Green All Alike: McDowell Wins At Manassas?

And the other Confederate politicians are better?

About the only choice who would have been worse than Davis was Rhett, and even he was smart enough to realize that sending diplomats with no authority to negotiate was an exercise in futility.

Breckinridge and Reagan probably would have been the best choices, but Kentucky didn't secede and Texas was a backwater with as many electoral votes as Rhode Island.

Even if Stephens (or Cobb, Harris, Hunter, Toombs, or Wigfall) was just as bad on playing favorites as Davis' it would be extremely difficult for their favorites to be worse than Bragg, Polk, Hood, and Northrop.
 
You mean the CSA would do what it did anyway, removing Beauregard, putting Joe Johnston in charge, and Lee as chief of staff and advisor to Jeff Davis with overall charge of Confederate strategy, such as it was? OK, that's great and all but this is what happened IOTL and it didn't do anything to alter the war or to keep Little Mac from getting to the gates of Richmond even with all his flaws.

The Confederacy did try to create a 20th Century command structure in the West IOTL, the military culture of the time made it unworkable in the Confederacy, and it didn't really work that much better in the Union's simultaneous efforts. A victory for McDowell's army could potentially lead to an Army of the Potomac starting the war with a separate cavalry arm akin to those had by both sides in the West, and while this arm would still be the weakest in the service its combat experiences would strengthen it and by the end of 1862 there is no arm where any CS army is superior to any of its Union opponents. Now, what this means for the war is something else again, the Union still has to turn this into conquest.

True enough. But with Davis in charge Lee had no real authority; his position was purely advisory. At one point he even resorted to subterfuge to get Jackson to go on the offensive in the Shenandoah Valley. With a different president, one who is not so much of a micromanager (or meddler, if you prefer) Lee could exercise some real authority and actually coordinate operations throughout the Confederacy.

The earlier creation of a unified cavalry for the Army of the Potomac will be beneficial for them, of course. McDowell is not the organizer and trainer that Little Mac is, though, so that offsets it somewhat.
 
True enough. But with Davis in charge Lee had no real authority; his position was purely advisory. At one point he even resorted to subterfuge to get Jackson to go on the offensive in the Shenandoah Valley. With a different president, one who is not so much of a micromanager (or meddler, if you prefer) Lee could exercise some real authority and actually coordinate operations throughout the Confederacy.

The earlier creation of a unified cavalry for the Army of the Potomac will be beneficial for them, of course. McDowell is not the organizer and trainer that Little Mac is, though, so that offsets it somewhat.

Indeed, McDowell might find subordinates he trusts and build a proper combination of infantry-artillery-cavalry, where Little Mac never did the former and failed abysmally to use his cavalry properly any at all. Without a Confederate advantage in either leadership or in their cavalry arm the war in the East as we know it is butterflied.
 
usertron2020 said:
The war was the North's to lose. Something that, in the East at least, they did quite well to lose up until Gettysburg. Or if you wish to be generous, Antietam.

This is true. The problem with the ACW is that as long as the Union is determined and reasonably able, the Confederacy is doomed.

On the other hand, the Confederacy's actions can make an impact on that, in some ways - as shown even in 1864 in Virginia. Militarily (as Snake can/will go into if asked) Grant was kicking Lee's tail all the way back to Richmond, politically it wasn't enough.

About the only choice who would have been worse than Davis was Rhett, and even he was smart enough to realize that sending diplomats with no authority to negotiate was an exercise in futility.

Breckinridge and Reagan probably would have been the best choices, but Kentucky didn't secede and Texas was a backwater with as many electoral votes as Rhode Island.

Even if Stephens (or Cobb, Harris, Hunter, Toombs, or Wigfall) was just as bad on playing favorites as Davis' it would be extremely difficult for their favorites to be worse than Bragg, Polk, Hood, and Northrop.

It would be pretty hard to worse than Northrop, but I can see any of the others picking officers regardless of merit as part of some pet prejudice or another. Appointing guys highly regarded in the state armies with no military knowledge or likelihood of acquiring any would make even Hood look like the MVP in the West. Polk was more concerned with fighting other Confederates than the Union, so that's hardly a unique flaw.

And Bragg is not given enough credit - he's the only Confederate general other than Lee, and maybe Kirby-Smith if he gets credit as department head, to win any battles.

But the main point here is that people are acting as if Davis was unique for being petty etc. The whole point is that the other guys were as bad or worse. Their sniping and carping about Davis should not be taken as a sign that they were the ones with real insight, just in a position where its easier to criticize than do something.

