Goering was a cunning sociopath and a reflexive anti-Semite.
His intelligence was fairly high, but he was inconsistent and lacked follow-through. When pressed, he could exercise remarkable will- and brain-power to avoid being embarrassed or to seize power. For instance, upon being elected to the Reichstag, he realized he had no clue how a Parliamentary system worked except that he hated it - because of course he did. He then proceeded to do a crash-course in learning the finer points of Parliamentary debate and procedures, including the arcane and used it with aplomb on several ocassions. But then struggled to recall his skill-set years later, because by that point of course the Parliamentary system in Germany was dead and gone.
His anti-Semitism was... complicated. Anti-Semitism almost always existed in Germany, but in the early 1910s, it existed in a much more muted form than in places such as Russia. The street-level feeling was to crack a Jew joke and talk nonsense about them, but then have a Jewish pal and justify it as saying, "well, he's not like the others." Of course this type of horseshit semi-mild anti-Semitism is not unique, and exists in many places today, but in that era it was much more "open." Yet, Goering's upbringing precluded him from the cruder form of anti-Semitism as practiced by the sons of minor officials of the Empire and service-class not-quite-white-collar professionals who rubbed up against Jews in their jobs and resented them on a visceral and personal level. Goering's anti-Semitism prior to the War would have been upper-class snobbery more than anything else. We also cannot discount that his family's great friend was a Jew and even was rumored to be his mother's lover and the real father of Goering. The effect of these rumors on Goering's state of mind are hard to decipher. But the rumors were certainly not unknown to him.
What seems to radicalize Goering's anti-Semitism is the post-War search for scapegoats and his lunatic wife, the first one - Karin. Karin was a neo-pagan mystic whose treatment of Christianity would certainly raise a few eyebrows. She brought a lot of baggage into the relationship, just as Goering was dealing with various issues. She most certainly made him worse. Hanging out with Hitler in tight-quarters also did not help with one's stable world-view of minorities as well.
By 1938, Goering's anti-Semitism would be reflexively rabid, but skin-deep. He was not a man to spin Rosenberg conspiracy yarns, or to believe the pages of Der Sturmer. He would squeeze the Jews for all they had, scapegoat them, and parrot what Nazi piece of claptrap put before him by speech-writers, but he was no zealot. Zealotry requires too much work.
What Goering does with the power once he seizes it is an intriguing concept, and really requires a nailed down timeline of when that occurs: 1938 or post-Czech 1939. Because that will influence his relationship with the Army. In 1938, Goering at the niggling instigation of Hitler and his inner circle presided over a kangaroo military court in the sordid, confusing and awful Blomberg–Fritsch affair. The upshot of which was that the Army realized that Goering, far from being a moderating influence of the Nazi Party and being "their" man on the inside who could calm the lunatics around Hitler was actually Hitler's man and could not be relied upon. It damaged his reputation among the generals. Oh he still has his Air Force that worships him, and his overall standing with the rank-and-file is fairly good, but the Army's support for him is not iron-clad.
That brings up the next point: The Oath. Much has been made of the Fuhrer Oath. Probably a lot more than it should haven been. But whatever the impact it had on having army officer pledge allegiance to Hitler, it would not automatically transfer to Goering and he would know not to press for it... at least not early enough in the game. Without that Oath, the Army's so-called and much commented upon "blind allegiance" should not be taken for granted. The Army reserves the right to shop around for a better candidate should Goering bungle the job, or makes too many left turns and makes them nervous on the way to Poland or France.
But in the 1939 scenario, some of the awful taste in the throat of everyone with cabbage on their collar tabs would be gone a bit and the miracle of having Czechoslovakia dismember itself and hand over its redoubts with France and Britain being accessories to the crime... it sure would have risen the stock of a senior Nazi Party official, even if Goering was not really in favor of the Munich bluff and having Hitler hold the Western Civilization hostage.
Goering, left to his own devices, might eventually get around to turning his eye towards Poland, or France, or he might not. It would depend not just on him, but internal and external forces. The Army I already mentioned. There were eager hawks in the ranks, but there were also very prominent doves in the senior leadership and they regarded Nazi adventurism as dangerous to Germany. With his reputation with generals tarnished by the kangaroo court performance and knowing that his hold over the Army is not absolute, Goering would need to watch his step.
