Grab-bag of Soviet what-ifs

raharris1973

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I expect these to be developed "from each according to his ability" ;)

1) Collectivization & 5-year planning & ending of the NEP start 4 years earlier than, in 1924-
How might this happen. But even more importantly, assuming it did happen, what are the medium-term and long-term effects? Is the USSR better or worse equipped for any mid-20th century brutal military-industrial competition? Any economic ripple effects abroad?

2) Collectivization & 5-year planning & ending of the NEP start 4 years later than in OTL, in 1932-
How might this happen. But even more importantly, assuming it did happen, what are the medium-term and long-term effects? Is the USSR better or worse equipped for any mid-20th century brutal military-industrial competition? Any economic ripple effects abroad? Do people end up attributing the decision to launch then as much to the Gold Depression as to founding ideological concepts?

3) Stalin dies between September 1938 and May 1941 of sudden natural or accidental causes (not assassination, not an act of war, not a coup). How does the succeeding collective leadership or single successor Vozhd perform in charge of the USSR in comparison to him? Is this as much of a disaster vis-a-vis foreign enemies as Stalin himself and Stalin fanboys would like to portray?

4) AHC: USSR adopts NEP-like policies within 30 years after WWII

5) Soviet Union sends Red Army across the border to support the KMT-CCP United Front in 1925-1927. It's quite precocious of course, but what happens fro there.

6) Soviets invade China more broadly in 1929 railway war

7) Soviets intervene against Japanese occupation of Manchuria as it happens in 1932-1933

8) Soviet-French military cooperation or Soviet-British or Soviet-Japanese or Soviet-Italian or Soviet-American military cooperation in place of historic Weimar Reichswher military cooperation

9) AHC: Soviet leader as thin and athletic as Putin

10) AHC: Female Soviet leader
 
I expect these to be developed "from each according to his ability" ;)

1) Collectivization & 5-year planning & ending of the NEP start 4 years earlier than, in 1924-
How might this happen. But even more importantly, assuming it did happen, what are the medium-term and long-term effects? Is the USSR better or worse equipped for any mid-20th century brutal military-industrial competition? Any economic ripple effects abroad?

2) Collectivization & 5-year planning & ending of the NEP start 4 years later than in OTL, in 1932-
How might this happen. But even more importantly, assuming it did happen, what are the medium-term and long-term effects? Is the USSR better or worse equipped for any mid-20th century brutal military-industrial competition? Any economic ripple effects abroad? Do people end up attributing the decision to launch then as much to the Gold Depression as to founding ideological concepts?

3) Stalin dies between September 1938 and May 1941 of sudden natural or accidental causes (not assassination, not an act of war, not a coup). How does the succeeding collective leadership or single successor Vozhd perform in charge of the USSR in comparison to him? Is this as much of a disaster vis-a-vis foreign enemies as Stalin himself and Stalin fanboys would like to portray?

4) AHC: USSR adopts NEP-like policies within 30 years after WWII

5) Soviet Union sends Red Army across the border to support the KMT-CCP United Front in 1925-1927. It's quite precocious of course, but what happens fro there.

6) Soviets invade China more broadly in 1929 railway war

7) Soviets intervene against Japanese occupation of Manchuria as it happens in 1932-1933

8) Soviet-French military cooperation or Soviet-British or Soviet-Japanese or Soviet-Italian or Soviet-American military cooperation in place of historic Weimar Reichswher military cooperation

9) AHC: Soviet leader as thin and athletic as Putin

10) AHC: Female Soviet leader
I'm not super well-versed in soviet history, but I can answer 7 and 8.

See, before the purges, the red army was actually pretty decent, with a veteran army leftover from the civil war and basmachi conflict, not to mention men like tukhashevsky. If they had intervened in manchuria (i'm not sure of the likelihood of that but nonetheless) the kwantung army would, pardon my french, get its shit kicked in.

8 Might well butterfly world war two as we know it. If the germans are starved of soviet resources and military support, rearmament will be significantly harder, allowing the "entente"'s buildup to continue. More importantly, the french strategy against the germans would probably work if it does come to war.
 

raharris1973

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See, before the purges, the red army was actually pretty decent, with a veteran army leftover from the civil war and basmachi conflict, not to mention men like tukhashevsky. If they had intervened in manchuria (i'm not sure of the likelihood of that but nonetheless) the kwantung army would, pardon my french, get its shit kicked in.

But I don't think Soviet forces were nearly as well-equipped at the beginning of the 1930s as they were by the time of Khalkin Gol in 1939, when the Japanese "got their shit kicked in". Even if some Russian Civil War experience was useful, Soviet forces probably were relying on too many Civil War & WWI vintage weapons. Certainly their armor would not be as impressive as later, they would be more reliant on horse cavalry and armored trains, etc.
Soviet forces would not be backed up by nearly as much heavy industry either, especially in the Urals and points east.
 
