Greatest American General

Washington was a terrible tactician, he didn’t know how to effectively employ cavalry, the New York campaign was an utter disaster for the Americans, and he was lucky Cornwallis wasn’t that much better than him or he would have finished the job in New Jersey. For the rest of the war he was constantly obsessed with recapturing New York while neglecting the Southern theater, which luckily for the Americans Nathanael Greene salvaged. Washington had charisma, he knew how to mantain order and morale, but comparing him to Lee, Scott? It’d be like comparing George McClellan to Grant and Sherman.




I would be the first to admit that tactically Washington didn't show too much to prove it was his strongest point. And yes, the early war NY events are probably the best case in point. He himself basically stated it was a miracle (literally he credited providence) that allowed escape. Yet, if purely basing the question on 'greatest general', I still would choose him based on the situation and circumstances he faced and more importantly the results of his command. The limitations of his political support, logistics lack thereof, and conditions of the commanders he was forced to use, all are strains and hindrances some of the others on this list couldn't even imagine. Greene is one of my favorites (got his portrait right here in my cube), and in many ways Washington's superior, but I still have doubts anyone put in Washington's place could have done a better job. For example, even the best tactical plan might fail miserably if the men are not inspired to fight. I don't take anything away from Greene, I only feel Washington's conduct, perseverance, inspiration, dedication, and pressures facing him in his moment were worthy of catapulting him over the others IMHO. Even when making the case for Greene, I also strongly disagree on a McClellan comparison to Washington, and feel is incredibly unjust and untrue. The decision to attack Trenton alone is an example of something McClellan would never do.

Lee and Jackson are overrated generals, IMO. Jackson was a competent corps commander with a unique ability to inspire his men, a good quality to be sure but he was widely disliked by his subordinates because he was terrible at communication. He would have been a disaster at any level above a corps.


Lee frequently beat inferior opponents despite setting himself up for destruction. His army should have been smashed to pieces at Chancellorsville and Antietam but on both occasions the Union commanders lost their nerve.


It must be remembered that the mystique of Jackson and Lee are almost entirely inflated by post-war Lost Cause mythologizing that resulted in their elevations to exalted status at the expense of other generals like Longstreet, who was reviled for supporting Reconstruction.


As for Lee, I think again you fail to appreciate being in command of a force often incredible outnumbered, while burdened with protecting a single geographic location for fear of losing the war (Richmond). Bad leadership on the Federal side indeed, but Lee's moves often were bold and risky because he had to be. There wasn't much choice beyond risking destruction because the alternative was letting the Union build up overwhelming force and just beating him down through attrition (aka what Grant managed eventually). As for Stonewall, he was disliked, but often if you look you'll see that before his death almost all of those came around to seeing his genius. He was terrible at communication, but often because he was obsessed with secrecy, to the point where it did cost him sometimes. He was petty, and devoted to duty literally to a fault. But you can't look at what his forces did in the Shenandoah and claim overrated. As for post-war mystique ... that would be almost equally given from both North and South so I don't see much evidence it was some kind of undeserved flattery by a defeated society. Who would you propose are more deserving generals? But again I'm defending the Generals I didn't even select as my pick.
 
As for Lee, I think again you fail to appreciate being in command of a force often incredible outnumbered, while burdened with protecting a single geographic location for fear of losing the war (Richmond). Bad leadership on the Federal side indeed, but Lee's moves often were bold and risky because he had to be. There wasn't much choice beyond risking destruction because the alternative was letting the Union build up overwhelming force and just beating him down through attrition (aka what Grant managed eventually).

Granted this was not Lee's call to make but I find it noteworthy that only at Chickamagua did the Confederates fully utilize the ability to use interior lines to shift forces from the Eastern theater to the West. A better strategy would be less about trying to march North and whip the Army of the Potomac and more about holding onto as much of the Confederacy as possible until the 1864 elections where their best hope is to get Lincoln kicked out of office. Thus fighting defensively would be the best course of action, not exposing the army to destruction by marching into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Instead of attacking at Gettysburg some of those troops could have been sent to assist Vicksburg, a strategic location that was absolutely vital to the Confederate cause.

As for Stonewall, he was disliked, but often if you look you'll see that before his death almost all of those came around to seeing his genius. He was terrible at communication, but often because he was obsessed with secrecy, to the point where it did cost him sometimes. He was petty, and devoted to duty literally to a fault. But you can't look at what his forces did in the Shenandoah and claim overrated.

