Guy Simonds and First Canadian Army...

MacCaulay

Banned
...this is a POD I've had up my sleeve for awhile and I figured I'd pitch it now that I have a bit more knowledge on the subject.

In late 1944, the commander First Canadian Army in Northwest Europe, Harry Crerar, was removed to England for dysentery. Crerar was an amazing staff officer from the artillery arm of the Canadian military that had served in World War I and had devised some of the most audacious and intricate army-level fireplans ever used in the Second World War, but he was also a cold and aloof individual who was considered by his subordinates and fellow General Officers to be stand-offish and "old-fashioned."
Montgomery himself, though personally friends with him, once commented that Crerar did not "have the pushiness" to be an Army commander. This was one of the reasons that Monty pushed for him to take a voluntary demotion and serve as a divisional commander in Italy prior to the operations in Normandy.

When Crerar was sent to England to recover, II Canadian Corps commander Guy Simonds temporarily replaced him as First Canadian Army commander and in the words of one staff officer, the effect was "electrifying."
Simonds was to the Canadian armoured community what Patton and Rommel were to their respective countrymen. His claim to fame was the Kangaroo, an early APC created by "de-frocking" the Priest self propelled guns and using them to transport troops and then provide them with a machine gun that would instantly be up front with them. These were first used during Simonds' II Canadian Corps' performance in Operation Totalize where they performed with flying colours.

One need only compare the Canadian approach to operations in Normandy (when Crerar was in charge of 1stCA) to the Scheldt Estuary operations, when Simonds was given a chance to act independently of his higher up to see the difference in the two mens' command styles.




So...let's suppose (for the sake of argument) that Monty uses...more forceful measures and Crerar settles for keeping command of I Canadian Corps in Italy.

First Canadian Army lands in Normandy with Gen. Chris Vokes in command of II Canadian Corps, and Guy Simonds in command of First Canadian Army. How does this relatively more progressive style of warfare fit in with the kind of battle that Montgomery's 21st Army Group wanted to fight in Normandy?
 

MacCaulay

Banned
They'll still get chewed up in Normandy but its the post Goodwood breakout where you would see changes.

Well, there were a lot of times in Normandy where the British approach to war let a lot of chances slip. In Grenadiers, 12th SS Panzer Division commanderKurt Meyer notes a number of times that entire brigade or divisional offensives were halted by platoon-level defensive actions: it was something he didn't understand.
In Steel Inferno: I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy by Michael Reynolds and Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Normandy by Hart, it's shown that these pauses were frequently because the commanders at army and division level were getting what Monty began to call "Tiger Fever," and reporting them everywhere. So when things like the counterattack by Michael Wittman happened it just made the Fever worse.

Now I've just read...I don't know...four or five books in all in the last month, so I'm not an expert or anything. But what I'm seeing in the operations of the British Army is an evolution of the setpiece battle: massive artillery and air barrages to pound the defenders into a state of utter confusion, then a movement into the projected zone of occupation in overwhelming numbers.
This is fine: it's a great way to run a campaign, especially when you've got air superiority, amazing gunners, and a civilian conscript army with morale and numbers that must be husbanded.

But comparing two books like Steel Inferno: I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy and Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, one sees a few points that slipped through their fingers. There was the crossing of a river near Carpiquet in late June (I forget the name of the river, the book's at work) where the two-tiered artillery and air bombardment fire plan managed to disrupt German reinforcements not just in their forward defenses but in their lodgements behind the lines where they were waiting to react to the coming attack, as well. Kurt Meyer reported that what was left of 12th SS and the sole battalion of Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler in the rear were completely off their rockers.

But after that, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division advanced to it's position and on informing Crerar that the German defenses were disarray...they fucking stopped. Now of course, there's a logic to this: the great fear was that Rommel would get the Anglo-Canadian armies to stick their necks out and he'd whomp them. But to advance 10 or 15 miles and take an objective a week ahead of schedule? That's just silly not to. Especially in the brigade-level strength that 3CID could've thrown at it.

What 1st Canadian Army needed in Normandy (hell, the entire campaign) was a more personable and bullish soldier that could actually move progressively. I think Simonds was it.
 
The river was the Orne. Simonds was not personable. Maybe to generals. He was accused of coming up a little short at the Falaise Gap. If you want another book to read, The Guns of Normandy is the story of my father-in-law's war, plus one more book that goes to the Scheldt. Interesting story about an abandoned fully loaded nebelwerfer. Anyway, Billy didn't like him because he wouldn't let the troops wear warm waterproof jackets in Holland, just because they were for Germans. Not personable.
 
Mac I gotta, be honest command personalities aside, the fact that Canadians and Poles went through some serious mutual recriminations during Falaise and counter blaming only labors the point, they both dropped the ball; where inspite of Bradley being a pussy, they could have stomped the Germans and won the war right then and there

The only reason Goodwood and Cobra broke out was because Hitler transferred all the armored divisions for a counter attack that made German flank allocations at Stalingrad look brilliant
 

MacCaulay

Banned
Mac I gotta, be honest command personalities aside, the fact that Canadians and Poles went through some serious mutual recriminations during Falaise and counter blaming only labors the point, they both dropped the ball; where inspite of Bradley being a pussy, they could have stomped the Germans and won the war right then and there

The only reason Goodwood and Cobra broke out was because Hitler transferred all the armored divisions for a counter attack that made German flank allocations at Stalingrad look brilliant

But that's the kind of stuff I'm talking about. There almost seemed to be this entropy going up the chain of command in the Anglo-Canadian army, and it didn't seem to help that their strength turned into a crutch: the artillery was a double-edged sword.

