Grant vs. Johnston - Sherman vs. Lee

67th Tigers

Banned
I'm sorry but I think your wrong.

First and foremost is the reason that the Confederate records are unreliable at best and the were largely conflicting ideas of the strength of the Army of Tennessee within the Confederacy the time and thereafter.
Joe Johnston claimed 40,000 effective when he took command at Dalton, 60,000 when Polk join him at Resaca and a zenith of 70,000 near Adairsville and Cassville.
63,812 PFD producing 44,000 effectives. It increased to the region of 90,000 PFD and 65,000 effectives when reinforced.

The other reason is that Sherman himself disagrees with your numbers. Sherman reported his strenght at the beginning of the campaign as:

Army of the Cumberland - commander George Henry Thomas - present and absent: 171,450 - present for duty: 88,883 - effectives: 50,000

Army of the Tennessee - commander James B. McPherson - present and absent: 134,763 - present for duty: 64,957 - effectives: 35,000

Army of the Ohio - commander John M Schofield - present and absent: 46,052 - preent for duty:26,242 - effectives:15,000

And he counted his loses on the Campaign as 31,687.

The figures I have show an estimate of 120,368 PFD, producing 78,000 effectives, although he left a Corps behind and set of with just over 97,000 PFD and 60,000 effective.

Now, while this does indeed mean that Sherman's Army Group could have been down to around 68,000 this does not mean he faced an enemy of equal strength as the Confederate Army of Tennessee also lost over 30,000 men (mostly under Hood's direction) and finished the Campaign with only around 30,000 men in its rank.

If the two sides ever faced each other on equal footing it was at Peechtree Creek but other than that Sherman had a clear numerical advantage.

The real killer for the Confederacy was desertion (worse than even the US, which by this period had over 80% of recruits deserting before they saw regimental service). CS soldiers deserted in droves, and their strength couldn't be maintained. Most seem to have simply gone home.
 
Haven't I seen you somewhere before? What a minute!! PROVOST!!!

67th Tigers


Any idea how many of those 80% desertion rate of the Union Army were draftees and/or bounty men? Bounty men were notorious for taking bounties and deserting repeatedly, even over fifty times in some cases!:p That can skew the desertion rate quite markedly.:(
 
I should have been clearer. Sorry. But with Sherman in command, what do YOU suggest a general who likes to manuever would do against Lee?

If you take a look at Grant's campaigns out west, Grant liked to maneuver. The problem is that in the east, the physical and political geography don't allow for that.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
If you take a look at Grant's campaigns out west, Grant liked to maneuver. The problem is that in the east, the physical and political geography don't allow for that.

He had one campaign as commander, Vicksburg. He advanced down the one available maneouvre corridor, attacked the blocking force frontally, then besieged the enemy position.

The physical geography of the east is much more open to maneouvre, even if Washington restricts you.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The physical geography of the east is much more open to maneouvre, even if Washington restricts you.

Not so sure I agree. The rivers in the Virginia theater run mostly east-west, while the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Shenandoah Valley generally funneled Union movements in that area southwestward, away from Richmond, while actually serving as a useful corridor through which the Confederates could strike northwards.

In the West, the Mississippi, Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers were much more useful as avenues of invasion for the Union, especially as they were much more easily navigable for Union gunboats and transports than rivers in Virginia. Unlike in the East, there were no major mountain ranges to inhibit maneuver.

As far as the Union was concerned, the West clearly offered more opportunities for maneuver than did the East.
 
He had one campaign as commander, Vicksburg.

Apparently you are unfamiliar with the Battles of Forty Henry, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh; as well as the Chattanooga Campaign.

He advanced down the one available maneouvre corridor, attacked the blocking force frontally, then besieged the enemy position.

There is no "one available maneuver corridor" when you are facing an enemy with multiple forces in multiple locations.

Grant maneuvered around Vicksburg to land his troops downriver after suppressing and bypassing Confederate forts. After landing at multiple points, he almost succeeded in encircling part of the Confederate forces before they could withdraw into Vickburg. Grant then maneuvered to begin cutting Vicksburg off from supply and reinforcement, advancing his forces along three separate roads. He kept Pemberton from consolidating his forces, leading to part of the Confederate forces retreating towards Jackson, Mississippi. Grant then divided his forces, leaving the XIII Corps to guard against CSA attempts break out of Vicksburg while using his other 2 Corps to drive off CSA forces under Johnston. Grant then reconsolidated his forces to repulse Pemberton at Champion Hill. Union forces flanked the Confederates, seizing a crossroad and threatening to cut off their retreat. The Confederates were driven back to Vicksburg, losing about half of their number.

During the Siege of Vicksburg, Grant also had to fend off various Confederate raids and prevent Johnston from advancing upon his rear.
 
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