Glossary of Sealion Threads

[Saphroneth]

Calm your passions I hereby advise - crucially, not advertise - cannabis.

My most humble and effusive apologies for posting about an alternate history book involving Operation Sealion on an alternate history website called alternatehistory.com in a thread dedicated to Operation Sealion. I will NEVER, I repeat, NEVER do that again.

I think it's that you just pasted up the link to the book without going into any detail whatsoever.
If you'd gone into detail about HOW you think a Sealion could have taken place (précis level, a few thousand words) and then said you covered it in more detail in a book... then it's perhaps a little more grey. But as is, your post consisted in entirety of "Buy my book!"
Also, your entire postings on this forum consisted of three other posts and an advert.

 

[cpip]

Of course, this thread ("Operation Sea Lion: The Invasion Itself") can be added to the collection of Sea Lion threads.

 

[Daniel S. Fletcher]

I think it's that you just pasted up the link to the book without going into any detail whatsoever.
If you'd gone into detail about HOW you think a Sealion could have taken place (précis level, a few thousand words) and then said you covered it in more detail in a book... then it's perhaps a little more grey. But as is, your post consisted in entirety of "Buy my book!"
Also, your entire postings on this forum consisted of three other posts and an advert.

Point taken, and undeniably well made

Would "download my book for free today or tomorrow" go down better? I'm just looking for some vindication... it's lonely living here in a Thailand jungle. DL Jackboot. Enjoy. Share your views!

Regarding the feasibility of Sealion, we all know that there was no chance, it was conclusively proven.
As for that issue in JB, it took some creative license and a greatly worsened and more unstable situation on the British home front to vaguely justify it. But the focus was more on the dystopia that followed, not the nitty-gritty of an unthinkable sea mammal being quite thinkable in this timeline, and detailing it in full.

Cheers!

 

[oldironside]

They are rational germans the nazi's just became a laderhosen appreciation society.

You bastard! That was my joke!

 

[cpip]

WI: Hitler doesn't interfere in the Battle of Britain? is turning into a Sealion thread. At the least it's quite useful for anyone wanting information on the air aspects of the USM.

 

[Alternate History Geek]

Sealion on crack.

 

[Michele]

Picture me speechless:

"Build a huge U-Boat fleet, but each one can carry a Panzer or Tiger Tank. Just imagine waking up mourning seeing thousands of U-Boats unloading tanks and troops. This will need to be quick, and have total air control over Southern England."

 

[WillieB]

In the hopes of this sticky being a useful source of information to refer to & not just a rehash of the fractious debates we already have........

Royal Navy dispositions in home waters from Pink List 16.09.40. National Archive ADM 187/9

Approx steaming time from Straits of Dover at 20 knots is given for each location in brackets. Destroyers with sweeping gear are indicated with *.

Dover (1hr)
2 MTB

Harwich (3.5hrs)
6 DD (Malcolm, Venerious, Verity, Wild Swan, Wivern, Worcester)
11 MTB

Portsmouth (3.5hrs)
1 CL (Cardiff)
14 DD (Beagle, Bulldog, Havelock, Harvester, Hesperus, Highlander Vanoc, Viscount, Saladin, Sturdy, Berkeley, Fernie, Mistral (FR))
5 TB (Branlebas, L'Incomprise, La Cordeliere, La Flore (FR), Z7 (Dutch))
6 MTB

Southampton (3.5hrs)
2 DD (Volunteer, Wolverine)

Sheerness/Chatham (4hrs)
2 CL (Galatea, Aurora)
18 DD (Brilliant, Icarus*, Impulsive*, Campbell, Venetia, Vesper, Vivacious, Walpole, Cattistock, Holderness, Garth, Hambledon, Vanity, Viriera*, Wallace, Westminster, Winchester, Wolsey)

London (4.5hrs)
1 MTB

Lowestoft (5hrs)
1 TB (Draug (Norwegian))
1 MTB

Portland (5hrs)
2 MTB

Plymouth
1 BB (Revenge)
2 CL (Newcastle, Emerald)
11 DD (Isis*, Broke, Vansihart, Whitehall, Westcott, La Melporiene (FR), Ouragan (FR), Bouclier (FR), Blyskawica (Pol), Burza (Pol), Garland (Pol))

The Humber (10hrs)
3 CL (Manchester, Southampton, Birmingham)
5 DD (Javelin*, Jupiter*, Jaguar*, Kelvin*, Watchman)
11 MTB

Milford Haven (14hrs)
1 TB (G13 (Dutch))

