When "Special Order 191" (Lee's famous "Lost order" of September 1862) was brought to McClellan's headquarters, a Union officer recognized the handwriting of the Confederate staff officer who had written out that copy (and signed it as copyist). They had been acquaintances before the war. This completely authenticated the document.
Grand Registry of American Civil War trivia
- Thread starter Strategos' Risk
- Start date
One evenng, Joe Johnston was eating dinner in the dining room of a Richmond hotel, when he was recognized by a Confederate politician. The politician stood up and asked the other diners to join him in a toast to "The Confederacy's second-best General!"
At the battle of Spotsylvania, Union Major General John Sedgwick rebuked his men for flinching and dodging from long range fire by a handful of Confederate snipers. "They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance!" he said - and was killed seconds later.
Can you just make one big post of things instead of a bunch of small ones and posting them every 5 minutes?
Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, son of the famous rear admiral who brought us the Dahlgren guns, was involved in the Dahlgren Affair, a raid on Richmond which may or may not (prob wasn't) an assassination attempt on Jefferson Davis and the Confederate cabinet. Wikipedia cites "Most historians today, such as Duane Schwartz in Dalhlgren Affair, agree the papers were forged, intended to justify numerous plots by the Confederate Secret Service to kidnap Lincoln or blow up the White House", which makes me want to know about these explosive attempts. The plot might have also influenced John Wilkes Booth's actions.
Confederate engineer Martin Luther Smith was present at multiple important battles, from the defenses of New Orleans, to the defenses of Vicksburg, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and most of all on the banks of the North Anna River with Lee.
Confederate engineer Martin Luther Smith was present at multiple important battles, from the defenses of New Orleans, to the defenses of Vicksburg, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and most of all on the banks of the North Anna River with Lee.
- Some 2,500 Hispanics served in the Confederate Army, among them was Loreta Velazquez [1], a Cuban woman who dressed as man and fought at First Manassas and Shiloh.
- The Indian Wars fought in the West continued pretty much unabated even with U.S Army occupied in the South. In fact, some of the bloodiest American Indian conflicts of the 19th century occured during the war, such as the Dakota War of 1862 [2] and the Sand Creek Massacre [3].
- Related to the above, Confederate Army troops fought not one, but two battles with Apache warriors [4].
[2]http://www.usdakotawar.org/
[3]http://www.smithsonianmag.com/histo...massacre-will-be-forgotten-no-more-180953403/
[4]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Battle_of_Dragoon_Springs/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Dragoon_Springs
Are you aware of any gay men fighting for one of the sides during the ACW? I mean we have Buchanan as a famous example during this era, but he wasn't involved in the actual war.
Colonel Sir Percy Wyndham was effectively barred from further service by Secretary Stanton after he commanded a cavalry brigade near D.C. The rumours that swirled around were that Percy was planning to kidnap the President and cabinet...the source is Roger Hunt. His reply to an inquiry in 2008 is below:
He was relieved from “regimental command, or other military duty, and ordered to proceed to Washington, but not in arrest,” Oct. 2, 1863, in response to the following mysterious order from Secretary of War Stanton to Maj. Gen. Meade, “Information received at this Department indicates that Colonel Percy Wyndham should not be permitted to have a command or come within the lines of your army at present.” The information referred to may have been allegations that Wyndham was connected with a plot to kidnap Lincoln and his Cabinet.
The speculation as to the reason for Stanton’s order is based on correspondence with the late Lincoln- assassination scholar James O. Hall, citing an article in the July 29, 1867 issue (p. 2) of the Philadelphia Inquirer. This source is listed in the book with my references for the Wyndham sketch.
Quoting from the newspaper article (of which I only have excerpts), which appeared at the time of the trial of John H. Surratt, “The parties mentioned, proceeding in their accounts, assert that it is very probable Surratt was engaged in the attempt to abduct Lincoln, as that scheme had first been started in 1863, as a legitimate piece of warfare. At that early date, Percy Wyndham, commanding at and around Washington, it is alleged, was to have delivered Mr. Lincoln and Cabinet to General Lee’s headquarters, and would, they say, have done so had he not been removed before the time fixed for carrying out the project.”
In my opinion the allegations of Wyndham’s involvement in the Lincoln conspiracy, although providing a convenient explanation for his treatment by the War Department, are just speculation and impossible to prove.
Best Wishes,
Roger D. Hunt
He was relieved from “regimental command, or other military duty, and ordered to proceed to Washington, but not in arrest,” Oct. 2, 1863, in response to the following mysterious order from Secretary of War Stanton to Maj. Gen. Meade, “Information received at this Department indicates that Colonel Percy Wyndham should not be permitted to have a command or come within the lines of your army at present.” The information referred to may have been allegations that Wyndham was connected with a plot to kidnap Lincoln and his Cabinet.
The speculation as to the reason for Stanton’s order is based on correspondence with the late Lincoln- assassination scholar James O. Hall, citing an article in the July 29, 1867 issue (p. 2) of the Philadelphia Inquirer. This source is listed in the book with my references for the Wyndham sketch.
Quoting from the newspaper article (of which I only have excerpts), which appeared at the time of the trial of John H. Surratt, “The parties mentioned, proceeding in their accounts, assert that it is very probable Surratt was engaged in the attempt to abduct Lincoln, as that scheme had first been started in 1863, as a legitimate piece of warfare. At that early date, Percy Wyndham, commanding at and around Washington, it is alleged, was to have delivered Mr. Lincoln and Cabinet to General Lee’s headquarters, and would, they say, have done so had he not been removed before the time fixed for carrying out the project.”
In my opinion the allegations of Wyndham’s involvement in the Lincoln conspiracy, although providing a convenient explanation for his treatment by the War Department, are just speculation and impossible to prove.
Best Wishes,
Roger D. Hunt
Saphroneth
Banned
Statistics would suggest at least 50,000 did. The question is how one identifies an out gay man during the 1860s...
Rumors, letters, conviction on a charge of sodomy... there are more than enough sources that would come to my mind.
The most famous of these was the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, "Rush's Lancers". The were initially issued 9 foot lancers of the Prussian style. By mid-1863 they had been replaced by Spencer carbines.
Benjamin
History Learner
Banned
robertp6165, Lord rest his soul, passed away five years ago tomorrow (September 6th).
Speaking of Robert, he once wrote a very interesting article concerning Confederate intrigue in Mexico:
It is a little known fact that, even as its armies were attempting the conquest of the United States Territory of New Mexico, and as its politicians were debating the creation of a Territory of Arizona, the Confederate States of America was engaged in a covert attempt to wrest the northern states of Mexico from that Republic and to annex them to the new Southern nation. Had this attempt been successful, it might have changed the outcome of the war. It is this little known, but highly significant episode of the War Between the States that will be examined in this article.
Before delving into the details of Confederate espionage and intrigue in Mexico, it would be well to examine the reasons for Confederate interest in its neighbor to the South. The Confederacy in 1861 saw both potential riches to be gained in Mexico, and the opportunity to acquire, without much cost, those riches.
The riches of Mexico were of many kinds. Of course, since the days of the Spanish Conquistadors, Mexico had been a source of great mineral wealth, especially gold and silver. The mines of the northern Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora were productive, and would have been a definite asset to the new Southern nation. And Mexico had other, non-mineral riches to offer as well. At a time when the United States was beginning to impose a blockade of Southern ports, Mexico offered a virtually unblockadeable Pacific coastline with one of the finest harbors in the Western Hemisphere, at Guaymas. With the Union blockade thus defeated, and with the specie of Northern Mexico in its hands, the Confederacy could have imported whatever it needed to wage war. The material advantages of the Union over the Confederacy would have melted like dew beneath the morning sun.
Furthermore, it was widely believed that the Confederate annexation of northern Mexico would have led inevitably to the conquest of California as well. The advantages which the Confederacy might have gained from such an occurrence were immense. First, the flow of California gold would have been diverted from Washington to Richmond, thus reversing the relative quotations of United States and Confederate States currency. Abraham Lincoln himself considered California gold to be the "lifeblood" of the Union, and its loss to the Confederacy would have been a severe, and possibly fatal, blow to the Union war effort. Second, the conquest of California, together with the States of northern Mexico, would have given the Confederacy a Pacific coastline of over 1,500 miles, with fine harbors at several places, good shipyards, and abundant materials. There the Confederacy might have built a merchant fleet, or even a navy, free from Union interference.
Finally, it should also be stated that at least part of Confederate interest in Mexico stemmed from a desire, on the part of some of its politicians, to gain territory for the expansion of slavery. This was not a new desire...indeed, slavery advocates had howled with rage when, in the wake of U.S. victory in the Mexican War (1846-48), the United States had not incorporated the whole of Mexico into the United States, rather than absorbing only the most northern tier of Mexican provinces, as was the case. In 1861 there were many Southerners (perhaps not a majority, but at the very least a highly vocal minority) who believed that the expansion of slavery into new territories would strengthen the Confederacy, and Mexico would provide those new lands.