Like I said, Stonewall was competent and had a solid grasp of tactics, making him a real assist to ANV. But so many seem to think if he hadn't had his unfortunate accident then suddenly the CSA has a real chance at winning and that's an attitude that persisted after the war by an embittered society.

Hell, Jackson's most celebrated action at Chancellorsville was nearly undid by Dan Sickles, of all generals, who noticed his movement around the Union flank and wanted to attack but was denied by Hooker. Imagine if a political general with zero military experience foiled the great Stonewall Jackson.

Who would you propose are more deserving generals? But again I'm defending the Generals I didn't even select as my pick.

James Longstreet for the Confederates and George Thomas for the Union.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Washington was a terrible tactician, he didn’t know how to effectively employ cavalry, the New York campaign was an utter disaster for the Americans, and he was lucky Cornwallis wasn’t that much better than him or he would have finished the job in New Jersey. For the rest of the war he was constantly obsessed with recapturing New York while neglecting the Southern theater, which luckily for the Americans Nathanael Greene salvaged. Washington had charisma, he knew how to mantain order and morale, but comparing him to Lee, Scott? It’d be like comparing George McClellan to Grant and Sherman.
The problem with this analysis it that it fails to consider what Washington's primary mission was; ironically it was the exact same mission that Lee had 87 years later. Both men's primary task was to KEEP THEIR ARMY ALIVE. Battles won and lost were important, and his subordinates did so, be it Greene in the South or Arnold at Saratoga, but the critical element was to keep a viable force in the field and prevent it being bottled up and destroyed. Washington succeeded in this, Lee failed.

Lee, like Washington, was in command of the one force his Nation could not afford to lose, the one command that could not be destroyed. Yet Lee willingly went into Pennsylvania to engage a much stronger force, allowed his lower ranking subordinates to engage the enemy while his forces were still scattered, refused to withdraw to strong defensive ground and force the Federals to make yet another pointless frontal assault. As a result his army was shattered, never to fully recover and forced into an ever shrinking set of defensive works.

Washington had to keep his army in being until the French decided to aid the Rebellion, and succeeded. Lee had to keep his army in being and effective until the Northern electorate grew weary of the War's cost and he failed. Washington may not have been a tactical genius, but he was a master strategist. Possibly the best measure is this: Washington's country still exists; Lee's does not.
 
Last edited:
Basically agree with the assessment that Lee and Jackson's faults are too easily overlooked, but Longstreet's record was as mixed as anyone's. In independent command he accomplished nothing noteworthy and as a subordinate he squandered opportunities he really shouldn't have. There's an argument to be made that Lee starts to shine when he no longer has subordinates he trusted the same way he trusted Jackson and Longstreet.
 
Lee and Jackson are overrated generals, IMO. Jackson was a competent corps commander with a unique ability to inspire his men, a good quality to be sure but he was widely disliked by his subordinates because he was terrible at communication. He would have been a disaster at any level above a corps.

Interesting, considering he became one of the preeminent southern heroes of the war for his command of the Army of the Shenandoah, brilliantly exploiting interior lines to defeat three separate Union armies.

Lee frequently beat inferior opponents despite setting himself up for destruction. His army should have been smashed to pieces at Chancellorsville and Antietam but on both occasions the Union commanders lost their nerve.

'Inferior' opponents who at i.e. Chancellorsville outnumbered him 2-1. Lee chose his ground well at Antietam; the only area where his army would have been decisively beaten was the area around Boteler's ford, where the ground was such that you could only really employ one corps along that axis. Chancellorsville at well; he was constantly massing force at the point of decision, keeping forces for secondary purposes to an absolute minimum. If Lee was lucky to escape destruction, luck righted itself when his subordinates failed to destroy Sedgewick's force once its was over the river. Every battle involves mistakes by both sides; claiming a general hasn't earned his victory because of his enemy's errors is frankly pretty facile. Seriously, look at the campaigns of Grant or Napoleon or Marlborough or any of the great captains and find one where their enemy made no mistakes.

It must be remembered that the mystique of Jackson and Lee are almost entirely inflated by post-war Lost Cause mythologizing that resulted in their elevations to exalted status at the expense of other generals like Longstreet, who was reviled for supporting Reconstruction.
That's just flat out wrong; throughout the war, Lee and his army were consistently identified as the Confederacy's greatest pillar of strength by both sides, the 'center of gravity' for the southern cause. His victories gave the southern people hope, even to the bitter end.
 
James Longstreet for the Confederates and George Thomas for the Union.