Roysth (18hrs)
2 BB (Nelson, Rodney)
1 BC (Hood)
3 CLAA (Bonaventure, Naiad, Cairo)
17 DD (Cossack, Maori, Sikh, Zulu, Jackel*, Kashmir*, Kipling*, Ashanti, Bedouin, Punjabi, Tartar, Electra*, Vortigen, Valorous, Vega*, Verdun*, Woolston)
1 TB (Sleipner (Norwegian))

Liverpool (18.5hrs)
3 DD (Vanquisher, Walker, Sabre)

Dundee (19hrs)
3 TB (Z5, Z6, Z8 (all Dutch))

Belfast (20hrs)
3 DD (Shikari, Scimitar, Skate)

Firth of Clyde (21.5hrs)
1 CL (Sheffield)
10 DD (Keppel, Achates*, Active*, Amazon*, Antelope*, Arrow*, Douglas, St. Laurent (RCN), Ottowa (RCN), Skeena* (RCN))

Scapa Flow (26hrs)
1 BC (Repulse)
1 CV (Furious)
2 CA (Berwick, Norfolk)
1 CL (Glasgow)
1 CLA (Curacoa)
7 DD (Somalia, Eskimo, Matabele, Duncan, Versatile, Vimy, Eglington

On patrol or escort duty
10 DD (Veteran, Witherington, Mackay, Hurricane, Winchelsea, Warwick, Witch, Wanderer, Vivien, Wolfhound)
1 TB (G15 (Dutch))

Auxiliary Patrol - from Wash to Selsey Bill approx 700 small patrol vessels of which 300 at sea at any one time.

Apologies for any typo's, I'm working from a written record taken from the internet several years ago & my typing is worse than my handwriting.

I'm curious if anyone has any information regarding readiness at port that could impact on the steaming times. Also manning on the French & Dutch vessels, were there really enough Free French/ Dutch manpower for there?

Now, this is a very interesting post: A gem amongst the often heavily opiniated ones I keep reading here.

I think we can safely assume that the French vessels were adequately manned, the Dutch (of which not may personnel escaped to the UK) perhaps less so. No idea about the Polish vessels.

The RN too would be on -high- alert so we can again safely assume that most ships would be ready to go at a very short notice. They will need some time for preparation and forming up but I wouldn't add more than 2-3 hours to each schedule. Of course during that period they would be rather vulnerable to air attacks, much more so than at open sea.
Exception probably those in Scapa Flow were the exact infrastructure would seriouly hinder any ships exiting. I honestly don't think any of the Scapa ships would make it in time.

If the Luftwaffe manages to disrupt these procedures the RN might be in some trouble.

No doubt the approaches to Dover Straits would be heavily mined, so the minesweepers (and charges) won't be able to proceed at 20knts.
Of course the RN could pull a 'Farragut' but this might prove disastrous so it's implausible. I'll leave it up to more nautical knowledgeable minds to figure out a which speed the respective forces could have moved while sweeping for mines.

Now, let's see what the KM could put against this RN might. (optimal availabilty)
Obviously they have the 'advantage' of knowing exactly where they want to be, wheras the RN has to 'search' for individual combat groups.
As such the available air cover wil be better concentrated for the LW.

2, possibly 3, pre- dreadnought BB's. Pre -WWI vintage and unsuitable for anything but supporting tasks. Then again most of the British BB's and BC's are also WWI or slightly later.(Schlesien, Schleswig-Holstein and possibly Hannover)

1 modern BB Bismarck

4 modern BC's I assume that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau will be ready together with Lutzow and Scheer.

2 heavy Cruisers (Hipper & Prinz Eugen)

4 light cruisers ( Emden, Koln, Leipzig and Nurnberg.)

11 Auxiliary Cruisers ( Orion, Widder etc) They were -proven-capable of going against a regular CL or even CA at a pinch (doubful) but would be very effective against DD's.

14 destroyers. In spite of their less than stellar performance in Narvik theoretically at least the equivalent of any RN DD.

30 Torpedo boats of varying quality. Some were obsolete ( T107,108,110,196) others like the 6 Raubtier and 6 Raubvogel class were quite good. The 12 T35 types were fast torpedo carriers but hardly carried any other armament. Panther & Lowe were unknown factors.

9 F class Frigates. Badly designed and possibly only useful as a limited ASW platform. Still, they might have soaked up some RN firepower.

50+? Minensuch boote T 1935. 69 of those were built but I don't know how many were available in the given timeframe. Probably some 50+. The British called these 'Channel destroyers' which gives a fair indication of their capabilities.