Mexico had many things to offer the Confederacy, but it is unlikely that the Confederate leadership would have attempted to take what it wanted from Mexico if that nation had been perceived as strong enough to resist. And, it just so happened that, in 1861, Mexico was in a state of chaos. After the war, Trevanion T. Teel, artillery chief of the Confederate Army of New Mexico, reported a conversation with Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley which revealed much about the Confederate leadership's perception of Mexican weakness in 1861. Teel was informed that "Juarez, the President of the Republic (so called), was then in the City of Mexico with a small army under his command, hardly sufficient to keep him in his position." Sibley believed Juarez might be willing to agree to the Confederate annexation of the northern states of Mexico, both as a means of enriching his treasury, and because he was scarcely able to control them anyway.
And even if Juarez was not agreeable, it might not be in his power to prevent the Confederacy from doing what it would anyway. The states of northern Mexico, most notably Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Baja California, were at this time virtually independent of the central government of Mexico, being more the feudal principalities of their Governors than integral parts of the Republic of Mexico. Direct negotiations with these Governors promised to bring these provinces into the Confederate fold, regardless of what Juarez might say or do.
Thus did the Confederacy see in Mexico not only wealth to be gained, but also the opportunity to take that wealth. And it quickly acted to seize that opportunity. In May 1861, Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs dispatched one John T. Pickett to Mexico as the Minister of the Confederacy. Pickett was empowered to draw up a treaty of alliance between the Confederacy and Mexico, and there was some hope that this might be accomplished, as feelings in Mexico were said (whether rightly or wrongly) to be generally favorable toward the South. But it soon became apparent that Pickett's orders were not those of a peaceful ambassador, for immediately upon arriving he set about stirring up an independence movement at Vera Cruz. However, Pickett's efforts were not to be crowned with success, and were to create severe problems for the Confederacy in its future relations with Mexico.
Worried United States citizens in Vera Cruz reported Pickett's activities to the State Department, and U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward threatened to occupy Sonora with Union troops. Mexican President Benito Juarez, anxious both to forestall the Union invasion and to thwart the designs of the Confederacy on his country, introduced a bill into the Mexican Congress to authorize Union soldiers to cross northern Mexico and to use the port of Guaymas. In spite of the protests of Pickett, the bill was passed by the Mexican Congress on June 20, 1861. Pickett's blustering threats of Confederate invasion served only to land him in jail, and President Jefferson Davis was forced to recall him to Richmond.
But the damage was done. Any chance for the annexation of Mexican Territory with the consent of the Mexican government, if such chance had ever existed, was now gone forever. Pickett's successor and Confederate Minister to Mexico, Hamilton Bee of Texas, tried to mend the relationship between the Confederacy and the Juarez government, without success. Later he tried to forge a relationship with the Emperor Maximilian, and was no more successful, although that ruler feigned friendship with the Confederacy so long as it kept the United States too busy to interfere with his plans in Mexico.
The collapse of its credibility with the Mexican central government did not end the Confederacy's intrigues in Mexico. For, as mentioned earlier, there still remained the possibility of direct negotiations with the semi-independent Governors of the northern Mexican provinces. Indeed, that option presented itself soon after Pickett's departure, although, for reasons that are not entirely clear, the Confederacy did not act upon it.
In the summer of 1861, Governor Santiago Vidaurri, the feudal ruler of the provinces of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila, wrote to the Confederate Government at Richmond, offering to annex his provinces to the Confederacy in return for a regiment of Texas troops and artillery, which would be used to win a revolution. President Jefferson Davis considered it "imprudent and impolitic" to accept Vidaurri's offer at that time, but nevertheless instructed a Confederate spy in Monterey to send information about the value of Vidaurri's provinces, evidently for future reference. The strange thing is, however, that the Confederacy NEVER took up Vidaurri's offer, even at a later date. Thus, the only Mexican governor who ever expressed a serious interest in selling his provinces to the Confederacy, and certainly the only one to ever promise anything in writing, was totally ignored by the Confederate Government.
At about the same time that President Davis was inserting a spy into Monterey, the Confederate Governor of Arizona, John Robert Baylor, was doing the same for the Mexican provinces of Sonora and Chihuahua.12 Baylor's spy (politely designated an "agent"), Jose Augustin Quintero, was an interesting character. He was a Cuban revolutionary who was born at Havana, Cuba, in 1829. He was educated at Harvard, but on account of the death of his father was unable to complete his course, and engaged in teaching Spanish at Cambridge, Massachusetts, until about 1850, when he returned to Cuba, and became the publisher of a newspaper at Havana. Supporting the patriotic Cuban movement of 1850-51, he was thrown in prison by the Spanish authorities and sentenced to be shot, but had the good fortune to escape from Morro Castle. Taking boat for Texas, he made his home at Richmond, Texas, studied law, and was admitted to the practice. He also obtained appointment as translator of land titles at Austin, and was thus engaged until 1859, when he went to New York city and became connected with a Spanish-American illustrated paper, edited by George D. Squires, the Illustracion-Americano. When hostilities began in 1861 he decided to cast his lot with his Texas friends, and returning to that State, enlisted at San Antonio as a privat in the Quitman Rifles, which he accompanied to Virginia. In the latter part of 1862 he was transferred to the diplomatic service, and appointed confidential agent of the Confederate States government in Mexico. It was in this capacity that he worked for Baylor.
Quintero was charged with the collection and transmittal of "accurate and minute information regarding the population, area, farming potentiality, mineral resources, commercial possibilities, and the extent and state of industry" in these two northern Mexican provinces. It seems quite probable that Quintero's reports from Chihuahua and Sonora influenced the later decision of the Confederate authorities to open direct negotiations with the Governors of those Mexican states.
On December 14, 1861, Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley assumed command of all Confederate forces in the Confederate Territory of Arizona, giving them a new name...The Army of New Mexico. Sibley was charged with an important mission, nothing less than the conquest of the United States Territory of New Mexico, which would then be used as a base of operations for the conquest of California, Nevada, Utah, and northern Mexico. On January 3, 1862, Sibley penned the following note to General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General of the Confederate Army:
GENERAL: I have the honor to report that in view of the importance of establishing satisfactory relations with the adjacent Mexican States of Chihuahua and Sonora, I have ordered Col. James Reily, Fourth Regiment Texas Mounted Volunteers, to proceed to the capitals of those States, for the purpose of delivering to their respective governors the communications which I have addressed to them, and of conferring with those officials in person upon the subjects of those communications....Colonel Reily left these headquarters for the city of Chihuahua on yesterday, the 2nd instant. The result of this mission, when known, will be promptly communicated to you.
Sibley's aims in dispatching Colonel Reily to Chihuahua and Sonora were varied. First, he wanted to secure his southern flank by forging agreements with the Governors of those Mexican States not to allow the passage of Union troops over the territory of those States. Second, he wanted to secure the right to pursue hostile Indians into Mexican territory (an important consideration for the Confederates in Arizona, who faced an Apache enemy who thought nothing of crossing the international line to escape pursuit). Third, he wanted to purchase and store supplies in Mexico. And lastly, he wanted to set the groundwork for a later occupation, with the consent of the Governors, of Chihuahua and Sonora by the Confederate Army.
In selecting Reily for this mission, Sibley made what seemed to be an excellent choice. Reily, a Texas lawyer in civilian life, had been a member of the diplomatic corps of the old Republic of Texas. He was friendly to, and understood, the Mexican people, and was considered an able man for any mission to Mexico. Furthermore, he had been, since his teens, renowned for his skills in the art of oratory, and thus he promised to be a very persuasive negotiator. However, as one historian has pointed out, he seems to have been an "incorrigible enthusiast," who was "prone to accept half-promises as agreements, and diplomatic double-talk as indicative of progress." We shall see how these qualities affected his missions.
Reily arrived in the city of Chihuahua on January 8th, 1862. Taking up residence in Riddell's Hotel in that city, Reily sent a note to the Governor, Luis Terrazas, informing that official of his presence in Chihuahua and of his desire to confer with the Governor. The next morning, Reily received a note from the Governor, designating 12:00 noon that same day as the time for an interview at the Governor's palace. Reily was escorted to the palace by Don Carlos Moye (whose name is mis-spelled in Reily's report as "Moyo"), brother-in-law of the Governor and ardent supporter of the Confederacy.