I'm not saying Davis was a good choice, but the CSA doesn't have any.
 
Getting back to the original post.

1) After victory at Bull Run, how far south can McDowell go before being stopped, and what stops him?

2) Assuming he does not take Richmond, what happens next? Can the Union Army be kept in the field, keeping effective control of NE Virginia? Or does it need to retreat at some point?

3) What are the subsequent operations in 1861?

4) Given victory here and expected victories in the West in 1862, what will be the repercussions on organization of the Union Army and political interference into the war? ITOL, the defeats in 1861 provoked muich needed reforms, but it also subjected the Union army to a lot of political interference. What are the changes for good and bad?

5) What will be the long term morale effects on both the Union and Confederate armies? Can Richmond be taken in 1862 even if it can't be seized in 1861?
 
1) As far south as Joe Johnston went north after OTL Manassas. Meaning nowhere at all as victory would disorganize the US Army as badly as defeat disorganized the Confederate army, and the same logistical problems handicap the Union army at this point as would handicap the Confederate one.

2) It depends on what happens after the battle. Arguably Sherman gets a promotion in the ATL given his brigade would be crucial to any Union victory given how the battle unfolded, and McDowell may well take the time to organize an army with separate cavalry and attempts to form proper leadership in infantry, artillery, *and* cavalry and most generals other than McClellan would have organized something much bigger and better-planned than Ball's Bluff at this time.

3) Probably a few more Union raids with McDowell seeking to consolidate his control of the Manassas-Alexandria region to shield the capital as a prelude to further operations but nothing really until 1862 and the spring beyond perhaps another relatively small-scale fight that would confirm the results of the first. Maybe nipping Stonewall Jackson's career in the bud out of the starting gate with a much worse for him fight at Romney.

4) McClellan likely rises anyway due to his victories in West Virginia but winds up in continual infighting with McDowell akin to his IOTL with Pope, but a more balanced Union army spends 1862 in the East winning bloody stalemates with the Confederacy which has enough manpower and callousness to prevent the USA from menacing Richmond IOTL, the West goes as per OTL and leaves the CSA in a position for complete collapse by 1864.

5) No, but by 1863 the question will be where and when Union armies start meeting up past the state of Virginia. McDowell is unlikely IMHO to be worse than McClellan as an organizer and certainly was superior as a field commander, given he was able to understand certain realities of taking the offensive that the "great organizer" did not, and he's at least going to try to do something with the cavalry as opposed to doing nothing with it. In the long term victory at Manassas will greatly strengthen the North's strategic position in the East and as per OTL short of a Salvation War scenario there's nothing that can repair the problems the CSA will have in the West bar Jeff Davis adopting a different policy there in 1861.
 
2) It depends on what happens after the battle. Arguably Sherman gets a promotion in the ATL given his brigade would be crucial to any Union victory given how the battle unfolded, and McDowell may well take the time to organize an army with separate cavalry and attempts to form proper leadership in infantry, artillery, *and* cavalry and most generals other than McClellan would have organized something much bigger and better-planned than Ball's Bluff at this time.

3) Probably a few more Union raids with McDowell seeking to consolidate his control of the Manassas-Alexandria region to shield the capital as a prelude to further operations but nothing really until 1862 and the spring beyond perhaps another relatively small-scale fight that would confirm the results of the first. Maybe nipping Stonewall Jackson's career in the bud out of the starting gate with a much worse for him fight at Romney.

4) McClellan likely rises anyway due to his victories in West Virginia but winds up in continual infighting with McDowell akin to his IOTL with Pope, but a more balanced Union army spends 1862 in the East winning bloody stalemates with the Confederacy which has enough manpower and callousness to prevent the USA from menacing Richmond IOTL, the West goes as per OTL and leaves the CSA in a position for complete collapse by 1864.

5) No, but by 1863 the question will be where and when Union armies start meeting up past the state of Virginia. McDowell is unlikely IMHO to be worse than McClellan as an organizer and certainly was superior as a field commander, given he was able to understand certain realities of taking the offensive that the "great organizer" did not, and he's at least going to try to do something with the cavalry as opposed to doing nothing with it. In the long term victory at Manassas will greatly strengthen the North's strategic position in the East and as per OTL short of a Salvation War scenario there's nothing that can repair the problems the CSA will have in the West bar Jeff Davis adopting a different policy there in 1861.

