Greece Holds Out or No Italo-Greek War: Allied Operations in the Balkans?

The main scenario I would like to discuss is the Axis invasion of Greece that, IOTL, led to the occupation of mainland Greece by April of 1941. Suppose that, somehow, some part of mainland Greece is free of Axis forces in early 1942--either the Germans don't intervene and the Italo-Greek war degenerates into a stalemate, or there is no Italo-Greek War at all. Or the Greeks perform much better than IOTL and hold the Germans at the Peloponnese.

Could Greece become a starting point for Anglo-American land operations in the European continent in 1942? If Greece is holding out in some form, how many troops can the Allies put in to start driving the Axis forces back? And how would such a Balkan campaign look?

The main reason for this question is that, until 1943 (when the Allies made Unconditional Surrender their official war aim) there were Hungarian and Romanian politicians open to changing sides, and I am curious as to whether they could actually manage it if Allied forces could grind their way through Greece and into Bulgaria and Yugoslavia by the end of 1942.

If there is no Italo-Greek War at all, and Greece remains neutral, would the country instead be a Spain-like neutral power, or might the Allies somehow turn it to their side and use it as a springboard that way?
 
In 1942? I don't think. they could definitely use it as a jumping off point for an invasion of Italy through the straits of Otranto, but I don't think they'll invade the Balkans so early, it's a really wide front.
in 1944 I can imagine the western allies using Greece to liberate Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to block the Soviets.
 
In 1942? I don't think. they could definitely use it as a jumping off point for an invasion of Italy through the straits of Otranto, but I don't think they'll invade the Balkans so early, it's a really wide front.
in 1944 I can imagine the western allies using Greece to liberate Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to block the Soviets.

The question is also inspired by some reading of "Operation Sledgehammer," the proposed invasion of France in 1942. There was a heavy lobby in the US command structure and, of course, from Stalin for immediate Allied operations in Europe, so I think that, if Greece held at all, there'd be a lobby to put divisions in there.

There are of course logistical challenges, which suggest that something like Operation Torch would still happen--to clear a supply route from Gibraltar to the eastern end of the Mediterranean.
 

raharris1973

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I think in the period between taking Paris and Barbarossa, the Germans would ultimately ensure that any Italo-Greek War, especially one they are participating in, does not stalemate. They'd do this pulling in more resources and possibly delaying Barbarossa for some weeks, if it became necessary. The Germans can probably live with not having Crete or Rhodes, but they couldn't take the risk of an Allied holdout in the Peloponnese.

So this means the realistic circumstance to focus on is the Italians not launching the war in Greece to begin with. Or launching it just before Barbarossa starts.
 

raharris1973

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Continuing based on the logic I laid out, getting Greece to turn from an unmolested neutral to pro-Allied would require at a minimum territorial bribes (Cyprus + Dodecanese + southern Albanian + eve more) and promises of massive support and reinforcement.

An important factor is that Yugoslavia is likely to be paired with Greece in neutrality. It was the need to invade Greece and the unpopularity of Yugoslav adherence to the Tripartite Pact that caused the March coup that caused the German invasion of Yugoslavia. Perhaps without an Italo-Greek War there is less pressure on Yugoslavia, the Axis powers are satisfied as long as the flow of minerals continues and the Regency of Prince Paul survives.

It would be tempting for the Allies to tempt Yugoslavia and Greece into the anti-Nazi fight, but the latter will not find the case persuasive until the local tides are visibly turning in the Allies' favor.
 

Ian_W

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How are people proposing the Allies supply ~20 divisions on the roads and railways going north from Greece ?
 
I think in the period between taking Paris and Barbarossa, the Germans would ultimately ensure that any Italo-Greek War, especially one they are participating in, does not stalemate. They'd do this pulling in more resources and possibly delaying Barbarossa for some weeks, if it became necessary. The Germans can probably live with not having Crete or Rhodes, but they couldn't take the risk of an Allied holdout in the Peloponnese.

So this means the realistic circumstance to focus on is the Italians not launching the war in Greece to begin with. Or launching it just before Barbarossa starts.

Barbarossa was already running late. If you need to delay it "some more weeks" you can just as well delay it for 1942. And how likely is Hitler to do that as opposed to falling back to the original Marita that called for capturing north Greece, declare victory and leave behind the Italians and Bulgarians finish the job? After all Soviet Union is supposed to fall by winter. If the Italians botch up the job, the Germans can finish it up after the Soviets have been defeated. Too bad the Soviet Union won't be cooperating.
 