Upon arriving at the palace Reily presented Governor Terrazas with the notes with which General Sibley had entrusted him. Terrazas, upon having them translated, expressed willingness to open negotiations on the points contained in the notes (right of transit over Mexican territory for Confederate troops, and denial of that right to the Union, right of pursuit of hostile Indians into Mexican territory, and the purchase of supplies in Chihuahua for the Confederate armies). These negotiations were not to prove fruitful, and it would seem that Reily was mislead into believing he had achieved more than he actually had.
For example, Reily's report to General Sibley stated that the Governor had told him that "if even the assent of the President had come to him, sanctioned by the act of Congress, he did not think he would permit Federal troops to pass through the territory of Chihuahua to invade Texas." In fact, in the note sent by Terrazas to Sibley, giving the Governor's version of the negotiations, Terrazas says that he WOULD allow Federal troops to cross his territory if ordered by the Mexican Congress, for he was bound by the Mexican Constitution to do so.
On the second point of discussion, namely the right to pursue hostile Indians into Mexican territory, Reily's report was again misleading. According to Reily, Terrazas replied to the Confederate request by saying that "if ever rendered necessary, your troops will have no trouble." In fact, Governor Terrazas was specific that he could not allow such pursuits to take place. However, he did offer the slight concession that, if and when he judged that the situation warranted it, he would make application to the Mexican Congress to allow such pursuits, and if such application were granted by the Congress, he would then allow it (of course he probably knew of the hostility of the Mexican central government to the Confederacy, and that any application on its behalf would certainly have been denied by the Congress).
On the third point, the right to purchase and store supplies in Mexico, Reily and Terrazas apparently did reach an agreement. However, the Mexicans would not accept Confederate currency, and since the Confederates lacked any substantial amounts of gold or silver, the accord thus reached was of little practical use to the Confederacy.
Why did Reily and Terrazas interpret the results of their discussions so differently? There are several possible reasons for this. One possibility is the language barrier. Reily spoke no Spanish, and Terrazas no English, and in the course of translation meaning could have been altered for one or both of them. Another possibility is the deliberate deception of Reily by Terrazas. Terrazas may indeed have VERBALLY assured Reily of his agreement on the concessions requested, and later, in writing, repudiated his verbal agreements. This would seem to be a more likely answer to the mystery at hand. As one historian has stated, Terrazas was "between three fires, the Union, the Confederacy, and Mexico," and it seems likely that he simply chose not to add fuel to one fire for fear of being burned in return by the others.24 And there is one possibility as well. It is not impossible that Reily himself exaggerated the success of his negotiations, either out of the incorrigible enthusiasm which was a feature of his personality, or as a deliberate attempt to ingratiate himself with his commander. In either case, the letter sent by Terrazas to Sibley would have revealed Reily's exaggerations for what they were.
After returning from Chihuahua, Colonel Reily was ordered to proceed to Hermosillo, the capital of Sonora. He accompanied Captain Sherod Hunter's command when it left Mesilla, capital of the Confederate Territory of Arizona, for the little adobe village of Tucson on February 14, 1862. Arriving in Tucson on February 28th, Reily participated in the flag-raising ceremony in the town plaza, whereby Captain Hunter formally took possession of Tucson (and western Arizona) for the Confederacy. Reily made a speech that was well-received by the crowd. On March 3rd he left with his escort (20 men commanded by Lieutenant James H. Tevis) to proceed on to Sonora.
Upon arriving in Sonora, Reily was received at the palace of Governor Don Ignacio Pesqueira. Reily here bargained for the same concessions he had sought in Chihuahua, and it seems that he apparently did in fact enjoy success with the Governor of Sonora. Pesqueira verbally assured Reily that Sonora would forbid the use of the port of Guaymas to the United States, refuse the Union Army transit over its territory, grant free entry and passage to the Confederate Army, and supply the Confederates with food and military stores. Pesqueira also stated that not only would Sonora agree to these concessions, but the province would rebel from the Republic if the Juarez government questioned its authority to do so. It is possible that the future annexation of Sonora by the Confederate States was also discussed, but if so, the results of that discussion have not been recorded.
Unfortunately for Reily and for Confederate hopes, there was in Hermosillo at that time an enterprising reporter for the SAN FRANCISCO BULLETIN, one W. G. Moody. Moody heard of the discussions between Reily and the Governor, and he managed to steal copies of Reily's introduction from Sibley and some of his notes (Moody stole the letters from the office of Pesqueira's translator, when the latter left to take the Spanish copies to the Governor) and transmit them to General Wright, the commanding General of Union forces in California. Within days, Wright had a gunboat on patrol off the harbor at Guaymas. He also had a letter prepared and sent to Pesqueira, containing what historian Robert Lee Kerby has called "one of the most diplomatic threats ever penned."
Wright's letter started off by congratulating Pesqueira for REFUSING Reily's overtures. Wright then went on to assure the Mexican official that "under no circumstances will the Government of the United States permit the rebel hordes to take refuge in Sonora. I have an army of ten thousand men ready to pass the frontier and protect your government and people." Upon receiving Wright's "promise of protection," Pesqueira suddenly decided to to reconsider his accord with Reily. He sent a letter to General Sibley, stating that Reily's claims of success had been "exaggerated, or perhaps badly misinterpreted." And as a final indignity, in August 1862 (after Sibley's army had been defeated and the Confederate position in Arizona had collapsed), Pesqueira sent a letter to General Wright promising that if any "rebels" set foot on Mexican soil, he would exterminate them. Thus ended James Reily's mission to Sonora.
In the end, perhaps the only "achievement" of Reily's missions to Chihuahua and Sonora was the "recognition" of the Confederacy as a nation by the Governors of those states. Reily was presented to the Governors of both States while wearing the uniform of a Colonel of Cavalry, Confederate States Army. He insisted on being addressed by his title, and always negotiated on the understanding that he represented a sovereign nation. And both Governors, Terrazas and Pesqueira, did negotiate with him on that basis. Of course that leaves open the question of whether recognition of the Confederacy as a legitimate nation by the governors actually represents "recognition by a foreign power" under international law. The central government of Mexico never recognized the Confederacy, and it is uncertain whether states in a federal system of government, even if virtually independent of the control of the central government (as Chihuahua and Sonora were in the 1860s), can independently recognize a foreign nation. All this writer can say is that Reily thought so!
With the end of the diplomatic missions of James Reily to Sonora and Chihuahua, and especially after the collapse of the Confederate Territory of Arizona, Confederate aspirations in Mexico dwindled away into nothing. Eventually the affair would be virtually forgotten, even by historians. Yet the Confederate attempt to annex the northern provinces of Mexico was an important episode in the history of the War Between the States. If the Confederates had been successful, the advantages gained might have shifted the balance of power in their favor, and their struggle for independence might have had a different outcome. For this, if for no other reason, the story of Confederate diplomacy and intrigue in Mexico deserves to be told.
Before delving into the details of Confederate espionage and intrigue in Mexico, it would be well to examine the reasons for Confederate interest in its neighbor to the South. The Confederacy in 1861 saw both potential riches to be gained in Mexico, and the opportunity to acquire, without much cost, those riches.
The riches of Mexico were of many kinds. Of course, since the days of the Spanish Conquistadors, Mexico had been a source of great mineral wealth, especially gold and silver. The mines of the northern Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora were productive, and would have been a definite asset to the new Southern nation. And Mexico had other, non-mineral riches to offer as well. At a time when the United States was beginning to impose a blockade of Southern ports, Mexico offered a virtually unblockadeable Pacific coastline with one of the finest harbors in the Western Hemisphere, at Guaymas. With the Union blockade thus defeated, and with the specie of Northern Mexico in its hands, the Confederacy could have imported whatever it needed to wage war. The material advantages of the Union over the Confederacy would have melted like dew beneath the morning sun.
Furthermore, it was widely believed that the Confederate annexation of northern Mexico would have led inevitably to the conquest of California as well. The advantages which the Confederacy might have gained from such an occurrence were immense. First, the flow of California gold would have been diverted from Washington to Richmond, thus reversing the relative quotations of United States and Confederate States currency. Abraham Lincoln himself considered California gold to be the "lifeblood" of the Union, and its loss to the Confederacy would have been a severe, and possibly fatal, blow to the Union war effort. Second, the conquest of California, together with the States of northern Mexico, would have given the Confederacy a Pacific coastline of over 1,500 miles, with fine harbors at several places, good shipyards, and abundant materials. There the Confederacy might have built a merchant fleet, or even a navy, free from Union interference.