8) Soviet-French military cooperation or Soviet-British or Soviet-Japanese or Soviet-Italian or Soviet-American military cooperation in place of historic Weimar Reichswher military cooperation

8 Might well butterfly world war two as we know it. If the germans are starved of soviet resources and military support, rearmament will be significantly harder, allowing the "entente"'s buildup to continue. More importantly, the french strategy against the germans would probably work if it does come to war.

assume this scenario to mean there are no 1920's dealings between Reichswehr and Soviets? and this situation continues when Nazi regime comes to power? (which historically the Nazis DID freeze Soviets out of most trade)

it seems as though without some avenue for the German military they might not be the same force in the country? (closer to Bulgarian Zveno than their historical kingmaker role)
 

Anchises

Banned
3) I think killing Stalin off at that point would be negative in regards to Barbarossa.

Either he dies sooner and his purges and terror never cause the damage they did IOTL.

Or he trips and falls down a flight of stairs after Bagration.

But in 1938-1941 the state is pretty much a one-man-show and if Stalin suddenly dies there will be chaos and uncertainty. That might have negative effects when the Germans attack.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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1) Collectivization & 5-year planning & ending of the NEP start 4 years earlier than, in 1924-
How might this happen. But even more importantly, assuming it did happen, what are the medium-term and long-term effects? Is the USSR better or worse equipped for any mid-20th century brutal military-industrial competition? Any economic ripple effects abroad?

2) Collectivization & 5-year planning & ending of the NEP start 4 years later than in OTL, in 1932-
How might this happen. But even more importantly, assuming it did happen, what are the medium-term and long-term effects? Is the USSR better or worse equipped for any mid-20th century brutal military-industrial competition? Any economic ripple effects abroad? Do people end up attributing the decision to launch then as much to the Gold Depression as to founding ideological concepts?

On these questions, Adam Tooze, in The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931, makes an argument that the OTL timing of the Soviet program was near perfect, and he emphasized the utility of the worldwide Great Depression for Stalin's economic program. Essentially, the global Depression made western governments, companies and experts more willing to open trade with the Soviet Union, and made key western goods and services important for rapid development far more affordable than they would have been in the 1920s.

I wonder if that means that in an 4 year early attempt to industrialize at the hectic pace of the 1930s, while the U.S. and Britain were having good years in the 1920s, the Soviet state would have run into balance of payments problems much faster and not been able to sustain good and service imports at the rate achieved in the OTL 1930s.

Alternatively, if the NEP had been kept around for four more years, perhaps the Soviet economy, producers and consumers could have been more exposed to the global downturn, as opposed to being somewhat insulated by having switched to a different set of rules for a command/mobilization economy with the 5 year plan.
 
6) Soviets invade China more broadly in 1929 railway war

I discussed this a few months ago at https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/stalin-revolutionizes-manchuria-1929.446168/

***
From Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936 (dated October 7, 1929--this was during the Sino-Soviet conflict caused by Zhang Xueliang's attempt to gain control of the northern part of the Chinese Eastern Railway):

"There will be a lot of trouble with China. By the way, I think it's time to think about organizing an uprising by a revolutionary movement in Manchuria. The isolated detachments being sent to Manchuria to perform isolated tasks of an episodic nature are a good thing, of course, but they are not enough. We have to go for bigger things now. We need to organize two double regiment brigades, chiefly made up of Chinese, outfit them with everything necessary (artillery, machine guns, and so on), put Chinese at the head of the brigade, and send them into Manchuria with the following assignment: to stir up a rebellion among the Manchurian troops, to have reliable soldiers from these forces join them (the others should be sent home after removing the officer corps), to form into a division, to occupy Harbin, and, after gathering force, to declare Chang Hsueh-liang overthrown, establish a revolutionary government (massacre the landowners, bring in the peasants, create soviets in the cities and towns, and so on). This is necessary. This we can and, I think, should do. No 'international law' contradicts this task. It will be clear to everyone that we are against war with China, that our Red Army soldiers are only defending our borders and have no intention of crossing into Chinese territory, and if there is a rebellion inside Manchuria, that's something quite understandable, given the atmosphere of the regime imposed by Chang Hsueh-liang. Think about it. It's important." https://books.google.com/books?id=jjzopxC9ICYC&pg=PA182

This obviously would have gone much farther than what the USSR did in OTL, which was basically simply to use force to restore the 1924 Soviet agreement with Zhang Xueliang's father. Lars T. Lih notes in his preface that "This revolutionary daydream seems atypical of the cautious Stalin, and there is no indication anything was done with it." https://books.google.com/books?id=jjzopxC9ICYC&pg=PA35 Was there any chance that Stalin would actually follow through with this? It sounds like a recipe for a war with Japan, in which Japan would not only have the support of the other major capitalist powers, but (unlike what it did in Manchuria in 1931 in OTL) could claim it was acting in defense of China.
 

raharris1973

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It sounds like a recipe for a war with Japan, in which Japan would not only have the support of the other major capitalist powers, but (unlike what it did in Manchuria in 1931 in OTL) could claim it was acting in defense of China.