Longstreet I certainly agree is needlessly reviled mostly for political reasons, but still, I didn't think he exhibited much talent above the corps level either. From what I've gathered about his own suggestions to Lee during the Gettysburg campaign, he'd have risked getting pinned between the AotP and Washington's defenses and probably destroyed there. And during his time in Tennessee, he got his ass handed to him by Ambrose Burnside, which, well, it's hard to get over that.
 
That's just flat out wrong; throughout the war, Lee and his army were consistently identified as the Confederacy's greatest pillar of strength by both sides, the 'center of gravity' for the southern cause. His victories gave the southern people hope, even to the bitter end.

When I say "mystique" I don't mean that they weren't beloved until after the war, I'm referring to ahistorical notions that the Confederacy could have won if Jackson didn't have his accident and Longstreet didn't spitefully sabotage Lee at Gettysburg, ideas that festered for almost a century after the fact. Lee and Jackson were both fine generals but their accomplishments should be evaluated in consideration of the remarkably poor leadership that plagued the Army of the Potomac until Grant arrived.

Longstreet I certainly agree is needlessly reviled mostly for political reasons, but still, I didn't think he exhibited much talent above the corps level either. From what I've gathered about his own suggestions to Lee during the Gettysburg campaign, he'd have risked getting pinned between the AotP and Washington's defenses and probably destroyed there. And during his time in Tennessee, he got his ass handed to him by Ambrose Burnside, which, well, it's hard to get over that.

Tennessee was certainly not Longstreet's finest hour but I will give him some slack given that he had to contend with Bragg and the utterly toxic atmosphere that was the Army of Tennessee.

As for Gettysburg, hindsight is 20/20 but I think compelling Meade to move AotP off of the high ground around Gettysburg and onto a ground of Lee's choosing would have been a better move. And of course we all know he was right about Pickett's Charge.
 
The problem with this analysis it that it fails to consider what Washington's primary mission was; ironically it was the exact same mission that Lee had 87 years later. Both men's primary task was to KEEP THEIR ARMY ALIVE. Battles won and lost were important, and his subordinates did so, be it Greene in the South or Arnold at Saratoga, but the critical element was to keep a viable force in the field and prevent it being bottled up and destroyed. Washington succeeded in this, Lee failed.

Lee, like Washington, was in command of the one force the Confederacy could not afford to lose, the one command that could not be destroyed. Yet Lee willingly went into Pennsylvania to engage a much stronger force, allowed his lower ranking subordinates to engage the enemy while his forces were still scattered, refused to withdraw to strong defensive ground and force the Federals to make yet another pointless frontal assault. As a result his army was shattered, never to fully recover and forced into an ever shrinking set of defensive works.

Washington had to keep his army in being until the French decided to aid the Rebellion, and succeeded. Lee had to keep his army in being and effective until the Northern electorate grew weary of the War's cost and he failed. Washington may not have been a tactical genius, but he was a master strategist. Possibly the best meause is this: Washington's country still exists; Lee's does not.
I don't have a firm opinion on Lee vs Washington per se, mostly since I haven't studied the ARW as much, so I'll just point out that historians debate if it was even possible for the Confederates to win, while others debate if it was possible for the Continentals to lose.

I have to say, I think it's very strange that you point to Gettysburg as the destruction of Lee's army, when this post-Gettysburg army was the one that brought northern morale closer to the breaking point than ever before, with the US losing 60,000 men in a matter of weeks, and when you note specifically the importance of the 1864 elections. This success as far as it goes is to a large degree the result of Lee's efforts at Gettysburg, where the Army of the Potomac suffered devastating losses itself, leading to a serious decline in fighting quality among the rank and file. Because of Gettysburg and the damage inflicted on the federals, Lee was able to transfer divisions west, where they were instrumental in winning the Army of Tennessee's only major victory at Chickamauga.

Leaving aside Gettysburg specifically, Lee's strategic situation was quite different from Washington's. For one, he had very little room to retreat in practice; much of what vital industry the Confederacy had was concentrated near the border in Richmond, and the rail net being what it was, it would be impossible to support a major army any further north of the Roanoke river in NC, and without Virginia's manpower and resources, any stand there would be a losing proposition. As such, Lee was in a position where fighting general engagements was a necessity simply to survive, while Washington was not.