Finally, it should also be stated that at least part of Confederate interest in Mexico stemmed from a desire, on the part of some of its politicians, to gain territory for the expansion of slavery. This was not a new desire...indeed, slavery advocates had howled with rage when, in the wake of U.S. victory in the Mexican War (1846-48), the United States had not incorporated the whole of Mexico into the United States, rather than absorbing only the most northern tier of Mexican provinces, as was the case. In 1861 there were many Southerners (perhaps not a majority, but at the very least a highly vocal minority) who believed that the expansion of slavery into new territories would strengthen the Confederacy, and Mexico would provide those new lands.
Mexico had many things to offer the Confederacy, but it is unlikely that the Confederate leadership would have attempted to take what it wanted from Mexico if that nation had been perceived as strong enough to resist. And, it just so happened that, in 1861, Mexico was in a state of chaos. After the war, Trevanion T. Teel, artillery chief of the Confederate Army of New Mexico, reported a conversation with Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley which revealed much about the Confederate leadership's perception of Mexican weakness in 1861. Teel was informed that "Juarez, the President of the Republic (so called), was then in the City of Mexico with a small army under his command, hardly sufficient to keep him in his position." Sibley believed Juarez might be willing to agree to the Confederate annexation of the northern states of Mexico, both as a means of enriching his treasury, and because he was scarcely able to control them anyway.
And even if Juarez was not agreeable, it might not be in his power to prevent the Confederacy from doing what it would anyway. The states of northern Mexico, most notably Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Baja California, were at this time virtually independent of the central government of Mexico, being more the feudal principalities of their Governors than integral parts of the Republic of Mexico. Direct negotiations with these Governors promised to bring these provinces into the Confederate fold, regardless of what Juarez might say or do.
Thus did the Confederacy see in Mexico not only wealth to be gained, but also the opportunity to take that wealth. And it quickly acted to seize that opportunity. In May 1861, Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs dispatched one John T. Pickett to Mexico as the Minister of the Confederacy. Pickett was empowered to draw up a treaty of alliance between the Confederacy and Mexico, and there was some hope that this might be accomplished, as feelings in Mexico were said (whether rightly or wrongly) to be generally favorable toward the South. But it soon became apparent that Pickett's orders were not those of a peaceful ambassador, for immediately upon arriving he set about stirring up an independence movement at Vera Cruz. However, Pickett's efforts were not to be crowned with success, and were to create severe problems for the Confederacy in its future relations with Mexico.
Worried United States citizens in Vera Cruz reported Pickett's activities to the State Department, and U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward threatened to occupy Sonora with Union troops. Mexican President Benito Juarez, anxious both to forestall the Union invasion and to thwart the designs of the Confederacy on his country, introduced a bill into the Mexican Congress to authorize Union soldiers to cross northern Mexico and to use the port of Guaymas. In spite of the protests of Pickett, the bill was passed by the Mexican Congress on June 20, 1861. Pickett's blustering threats of Confederate invasion served only to land him in jail, and President Jefferson Davis was forced to recall him to Richmond.
But the damage was done. Any chance for the annexation of Mexican Territory with the consent of the Mexican government, if such chance had ever existed, was now gone forever. Pickett's successor and Confederate Minister to Mexico, Hamilton Bee of Texas, tried to mend the relationship between the Confederacy and the Juarez government, without success. Later he tried to forge a relationship with the Emperor Maximilian, and was no more successful, although that ruler feigned friendship with the Confederacy so long as it kept the United States too busy to interfere with his plans in Mexico.
The collapse of its credibility with the Mexican central government did not end the Confederacy's intrigues in Mexico. For, as mentioned earlier, there still remained the possibility of direct negotiations with the semi-independent Governors of the northern Mexican provinces. Indeed, that option presented itself soon after Pickett's departure, although, for reasons that are not entirely clear, the Confederacy did not act upon it.
In the summer of 1861, Governor Santiago Vidaurri, the feudal ruler of the provinces of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila, wrote to the Confederate Government at Richmond, offering to annex his provinces to the Confederacy in return for a regiment of Texas troops and artillery, which would be used to win a revolution. President Jefferson Davis considered it "imprudent and impolitic" to accept Vidaurri's offer at that time, but nevertheless instructed a Confederate spy in Monterey to send information about the value of Vidaurri's provinces, evidently for future reference. The strange thing is, however, that the Confederacy NEVER took up Vidaurri's offer, even at a later date. Thus, the only Mexican governor who ever expressed a serious interest in selling his provinces to the Confederacy, and certainly the only one to ever promise anything in writing, was totally ignored by the Confederate Government.
At about the same time that President Davis was inserting a spy into Monterey, the Confederate Governor of Arizona, John Robert Baylor, was doing the same for the Mexican provinces of Sonora and Chihuahua.12 Baylor's spy (politely designated an "agent"), Jose Augustin Quintero, was an interesting character. He was a Cuban revolutionary who was born at Havana, Cuba, in 1829. He was educated at Harvard, but on account of the death of his father was unable to complete his course, and engaged in teaching Spanish at Cambridge, Massachusetts, until about 1850, when he returned to Cuba, and became the publisher of a newspaper at Havana. Supporting the patriotic Cuban movement of 1850-51, he was thrown in prison by the Spanish authorities and sentenced to be shot, but had the good fortune to escape from Morro Castle. Taking boat for Texas, he made his home at Richmond, Texas, studied law, and was admitted to the practice. He also obtained appointment as translator of land titles at Austin, and was thus engaged until 1859, when he went to New York city and became connected with a Spanish-American illustrated paper, edited by George D. Squires, the Illustracion-Americano. When hostilities began in 1861 he decided to cast his lot with his Texas friends, and returning to that State, enlisted at San Antonio as a privat in the Quitman Rifles, which he accompanied to Virginia. In the latter part of 1862 he was transferred to the diplomatic service, and appointed confidential agent of the Confederate States government in Mexico. It was in this capacity that he worked for Baylor.
Quintero was charged with the collection and transmittal of "accurate and minute information regarding the population, area, farming potentiality, mineral resources, commercial possibilities, and the extent and state of industry" in these two northern Mexican provinces. It seems quite probable that Quintero's reports from Chihuahua and Sonora influenced the later decision of the Confederate authorities to open direct negotiations with the Governors of those Mexican states.
On December 14, 1861, Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley assumed command of all Confederate forces in the Confederate Territory of Arizona, giving them a new name...The Army of New Mexico. Sibley was charged with an important mission, nothing less than the conquest of the United States Territory of New Mexico, which would then be used as a base of operations for the conquest of California, Nevada, Utah, and northern Mexico. On January 3, 1862, Sibley penned the following note to General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General of the Confederate Army:
GENERAL: I have the honor to report that in view of the importance of establishing satisfactory relations with the adjacent Mexican States of Chihuahua and Sonora, I have ordered Col. James Reily, Fourth Regiment Texas Mounted Volunteers, to proceed to the capitals of those States, for the purpose of delivering to their respective governors the communications which I have addressed to them, and of conferring with those officials in person upon the subjects of those communications....Colonel Reily left these headquarters for the city of Chihuahua on yesterday, the 2nd instant. The result of this mission, when known, will be promptly communicated to you.
Sibley's aims in dispatching Colonel Reily to Chihuahua and Sonora were varied. First, he wanted to secure his southern flank by forging agreements with the Governors of those Mexican States not to allow the passage of Union troops over the territory of those States. Second, he wanted to secure the right to pursue hostile Indians into Mexican territory (an important consideration for the Confederates in Arizona, who faced an Apache enemy who thought nothing of crossing the international line to escape pursuit). Third, he wanted to purchase and store supplies in Mexico. And lastly, he wanted to set the groundwork for a later occupation, with the consent of the Governors, of Chihuahua and Sonora by the Confederate Army.
In selecting Reily for this mission, Sibley made what seemed to be an excellent choice. Reily, a Texas lawyer in civilian life, had been a member of the diplomatic corps of the old Republic of Texas. He was friendly to, and understood, the Mexican people, and was considered an able man for any mission to Mexico. Furthermore, he had been, since his teens, renowned for his skills in the art of oratory, and thus he promised to be a very persuasive negotiator. However, as one historian has pointed out, he seems to have been an "incorrigible enthusiast," who was "prone to accept half-promises as agreements, and diplomatic double-talk as indicative of progress." We shall see how these qualities affected his missions.
Reily arrived in the city of Chihuahua on January 8th, 1862. Taking up residence in Riddell's Hotel in that city, Reily sent a note to the Governor, Luis Terrazas, informing that official of his presence in Chihuahua and of his desire to confer with the Governor. The next morning, Reily received a note from the Governor, designating 12:00 noon that same day as the time for an interview at the Governor's palace. Reily was escorted to the palace by Don Carlos Moye (whose name is mis-spelled in Reily's report as "Moyo"), brother-in-law of the Governor and ardent supporter of the Confederacy.