"The Soft Underbelly of Europe." Yah, right.

Well a little bit mountainous without roads or railroads and full of friendly rifle totting locals but yes. After all the locals are on your side. Well not all the locals but at least the ones in Greece and half of Yugoslavia ...
 

raharris1973

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In 1942? I don't think. they could definitely use it as a jumping off point for an invasion of Italy through the straits of Otranto,

In '42 or '43?

I don't think they'll invade the Balkans so early, it's a really wide front.

So not in '42. Not in '43 either? The width of the front is to some extent a feature, not a bug, because you can threaten multiple divergent objectives more easily than on a narrow front.

How are people proposing the Allies supply ~20 divisions on the roads and railways going north from Greece ?

Well, they will just have to figure things out and build what they need to support a force to first hold their mainland readout and eventually start expanding it.

As @Polish Eagle suggested, with pressure to act against the Germans domestically and from the Soviets, there will be no politically feasible way to avoid a heavy investment in the only part of Europe where Western Allied forces are in direct contact with German ground force. FDR will want the US to be seen doing its part. If the stage is in Greece and that's less than optimal for the main event, tough, they'll still have a significant effort there, whatever else they plan to supplement it with on the West European coast most likely.

There was a heavy lobby in the US command structure and, of course, from Stalin for immediate Allied operations in Europe, so I think that, if Greece held at all, there'd be a lobby to put divisions in there.

And how likely is Hitler to do that as opposed to falling back to the original Marita that called for capturing north Greece, declare victory and leave behind the Italians and Bulgarians finish the job?

If the Italians botch up the job, the Germans can finish it up after the Soviets have been defeated.

This just seems wrong, as it leaves an open flank, and does not close it down, and it relies on the Italians, whose poor performance made the German intervention necessary in the first place. Can Hitler be sure that the Italians and Bulgarians can finish off the Peloponnese (and maybe Attica) and the Greek and British Empire forces there?

Leaving an Allied foothold on the mainland seems to court a risky situation during a Soviet campaign where the British choose that moment to massively reinforce and threaten/distract Germany's southern European allies.
 

raharris1973

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The main scenario I would like to discuss is the Axis invasion of Greece that, IOTL, led to the occupation of mainland Greece by April of 1941. Suppose that, somehow, some part of mainland Greece is free of Axis forces in early 1942--either the Germans don't intervene and the Italo-Greek war degenerates into a stalemate, or there is no Italo-Greek War at all. Or the Greeks perform much better than IOTL and hold the Germans at the Peloponnese.

Could Greece become a starting point for Anglo-American land operations in the European continent in 1942? If Greece is holding out in some form, how many troops can the Allies put in to start driving the Axis forces back? And how would such a Balkan campaign look?

The main reason for this question is that, until 1943 (when the Allies made Unconditional Surrender their official war aim) there were Hungarian and Romanian politicians open to changing sides, and I am curious as to whether they could actually manage it if Allied forces could grind their way through Greece and into Bulgaria and Yugoslavia by the end of 1942.

If there is no Italo-Greek War at all, and Greece remains neutral, would the country instead be a Spain-like neutral power, or might the Allies somehow turn it to their side and use it as a springboard that way?

Despite my skepticism about any part of mainland Greece being held if the Axis powers bring it into the war before Barbarossa, I'd be interested to see any scenario where you make it work.
 
In '42 or '43?


This just seems wrong, as it leaves an open flank, and does not close it down, and it relies on the Italians, whose poor performance made the German intervention necessary in the first place. Can Hitler be sure that the Italians and Bulgarians can finish off the Peloponnese (and maybe Attica) and the Greek and British Empire forces there?

Leaving an Allied foothold on the mainland seems to court a risky situation during a Soviet campaign where the British choose that moment to massively reinforce and threaten/distract Germany's southern European allies.