Besides retreating, standing still was not an attractive option either; his position in the Fredericksburg Wilderness area was strong, but left to their own devices, the Federals would attack at their leisure, when they were well prepared with their superior numbers, artillery, and engineering. In the meantime, the countryside was being exhausted at an alarming rate. Perhaps Lee could keep winning Chancellorsvilles and Fredericksburgs, desperate battles that leave the enemy to lick their wounds and try again, but there's no guarantee this would produce defeats heavy enough to enable the friends of peace in the north, and letting the enemy gather superior strength and retain the initiative is a recipe for failure. If Lee allowed his army to disintegrate from want of supplies and be destroyed in a set-piece federal attack, he would rightly be censured for all of history.

As Clausewitz remarked, danger and success stand in perpetual relation; the greater the success, the greater the danger that must be hazarded in chasing it. Breaking the north's will to continue the war would require greater results and thus a more risky strategy than desperate battles along the Rappahannock. By invading the North, Lee had the prospect of engaging the federals out of set positions, strung out in forced marches along different roads, while he plundered some of the richest country in the Union. Lee was able to destroy several isolated Union corps on the first two days of battle because the federals were still arriving on the battlefield one corps at a time, and this fluid situation in which his forces often got the better of them is due in chief to his decision to invade the north.

By no means do I think Lee is a faultless general -he should gave kept a tighter leash on Stuart, he should have been more active in directing the July 3rd attack or perhaps not have made it, he shouldn't have prematurely packed up his artillery at Spotsylvania, etc.- but I do think he had the right concept for how to fight the war. Any way you slice it, it was a massive uphill battle. It certainly would never have lasted into 1865 if he had not taken command. The problem is that he had vastly inferior resources to his enemy, and thus a greatly diminished margin of error, while the battle-centric strategy necessitated by circumstances thus had to accommodate the constant intrusions of chance. When resources and chance turn against you, there's only so much you can do.
 
As for Gettysburg, hindsight is 20/20 but I think compelling Meade to move AotP off of the high ground around Gettysburg and onto a ground of Lee's choosing would have been a better move. And of course we all know he was right about Pickett's Charge.
I don't think Longstreet's concept was workable. For one, Lee, being on an exterior line, would have to march Ewell a hell of a long way to get around the federal position and onto the road if he was going to threaten i.e. Washington, during which the column would be very vulnerable. Second, Lee doesn't know what's out there. Partially, this is his responsibility, since Stuart was in the wind for much of the battle, but you have to admit he didn't exactly meet Lee halfway. Lee could stumble into the massive and powerful VI Corps on the Emmitsburg road and be caught between them and the rest of the federals.
 
Are we specifically limiting ourselves to pre-1900?

Also, must we exclude admirals? Because I'd argue that the US Navy has traditionally been the service with the better record, at least through the end of WWII (partially because the navy actually existed during peacetime, while pre-WWII the Army basically disbanded between wars).
 
William Sherman, the most unorthodox and badass of all pre WW2 American generals. His march to the Sea was the most daring and foolhardy campaign of the civil war.
I agree and will second, plus scaring Atlanta to setting itself partially on fore before he came and finished the job too.
 

Md139115

Banned
Are we specifically limiting ourselves to pre-1900?

Also, must we exclude admirals? Because I'd argue that the US Navy has traditionally been the service with the better record, at least through the end of WWII (partially because the navy actually existed during peacetime, while pre-WWII the Army basically disbanded between wars).

I don’t think we have to limit ourselves to pre-1900, but we should probably limit it to Generals lest the Navy vets on this forum open a broadside on us.
 
We can't count Lee, can we? I mean, the man was good, but he was just bonkers! There is no way on earth that Chancellorsville should have worked, but it did. He is either the greatest or most insane American general ever.

Lee was a Confederate general, and had he won,the American experiment he chose to rebel against would have been shattered beyond repair.So, as far as I am concerned,, he ought never to be counted among any pantheon of American generals, any more than Benedict Arnold ought to be.
 
Lee was a Confederate general, and had he won,the American experiment he chose to rebel against would have been shattered beyond repair.So, as far as I am concerned,, he ought never to be counted among any pantheon of American generals, any more than Benedict Arnold ought to be.

Benedict Arnold did way more good when he served the Union than Lee did, though. Honestly, I'm not convinced the Revolution could have succeeded without him.
 
Lee was a Confederate general, and had he won,the American experiment he chose to rebel against would have been shattered beyond repair.So, as far as I am concerned,, he ought never to be counted among any pantheon of American generals, any more than Benedict Arnold ought to be.

Regardless of ideology, he was still American, and he supported the Confederacy because his state did. We’re talking about one’s competence on a military basis, whatever else about the man is not important.
 