Upon arriving at the palace Reily presented Governor Terrazas with the notes with which General Sibley had entrusted him. Terrazas, upon having them translated, expressed willingness to open negotiations on the points contained in the notes (right of transit over Mexican territory for Confederate troops, and denial of that right to the Union, right of pursuit of hostile Indians into Mexican territory, and the purchase of supplies in Chihuahua for the Confederate armies). These negotiations were not to prove fruitful, and it would seem that Reily was mislead into believing he had achieved more than he actually had.
For example, Reily's report to General Sibley stated that the Governor had told him that "if even the assent of the President had come to him, sanctioned by the act of Congress, he did not think he would permit Federal troops to pass through the territory of Chihuahua to invade Texas." In fact, in the note sent by Terrazas to Sibley, giving the Governor's version of the negotiations, Terrazas says that he WOULD allow Federal troops to cross his territory if ordered by the Mexican Congress, for he was bound by the Mexican Constitution to do so.
On the second point of discussion, namely the right to pursue hostile Indians into Mexican territory, Reily's report was again misleading. According to Reily, Terrazas replied to the Confederate request by saying that "if ever rendered necessary, your troops will have no trouble." In fact, Governor Terrazas was specific that he could not allow such pursuits to take place. However, he did offer the slight concession that, if and when he judged that the situation warranted it, he would make application to the Mexican Congress to allow such pursuits, and if such application were granted by the Congress, he would then allow it (of course he probably knew of the hostility of the Mexican central government to the Confederacy, and that any application on its behalf would certainly have been denied by the Congress).
On the third point, the right to purchase and store supplies in Mexico, Reily and Terrazas apparently did reach an agreement. However, the Mexicans would not accept Confederate currency, and since the Confederates lacked any substantial amounts of gold or silver, the accord thus reached was of little practical use to the Confederacy.
Why did Reily and Terrazas interpret the results of their discussions so differently? There are several possible reasons for this. One possibility is the language barrier. Reily spoke no Spanish, and Terrazas no English, and in the course of translation meaning could have been altered for one or both of them. Another possibility is the deliberate deception of Reily by Terrazas. Terrazas may indeed have VERBALLY assured Reily of his agreement on the concessions requested, and later, in writing, repudiated his verbal agreements. This would seem to be a more likely answer to the mystery at hand. As one historian has stated, Terrazas was "between three fires, the Union, the Confederacy, and Mexico," and it seems likely that he simply chose not to add fuel to one fire for fear of being burned in return by the others.24 And there is one possibility as well. It is not impossible that Reily himself exaggerated the success of his negotiations, either out of the incorrigible enthusiasm which was a feature of his personality, or as a deliberate attempt to ingratiate himself with his commander. In either case, the letter sent by Terrazas to Sibley would have revealed Reily's exaggerations for what they were.
After returning from Chihuahua, Colonel Reily was ordered to proceed to Hermosillo, the capital of Sonora. He accompanied Captain Sherod Hunter's command when it left Mesilla, capital of the Confederate Territory of Arizona, for the little adobe village of Tucson on February 14, 1862. Arriving in Tucson on February 28th, Reily participated in the flag-raising ceremony in the town plaza, whereby Captain Hunter formally took possession of Tucson (and western Arizona) for the Confederacy. Reily made a speech that was well-received by the crowd. On March 3rd he left with his escort (20 men commanded by Lieutenant James H. Tevis) to proceed on to Sonora.
Upon arriving in Sonora, Reily was received at the palace of Governor Don Ignacio Pesqueira. Reily here bargained for the same concessions he had sought in Chihuahua, and it seems that he apparently did in fact enjoy success with the Governor of Sonora. Pesqueira verbally assured Reily that Sonora would forbid the use of the port of Guaymas to the United States, refuse the Union Army transit over its territory, grant free entry and passage to the Confederate Army, and supply the Confederates with food and military stores. Pesqueira also stated that not only would Sonora agree to these concessions, but the province would rebel from the Republic if the Juarez government questioned its authority to do so. It is possible that the future annexation of Sonora by the Confederate States was also discussed, but if so, the results of that discussion have not been recorded.
Unfortunately for Reily and for Confederate hopes, there was in Hermosillo at that time an enterprising reporter for the SAN FRANCISCO BULLETIN, one W. G. Moody. Moody heard of the discussions between Reily and the Governor, and he managed to steal copies of Reily's introduction from Sibley and some of his notes (Moody stole the letters from the office of Pesqueira's translator, when the latter left to take the Spanish copies to the Governor) and transmit them to General Wright, the commanding General of Union forces in California. Within days, Wright had a gunboat on patrol off the harbor at Guaymas. He also had a letter prepared and sent to Pesqueira, containing what historian Robert Lee Kerby has called "one of the most diplomatic threats ever penned."
Wright's letter started off by congratulating Pesqueira for REFUSING Reily's overtures. Wright then went on to assure the Mexican official that "under no circumstances will the Government of the United States permit the rebel hordes to take refuge in Sonora. I have an army of ten thousand men ready to pass the frontier and protect your government and people." Upon receiving Wright's "promise of protection," Pesqueira suddenly decided to to reconsider his accord with Reily. He sent a letter to General Sibley, stating that Reily's claims of success had been "exaggerated, or perhaps badly misinterpreted." And as a final indignity, in August 1862 (after Sibley's army had been defeated and the Confederate position in Arizona had collapsed), Pesqueira sent a letter to General Wright promising that if any "rebels" set foot on Mexican soil, he would exterminate them. Thus ended James Reily's mission to Sonora.
In the end, perhaps the only "achievement" of Reily's missions to Chihuahua and Sonora was the "recognition" of the Confederacy as a nation by the Governors of those states. Reily was presented to the Governors of both States while wearing the uniform of a Colonel of Cavalry, Confederate States Army. He insisted on being addressed by his title, and always negotiated on the understanding that he represented a sovereign nation. And both Governors, Terrazas and Pesqueira, did negotiate with him on that basis. Of course that leaves open the question of whether recognition of the Confederacy as a legitimate nation by the governors actually represents "recognition by a foreign power" under international law. The central government of Mexico never recognized the Confederacy, and it is uncertain whether states in a federal system of government, even if virtually independent of the control of the central government (as Chihuahua and Sonora were in the 1860s), can independently recognize a foreign nation. All this writer can say is that Reily thought so!
With the end of the diplomatic missions of James Reily to Sonora and Chihuahua, and especially after the collapse of the Confederate Territory of Arizona, Confederate aspirations in Mexico dwindled away into nothing. Eventually the affair would be virtually forgotten, even by historians. Yet the Confederate attempt to annex the northern provinces of Mexico was an important episode in the history of the War Between the States. If the Confederates had been successful, the advantages gained might have shifted the balance of power in their favor, and their struggle for independence might have had a different outcome. For this, if for no other reason, the story of Confederate diplomacy and intrigue in Mexico deserves to be told.
Robert is a bit sparse on details concerning the Vidaurri Affair, so here is @David T concerning it:
In 1861, Confederate diplomacy in Mexico essentially followed two tracks.
The first, and less successful, was the Confederacy's relationship with
President Juarez in Mexico City. One reason this relationship was not
very successful was Jefferson Davis's choice of the very undiplomatic John
T. Pickett as envoy to Juarez. (Pickett openly insulted liberal government
officials and befriended supporters of Miguel Miramon's outcast
conservative faction. He eventually left after serving a month in jail for
getting into a brawl with a Yankee who had cast aspersions on the virtue
of the wife of a Confederate Cabinet Secretary.) Much more successful
were the Confederacy's negotiations with Santiago Vidaurri, Governor of
Nuevo Leon y Coahuila, a *caudillo* whose influence extended into regions
of northern Mexico (e.g., Tamaulipas) beyond the two states he had united.
For these negotiations, the Confederates sent Jose Agustin Quintero to
Monterey. Quintero, a native Cuban but devoted Southerner, was the ideal
choice; he was already friendly with Vidaurri, having met him when
Vidaurri had briefly been exiled to Texas in 1859. Quintero wanted
Vidaurri's assurances that he would not let either the US Army or Mexican
bandits invade the Confederacy through northern Mexico, that he would
provide the Confederacy with supplies, etc. Vidaurri replied favorably.
