Guderian Goes Into Plastics

Bonus if you understand the PoD reference from a alt history movie.

PoD being in the 1920s, the Reichswehrs investigation of mechanization and the theories of the tank as a "strategic weapon" is stillborn and the trend continues into the nazi/Wehrmacht era. The doctrine chosen is more mainstream, that tanks are a support weapon, a sort of assault weapon supporting infantry and cavalry like artillery, pioneers, ect...

First: how does this affect the choices in general Wehrmacht & ground forces doctrine, and the organization & weapons selection?

Second: what is the effect externally in other nations military theory?

In the latter case I am wondering if the development of other nations tank or armored divisions would be far less 1937-1941 absent the German example. In the USSR there was a trend from 1937 to question the doctrine of massed mobile armored or mechanized forces. That changed after the polish defeat & there was a reformation of tank dominated 'armored' corps in the Red Army. Less clea to me was the mechanization of the French cavalry. I'm not sure how much of that & the formation of the DLM was inspired by internal French cavalry theory and external German example.
 
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Internally its not clear what design changes this implies for the German tanks. The Mk I might be identical, intended as it were as a temporary training vehicle. With its twin MG its no more than a light infantry support vehicle, with a secondary role as a scout vehicle. Perhaps the cavalry would acquire a few for mobile fire support for the horse squadrons. The MkII is more problematic, intended as it were as a actual scout and a command vehicle. It & the MkIII might be replaced here by a more heavily armored vehicle, with gearing and tracks more appropriate to crossing trenches, & less for roads. A heavier infantry support assault tank. The Mk IV was originally intended as a support tank, lobbing HE at dangerous targets from 800 meters or further. It might be judged the StGIII is a more efficient vehicle, but I'm guessing both will be deployed as OTL. The other support vehicles, the early SP AT and artillery weapons may be similar to those of OTL.
 
The other general European principle for tank deployment was the French specialization and wide distribution route. So in addition to StuG units, each infantry division would have their own, organic light infantry tank battalion.

The cavalry formations would have armored cars and light cavalry tanks akin to OTL Czechoslovak designs. Whereas the heavy assault tank units would be created to support the motorized Stosstruppen units with Neubaufahrzeug-type heavy infantry tanks.
 
I could see the Germans deploying independent tank Company’s/Battalions/Brigades for specific missions under Divisional command. The allocation of the tanks would be controlled by higher formation commanders.

This fits with the German operational doctrine of point of maximum effort. Of course it means less Lightning War and more Heavy Metal Magic. However the more flexible German command system combining with a flexible tank based battle group is going to be better than anything anyone else has in the early war.

Poland has no chance either way. France in my opinion still falls if the Germans still go for the sickle cut and go for a more traditional flanking movement. The fall of France just takes a little longer.

I suspect that after real battlefield lessons are learnt the Germans will start forming Panzer/Panzer Grenadier type divisions ready for 1941.
 
The Germans did build a few heavy tanks in this period, tho I don't see it certain they will pursue that much further.

The French model was to pool tank battalions at the corps or army level & distribute to the division as needed. They were not a permanent part of the infantry division organization. However to make training and coordination more effective they tended to leave a tank battalion with a division for extended periods. Similar to habitually supporting the same infantry regiment with the same artillery battalion.
 
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I suspect that after real battlefield lessons are learnt the Germans will start forming Panzer/Panzer Grenadier type divisions ready for 1941.

I suspect everyone will. Some of the mistakes of the proto tank divisions will be avoided, but others will still be made.

Motorized infantry had been a thing before the development of tank divisions & their existence 1936-1941 may not change much. for many armies simply striping out some of the infantry battalions & inserting tank battalions may be the initial course for jumping from small brigade groups to division size armored formations.
 

Deleted member 1487

Bonus if you understand the PoD reference from a alt history movie.

PoD being in the 1920s, the Reichswehrs investigation of mechanization and the theories of the tank as a "strategic weapon" is stillborn and the trend continues into the nazi/Wehrmacht era. The doctrine chosen is more mainstream, that tanks are a support weapon, a sort of assault weapon supporting infantry and cavalry like artillery, pioneers, ect...

First: how does this affect the choices in general Wehrmacht & ground forces doctrine, and the organization & weapons selection?

Second: what is the effect externally in other nations military theory?