Lee was a Confederate general, and had he won,the American experiment he chose to rebel against would have been shattered beyond repair.So, as far as I am concerned,, he ought never to be counted among any pantheon of American generals, any more than Benedict Arnold ought to be.

I'm all in favor of removing Confederate monuments and place names but there's no reason we can't neutrally evaluate a general on his merits regardless of the side they were on.

If we can do it for Nazi generals we can do it for Confederates.
 
I don’t think we have to limit ourselves to pre-1900, but we should probably limit it to Generals lest the Navy vets on this forum open a broadside on us.
I started this thread originally because I tried to reply to an earlier similar thread that excluded Winfield Scott, but the discussion was locked due to being to long ago.
My question was meant for all American Generals through present day including confederates.

I didn’t think about Admirals but if I did I would pick Spruance.
As far as other Generals go beside Scott I lean toward Nathaniel Greene who managed so much with so little.
 
Speaking of Confederate generals, let’s analyze the big three Confederate generals:

Longstreet was probably the number one Corps commander of the war. He was a world-class tactician and orchestrated several of the greatest sweeping movements in the American Civil War: sweeping John Pope's flank in Second Bull Run/Manassas, attacking with 20,000 men against an enemy that eventually totaled 50,000 men and still inflicting heavier losses onto his foe on the 2nd day of Gettysburg, smashing the Army of the Cumberland with an impressive, wheeling, columar assault (though his performance was not entirely flawless, see Horseshoe Ridge), and routing Hancock's II Corps in the Wilderness.

However, these great performances should not cover up some of Longstreet's lower moments: his time as independent commander was not anything stellar, the Suffolk Campaign was nothing serious, but his performance in the Knoxville campaign was not good at all. The strategies he proposed were a bit questionable: the famous idea of go between the Army of the Potomac and Washington was unfeasible due to logistical and operational realities, his idea to James Seddon to execute a turning movement after Chickamauga once again ignored logistical realities (see the pattern here?). I think Longstreet's reputation is a bit overblown here and there, but he deserves the title of 'Greatest Tactician' and not...

Jackson: Jackson's reputation as a master tactician and strategist is rather baseless. After from his lackluster performance in the Seven Days Campaign, Jackson opened the Second Manassas Campaign by nearly getting whipped by Nathaniel Banks' numerically inferior force at Cedar Mountain, and was saved by A.P. Hill's arrival and Jubal Early's actions. At Brawner's Farm, he somehow failed to destroy a still green Iron Brigade under John Gibbon, 2,100 man strong, and Doubleday's eventual 800 man reinforcements with 5,900 veterans and the element of surprised. The battle was micromanaged by Jackson, and he did so poorly, sending in units piecemeal. He did decently at parrying Pope's poorly organized thrusts, but when Longstreet pitched his corps into the fray, Jackson sat there with an entirely fresh reserve division, allowing John Pope to shift units to fight a rearguard action against Longstreet.

In the Maryland Campaign, Jackson performs well enough, though I must note that Harper's Ferry was an easy win thanks to a foolish decision not to evacuate and Jackson's lines were saved by a lack of coordination by Union commanders in Antietam. At Fredericksburg, Jackson allowed a severe gap in his line, allowing Meade's division to breach his line, resulting in a fluid, close combat, and costly fight for both sides. Had Reynolds' entire Corps been pitched in, Jackson may have well been defeated.

I have no real criticism of his performance at Chancellorsville, but his flanking march has been overhyped. Total secrecy was not maintained, Sickles' men discovered the march but Hooker deluded himself into believing it was a retreat. The flank attack routed the XI Corps (which put up a better fight than history remembers), but that's not surprising when Jackson had 30,000 men against Howard's unprepared 12,000. The flank attack ultimately sputtered out against Alpheus Williams' division of the XII Corps, and Jackson and Lee were still separated.

Where Jackson deserves credit is Operations and Grand Tactics: in the Valley Campaign, Jackson's operations were excellent, successfully panicking and distracting Washington, while taking advantage of the divided Union commands in the Valley. In the Second Bull Run campaign, Jackson's bold and well-executed maneuver to Pope's rear was what allowed for Lee's greatest victory. Very rarely did independent forces work smoothly in conjunction towards a single goal; Jackson, when detached from Lee in the Valley and Second Bull Run, perfectly understood his commander's intent and was able to accomplish his mission. That's a credit to him. Speaking of plans, the man who composed Jackson's mission for the Valley and Second Bull Run Campaign was...