But he went much further, and presented Quintero with a truly remarkable
proposal, summarized as follows in Ronnie C. Tyler's *Santiago Vidaurri
and the Southern Confederacy* (Austin: Texas State Historical Association
1973), pp. 52-53:
"It was well known to everyone on the border, Vidaurri had begun, that for
several years he had been 'anxious to establish the Republic of Sierra
Madre,' [1] composed of the northern states of Mexico. With the advent of
the American Civil War, however, outright annexation of these states by
the Confederacy might be a better solution. Vidaurri mentioned several
reasons for his opinions. He had admired Americans for several years and
felt that northern Mexico more nearly resembled the southern part of the
United States, both geographically and psychologically, than it did
southern Mexico, with its tropical climate and illiterate Indians. 'God
had made everything beautiful in Mexico, except man,' Vidaurri concluded,
indicating his disillusionment with Juarez and the liberals. Fortunately,
there were 'intelligent people' in northern Mexico who realized that
numerous advantages could be had by association with the Confederacy. The
Mexican states had huge amounts of mineral wealth that could be
successfully mined--with adequate technical skill and an industrious labor
force available from the South. Agriculture had not been developed in
Mexico as it had been in the Confederacy. Mexico raised some cotton and
had mills that could be vastly improved with Southern help. In addition,
property would be safer after alliance with the South because of
stricter law enforcement. Vidaurri insisted that these states would
continue the process of Americanization already germinating, in the area,
leading eventually to governmental stability which the progressive
citizens so badly wanted. Proponents of Manifest Destiny could not have
asked for a more willing subject.
"Vidaurri had convinced Quintero that he was sincere in his proposal,
explaining that he foresaw important occurrences within Mexico that would
soon facilitate the annexation. He only sought some Confederate assurance
that his plan was acceptable. There would be trouble with the Juarez
government of course, but limited support from Texas--perhaps the 1,000
men that had been offered previously--would insure success. The governor
suggested that if President Davis would appoint someone he trusted to
negotiate this proposal with Vidaurri, discussions could begin
immediately...
"Limited by his instructions in replying to Vidaurri's fantastic offer,
Quintero had only said that he would faithfully report it to the proper
officials and maintain strictest confidence. Although Vidaurri's offer was
not remotely covered by his orders, he had considered it his duty to
listen to the governor and let the State Department make its own
decision..."
Was Vidaurri's offer sincere? Tyler is inclined to beleive that it was,
though he adds that it is possible that Vidaurri was just trying to test
the Confederacy's willingness to add new territory to its domain.
Vidaurri was in a difficult position in 1861. He had lost Juan Zuazua,
his best military leader, in 1860. Furthermore, in 1859, Vidaurri had
split with the liberals (as one might expect, it was over a question of
power, not ideology) who now considered him a conservative--and some of
the young liberals angry with his "betrayal" had fled to Mexico City and
now had Juarez's ear. If Juarez, in control of Mexico City since January
1861, were to consolidate his position, the prospects for Vidaurri and
other strong state governors maintaining their power would be dim. (And of
course if some foreign power were to intervene and occupy Mexico it too
might take a very unfavorable view of too-powerful governors.) By
contrast, the Confederacy was supposed to be based on states' rights,
which was just what Vidaurri wanted. Besides, Tyler seems to think that
Vidaurri's admiration for American institutions was genuine, and of course
annexation could help Vidaurri "Americanize" northern Mexico.
In any event, Davis, though otherwise pleased by the Quintero-Vidaurri
negotiations, and favoring "intimate social and commercial relations" with
northern Mexico, rejected annexation of the Mexican border states as
"imprudent and impolitic." The purpose of this post is to explore Davis's
probable reasons for this rejection, and ask if there was any chance he
(or perhaps another Confederate president) might have accepted it.
The Confederate case against annexation--and in favor of keeping Mexico's
borderland under the control of pro-Confederate governors nominally loyal
to Juarez--was indeed a strong one:
(1) Most obviously, the "one war at a time" principle: If you're already
fighting the Yankees, why fight Juarez, too?
(2) Davis expected that there was going to be European intervention in
Mexico, which owed the European powers huge debts it could not pay. In
that event, he expected the US to clash with whichever power would
intervene. (Not everyone thought it would be France btw; some Southerners
like Pickett throught Spain would be the main interventionist.) This
clash would lead the European interventionist to form an alliance with the
Confederacy, assuring the latter's victory. But if the CS were to annex
Mexican land, the European interventionist would probably be more angry
with the Confederacy than with the Yankees.
(3) Annexing northern Mexico would mean that the area's ports would be
subject to the Yankee blockade. It was more advantageous for the
Confederacy to keep such ports part of neutral Mexico, so that European
supplies could be shipped there free of the blockade and then be sent
across the Rio Grande to Texas (with cotton taking the same route in
reverse, though at first the Confederates imposed an embargo on cotton ).
(4) Finally, Davis already had enough independent-minded governors who put
their own states' interests first. Why add another?
These reasons (given in Tyler's book and in Frank Owsley's *King Cotton
Diplomacy*, University of Chicago Press, second edition [1959]) are
sufficiently cogent that I have despaired of making a plausible case for
the Confederacy accepting Vidaurri's offer. Still, there are some
counter-arguments and maybe under some circumstances they could have
persuaded Davis or at least some other Confederate president:
(1) First of all, there was still the spirit of expansion, which
Southerners had championed when they were part of the US. It is true that
Pickett had told Juarez that the only reason Southerners had previously
favored southward expansion was to get new slave states to counterbalance
the growing number of free states. Now that the South was no longer in
the Union, Pickett explained, this motive was no longer relevant, and the
South desired no further expansion, having plenty of land. It was now
only the United States which coveted Mexico. However, Pickett's real
opinion was indicated in his letter to Secretary of State Toombs in which
he explained that he said all this for Mexican consumption and that it
need not be taken too seriously in Richmond because "It must not be
supposed from the expression in this capital, of the foregoing diplomatic
language, that I am not fully impressed with the fact that 'manifest
destiny' may falsify the foregoing declaration." (Quoted in Owsley, p.
94.) (Incidentally, one of Pickett's problems was that his dispatches to
Richmond, which indicated his very low opinion of the Mexicans, were
regularly intercepted by the Mexicans and shown to Juarez...)
(2) With respect to the prospect of European intervention, one could use
it--as Pickett did--as an argument for getting Mexican territory *now*,
since it might be impossible to get it once the Europeans came. If a few
northern Mexican states were already part of the Confederacy by the time
the Europeans intervened, the intervening powers might accept this as a
*fait accompli*; after all, the Confederacy would not object to their
occupation of the great majority of Mexico. (And of course if the Yankees
objected to such occupation, all the better for the Confederacy, since
this could force any intervening power into an alliance with the
Confederates which would amount in effect to the partition of Mexico.)
(3) As for fighting Juarez, maybe Davis or some less cautious Confederate
president might decide that this was not a very frightening prospect.
Pickett gave a very unfavorable estimate of Juarez's military strength.
Indeed, even before the European intervention, Juarez faced severe
problems with an uncooperative Congress and a countryside that had by no
means been completely pacified.
(4) There was also Pickett's argument that the Confederates should acquire
Mexican territory if only to prevent Mexico from pledging it to the United
States under US envoy Tom Corwin's proposed loan treaty.
(5) There was considerable concern that Juarez would allow passage of US
troops through Mexico. In fact, the Mexican Congress agreed to let US
troops march through Sonora on their way from California to Arizona.
Mexican officials later tried to reassure the Confederates that this had
been done only because the Mexican government did not realize that the
Confederacy claimed Arizona, but it could be argued that there was no way
to prevent this sort of thing from happening except by outright
Confederate annexation of northern Mexico. You could certainly *hope*
that the Mexican government would not authorize any more troop movements
like this, and that even if it did the northern Mexican governors would
defy Mexico's central government, and prevent such troop movements, but
you couldn't be sure. It would be safer to have those governors under the
Confederate government than--even nominally--under Juarez's.
(6) As for the advantage of having northern Mexican ports not subject to
the blockade: Was it really clear in 1861 whether trade from Europe to
Tamaulipas to Texas would be that much cheaper than blockade-running,
given that the Mexicans could impose stiff tariffs, etc.? (Indeed, at
first "sometimes excessive duties were levied" according to Owsley, p.
118, but that changed once Vidaurri got control of Tamualipas in the
spring of 1862.) In any event, according to Owsley (pp. 258-9) Matamoros
was in fact blockaded, in the sense that "An American fleet watched just
outside the bar, and many ships were seized (most of them were ultimately
freed by the United States Supreme Court, but not until the war was about
over), and the greater part of the other ships were subjected to the
rigors of an ordinary blockade."
See http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/VV/fvi24.html for
more on Vidaurri (though curiously it fails to mention his 1861 offer to
bring northern Mexico into the Confederacy). As it notes, he was
eventually to side with Maximilian and to be executed without a trial on
the latter's fall.
Any thoughts? If the Confederates had accepted the offer, would Vidaurri
in any event have been able to get other northern Mexican states to follow
the lead of Nuevo Leon y Coahuila into the Confederacy? And finally, is
there any chance that after the war, a victorious US would choose to keep
some or all of the Confederacy's Mexican states as I suggested some years
ago at
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/9c3d82105c8cc62b ?