The Japanese PM reminds you that Japan is not at war, it is merely conducting a "police action" in support of League of Nations resolutions to halt Soviet aggression.
 

raharris1973

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3) I think killing Stalin off at that point would be negative in regards to Barbarossa.

But in 1938-1941 the state is pretty much a one-man-show and if Stalin suddenly dies there will be chaos and uncertainty. That might have negative effects when the Germans attack.

How would these negative consequences play out? On the one hand the surviving Soviet leadership has a common interest in protecting the state and party in a dangerous international situation. On the other hand, perhaps there could be an unintended loss of confidence or confusion if the succeeding leadership fails to coordinate all their messages in all the public information organs.

What if Stalin dies in October 1939, for example? How do things play out from there? I would imagine that things in the Soviet leadership would be pretty well sorted out by the time of Barbarossa in 1941, so leadership should be unified. On the other hand, might Stalin's death loom large in Hitler's calculation (dictators tend to assume the necessity of a single dictator for stability) and make him decide to attack the USSR in spring 1940, perceiving the USSR as vulnerable. I imagine the USSR will not reach consensus to invade Finland in November, so that would have some effects too.

assume this scenario to mean there are no 1920's dealings between Reichswehr and Soviets? and this situation continues when Nazi regime comes to power? (which historically the Nazis DID freeze Soviets out of most trade)

it seems as though without some avenue for the German military they might not be the same force in the country? (closer to Bulgarian Zveno than their historical kingmaker role)

Yes - no dealings in the 20s. Intriguing analogy with Bulgaria, please elaborate on the Zveno.
 
Yes - no dealings in the 20s. Intriguing analogy with Bulgaria, please elaborate on the Zveno.

Zveno https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zveno was on the outside looking in, the Reichswehr was power behind the throne? IF they did not have avenue of covert dealings with USSR that limits them (unless and until they can find a substitute) both with training and finances. (assuming they had off-budget sources related to their arms dealings)

maybe some of the WWI losers can operate clandestine cooperation?
 

raharris1973

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3) I think killing Stalin off at that point would be negative in regards to Barbarossa.

But in 1938-1941 the state is pretty much a one-man-show and if Stalin suddenly dies there will be chaos and uncertainty. That might have negative effects when the Germans attack.
'

Well, I've just watched The Death of Stalin (2017) - IMDb, great movie. If the hijinks in there are any indication, there would be chaos and uncertainty, so I've converted to your point of view.
 
in 1938-1941 the state is pretty much a one-man-show and if Stalin suddenly dies there will be chaos and uncertainty. That might have negative effects when the Germans attack.

negative for which side? assume the Soviets, "decisions by committee" and all but the "committee" might or likely would be more distrustful of Germany?
 
What if Stalin dies in October 1939, for example? How do things play out from there? I would imagine that things in the Soviet leadership would be pretty well sorted out by the time of Barbarossa in 1941, so leadership should be unified. On the other hand, might Stalin's death loom large in Hitler's calculation (dictators tend to assume the necessity of a single dictator for stability) and make him decide to attack the USSR in spring 1940, perceiving the USSR as vulnerable. I imagine the USSR will not reach consensus to invade Finland in November, so that would have some effects too.

The thing is, though, that if the USSR has already made territorial demands on Finland and the Finns flat out decline to hand over any land, like IOTL, the Soviets would pretty much need to invade. Otherwise they are giving out a bad message: tiny little countries can snub the mighty USSR by refusing an ultimatum and getting away scot-free. Internationally, it would make the USSR look ridiculous and weak.
 

raharris1973

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The thing is, though, that if the USSR has already made territorial demands on Finland and the Finns flat out decline to hand over any land, like IOTL, the Soviets would pretty much need to invade. Otherwise they are giving out a bad message: tiny little countries can snub the mighty USSR by refusing an ultimatum and getting away scot-free. Internationally, it would make the USSR look ridiculous and weak.

When in October 1939 were the demands on Finland publicized?
 
When in October 1939 were the demands on Finland publicized?

I don't think that the exact Soviet demands became public before November. There certainly were different rumours about in the international press through late October. Molotov publicly told about the official demands to the Supreme Soviet on October 31st, on the next day they started to circulate in the international press. Generally, even before that, the entire world knew of what had happened between the USSR and the Baltic states, and it was generally known since about October 15th that Finland and the USSR were negotiating what could only be about concrete Finnish concessions to the USSR. If the Soviet government comes out of these negotiations with practically no gains to show, and then does not follow up by retaliating towards Finland in some way, the USSR would lose in diplomatic terms: the plucky little Finns managed to rebuff the demands of the great USSR and did not suffer any negative consequences. In the international situation of the day, Moscow could not afford such a show of weakness.
 
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