In the latter case I am wondering if the development of other nations tank or armored divisions would be far less 1937-1941 absent the German example. In the USSR there was a trend from 1937 to question the doctrine of massed mobile armored or mechanized forces. That changed after the polish defeat & there was a reformation of tank dominated 'armored' corps in the Red Army. Less clea to me was the mechanization of the French cavalry. I'm not sure how much of that & the formation of the DLM was inspired by internal French cavalry theory and external German example.
Have you read the book "Storm of Steel"? Not the Ernst Junger book, the one about German and Soviet armor doctrine. Since they, that is the Reichswehr and Red Army, worked together to develop technology and tactics it is likely that they'd 'rub off on each other' in doctrine. In the 1920s IOTL it was the Soviets who were more innovative in armor doctrine and the Germans who were more conservative, with the flip coming in the course of the 1930s.

I'm not necessarily sure that it would be possible to continue such a conservative mindset about armor in to the 1930s given the work the French and British were doing and the developments in automotive technology.

But for the sake of argument let's say that is the case. The French and British will be doing their own thing, the Soviets would probably take their OTL direction away from armor organized independently given their own experiences and the impact of the Purges on the Soviet officer corps. The German example didn't become relevant to most nations until the victory in France in 1940 shocked everyone. Depending on how things change as a result of the butterflies the Soviets may or may not try to form mechanized corps after summer 1940.

If anything though I could see the trend toward mechanized infantry, with motorized or APC borne infantry forming the core of the 'cavalry' or at least mobile infantry formation, with something like the Panzer IV as a fire support weapon. Ironically it might give the Germans a properly balanced 1941 style panzer division (two infantry regiments and one armored regiment), just called something else. The Panzer III is certainly not going to come about if armor is just viewed as a support weapon, leaving things like towed and/or SP AT weapons the primary anti-armor weapon and actual AFVs as heavier fire support weapons or 'heavy' recon. In terms of actual unit output that would yield quite a bit of economies of scale by having fewer types.

Effectively it might mean something like the Panzergrenadier divisions of 1944 get formed in the 1930s instead, but instead of StuG support they have what would IOTL be Panzer IVs. This ATL support AFV might have a medium velocity 75 instead of the short howitzer they had IOTL by 1940, so they have more versatility in terms of being able to fight enemy armor as well as soft targets. By medium velocity I mean the L/41 75mm gun they developed IOTL in the mid-1930s for a prototype AT half track. It would certainly be the better route to take compared to the OTL version, but who knows for sure if they would.

StuGs would probably still be developed for assault engineers initially, then foot infantry divisions as IOTL.
Motorized/Mechanized infantry would probably have exclusive access to turreted AFVs. Perhaps there might be a distinction between Mechanized and Motorized divisions like the French had, but perhaps not and they all take a uniform organization so that all German mobile divisions are close to the OTL 1941 style Panzer division.
 
Have you read the book "Storm of Steel"? Not the Ernst Junger book, the one about German and Soviet armor doctrine. Since they, that is the Reichswehr and Red Army, worked together to develop technology and tactics it is likely that they'd 'rub off on each other' in doctrine. In the 1920s IOTL it was the Soviets who were more innovative in armor doctrine and the Germans who were more conservative, with the flip coming in the course of the 1930s.

Never heard of the book, tho there are many other sources describing the German Soviet cooperation previous to 1934. My main question with this; is if the Germans had dropped the idea of a 'tank' division & the tank as a "strategic weapon" was Guderian argued, how far the Red Army development would have gone. The tank crowd in Germany did not have the opportunity to apply their theories until after the German Soviet cooperation ceased 1934. I'm unclear on if the Red Army had started organizing actual armored or mechanized divisions and corps before or after that. Since they organized a large armored force of mechanized divisions and corps after the 1934 separation we cant discount the possibility the Red Army would have continued all that. However there was the disruption in the tank or mechanized units from 1937. New leadership @ STAVKA caused the mechanized forces to be radically reorganized & tank or armored divisions to be disbanded. I've been trying to translate some Soviet writing on this subject, but its pretty muddy. Its possible that without the example of the Polish campaign the Red Army would have largely abandoned the armored or mobile warfare doctrines & the mechanized or tank or mobile corps along with that.

I'm not necessarily sure that it would be possible to continue such a conservative mindset about armor in to the 1930s given the work the French and British were doing and the developments in automotive technology.