We are talking about the same man and military organization, that decided that it was a sound strategic option to launch an all out invasion of the Soviet Union with Britain still undefeated. In comparison not finishing up Greece from the German point of view is a reasonable strategic risk. The threat has been seriously reduced with the capture of Northern Greece (even more if central Greece got also taken). Britain can be expected not to be able to reinforce in any serious extend Greece for the foreseeable future (as in several months to a year), where are the logistics and divisions coming from to deal with 20-30 Axis divisions in the Greek mainland? Given that the expectation is that by Christmas everything up to the Urals will be the new shiny province of the Reich?
 

raharris1973

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We are talking about the same man and military organization, that decided that it was a sound strategic option to launch an all out invasion of the Soviet Union with Britain still undefeated. In comparison not finishing up Greece from the German point of view is a reasonable strategic risk. The threat has been seriously reduced with the capture of Northern Greece (even more if central Greece got also taken). Britain can be expected not to be able to reinforce in any serious extend Greece for the foreseeable future (as in several months to a year), where are the logistics and divisions coming from to deal with 20-30 Axis divisions in the Greek mainland? Given that the expectation is that by Christmas everything up to the Urals will be the new shiny province of the Reich?

OK, I'll take that as part 1 of the scenario-

What happens from July 1 1941 to January 1 1943?
 

Ian_W

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OK, I'll take that as part 1 of the scenario-

What happens from July 1 1941 to January 1 1943?

The Allies manage to get a foothold in Northern Greece, but keep running their heads into walls of German artillery, mortar and antitank fire in the Balkan mountains. The campaign is widely agreed to be a strategic mistake, as the logistics needed to support a victory simply does not exist.

Eventually, Allied troops link up with Soviet troops along the Bulgarian-Rumanian border as Yugoslavia is liberated by Tito.

Future historians agree that Churchill's Mistake delayed Overlord from 1943 to 1944.
 
Assuming the Greeks remain neutral, when the tide begins to turn obviously to the Allies they might throw in, but until then they will be neutral, perhaps Allied friendly (like Spain for Axis). They may protest Allied bombers flying over Greece to hit Romania but "we don't have the resources to do anything about it". If the Italians invade but they are held more or less like OTL the British will reinforce the Greeks, send some equipment. However North Africa is more vital, so until 1943 when North Africa is cleared out, the Greek front is a backwater. BTW I wonder if the Bulgarians would pile on if the Italians (and Germans) don't trash the Greeks.
 

raharris1973

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@Polish Eagle

We need to consider your scenarios separately, here is the first:

Suppose that, somehow, some part of mainland Greece is free of Axis forces in early 1942--either the Germans don't intervene and the Italo-Greek war degenerates into a stalemate. Or the Greeks perform much better than IOTL and hold the Germans at the Peloponnese.

Could Greece become a starting point for Anglo-American land operations in the European continent in 1942? If Greece is holding out in some form, how many troops can the Allies put in to start driving the Axis forces back? And how would such a Balkan campaign look?

I'd love to see a slightly more detailed discussion of the plausibility of the Greeks holding the Peloponnese in the face of Italo-German invasion. That aside, there is high potential with the quoted scenarios for the situation to end up as Ian W., with the British bottlenecked for a long time and not outracing the Soviets to Romania or Hungary.

Eventually, Allied troops link up with Soviet troops along the Bulgarian-Rumanian border as Yugoslavia is liberated by Tito.

Reasons: Germans will know this frontier bears watching and defending, Germans have substantial force to contain the British and take maximum advantage or rough terrain. Germans are there to stiffen the Bulgarians and their Greek, Serb and Albanian puppets.

Your second scenario scenario I believe has more potential for a "grand realignment" of the Balkans occurring quickly.

The main scenario I would like to discuss is there is no Italo-Greek War at all. .

Could Greece become a starting point for Anglo-American land operations in the European continent in 1942? And how would such a Balkan campaign look?

The main reason for this question is that, until 1943 (when the Allies made Unconditional Surrender their official war aim) there were Hungarian and Romanian politicians open to changing sides, and I am curious as to whether they could actually manage it if Allied forces could grind their way through Greece and into Bulgaria and Yugoslavia by the end of 1942.

If there is no Italo-Greek War at all, and Greece remains neutral, would the country instead be a Spain-like neutral power, or might the Allies somehow turn it to their side and use it as a springboard that way?

1942 is too early for the British to make any headway and too early for the Greeks to abandon neutrality.

Now 1943 can be a different story. Once the Allies have taken North Africa and cleared Mediterranean shipping routes (with or without seizing Sicily) they can be more convincing when they try to persuade the Greeks they can get forces in fast.