Think about it: the Canadians were laying these brilliant fireplans, then the British caught on as this was all at corps and army level and everything was mixed. So they were able to disrupt German rear areas and stop their ability to reinforce at key points: 21st Army Group knew this.
But this knowledge of strong artillery became a weakness. It turned from reliable to a liability when units would call in absurdly large fire missions because they knew the guns were there. Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Normandy talks about an assault from British VIII Corps that was allocated division level artillery, and all the artillery from two brigades. The attack was for a single platoon on a recon mission.

Now it seems understandable that the Anglo-Canadian armies came to the conclusion that artillery was the answer to their problems: Montgomery was from the artillery arm, Crerar was a gunner, as were several division and corps commanders. These men were simply using their training: when faced with an enemy possessed of superior weapons and training, use whatever training and weapons you have which are superior to his.

With the Anglo-Canadian armies, that was long range artillery and airpower. So it's no wonder that the commanders started using up artillery rounds at a faster rate than their American counterparts: they were making up for the fact that the Americans were burning gas and tank rounds.


But Guy Simonds, on the other hand, came from a different position. He was from the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery of the 1920s, which leant itself more to the "Horse" and less to the "Artillery." He commanded an armoured division in Italy, and the sole Canadian infantry division in Sicily.

And in Falaise, he moved II Canadian Corps repeatedly against the Germans and caused great damage against them. Hell, Kurt Meyer was debriefed later on the fighting between his 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend and the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, and said that the II Canadian Corps advance was "so rapid that I could not withdraw my Infantry and the Canadian Infantry completely passed all of my Infantry Battalions, and when they reached their objectives and held up they were halfway between my Infantry and Armoured Columns. It took my Infantry two days to rabbit-leap back to my armour."
According to Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy by Copp, II Canadian Corps stopped because Crerar (First Canadian Army's commander) ordered Simonds not to move his Corps past the objectives, even after Simonds asked for permission to carry the attack further on into the rear of the 12th SS Panzer Division.

What this demonstrates (and I could keep going and show more times) is just how different the two most effective commanders of the Canadians in Europe were: Crerar was a master at setting the goalposts, but Simonds was the one that kept scoring.
 
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Mac, going to recommend two for your reading list (I know your brushing up on your ww2) one is Bevin Alexander's book which has over 30 pages on Falaise and mortain, explained from both ends with some really wicked maps

and the other is the Peter Tsouras Battle of the Bulge book (it has 10 scenarios including 2 Canadian wanks, includinga Simmonds wank :D)

both would run you less than 10 bucks on amazon

I just want to comment on your point on the overreliance on artillery and air power. This was not a problem unique to the Brits and Canadians. You have to keep in mind how few of the divisions in Normandy and Northwest Europe as a whole actually had combat experience... and especially in the American army, green infantry units had a tendancy to just find the enemy, fix them, hunker down and call on arty or air power to finish them off... which was not a really effective strategy for the following reasons:

1. It tore up the roads and terrain making it difficult to advance through moonscape, and making it damn near impossible to move up supplies
2. It used up a lot of ammo and gas which where at a premium summer/fall 1944
3. The long delays between allied advances allowed the Germans to do short retirements, and continually set up new defensive lines and anti tank screens

I will give credit to the Germans here, at least by doctrine they didn't shoot up and destroy roads and rail lines that they wanted to use to feed their own advances, whilst the allies had the dubious strategy of shooting up everything (except the Seine bridges, god that made no sense and it allowed the Germans to escape after Falaise; that mistake alone extended the war at least 3 months if not more)
 

MacCaulay

Banned
Mac, going to recommend two for your reading list (I know your brushing up on your ww2) one is Bevin Alexander's book which has over 30 pages on Falaise and mortain, explained from both ends with some really wicked maps

and the other is the Peter Tsouras Battle of the Bulge book (it has 10 scenarios including 2 Canadian wanks, includinga Simmonds wank :D)

Peter Tsouras did a Battle of the Bulge book? Holy shit...


I just want to comment on your point on the overreliance on artillery and air power. This was not a problem unique to the Brits and Canadians. You have to keep in mind how few of the divisions in Normandy and Northwest Europe as a whole actually had combat experience... and especially in the American army, green infantry units had a tendancy to just find the enemy, fix them, hunker down and call on arty or air power to finish them off... which was not a really effective strategy for the following reasons:

And one might say that those with combat experience found that the previous experience they did have wasn't all that useful. The Desert Rats were cut up horribly, and alot of that seems to stem from their rearming in England (they got different tank types and never got to do an exercise with them before the campaign) compounded by the unfamiliarity of the terrain.