Doughty in 'Seeds of Disaster' examines that in detail. From the 1920s there was internal debate in the French army of motorization vs mechanization. The motorization school argued for replacing horses with automobiles & adjusting doctrines, but not making radical changes in operational or strategic doctrines. Note: This was well before the doctrine of the Methodical Battle dominated French army thinking. The mechanization side were arguing for deeper doctrinal and organizational changes in the ground combat forces. At the extreme end were proposals like the well known book by DeGaulle. Neither side really won. The Cavalry branch embraced mechanization, through the 1930s tracked weapons carriers, armored cars, light tanks, and "dragoon vehicles" were added to the cavalry, replacing a large portion of the horses. By 1939 plans were in place to replace the last horse mounted brigade in each of the Light Cavalry Divisions (DLC) with vehicle mounted dragoons. These were not 'armored' divisions in the usual sense but were light mechanized units similar to the US Army armored cavalry regiments/groups of 1944. The experimental 'Light Mechanized Division' the cavalry formed after 1934 was a continuation of the embrace of mechanization. For the rest of the French Army the end state was falling between the two chairs. The large number of tanks in the independent tank battalions and regiments were 'mechanization' but without a doctrine of large armored formations. Otherwise the predominate trend through 1938 was motorization, replacement of horse draught with automotive. This was largely wheeled transport, tho the tactical advantages of tracked vehicles caused increasing numbers of artillery tractors and similar to be adopted. When in 1939 'Armored Divisions' were finally authorized for the army these were equipped and organized to fit the existing Methodical Battle doctrine. That is they were not for wide sweeping maneuvers or exploitation but as armored assault units for large scale destruction of any enemy who tried to make a stand. There is the point made earlier here that battle experience would lead to larger division and corps size tank formations. This is probably correct. But I'm skeptical the French would have formed their DCR as early as they did without the example of the Germans in Poland.

The US reorganized its old and moribund experimental mechanized force into the 7th Cavalry Brigade 1932-33. This units was most notable for possessing a complete service support group or battalion. This enabled it in theory to function independently from a larger division. Through the 1930s it was equipped with the leftovers of 1918 and the 1920s, along with a variety of one off or small batch test vehicles. As equipped and organized its might be bet described as a light hybrid unit something like the French DLC. While there were a fair number of papers written and discussions of a hypothetical tank division the 7th Brigade was not it. It was until 1940 the US Army was finally able to start real experimentation with armored divisions.

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If anything though I could see the trend toward mechanized infantry, with motorized or APC borne infantry forming the core of the 'cavalry' or at least mobile infantry formation, with something like the Panzer IV as a fire support weapon. ...

That seems to be the general trend in other armies of the era, except the Red Army & its still borne tank divisions of the middle 1930s.

I suspect that as battle experience accumulated there would be a proliferation of new tactical formations, some of which might not be recognizable in our context. Lashing together new solutions on a hasty ad hoc basis may not result in organizations and tactical doctrines much like those of OTL.
 

Deleted member 1487

Never heard of the book, tho there are many other sources describing the German Soviet cooperation previous to 1934.
https://www.amazon.com/Storm-Steel-Development-Doctrine-1919-1939/dp/0801479487
Check it out, really good book on the topic, as it explores how armor doctrine developed up to 1941 in both militaries and how they influenced one another.

My main question with this; is if the Germans had dropped the idea of a 'tank' division & the tank as a "strategic weapon" was Guderian argued, how far the Red Army development would have gone.
Oswald Lutz would be an obstacle there. Guderian wasn't the only one arguing that, hardly the first, nor original in thinking. Lutz did a much of the work, as he was actually the general of the Panzertruppe as of 1935 after overseeing the motorization programs since 1933. Not to mention Ernst Volckheim, who was Guderian's basis for theory and ran the armor training program for Germany up to 1933, including the school in the USSR.

Soviet doctrine was largely independent of German developments until the war started; they were much more interested in the advanced ideas of the western powers, which actually had armor forces as of the 1930s.

The tank crowd in Germany did not have the opportunity to apply their theories until after the German Soviet cooperation ceased 1934.
No one really did other than in maneuvers, which doesn't necessarily result in good doctrine.

I'm unclear on if the Red Army had started organizing actual armored or mechanized divisions and corps before or after that.
The first Soviet mechanized brigade was formed in 1929, the first two mechanized corps were formed in 1932. They formed their own armor school the same year, separate from the Kama tank school.