The logistics and infrastructure are not much better, but if plotting can be done between Hungarian and Romanian politicians (and maybe Italian too) within the Axis, the Western Allies and key authorities in neutral Greece and Yugoslavia, the Allies can propose that they can send light but capable forces to aid Hungary and Romania when they defect by being granted unopposed movement through Greece and Yugoslavia and Greek and Yugoslavian reinforcements.

Neither neutral Greece, nor neutral Yugoslavia will easily jump in the war if they think that will make them a battleground or a front-line.

If they think there is an understanding with Hungary and Romania where the latter defect though, and that western troops will pass all the way through them, then Athens and Belgrade could see such cooperation as improving their security for the wartime and post-war. Germany is going to start looking weaker after Stalingrad.

Even if the Western Allies only have a crappy transportation network and rugged terrain to get forces through to Hungary and Romania, in the absence of German opposition on the spot, with Yugoslav and Greek acquiesce/nonresistance or even collaboration with Allied movement, then the western allies can beat the Soviets to Bucharest and Buda.
 
@Polish Eagle

We need to consider your scenarios separately, here is the first:



I'd love to see a slightly more detailed discussion of the plausibility of the Greeks holding the Peloponnese in the face of Italo-German invasion. That aside, there is high potential with the quoted scenarios for the situation to end up as Ian W., with the British bottlenecked for a long time and not outracing the Soviets to Romania or Hungary.



Reasons: Germans will know this frontier bears watching and defending, Germans have substantial force to contain the British and take maximum advantage or rough terrain. Germans are there to stiffen the Bulgarians and their Greek, Serb and Albanian puppets.

I agree, it would be difficult for the Allies to decisively push the Axis out of Greece and into the Balkans much more quickly than IOTL. Still, if they do push into Romania, or start hitting Ploesti sooner from airfields in Greece, they might damage the German war effort more severely sooner.

Your second scenario scenario I believe has more potential for a "grand realignment" of the Balkans occurring quickly.



1942 is too early for the British to make any headway and too early for the Greeks to abandon neutrality.

Now 1943 can be a different story. Once the Allies have taken North Africa and cleared Mediterranean shipping routes (with or without seizing Sicily) they can be more convincing when they try to persuade the Greeks they can get forces in fast.

The logistics and infrastructure are not much better, but if plotting can be done between Hungarian and Romanian politicians (and maybe Italian too) within the Axis, the Western Allies and key authorities in neutral Greece and Yugoslavia, the Allies can propose that they can send light but capable forces to aid Hungary and Romania when they defect by being granted unopposed movement through Greece and Yugoslavia and Greek and Yugoslavian reinforcements.

Neither neutral Greece, nor neutral Yugoslavia will easily jump in the war if they think that will make them a battleground or a front-line.

If they think there is an understanding with Hungary and Romania where the latter defect though, and that western troops will pass all the way through them, then Athens and Belgrade could see such cooperation as improving their security for the wartime and post-war. Germany is going to start looking weaker after Stalingrad.

Even if the Western Allies only have a crappy transportation network and rugged terrain to get forces through to Hungary and Romania, in the absence of German opposition on the spot, with Yugoslav and Greek acquiesce/nonresistance or even collaboration with Allied movement, then the western allies can beat the Soviets to Bucharest and Buda.

I admit, the Balkan front of WWII isn't my strong suit. This thread originated from a "How could Mussolini redeem himself?" discussion, where I suggested that the only way for Mussolini to do that would be to jump ship before Unconditional Surrender becomes an official Allied war aim, and that this would require Allied victories in the Balkans (because an invasion of Italy would render the question of Mussolini changing sides moot) by 1943. The Siege of Malta would definitely have to be resolved much sooner than IOTL--possibly with a heavy infusion of American naval assets to the Mediterranean.

Yugoslavian neutrality is not a scenario I had considered, but it makes sense that it would be required to get the entire Balkan Peninsula on the Allied side--once Hungary goes full "Revise Trianon," they're too heavily invested in the Axis cause for an easy defection.

Yugoslavia's partition was a consequence of Axis pressure on the Balkan states to join the struggle against the Soviet Union--but without the Italian invasion of Greece, there's less work for the Axis to do at all in the Balkans, so maybe Yugoslavia could avoid German and Italian interest.