But, there are other actors on the stage with him. Terrible shitstains such as Himmler, who has his own poorly articulated agenda. But, the SS in 1938 or 1939 was not the SS as it was in the later (or even middle) stages of the War. What pressure Himmler can bring to bear is centered on being the Imperial Leader of all police... and this now too highlights what are we talking about - 1938 or 1939? While Himmler was the master of all cops in Germany, political and criminal since 1936, prior to the creation of RSHA, he did not as yet have a centralized control point. So, in theory, the Chancellor of Germany could de-couple the Chief of German Police title from Himmler's purely SS duties. That would of course be a declaration of war between Goering and Himmler, but Goering had legal options in his arsenal. By '38 and '39, Himmler's purge of the SS of all he found wanting was already complete, but there were enough disgruntled folks for Goering to leverage. However, Himmler too has weapons he can bring to the conflict, but he is not strong enough to dethrone Goering by himself and it would be a hard-sell to the Army to back Himmler since his talk of starting up the Armed Forces of the SS is also raising eyebrows.
That brings us to the next actor: the Nazi Party bureaucracy. Read that as Bormann. Yes, Deputy Leader Hess is technically in charge, but let's not pretend he wasn't permanently stuck in the broom closet in the corridors of power. Bormann and Goering relationship as it came down to us by history was, uh, frosty. Pakistan-India frosty. But that was years later. How would Bormann interact with Goering in '38? Carefully, probably. Bormann has his own crabbed dreams, but he also knows that he can never be The Guy, he's the Walk Behinder and Goering's behind is wide enough to walk behind for quite a few folks, Bormann included. What happens next though depends on whether Bormann underestimates Goering as so many have in the past, or realizes he's dealing with a charming serial-killer with a distaste for manual labor. If the former, Bormann is gone and Goering gets Hess to find a new Chancery majordomo. If the latter, Bormann can worm his way into Goering's inner circle and manipulate him subtly. Goering is a man of big gestures. Having his whims being catered to by a Walk Behinder would please him. With Bormann, Goering would gain access to the blood and guts of the Nazi party machinery of power. It could be a fruitful codependent partnership.
Last on the list is Goebbels. Goering and Goebbels were not buds. Goering could not take him seriously, while Goebbels resented Goering for being better than him, including find a good looking second wife, while Goebbels was stuck with his Magda (there is literally a diary entry that Goebbels writes after attending Goering's wedding that reads, "Why must he always win?") Goebbels would fall in line, but plot, because they are all plotters. But if push comes to shove, Goering would devour him in a single gulp and not even leave bones behind. Goebbels was replaceable. The myth of Goebbels as the lord and master of all Nazi Germany propaganda is very much a myth of Goebbels's own making. Goebbels in '38 only controlled the radio. The vast majority of the newspapers in Germany were controlled by Press Chief of the Nazi Party Otto Dietrich and President of the Reich Media Chamber and Reich Press Leader Max Amann, both of whom disliked Goebbels.
All of this is to set the scene. Goering, worried the Army does not like him as much as they should have (in Goering's mind), dealing with Himmler plotting, a sullen Goebbels, a smarmy Bormann and a general populace that loves him because they seem him as the un-official Foreign Secretary who avoided the War with the British and the French. In such an environment, Goering might sail in the direction the wind is blowing. Could he attack Poland? In a heart-beat, and he could also pull back if enough monocles stare blankly at him when he brings it up. Could he attack France, same scenario. As for the Soviet Union, ever impulse would tell him it's a bad idea, but he would also think it'd be a popular move. But, the Nazi economy was built for war. The whole of it was geared towards it to address the public expenditure and etc. Sooner or later, he'd have to dip his toe in the water: Poland or France? Even odds.
As for the concentration camps, they already existed. But, the extermination camps... Goering was the one who signed off on the Wannsee Conference. Did he know what he was doing when he gave Heydrich the instrument of power? Your guess is as good as mine. But he would not have lost a minute of sleep over it, if presented with a paper and told, "This is how you stay in power, my Leader and Chancellor. Give the order. The men are ready."