Lee: Though the Lost Cause tends to hype up Lee's abilities to stratospheric levels, it must be said that Lee was the best Confederate general. After his messy start at West Virginia and the Seven Days Campaign due to poor execution, overambitious plans and shoddy staff work, Lee finally molded the Army of Northern Virginia into an aggressive fighting force, much like how Grant transformed the Army of the Tennessee (and later the Army of the Potomac) into a well-oiled fighting machine. Lee's qualities were his canny use of his subordinates, a good read of his opponents, and a willingness to seize an opportunity presented to him. The Second Manassas Campaign is a good example of where Lee's qualities as a general truly shines.

Contrary to popular belief, Lee was not a terrible strategist on a campaign level. While serving as Davis' military advisor, Lee actually devises the only plan the Confederates implement in Virginia that represented a reasonable use of the operational art with his usage of Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign to keep Union reinforcements from reaching McClellan near Richmond. Jackson of course, plays his part in Lee's vision perfectly here. Then, Lee further displays sound judgement at the end of the Valley Campaign; when Jackson wants to continue north and continue threatening Washington, as appealing as this might have sounded, Lee correctly judges that Jackson's diversion has served its purpose and brings his troops to Richmond in time to achieve near-parity with McClellan's forces for the Seven Days Campaign. The resulting campaign was not coordinated very well, but Lee's strategy plays out and McClellan is neutralized for the time being. Lee plans well and across a broad area, incorporating multiple forces, and seizes the initiative and does not relinquish it. On the minus side, new to his army (like Grant with the Army of the Potomac in 1864), his forces don't coordinate terribly well during the Seven Days, and somewhat by accident, he ends up launching costly frontal assaults at Malvern Hill.

The Second Manassas Campaign is in many ways Lee's crowning achievement strategically. Faced with the dual threat of McClellan still on the James and John Pope's advance in Northern Virginia, Lee carefully manages his forces, detaching enough troops to blunt Pope's advance. When McClellan shows signs of withdrawing, Lee acts immediately and decisively, racing north with most of his army to confront Pope. Pope conducts a competent withdrawal behind and defense of the Rappahannock line, preventing any major clash initially, so Lee takes a risk to seize the initiative again, detaching Jackson to strike into the rear of Pope's army at his supply lines, and causing Pope to lose control of the campaign. Lee and Longstreet follow, and at the Battle of Second Manassas, a battle fought on as even terms as Lee ever gets, he decisively defeats Pope and brings the Union war effort in the east to its nadir.

Obviously Lee's failures in the Maryland and Pennsylvania campaigns will be brought up here, and justly so. I'll be happy to critique both campaigns to some extent. However, the main point I would make here is that Lee embarks on both campaigns for entirely rational strategic reasons. His biggest mistakes are, in order, giving battle at Antietam at all instead of falling back and conserving his troops after having mounted a very successful raid, and in committing to a battle of annihilation at Gettysburg when the time for such a strategy had long since passed.

This is where I think Lee's faults should be brought up. Lee could be overconfident and show contempt for the enemy's designs. This did not always result poorly, Chancellorsville is a great example where Lee cows Hooker into passivity by sheer audacity, but still Lee could have suffered a potentially fatal blow had Hooker stayed to receive Lee's final assault on his lines. Antietam and Gettysburg are two examples of this going very badly. Antietam was an unnecessary battle, the opportunity to escape was there, but he chose to stay and fight. Only his decision to stay one day after the battle salvaged some benefit to the Confederacy, giving his troops the impression that they had not lost. That said, it really did not compensate for 10,000 casualties and handing the Union a propaganda win. Gettysburg was, well, Gettysburg.
 
Nathanael Greene. Rarely have commanders done so much with so little. He was completely self-trained, rising from a militia foot-soldier to Washington's most gifted subordinate. He essentially saved the Southern Theatre. He often gets underrated, and that's just a crime.

Greene would be my choice as well. Most of the Union’s best commanders came out of the South IMHO...William Campbell, Daniel Morgan, etc.

Morgan deserves honorable mention. I couldn’t put him over Greene because Greene managed to display such consistent brilliance for so long while Morgan’s own record is far shorter, but Morgan mirrored his ability to draw out the British and then actually won set piece battles against them, while Greene usually gave them a Pyrrhic victory. Cowpens was a remarkable piece of work, as was his contribution at Saratoga.

Plus the guy was just awesome all around. Who in the mid-1700s survives 499 lashes and a bullet that blows out the entire side of one’s head?
 
Top