[1] Seeking to establish an independent "Republic of Sierra Madre" was a
standard accusation against northern Mexican *caudillos.* Tyler thinks
(p. 22) that in Vidaurri's case "the charge might have had some
substance."
The first, and less successful, was the Confederacy's relationship with
President Juarez in Mexico City. One reason this relationship was not
very successful was Jefferson Davis's choice of the very undiplomatic John
T. Pickett as envoy to Juarez. (Pickett openly insulted liberal government
officials and befriended supporters of Miguel Miramon's outcast
conservative faction. He eventually left after serving a month in jail for
getting into a brawl with a Yankee who had cast aspersions on the virtue
of the wife of a Confederate Cabinet Secretary.) Much more successful
were the Confederacy's negotiations with Santiago Vidaurri, Governor of
Nuevo Leon y Coahuila, a *caudillo* whose influence extended into regions
of northern Mexico (e.g., Tamaulipas) beyond the two states he had united.
For these negotiations, the Confederates sent Jose Agustin Quintero to
Monterey. Quintero, a native Cuban but devoted Southerner, was the ideal
choice; he was already friendly with Vidaurri, having met him when
Vidaurri had briefly been exiled to Texas in 1859. Quintero wanted
Vidaurri's assurances that he would not let either the US Army or Mexican
bandits invade the Confederacy through northern Mexico, that he would
provide the Confederacy with supplies, etc. Vidaurri replied favorably.
But he went much further, and presented Quintero with a truly remarkable
proposal, summarized as follows in Ronnie C. Tyler's *Santiago Vidaurri
and the Southern Confederacy* (Austin: Texas State Historical Association
1973), pp. 52-53:
"It was well known to everyone on the border, Vidaurri had begun, that for
several years he had been 'anxious to establish the Republic of Sierra
Madre,' [1] composed of the northern states of Mexico. With the advent of
the American Civil War, however, outright annexation of these states by
the Confederacy might be a better solution. Vidaurri mentioned several
reasons for his opinions. He had admired Americans for several years and
felt that northern Mexico more nearly resembled the southern part of the
United States, both geographically and psychologically, than it did
southern Mexico, with its tropical climate and illiterate Indians. 'God
had made everything beautiful in Mexico, except man,' Vidaurri concluded,
indicating his disillusionment with Juarez and the liberals. Fortunately,
there were 'intelligent people' in northern Mexico who realized that
numerous advantages could be had by association with the Confederacy. The
Mexican states had huge amounts of mineral wealth that could be
successfully mined--with adequate technical skill and an industrious labor
force available from the South. Agriculture had not been developed in
Mexico as it had been in the Confederacy. Mexico raised some cotton and
had mills that could be vastly improved with Southern help. In addition,
property would be safer after alliance with the South because of
stricter law enforcement. Vidaurri insisted that these states would
continue the process of Americanization already germinating, in the area,
leading eventually to governmental stability which the progressive
citizens so badly wanted. Proponents of Manifest Destiny could not have
asked for a more willing subject.
"Vidaurri had convinced Quintero that he was sincere in his proposal,
explaining that he foresaw important occurrences within Mexico that would
soon facilitate the annexation. He only sought some Confederate assurance
that his plan was acceptable. There would be trouble with the Juarez
government of course, but limited support from Texas--perhaps the 1,000
men that had been offered previously--would insure success. The governor
suggested that if President Davis would appoint someone he trusted to
negotiate this proposal with Vidaurri, discussions could begin
immediately...
"Limited by his instructions in replying to Vidaurri's fantastic offer,
Quintero had only said that he would faithfully report it to the proper
officials and maintain strictest confidence. Although Vidaurri's offer was
not remotely covered by his orders, he had considered it his duty to
listen to the governor and let the State Department make its own
decision..."
Was Vidaurri's offer sincere? Tyler is inclined to beleive that it was,
though he adds that it is possible that Vidaurri was just trying to test
the Confederacy's willingness to add new territory to its domain.
Vidaurri was in a difficult position in 1861. He had lost Juan Zuazua,
his best military leader, in 1860. Furthermore, in 1859, Vidaurri had
split with the liberals (as one might expect, it was over a question of
power, not ideology) who now considered him a conservative--and some of
the young liberals angry with his "betrayal" had fled to Mexico City and
now had Juarez's ear. If Juarez, in control of Mexico City since January
1861, were to consolidate his position, the prospects for Vidaurri and
other strong state governors maintaining their power would be dim. (And of
course if some foreign power were to intervene and occupy Mexico it too
might take a very unfavorable view of too-powerful governors.) By
contrast, the Confederacy was supposed to be based on states' rights,
which was just what Vidaurri wanted. Besides, Tyler seems to think that
Vidaurri's admiration for American institutions was genuine, and of course
annexation could help Vidaurri "Americanize" northern Mexico.
In any event, Davis, though otherwise pleased by the Quintero-Vidaurri
negotiations, and favoring "intimate social and commercial relations" with
northern Mexico, rejected annexation of the Mexican border states as
"imprudent and impolitic." The purpose of this post is to explore Davis's
probable reasons for this rejection, and ask if there was any chance he
(or perhaps another Confederate president) might have accepted it.
The Confederate case against annexation--and in favor of keeping Mexico's
borderland under the control of pro-Confederate governors nominally loyal
to Juarez--was indeed a strong one:
(1) Most obviously, the "one war at a time" principle: If you're already
fighting the Yankees, why fight Juarez, too?
(2) Davis expected that there was going to be European intervention in
Mexico, which owed the European powers huge debts it could not pay. In
that event, he expected the US to clash with whichever power would
intervene. (Not everyone thought it would be France btw; some Southerners
like Pickett throught Spain would be the main interventionist.) This
clash would lead the European interventionist to form an alliance with the
Confederacy, assuring the latter's victory. But if the CS were to annex
Mexican land, the European interventionist would probably be more angry
with the Confederacy than with the Yankees.
(3) Annexing northern Mexico would mean that the area's ports would be
subject to the Yankee blockade. It was more advantageous for the
Confederacy to keep such ports part of neutral Mexico, so that European
supplies could be shipped there free of the blockade and then be sent
across the Rio Grande to Texas (with cotton taking the same route in
reverse, though at first the Confederates imposed an embargo on cotton ).
(4) Finally, Davis already had enough independent-minded governors who put
their own states' interests first. Why add another?
These reasons (given in Tyler's book and in Frank Owsley's *King Cotton
Diplomacy*, University of Chicago Press, second edition [1959]) are
sufficiently cogent that I have despaired of making a plausible case for
the Confederacy accepting Vidaurri's offer. Still, there are some
counter-arguments and maybe under some circumstances they could have
persuaded Davis or at least some other Confederate president:
(1) First of all, there was still the spirit of expansion, which
Southerners had championed when they were part of the US. It is true that
Pickett had told Juarez that the only reason Southerners had previously
favored southward expansion was to get new slave states to counterbalance
the growing number of free states. Now that the South was no longer in
the Union, Pickett explained, this motive was no longer relevant, and the
South desired no further expansion, having plenty of land. It was now
only the United States which coveted Mexico. However, Pickett's real
opinion was indicated in his letter to Secretary of State Toombs in which
he explained that he said all this for Mexican consumption and that it
need not be taken too seriously in Richmond because "It must not be
supposed from the expression in this capital, of the foregoing diplomatic
language, that I am not fully impressed with the fact that 'manifest
destiny' may falsify the foregoing declaration." (Quoted in Owsley, p.
94.) (Incidentally, one of Pickett's problems was that his dispatches to
Richmond, which indicated his very low opinion of the Mexicans, were
regularly intercepted by the Mexicans and shown to Juarez...)
(2) With respect to the prospect of European intervention, one could use
it--as Pickett did--as an argument for getting Mexican territory *now*,
since it might be impossible to get it once the Europeans came. If a few
northern Mexican states were already part of the Confederacy by the time
the Europeans intervened, the intervening powers might accept this as a
*fait accompli*; after all, the Confederacy would not object to their
occupation of the great majority of Mexico. (And of course if the Yankees
objected to such occupation, all the better for the Confederacy, since
this could force any intervening power into an alliance with the
Confederates which would amount in effect to the partition of Mexico.)
(3) As for fighting Juarez, maybe Davis or some less cautious Confederate
president might decide that this was not a very frightening prospect.
Pickett gave a very unfavorable estimate of Juarez's military strength.
Indeed, even before the European intervention, Juarez faced severe
problems with an uncooperative Congress and a countryside that had by no
means been completely pacified.
(4) There was also Pickett's argument that the Confederates should acquire
Mexican territory if only to prevent Mexico from pledging it to the United
States under US envoy Tom Corwin's proposed loan treaty.