?# Raumboote. Light minesweepers armed mostly with light/medium AA guns. 300 were built but I guess only about 80- 100 were ready for Sealion.
Very maneuvrable but no match for a DD or even an armed sloop/corvette.

? # Sperrbrecher ships. Converted merchant ships that acted as minehunters. Heavily armoured with mostly heavy (10.5 cm) /medium AA guns. Best guess is about 30 were ready by late 1940.

40+ Schnelboote . The wellknown S- boats. In spite of their small size quite effective. During the war they sank or heavily damaged more than 25 warships, including 2 cruisers and hundreds of merchant ships and armed aux. vessels.

12 Leichte Schnellboote. Lightly armed fast attack boats.

60+ U- boats?

?# Vorpostenboote. Armed trailers. Same as the British aux. ships but usually more heavily armed. Hundreds were built but only about 100 or so were available in the timeframe we're looking at.

Have I forgotten anything?

 

[Saphroneth]

At what date, precisely, is this supposed to be happening? If we assume OTL RN deployments, then we have to assume OTL Kriegsmarine readiness - and Bismarck was barely even finished, while at least one of the Twins was in repair, IIRC. If you remove the Norway actions (which is doable), then both sides get their Norway losses made good.

 

[Michele]

Have I forgotten anything?

Lots of things. They are covered in old sea mammal threads.

But you can start by looking up whether by mid-September 1940 the Bismarck was ready (no); whether the Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, Lützow and Leipzig were operational (no - torpedo holes all around); whether the Scheer and Prinz Eugen were ready (no); whether the Hipper would not suffer from some major engine malfuctions (unlikely); and where were the crews of the obsolete battleships (manning the hapless barge and small-fry escort flotillas, as per the German plan).

Read the old threads.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I've always been a little dubious about this particular list of ships ... I know the Pink Lists are pretty accurate but I'm not sure how they have been compiled into this single list for 16th September. I'm assuming that the list here is not a list of permanent base of operations for the warships but a list of locations for the 16th. For instance the CL Cardiff was based at Sheerness not Portsmouth at this time. In addition the majority of French vessels, those that weren't under repair, had no crew, they were mainly captured ships. The Polish ships on the other hand were crewed and used regularly, the Dutch subs were out on patrols but I can't find any records of the surface vessels used. Also the Canadian destroyers were mainly used for convoy duties.

Basically not everything was available that appears on this list and those that are, whilst they may have been at the listed location on 16th September, they would probably not have been there on the date of any expected invasion. As with a lot of these things it is just a single snapshot of an ever moving landscape of war assets and should be treated as such.

 

[WillieB]

At what date, precisely, is this supposed to be happening? If we assume OTL RN deployments, then we have to assume OTL Kriegsmarine readiness - and Bismarck was barely even finished, while at least one of the Twins was in repair, IIRC. If you remove the Norway actions (which is doable), then both sides get their Norway losses made good.

I've taken late 1940 as that seems the most 'popular' timeframe for an attempted Sealion.
Mind you I said 'optimal availability' for the KM just to make it interesting but still plausible as some of the heavier units where either still repairing or just coming on-line.
Adm. Scheer was refitted in July, Bismarck barely ready by August, same as Prinz Eugen.
Lutzow was (imcompletely) sold to the SU early 1940 but could have been finished by say September 1940. That's definitely a POD.
Actually both the twins were still being repaired, but they were functional, especially Gneisenau.
Scharnhorst wasn't completely repaired and refitted until Nov/Dec 1940 but with SL coming on this might have been hurried up a bit. Anyway she was available in August 1940.
Gneisenau was to all practical purposes completely repaired and seaworthy.

I don't want to diverge too much from the OTL which is why I haven't done anything with the Norway losses.

Also don't know the readiness of the RN ships. Some of these were also refitting/repairing but I have no idea as to which degree.

Come to think of it better leave Lutzow out of the equation. It's a bit too much of a POD.

 

[Michele]

Adm. Scheer was refitted in July, Bismarck barely ready by August, same as Prinz Eugen.

Actually none of these were ready by mid-September.

Actually both the twins were still being repaired, but they were functional, especially Gneisenau.

It was in drydock until October, and then needed training exercises.

Scharnhorst wasn't completely repaired and refitted until Nov/Dec 1940 but with SL coming on this might have been hurried up a bit. Anyway she was available in August 1940.

