered France out of the Sudan. And at some point there was also a British ultimatum to Belgium to vacate some African territory that Great Britain considered her own.
In 1904, in the
Dogger Bank Incident, the Russian Baltic Fleet, on its way to fight Japan, mistakenly fired on British fishing boats causing a very serious incident.that could have led to a war had not Russia profusely apologized and paid for damages. At the time, Japan was in an alliance with Great Britain.
In 1911, the
Agadir Crisis between Germany and France, led to the British sharply reprimanding Germany though not by name…
According to Robert K. Massie’s “Dreadnought”, page 733, David Lloyd George, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, was known to be “a radical, a pacifist. His views on foreign affairs . insofar as they were known, were considered to be pro-German; certainly he had always strongly favored an Anglo-German understanding.”
However, Lloyd George was angry because the German Government was ignoring Great Britain in Germany’s bullying of France. Some of his words on the Agadir Crisis from “Dreadnought”, page 732:
Lloyd George said:
“I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international goodwill except questions of the gravest national moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally concerned, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure….”
So, with those examples of Britain’s concerns, consider if this scenario, in which Germany never invades Belgium, can be a casus belli to get Great Britain into World War 1. Let’s further assume that there is a daring, but highly rational, carefully plotted Wilhelmine diplomacy going on toward Great Britain.
First of all, we know that there will be no attacks by German ships on the French Atlantic coast and certainly no German naval blockade of France because Germany does not want Great Britain to come into the war on France’s side.
In 1912, there was an informal agreement (not sanctioned by the British Cabinet at large) whereby the French fleet would be concentrated in the Mediterranean and the British fleet could concentrate in the Atlantic against her naval rival Germany and, in effect, be responsible for defending the French Atlantic coast.
Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on August 2, 1914 (before the OTL German ultimatum to Belgium) got a majority of the British Cabinet to agree to prevent the German High Seas Fleet from attacking France’s Atlantic coast… From “Dreadnought”, pages 900, by Robert K. Massie:
Dreadnought said:
On Sunday morning, Grey brought the Cabinet along, urging that “we could not stand the sight of the German Fleet coming down the Channel and, within sight and sound of our shores, bombing the French coast.” The majority agreed and Grey was authorized to tell Cambon ((the French Ambassador))…the High Seas Fleet would be held at bay. This was too much for John Burns, who promptly resigned.
So, Germany and Austria-Hungary go to war with Russia. Germany totally ignores France, not even bothering to declare war on France even if France declares war on Germany. (Consider it a “Sitzkrieg” or “Phoney War” a la 1939 – 1940). In the Triple Alliance, Italy is only required to enter a war in which France attacks Germany, Italy has no treaty obligations regarding a war with Russia.
Germany makes public declarations that she will guarantee not to violate the borders of Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland and encourages France to do likewise. And for good measure (and propaganda purposes), Germany also pledges not to attack France. This veiled contempt will clearly demonstrate to Russia how worthless France is as an ally and might encourage the Tsar to consider early peace talks. Besides, France has nothing that Germany truly needs or wants.
In OTL, during the Franco-Prussian War, once she was assured Belgium’s neutrality would be respected by both Germany and France, Great Britain was in no rush to enter that war. I see no reason that she would be in a haste to enter TTL war either, given the conditions I am presenting. Ihagambia summed it up…..
Ihagambia said:
The British did not go to the aid of the French in 1870 when the Prussians attacked and without a direct reason to intervene they might sit it out in the short term.
Germany uses her navy, which is the second most powerful navy in the world, second only to the British Navy, to launch naval attacks upon Russia’s Baltic coast, but many battleships are also sent out to all the oceans except for the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea, to show Germany has only the utmost respect for British sensitivities. The German ships make no attempt to attack French ships and only defend themselves if attacked. No commerce raiding, no U-Boats, no stop and search, no threat to anyone’s trade, including France. By this somewhat unusual strategy, Germany could cast France in both the role of a war-like nation and a weakling who is hiding behind Great Britain’s skirts.
This naval strategy does run the risk of a potential
Copenhagenization. Might this be a casus belli where Great Britain sees an opportunity to strike and cripple the naval might of Germany ?
Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck’s original orders sending him to the German colony of Kamerun, instead of German East Africa, are maintained. It seems reasonable to assume that the French can only successfully attack the two German African colonies of Togo and Kamerun since the German Navy would rule the seas as far as France was concerned. Tiny Togo would fall quickly but Lettow-Vorbeck’s OTL success in German East Africa, could be be readily transferred to TTL’s Kamerun. ( OTL British are noted for highly regarding their chivalrous enemies like Lettow-Vorbeck himself, the Red Baron, Rommel, the Emden’s Karl von Müller..)
Once the French attack Togo and Kamerun, (something Germany may have actually hoped for) this gives Germany the green light to do likewise to French colonies (the British certainly believe in fair play, correct?). Germany avoids attacking any French colonies in Africa or the Western Hemisphere but focuses on the small, remote French possessions in the Pacific Ocean. Tahiti and French Polynesia are taken by German battleships operating out of German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, Kiaochau, German Samoa, and the Marianas, Marshalls and Caroline Islands.
A German fleet also seizes the French Chinese possession of Guangzhouwan (close to and similar to Great Britain’s Hong Kong). The Germans promptly return Guangzhouwan to China as a goodwill gesture.
Back to the war with Russia: the Germans win battles but the Russians refuse to make peace. All during this war with Russia, Germany has repeatedly urged Great Britain to mediate an end to the struggle, publicly calling the British “an honest broker”, Bismarck’s old title.
This Russian reluctance causes Germany to announce she intends to re-establish an independent Kingdom of Poland from Russia’s territory( but certainly not from German or Austrian territory). Poland’s freedom has long been desired in Western Europe, not the least in France.
The Germans end
Russification in all the territories they have, or will, conquer plus end discriminatory laws and pogroms against the Jews of the Russian Empire. Germany pledges to liberate the subject peoples and help them establish independent states in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.
These measures should greatly appeal to the many immigrant minorities in the United States and probably to President Wilson and the American people at large since Russia has a bad reputation as a hulking, massive, unpredictable, cruel power. But what will Great Britain think, considering its Irish problem ? Could this widespread world rebuilding and unilateral shape-shifting by the Germans be the casus belli that brings Great Britain into the war ?
Germany also attempts to get other nations to attack Russia, and to a much lesser degree, France. She encourages Romania to take mainly-Romanian Moldavia and the Ottoman Empire to recover territories lost to Russia in the Caucasus. She tempts China with recovering large parts of Siberia that Russia took from China in the past. Germany also entices Japan to take the rest of Sakhalin Island, Manchuria and the eastern Siberian landmass and to get an indemnity from Russia “this time”, unlike in 1905. Germany also dangles an isolated French Indochina before Japanese eyes. Germany might even encourage Italy to consider taking French Somaliland and redeeming the “losses” to France of Tunisia in 1881 and even Nice and Savoy in 1860.
Great Britain at this time would be similar to OTL World War I United States. She would be getting rich and making money by selling supplies to both sides (Germany and France). Her people would not be dying in war. She might swallow what I have described above since Germany would not actually be taking any Russian territory for herself but there is one area that Great Britain might have objections…
In 1907, Great Britain and Russia had concluded the
Anglo-Russian Convention in which Persia was, in effect, divided between them. North Persia was a Russian sphere of influence while South Persia was allotted to the British sphere. Central Persia was open to both. All this was done without consulting the Persians.
If Germany, along with the other nations she is tempting, also urges Persia to overthrow the Russian control of North Persia, might not the British be fearful that the Persians might attempt to drive her out of South Persia ?
Would that be a bridge too far for Great Britain,or would she have reached that bridge long before this ?
What Germany gets out of all of this is a reputation for restraint and basically seeking to live in peace, not war-like Huns spreading terror everywhere. Like Bismarck’s Germany, the Kaiser’s Germany is a satiated power notably not seeking conquests. She is known as a loyal ally, defending Austria-Hungary, much like Great Britain is defending France. And, most importantly, Germany enhances her position in Europe by substantially altering her eastern frontiers for the better. As A. J. P. Taylor expressed the situation in his book “The Origins of the Second World War”, pages 20 – 21, for OTL post-World War I, it also applies to the scenario described above:
A. J. P. Taylor said:
In March 1918 the new Bolshevik rulers made a peace of surrender at Brest-Litovsk. Subsequent defeat in the West compelled Germany to abandon the gains which she then made. The larger result could not be undone. Russia fell out of Europe and ceased to exist, for the time being, as a Great Power. The constellation of Europe was profoundly changed—and to Germany’s advantage. Where there had formally been a Great Power on her Eastern frontier, there was now a No Man’s land of small states and beyond it an obscurity of ignorance.