According to Wikipedia, the Germans opposed the invasion of Greece in the first place, preferring Italy to concentrate on North Africa. Maybe if Mussolini pays more attention to German warnings and does so, the Balkan front can be avoided and the Balkan realignment you propose can go ahead in 1943. By that point, the Soviet counteroffensive puts the specter of Communism back into Europe, so the threat of Soviet domination would be an incentive for the Germans' Balkan allies to defect.

If the Allies play their cards right, they can get troops all the way up along the Carpathians and moving on Vienna by the start of 1944. And cut off from Romanian oil, the German war machine would collapse in Ukraine and Belarus more quickly.

Of course, all this is contingent on Greece deciding to join the Allies in 1943, as opposed to following the Turkish example of remaining neutral until the last moment. Unlike the Hungarians and Romanians, the Greeks have no reason to believe that the Allies would allow the Soviets any influence in Greece--so what could the Allies promise them to get them to join, if the Germans and Italians are distracted in Russia and North Africa?
 
@Polish Eagle

We need to consider your scenarios separately, here is the first:



I'd love to see a slightly more detailed discussion of the plausibility of the Greeks holding the Peloponnese in the face of Italo-German invasion. That aside, there is high potential with the quoted scenarios for the situation to end up as Ian W., with the British bottlenecked for a long time and not outracing the Soviets to Romania or Hungary.

Let me take a shot at this actually. OTL allied forces deployed in two entirely separate positions with 4 divisions on the Bulgarian border, in a position that was known that it could be flanked in the west from Doiran and another 4 on the Aliakmon, 200km apart from the first (an also with a potentially exposed flank at Monastir). At the same time Papagos kept refusing to pull back forces from Albania to the potentially far more defensible Olympus-Venetikos line not just before the invasion as proposed to him by his corps commanders but all the way to April 13th was time had effectively run out.

The actual deployments and the proposed Olympus line can be seen here:

http://tothosewhoserved.org/aus/army/ausarm02/img/img004.jpg

So my POD is simple. Let the Italians helpfully drop a bomb on Papagos head sometime in late January. His replacement is either one of the corps level commanders (possibly Tsolakoglou) or one of the ex chiefs of staff whom Papagos replaced (Katheniotis I suppose although Theodore Pangalos is an interesting outside possibility and since command was offered him in late April after it was too late and again in place of Papagos in 1948 maybe he is not that outside a possibility as it looks)

Either option the allies by the start of April have pulled back on the Olympus line with only holding forces in Eastern Macedonia (the garrisons of the forts backed by a single division sized force consisting of the Neston and Ebros Brigades) while everyone else has been moved to the Olympus. Further the West Macedonia Army detachment with 6 more divisions (all veteran and better equipped ) is also deployed on the Olympus, the remaining 9 divisions of the Albanian front have been pulled back behind the Venetikos river. In total 14 divisions (10 infantry, 1 cavalry and 1 motorised for the Greeks plus the ANZAC and a British armoured brigade) will be dug in some extremely defensible terrain, with a grand total of three passes to access it and which the Germans will need about 5-6 days of advancing to make contact with in the first place with elements of 7 divisions that will be increasing to 9, further forces will have to be brought down from Belgrade, Bosnia and Croatia and there will be supply issues, only a single railroad coming down from Belgrade plus what will be going through Bulgaria to supply the attack.

Under the situation you stand a good chance to hold on Olympus in the first place, the Germans did not go through till April 19th OTL against about a quarter of the allied force in TTL which was not dug in for the past several weeks and if not to make an orderly withdrawal to Thermopylae, which means the Germans add yet more distance this time with a single track railroad for supply, and from there down to Attica and the Peloponnese.

Won't cheat by using a 1935 POD to make things even easier for the allies...
 

raharris1973

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snip
Of course, all this is contingent on Greece deciding to join the Allies in 1943, as opposed to following the Turkish example of remaining neutral until the last moment. Unlike the Hungarians and Romanians, the Greeks have no reason to believe that the Allies would allow the Soviets any influence in Greece--so what could the Allies promise them to get them to join, if the Germans and Italians are distracted in Russia and North Africa?

The best I can think of to motivate Greece is the following:

getting Greece to turn from an unmolested neutral to pro-Allied would require at a minimum territorial bribes (Cyprus + Dodecanese + southern Albania + maybe even more & not sure what that could be) and promises of massive support and reinforcement.
 
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