Since they organized a large armored force of mechanized divisions and corps after the 1934 separation we cant discount the possibility the Red Army would have continued all that. However there was the disruption in the tank or mechanized units from 1937. New leadership @ STAVKA caused the mechanized forces to be radically reorganized & tank or armored divisions to be disbanded. I've been trying to translate some Soviet writing on this subject, but its pretty muddy. Its possible that without the example of the Polish campaign the Red Army would have largely abandoned the armored or mobile warfare doctrines & the mechanized or tank or mobile corps along with that.
Mechanized corps weren't abandoned until November 1939 in response to the problems they experienced in Poland in 1939 as well as the Winter War. They only reformed them in 1940 in response to the German example in France.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Павло...туру_и_способы_применения_танковых_соединений

Doughty in 'Seeds of Disaster' examines that in detail.

From the 1920s there was internal debate in the French army of motorization vs mechanization. The motorization school argued for replacing horses with automobiles & adjusting doctrines, but not making radical changes in operational or strategic doctrines. Note: This was well before the doctrine of the Methodical Battle dominated French army thinking. The mechanization side were arguing for deeper doctrinal and organizational changes in the ground combat forces. At the extreme end were proposals like the well known book by DeGaulle. Neither side really won. The Cavalry branch embraced mechanization, through the 1930s tracked weapons carriers, armored cars, light tanks, and "dragoon vehicles" were added to the cavalry, replacing a large portion of the horses. By 1939 plans were in place to replace the last horse mounted brigade in each of the Light Cavalry Divisions (DLC) with vehicle mounted dragoons. These were not 'armored' divisions in the usual sense but were light mechanized units similar to the US Army armored cavalry regiments/groups of 1944. The experimental 'Light Mechanized Division' the cavalry formed after 1934 was a continuation of the embrace of mechanization. For the rest of the French Army the end state was falling between the two chairs. The large number of tanks in the independent tank battalions and regiments were 'mechanization' but without a doctrine of large armored formations. Otherwise the predominate trend through 1938 was motorization, replacement of horse draught with automotive. This was largely wheeled transport, tho the tactical advantages of tracked vehicles caused increasing numbers of artillery tractors and similar to be adopted. When in 1939 'Armored Divisions' were finally authorized for the army these were equipped and organized to fit the existing Methodical Battle doctrine. That is they were not for wide sweeping maneuvers or exploitation but as armored assault units for large scale destruction of any enemy who tried to make a stand. There is the point made earlier here that battle experience would lead to larger division and corps size tank formations. This is probably correct. But I'm skeptical the French would have formed their DCR as early as they did without the example of the Germans in Poland.

The US reorganized its old and moribund experimental mechanized force into the 7th Cavalry Brigade 1932-33. This units was most notable for possessing a complete service support group or battalion. This enabled it in theory to function independently from a larger division. Through the 1930s it was equipped with the leftovers of 1918 and the 1920s, along with a variety of one off or small batch test vehicles. As equipped and organized its might be bet described as a light hybrid unit something like the French DLC. While there were a fair number of papers written and discussions of a hypothetical tank division the 7th Brigade was not it. It was until 1940 the US Army was finally able to start real experimentation with armored divisions.
The French formation of DCRs might have been influenced by what happened in Poland, but it seems like they were already on their way there IOTL by the late 1930s:
http://enpointe.perso.infonie.fr/dcr.html
https://conflictuel.pagesperso-orange.fr/LGGtemp/ARMORED UNITS IN THE 1940 WESTERN CAMPAIGN.pdf
They had apparently already formed a tank brigade/half DCR in September 1939 before the major German successes in Poland.

Also don't forget the British, who formed their own armored divisions independently in 1937:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_(United_Kingdom)_Division#Formation

As to the US...since the budget of the Depression were still lingering and there wasn't really any threat to the US before 1940 it would make a lot of sense that they were well behind in forming armored divisions or even perceiving the need for them outside of limited theoretical circles.

That seems to be the general trend in other armies of the era, except the Red Army & its still borne tank divisions of the middle 1930s.

I suspect that as battle experience accumulated there would be a proliferation of new tactical formations, some of which might not be recognizable in our context. Lashing together new solutions on a hasty ad hoc basis may not result in organizations and tactical doctrines much like those of OTL.
Fair enough, though at least in the German case given their use of the Kampfgruppe they probably will organize on an ad hoc basis per mission out of their pool of unit resources to fight like IOTL.
 
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