But the Americans acted differently than the British and Canadians when faced with similar circumstances. Why? Well, they had a different way of making war, of course. We all know that by the time the 21st Army Group landed, it was obvious that was the last Army Group that Britain would ever field. If Montgomery used it in the same kind of meatgrinder battles that the Germans and Russians were doing on the Eastern Front and the Americans would later do to grind the Heer into the dust, there would be know British Army left by the time they reached the Rhine.
So they fought a war that husbanded their manpower and morale, while the Americans could afford to act bullishly and stick their necks out.

Here's what I'm saying in a nutshell: suppose Patton sees a possible opportunity for a river crossing in northern France. So he runs a division across, but it turns out that there's a Panzer brigade on either side and the division gets mauled.
Third Army can stand to lose a division: the Americans had more coming like they were on a damn assembly line.

But when the British 59th Infantry Division was cut up in Normandy, they decided that instead of rebuilding it, the British Army would be best served if the Division was just disbanded and it's survivors were moved to other units. For the rest of the war, most of the reinforcements came from divisions being disbanded.

So there would be two ways to conduct a war in order to bring it to a conclusion with low casualties and high morale: 1) the way the Anglo-Canadian armies did it. A slow and methodical destruction of the European continent by long range artillery fire. Then there's 2) fast armoured attacks against German forces that have been pinned down and immobilized by air attacks.


So I suppose what I'm saying is...if Simonds had been able to have complete tactical freedom at Falaise, there'd be no 12th SS Panzer Division. I'd be willing to bet my house that Simonds and II Canadian Corps could beat Meyer and 12th SS Panzer Division.
 
Peter Tsouras did a Battle of the Bulge book? Holy shit...




And one might say that those with combat experience found that the previous experience they did have wasn't all that useful. The Desert Rats were cut up horribly, and alot of that seems to stem from their rearming in England (they got different tank types and never got to do an exercise with them before the campaign) compounded by the unfamiliarity of the terrain.

But the Americans acted differently than the British and Canadians when faced with similar circumstances. Why? Well, they had a different way of making war, of course. We all know that by the time the 21st Army Group landed, it was obvious that was the last Army Group that Britain would ever field. If Montgomery used it in the same kind of meatgrinder battles that the Germans and Russians were doing on the Eastern Front and the Americans would later do to grind the Heer into the dust, there would be know British Army left by the time they reached the Rhine.
So they fought a war that husbanded their manpower and morale, while the Americans could afford to act bullishly and stick their necks out.

Here's what I'm saying in a nutshell: suppose Patton sees a possible opportunity for a river crossing in northern France. So he runs a division across, but it turns out that there's a Panzer brigade on either side and the division gets mauled.
Third Army can stand to lose a division: the Americans had more coming like they were on a damn assembly line.

But when the British 59th Infantry Division was cut up in Normandy, they decided that instead of rebuilding it, the British Army would be best served if the Division was just disbanded and it's survivors were moved to other units. For the rest of the war, most of the reinforcements came from divisions being disbanded.

So there would be two ways to conduct a war in order to bring it to a conclusion with low casualties and high morale: 1) the way the Anglo-Canadian armies did it. A slow and methodical destruction of the European continent by long range artillery fire. Then there's 2) fast armoured attacks against German forces that have been pinned down and immobilized by air attacks.


So I suppose what I'm saying is...if Simonds had been able to have complete tactical freedom at Falaise, there'd be no 12th SS Panzer Division. I'd be willing to bet my house that Simonds and II Canadian Corps could beat Meyer and 12th SS Panzer Division.


That book has a wide mix of dday-forward scenarios... including like 2 or 3 on the period you are interested in... its a high quality read for any AH geek

The unfamiliarity with the terrain was a severe oversight of the allied high command and rests with Morgan and Ike... they had total air superiority to photograph likely routes of advance, there where areas in Britain with terrain similar to Normandy for practice, there where British people who had vacationed there; and there where Free French soldiers who hailed from there would have been happy to tell Ike the tanks needed bulldozer blades until they hit open country

When Monty's army landed there where fewer than 4000 infantry replacements in Britain; poor resource allocation and planning; they still had WAY too many men serving in the air force and navy; far more than they could have ever needed... Patton was prolifigate, but at the same time this was a problem; because of the "90 division gamble" his divisions had to be on the line constantly, and replacements where just sent to the front without even having a week to integrate which frequently lead to their immediate death since they didn't know what to do, nor had they likely received enough infantry or tank training. Things like Hurtgen where devastating to the Americans because they where short man power and experienced troops for somewhat of the same reason... a small example is Audie Murphy's company in the 3rd infantry division... now admittedly this division saw a lot of action, but at the same time, they always had air, artillery numerical superiority; and the 3rd was an elite division (the only allied division mentioned in the OKH war diary by name) Murphy's company, had every single man killed or wounded in the course of their engagements except him and a clerk:eek:

One can't look at totalize or falaise in a vaccume, you have to look at Hitler's decision for the Mortain offensive and the draw off of the Leibstandarte away from the British/Canadian sector as well; along with the Hitler Youth being given orders to pull out to participate (when the Canadians caught them) and being stuck for a lack of fuel
 
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