2) Perhaps securing the Shenandoah once and for all?

3) A victory at Bull's Run gives McDowell the political heft he needs to be shielded from political interference? A level of interference that will be far less than with Little Mac as there isn't anyone north of the Mason-Dixon Line more politically cumbersome than McDowell's OTL succesor?

4) Where does Little Mac go with McDowell in place? Commander of the "Army of Virginia"? Or "Army of the Shenandoah"? He won't settle for a corps command, can't command cavalry, and won't subordinate himself to Julius Caesar, much less McDowell.:mad:

5) With a victory at Bulls Run, and a conquest of Virginia in 1862, McDowell's position becomes invincible (there'd already be talk of "President McDowell"). Once Richmond falls, his appointment as "General-In-Chief" is assured. It's a question though whether Mac still has a job, or has been moved elsewhere (Charleston? Mobile? Wilmington? The West?). I wonder how far and how long the CSA can hold together should Virginia fall within a year to eighteen months of the war starting.

And if the South shunts more forces East to face McDowell, that means heavy consequences in the West, allowing Grant to kick serious ass a whole lot sooner. Even Rosecrans could gain major battlefield victories (as opposed to victories of maneuver) ITTL.
 
2) Perhaps securing the Shenandoah once and for all?

3) A victory at Bull's Run gives McDowell the political heft he needs to be shielded from political interference? A level of interference that will be far less than with Little Mac as there isn't anyone north of the Mason-Dixon Line more politically cumbersome than McDowell's OTL succesor?

4) Where does Little Mac go with McDowell in place? Commander of the "Army of Virginia"? Or "Army of the Shenandoah"? He won't settle for a corps command, can't command cavalry, and won't subordinate himself to Julius Caesar, much less McDowell.:mad:

5) With a victory at Bulls Run, and a conquest of Virginia in 1862, McDowell's position becomes invincible (there'd already be talk of "President McDowell"). Once Richmond falls, his appointment as "General-In-Chief" is assured. It's a question though whether Mac still has a job, or has been moved elsewhere (Charleston? Mobile? Wilmington? The West?). I wonder how far and how long the CSA can hold together should Virginia fall within a year to eighteen months of the war starting.

And if the South shunts more forces East to face McDowell, that means heavy consequences in the West, allowing Grant to kick serious ass a whole lot sooner. Even Rosecrans could gain major battlefield victories (as opposed to victories of maneuver) ITTL.

2) Yes, perhaps. It depends on what happens with Romney. In particular if say, Rosecrans or Thomas stay in the East this gives it at least two good field commanders as opposed to middling organizers and lousy field commanders. McDowell + Thomas or even McDowell + Rosecrans alters the Union leadership relative to the CS leadership in a big way, and one hardly favoring the Confederacy. Their major advantage was a superior set of leaders, simpler command structure, and in the East a functional, well-led cavalry arm (it was there in the West, too, but there were too many problems for anything tactical to alter it). This goes away, there goes the OTL Eastern war.

3) Pretty much, yes. By comparison to that victory what happened in West Virginia will be middling and left to himself Little Mac will get into a brawl with Rosecrans over jurisdiction that may remove him from field command altogether. Which is great....for the Union.

4) Precisely. From President Lincoln's viewpoint 18,000 men guaranteeing the security of Washington v. a paltry few thousands smashing smaller CS forces favors McDowell, from Little Mac's viewpoint he alone knows all and nobody else knows anything, and without his OTL string of luck in his favor due to McDowell's misfortune he'd be a Bull Nelson at best.

5) I doubt it would fall that soon, but I believe in an ATL 1862 with a much-improved leadership in the East the fall of the Valley is inevitable in this year, and Richmond falls in the first 1863 campaign. The primary problem would be to transform the major Eastern army, which will still be the Union's largest, into a functional unit of all arms which is not something that any general has done before, and the logistics may well delay McDowell into 1862 just for itself. McDowell will do such self-evident things as keeping steady communication with Lincoln and the like that will make this much more politically feasible and give him much more room to maneuver to prepare a sound military force.

Endless quiet on the Potomac with no idea of what's going on v. a protracted tactical pause and steady communication between POTUS and his major general in the East, one whose combat ideas if Manassas and his realization of what Jackson was doing in the Shenandoah were any indication were actually pretty sound will give the Union a chance to put some serious hurt on the Confederacy and its odds of lasting to November 1864 are very narrow indeed.
 
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