Before accepting this view, students of World War Two should read Crusade in Europe which shows that Ike knew what he was doing most of the time and had good reasons for his decisions. The book reveals a mind steeped in the "military matters" that mattered most, including combined arms doctrine, logistics, force ratios, morale, coalition building, and how to handle prima donnas (of which there were many on the Allied command levels). Also there are many military historians (although not British ones) who take a very positive view of Eisenhower's leadership.
Oh, and read in Ike's book about how Alanbrooke wanted to call off D-Day, predicting disaster.
Except that Eisenhower
Crusade in Europe is his bit of propaganda. Its his biased version of events and is disputed in its validity. Its something that he wrote to try and present himself in a better light than he deserved and did this at the expense of either other generals or of Allied relations.
One thing, for example, that Eisenhower is to blame for is the split of historians and in the public mindset of the Normandy Campaign between the fighting of national armies. Where as Montgomery planned the whole Overlord Campaign as an Allied offensive, utilising both British/Commonwealth and United States troops to bring about one main strategical plan with one great victory for all and never tried to talk of the battle as seperate engagements Eisenhower alleged that the British/Commonwealth had failed in the tasks assigned to them and it was up to the Americans to save the day, which greatly annoyed Montgomery because he had told Eisenhower repeatedly throughout the planning of the campaign and its execution what the plan was and how he was planning to execute it.
Alanbrooke may have been nervous of the potential successes of Operation Overlord but he never officially called for it to be called off even if he expressed such a desire in private which, reading through his diaries, he does not seem to have done anyway.
Eisenhower was not above lying about other commanders and thier views or misquoting them if it meant making himself look good as a general. He did in one very clear example when trying to justify his broad front strategy when he claimed that Alanbrooke had admitted Eisenhower had been right to insist on the Broad Front.
Eisenhower telegraphed Marshall around March 25th 1945 with these words:
Naturally I am immensly pleased that the campaign west of the Rhine that Bradley and I planned last summer and insisted upon as a necessary preliminary to a deep penetration of the Rhine, has been carried out so closely in accordance with the conception. You possibly know that at one time the C.I.G.S [Alanbrooke]
thought I was wrong in what I was trying to do and argued heatedly upon the matter [on the eve of the German Ardennes Offensive].
Yesterday I saw him on the banks of the Rhine and he was gracious enough to say I was right, and that my current plan operations are well calculated to meet the current situation....I hope this does not sound boastful, but I admit to a great satisfaction that the things that Bradley and I have believed in from the beginning and have carried out in the face of some opposition both from within and without, have matured so spledidly. This Eisenhower repeated in Crusade in Europe and raised the ire of Alanbrooke.
Alanbrooke's diary entry of this meeting between him and Eisenhower read thus:
We were met there [Rhineberg]
by Eisenhower, Bradley and Simpson [commander US 9th Army].
I had a talk with Ike on the question of the surrender of Kesselring and all the other purely military surrenders. He also wanted to know whether I agreed with his present plans of pushing south for Franfurt and Kassel. I told him that with the Germans crumbling as they are the whole situation is now altered from the time of our previous discussions. Evidently the Bosche is cracking and what we want now is to push him relentlessly wherever we can until he crumples. In his present condition we certainly have necessary strenght for a double envelopment strategy which I did not consider as applicable when he was still in a position to resist seriously.
Alanbrooke wrote of Eisenhower version in Crusade in Europe that:
On page 372 of Eisenhowers Crusade in Europe he refers to a conversation which took place between us on the day this diary entry was written [March 25th 1945].
I feel certain he did not write at once the statement which he attributes to me, and I can only assume that when he came to write it down he did not remember clearly what I had said. According to him when we stood together on the bank of the Rhine on March 25th, I said to him "Thank God, Ike, you stuck to you plan. You were completely right, and I am sorry if my fear of dispersed efforts added to your burdens. The German is now licked. It is merely a question of when he choses to quit. Thank God you stuck to your guns." I think that when this statement is considered in connection with what I wrote in my diary that evening, it will be clear that I was misquoted. To the best of my memory I congradulated him heartily on his success, and said that as matters had turned out his policy was now the correct one, that with the German in his defeated condition no dangers now existed in a dispersal of effort. I am quite certian I never said to him "You were completely right", as I am still convinced that he was "completely wrong", as proved by the temporary defeat inflicted upon him by Rundstedt's counter stroke [Ardennes Offensive/Battle of the Bulge]
, which considerably retarded the defeat of Germany.
So I stand by my original statement. Eisenhower may have been a great coalition leader, he may have been a great politician but he was a complete amatuer as a general. That Eisenhower was written off as "hopeless as a general" at least twice by Alanbrooke is something worth noting and because of the weight Alanbrooke carries in assessments of military abilities and situations the only way we can disregard his assessment is if you believe he was bitter about not getting the SHEAF job - which is not a theory I subscribe to.
America had better generals that Eisenhower during WW2. Bradley was better, Patton was better, Hodges was better, Simpson was better, Devers was better, Collins was better, Truscott was better, etc, etc but Eisenhower had two things in his favor that the others did not. The first was that he was Marshall's favorite and was promoted to the highest office availble mainly because of this (his record pre-war and his performance during the North Africa and Mediterranean campaigns certainly didn't justify him being overall commander of any coalition force) and the second thing he had in his favor was that he was a damned good politician and that allowed him to balence and control the egos involved in the the Army Groups below the office of SHEAF and the ego's above the office of SHEAF. Had any of the other American Generals listed been SHEAF it would have been an unmitigated disaster.
I believe that there are only two people who could have concievably done as good a job as Eisenhower from a political stand point and I believe they are George Marshall and Alanbrooke but of those two I can only say that I beleive Alanbrooke would have done a better job from a military stand point as Marshall was completely untested as a field commander.