Never heard of the book, tho there are many other sources describing the German Soviet cooperation previous to 1934.
https://www.amazon.com/Storm-Steel-Development-Doctrine-1919-1939/dp/0801479487
Check it out, really good book on the topic, as it explores how armor doctrine developed up to 1941 in both militaries and how they influenced one another.
My main question with this; is if the Germans had dropped the idea of a 'tank' division & the tank as a "strategic weapon" was Guderian argued, how far the Red Army development would have gone.
Oswald Lutz would be an obstacle there. Guderian wasn't the only one arguing that, hardly the first, nor original in thinking. Lutz did a much of the work, as he was actually the general of the Panzertruppe as of 1935 after overseeing the motorization programs since 1933. Not to mention
Ernst Volckheim, who was Guderian's basis for theory and ran the armor training program for Germany up to 1933, including the school in the USSR.
Soviet doctrine was largely independent of German developments until the war started; they were much more interested in the advanced ideas of the western powers, which actually had armor forces as of the 1930s.
The tank crowd in Germany did not have the opportunity to apply their theories until after the German Soviet cooperation ceased 1934.
No one really did other than in maneuvers, which doesn't necessarily result in good doctrine.
I'm unclear on if the Red Army had started organizing actual armored or mechanized divisions and corps before or after that.
The first Soviet mechanized brigade was formed in 1929, the first two mechanized corps were formed in 1932. They formed their own armor school the same year, separate from the Kama tank school.
Since they organized a large armored force of mechanized divisions and corps after the 1934 separation we cant discount the possibility the Red Army would have continued all that. However there was the disruption in the tank or mechanized units from 1937. New leadership @ STAVKA caused the mechanized forces to be radically reorganized & tank or armored divisions to be disbanded. I've been trying to translate some Soviet writing on this subject, but its pretty muddy. Its possible that without the example of the Polish campaign the Red Army would have largely abandoned the armored or mobile warfare doctrines & the mechanized or tank or mobile corps along with that.
Mechanized corps weren't abandoned until November 1939 in response to the problems they experienced in Poland in 1939 as well as the Winter War. They only reformed them in 1940 in response to the German example in France.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Павло...туру_и_способы_применения_танковых_соединений
Doughty in 'Seeds of Disaster' examines that in detail.
From the 1920s there was internal debate in the French army of motorization vs mechanization. The motorization school argued for replacing horses with automobiles & adjusting doctrines, but not making radical changes in operational or strategic doctrines. Note: This was well before the doctrine of the Methodical Battle dominated French army thinking. The mechanization side were arguing for deeper doctrinal and organizational changes in the ground combat forces. At the extreme end were proposals like the well known book by DeGaulle. Neither side really won. The Cavalry branch embraced mechanization, through the 1930s tracked weapons carriers, armored cars, light tanks, and "dragoon vehicles" were added to the cavalry, replacing a large portion of the horses. By 1939 plans were in place to replace the last horse mounted brigade in each of the Light Cavalry Divisions (DLC) with vehicle mounted dragoons. These were not 'armored' divisions in the usual sense but were light mechanized units similar to the US Army armored cavalry regiments/groups of 1944. The experimental 'Light Mechanized Division' the cavalry formed after 1934 was a continuation of the embrace of mechanization. For the rest of the French Army the end state was falling between the two chairs. The large number of tanks in the independent tank battalions and regiments were 'mechanization' but without a doctrine of large armored formations. Otherwise the predominate trend through 1938 was motorization, replacement of horse draught with automotive. This was largely wheeled transport, tho the tactical advantages of tracked vehicles caused increasing numbers of artillery tractors and similar to be adopted. When in 1939 'Armored Divisions' were finally authorized for the army these were equipped and organized to fit the existing Methodical Battle doctrine. That is they were not for wide sweeping maneuvers or exploitation but as armored assault units for large scale destruction of any enemy who tried to make a stand. There is the point made earlier here that battle experience would lead to larger division and corps size tank formations. This is probably correct. But I'm skeptical the French would have formed their DCR as early as they did without the example of the Germans in Poland.
The US reorganized its old and moribund experimental mechanized force into the 7th Cavalry Brigade 1932-33. This units was most notable for possessing a complete service support group or battalion. This enabled it in theory to function independently from a larger division. Through the 1930s it was equipped with the leftovers of 1918 and the 1920s, along with a variety of one off or small batch test vehicles. As equipped and organized its might be bet described as a light hybrid unit something like the French DLC. While there were a fair number of papers written and discussions of a hypothetical tank division the 7th Brigade was not it. It was until 1940 the US Army was finally able to start real experimentation with armored divisions.
The French formation of DCRs might have been influenced by what happened in Poland, but it seems like they were already on their way there IOTL by the late 1930s:
http://enpointe.perso.infonie.fr/dcr.html
https://conflictuel.pagesperso-orange.fr/LGGtemp/ARMORED UNITS IN THE 1940 WESTERN CAMPAIGN.pdf
They had apparently already formed a tank brigade/half DCR in September 1939 before the major German successes in Poland.
Also don't forget the British, who formed their own armored divisions independently in 1937:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_(United_Kingdom)_Division#Formation
As to the US...since the budget of the Depression were still lingering and there wasn't really any threat to the US before 1940 it would make a lot of sense that they were well behind in forming armored divisions or even perceiving the need for them outside of limited theoretical circles.
That seems to be the general trend in other armies of the era, except the Red Army & its still borne tank divisions of the middle 1930s.
I suspect that as battle experience accumulated there would be a proliferation of new tactical formations, some of which might not be recognizable in our context. Lashing together new solutions on a hasty ad hoc basis may not result in organizations and tactical doctrines much like those of OTL.
Fair enough, though at least in the German case given their use of the Kampfgruppe they probably will organize on an ad hoc basis per mission out of their pool of unit resources to fight like IOTL.