(5) There was considerable concern that Juarez would allow passage of US
troops through Mexico. In fact, the Mexican Congress agreed to let US
troops march through Sonora on their way from California to Arizona.
Mexican officials later tried to reassure the Confederates that this had
been done only because the Mexican government did not realize that the
Confederacy claimed Arizona, but it could be argued that there was no way
to prevent this sort of thing from happening except by outright
Confederate annexation of northern Mexico. You could certainly *hope*
that the Mexican government would not authorize any more troop movements
like this, and that even if it did the northern Mexican governors would
defy Mexico's central government, and prevent such troop movements, but
you couldn't be sure. It would be safer to have those governors under the
Confederate government than--even nominally--under Juarez's.
(6) As for the advantage of having northern Mexican ports not subject to
the blockade: Was it really clear in 1861 whether trade from Europe to
Tamaulipas to Texas would be that much cheaper than blockade-running,
given that the Mexicans could impose stiff tariffs, etc.? (Indeed, at
first "sometimes excessive duties were levied" according to Owsley, p.
118, but that changed once Vidaurri got control of Tamualipas in the
spring of 1862.) In any event, according to Owsley (pp. 258-9) Matamoros
was in fact blockaded, in the sense that "An American fleet watched just
outside the bar, and many ships were seized (most of them were ultimately
freed by the United States Supreme Court, but not until the war was about
over), and the greater part of the other ships were subjected to the
rigors of an ordinary blockade."
See http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/VV/fvi24.html for
more on Vidaurri (though curiously it fails to mention his 1861 offer to
bring northern Mexico into the Confederacy). As it notes, he was
eventually to side with Maximilian and to be executed without a trial on
the latter's fall.
Any thoughts? If the Confederates had accepted the offer, would Vidaurri
in any event have been able to get other northern Mexican states to follow
the lead of Nuevo Leon y Coahuila into the Confederacy? And finally, is
there any chance that after the war, a victorious US would choose to keep
some or all of the Confederacy's Mexican states as I suggested some years
ago at
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/9c3d82105c8cc62b ?
[1] Seeking to establish an independent "Republic of Sierra Madre" was a
standard accusation against northern Mexican *caudillos.* Tyler thinks
(p. 22) that in Vidaurri's case "the charge might have had some
substance."
If anyone would like to read up further on the Vidaurri Affair, Tyler's book is available for download on JSTOR. One other minor quibble I would state concerning Robert's post is that, according to John D. P. Fuller's The Slavery Question and the Movement to Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848, by 1848 the All Mexico movement was opposed primarily by the Atlantic South in the form of Calhoun and his allies. By the time the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo arrived in Washington and took all the energy from the movement, the All Mexico movement had gained the support of a coalition as diverse as Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and New England abolitionists as odd as it may sound.
Untrue. He offered them to James Buchanan, but he was out of office by the time they arrived. And they weren't War elephants. The King of Siam wanted a breeding population in North America for some strange reason, and Lincoln declined:
"I appreciate most highly Your Majesty's tender of good offices in forwarding to this Government a stock from which a supply of elephants might be raised on our own soil. This Government would not hesitate to avail itself of so generous an offer if the object were one which could be made practically useful in the present condition of the United States.
"Our political jurisdiction, however, does not reach a latitude so low as to favor the multiplication of the elephant, and steam on land, as well as on water, has been our best and most efficient agent of transportation in internal commerce."
Saphroneth
Banned
Lucky them, actually, as Spencers weren't exactly common that early - in fact, in June 1863 only 7,500 Spencers of any type had been delivered.
In June of 1863 the USS Wyoming won America's first naval victory against Japanese forces. (Shimonoseki Straits)
Several years previously (1859) the first ever joint Anglo-American military operation occurred at the Chinese Taku forts...because "Blood is thicker than water."
"Chinese" Gordon's famous Ever-Victorious Army actually formed and gained its prestigious nom de Guerre under an American commander, Frederick Townsend Ward. It wasn't till shorty after Ward's death in September of 1862 that Gordon took command.
There was a Union officer named James T. Kirk. Sadly he was an Army (Volunteers) colonel and his middle name was Thompson, and even worse there were no Union ships named Enterprise in American service during the Civil War years.
Benjamin
Several years previously (1859) the first ever joint Anglo-American military operation occurred at the Chinese Taku forts...because "Blood is thicker than water."
"Chinese" Gordon's famous Ever-Victorious Army actually formed and gained its prestigious nom de Guerre under an American commander, Frederick Townsend Ward. It wasn't till shorty after Ward's death in September of 1862 that Gordon took command.
There was a Union officer named James T. Kirk. Sadly he was an Army (Volunteers) colonel and his middle name was Thompson, and even worse there were no Union ships named Enterprise in American service during the Civil War years.
Benjamin
History Learner
Banned
A couple more I'd like to note:
According to the 1860 Census, the population of the Confederacy was roughly 9,100,000 of which 38% was slaves. Once you remove the slave numbers you get a total population of about 5,640,000 Whites, of whom 2,820,000 would be Male presuming a 50/50 ratio. Given that figure includes men of all age groups, it's astonishing to note that current estimates place around 1,000,000 men as having served in the Confederate military. Such means that literally just about everyone that was capable of doing service did so at one point and, even more shockingly, did so overwhelmingly as volunteers. They also certainly paid the price for such, with 290,000 dead of all causes, which means that around 10% of the entire male population died - a rate almost comparable to Germany in World War I. This tradition of high military service continues to this day, with the South contributing 44% of the U.S. Military's recruits despite only having 36% of the population's 18-24 demographic.
According to the National Bureau of Economics, in 1860 the South had a GDP per capita of $149 (In 1840 U.S. Dollars). Converting that into 1960 U.S. Dollars gives you $486 and comparing that to Paul Bairoch's historical GDP per capita statistics shows that the average Southerner was wealthier than the average European in all countries except the United Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands (barely). In fact, France wouldn't surpass the 1860 numbers for the South until the 1880s while it took Germany until the 1890s. Italy and Austro-Hungary failed to do so until sometime after 1913. In the last few years here in the present, the South is starting to pull ahead again, as States like Georgia and North Carolina surpass the French while others such as Tennessee are close to doing so.
According to the 1860 Census, the population of the Confederacy was roughly 9,100,000 of which 38% was slaves. Once you remove the slave numbers you get a total population of about 5,640,000 Whites, of whom 2,820,000 would be Male presuming a 50/50 ratio. Given that figure includes men of all age groups, it's astonishing to note that current estimates place around 1,000,000 men as having served in the Confederate military. Such means that literally just about everyone that was capable of doing service did so at one point and, even more shockingly, did so overwhelmingly as volunteers. They also certainly paid the price for such, with 290,000 dead of all causes, which means that around 10% of the entire male population died - a rate almost comparable to Germany in World War I. This tradition of high military service continues to this day, with the South contributing 44% of the U.S. Military's recruits despite only having 36% of the population's 18-24 demographic.
According to the National Bureau of Economics, in 1860 the South had a GDP per capita of $149 (In 1840 U.S. Dollars). Converting that into 1960 U.S. Dollars gives you $486 and comparing that to Paul Bairoch's historical GDP per capita statistics shows that the average Southerner was wealthier than the average European in all countries except the United Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands (barely). In fact, France wouldn't surpass the 1860 numbers for the South until the 1880s while it took Germany until the 1890s. Italy and Austro-Hungary failed to do so until sometime after 1913. In the last few years here in the present, the South is starting to pull ahead again, as States like Georgia and North Carolina surpass the French while others such as Tennessee are close to doing so.
That source is rather...incomplete. Per Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy it was estimated that at least 177,000 were to be conscripted East of the Mississippi, with closer to 300,000 being possible given the incomplete CSA records.
What's more, as that source notes a large number of "volunteers" volunteered simply to AVOID being labeled conscripts, meaning that conscription was still responsible for them joining the army, it just didn't get counted. Given what we know about the south it really isn't unreasonable to assume that the VAST majority of those who were in the army past-1862 were there because of conscription.
To compound matters we also need to remember that the 1861 volunteers had their one-year enlistment terms increased by two years by the same laws which put conscription into place, so some of THEM should probably be counted as well.
All in all, it seems far more likely that conscription was responsible for at least half of the Confederate Army, quite possibly closer to 2/3.
Otherwise, why would they have instituted it so early in 1862?
I cannot count the amount of times I've heard those words before, relating to the ACW or otherwise.
Which means that re-equipping the entire Union Army which such a repeating firearm would require increasing production by several orders of magnitude.
Now you would think that anyone who suggested a TL where such a thing could occur would be laughed out of the forum, only AH's have been written with just such a premise.