"The damages on Scharnhorst were severe. The turret and magazines was filled with smoke, gun crews were evacuated, and magazine flooding was ordered, but cancelled when no danger of fire was reported. The shell plating, which offered enough impact resistance to activate the warhead detonator, bore the brunt of the detonation, and a section 6 by 14 meters was destroyed. The explosion was deep enough so that a major portion of its energy was vented into the ship, where it tore the torpedo bulkhead from the armour deck and bent its top edge inboard 1,7 meters. That bulkhead was damaged from the level of the side armor to a platform above the shaft alley for 10 meters. Two transverse bulkheads, the battery deck and the first platform deck were damaged. The armor shelf and some adjacent structure were slightly damaged.

The torpedo struck at a point where the propeller shafts passed through the torpedo bulkhead, which had had to be knuckled to fit in place and accordingly had reduced ability to deflect elastically. Also, there was an inadequate connection of the torpedo bulkhead to the armor deck, and the structure was not continuous, so that stress flow could not transfer to adjoining structure. The bulkhead began to deflect elastically, as designed, but the upper end connection failed and permitted extensive flooding of inboard compartments. As a result of this damage, four of the 22 main watertight compartments had some flooding; 30 spaces in the area took on some 2.500 tons of water and 48 men perished. The Scharnhorst listed 3 degrees to starboard and was down 3 meters by the stern.

The propulsion plant was seriously affected by flooding and damage. The starboard shaft, which passed through the lower part of the underwater side-protection system abreast of turret Caesar, was destroyed, and the shaft alley began to flood immediately. A seaman was trapped there, and when another man opened a watertight door in a rescue attempt, the after engine room, which supplied power to the centerline shaft, began flooding so rapidly that it was impossible to properly secure the plant. One of the turbines, under maximum load, cooled so quickly that the housing came in contact with the turbine blades, and it had to be stopped. All steam connections were shut off in this space. With the starboard engine room also secured, the ship had only one shaft in operation.

Turret Caesar was out of action. Some compartments below the magazine were flooded, and electrical and other equipment in the magazine was damaged. Some cartridges and a few powder cases burned; many were damaged. The cartridge magazine contained 283 projectiles and cartridges combined, ready to be fed to the turret above. Other projectiles, without cartridges, were on a loading platform a few meters from the impact area.

The starboard after 150 mm twin turret was put out of action by flooding of subturret compartments and damage to the electrical system. The fire-control system for the after group of 105 mm guns was damaged.

The ship was limited to a maximum speed of 20 knots en route to Trondheim. Collision mats were rigged in an attempt to prevent further structural damage, but could not be secured, and the attempt was abandoned.

...

t 17:30 the 23. June the group arrived at the southern part of the Great Belt and Scharnhorst made fast to buoy A12 in Kiel at 22:26. The battleship entered drydock "C" on the afternoon of 24. June.

That night the bodies of the dead crewmen were removed from the flooded stern rooms. The funerals were held on 27. June 1940.

The next six months were spent in making repairs, till 21. November 1940, than she went to Gothenhafen to run trials in the Baltic to return to Kiel on 19. December 1940."

http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharnhorst/history/scharnjuno.html

While you cannot skip on repairs, you can of course skip on sea trials and send unready warships in battle. This still mostly does not make for an "optimal" German order of battle by mid September 1940, and additionally we all know how well skipping final preparations worked with the Prince of Wales at its first engagement.

 

[WillieB]

I've always been a little dubious about this particular list of ships ... I know the Pink Lists are pretty accurate but I'm not sure how they have been compiled into this single list for 16th September. I'm assuming that the list here is not a list of permanent base of operations for the warships but a list of locations for the 16th. For instance the CL Cardiff was based at Sheerness not Portsmouth at this time. In addition the majority of French vessels, those that weren't under repair, had no crew, they were mainly captured ships. The Polish ships on the other hand were crewed and used regularly, the Dutch subs were out on patrols but I can't find any records of the surface vessels used. Also the Canadian destroyers were mainly used for convoy duties.

Basically not everything was available that appears on this list and those that are, whilst they may have been at the listed location on 16th September, they would probably not have been there on the date of any expected invasion. As with a lot of these things it is just a single snapshot of an ever moving landscape of war assets and should be treated as such.

Thanks for that info Ian.

 

[Michele]

11 Auxiliary Cruisers ( Orion, Widder etc) They were -proven-capable of going against a regular CL or even CA at a pinch (doubful) but would be very effective against DD's.

I had missed this idea before. Calling these "auxiliary cruisers" is functionally correct, but the more realistic definition is "armed merchant ships" - they were civilian cargoes with a few guns stuck on them.
And yes they were proven, in the sense that IF they were lucky with their gunnery, and IF they could deceive the enemy warship into thinking they were harmless neutral merchantmen, that could work - a non-extant chance in a sea mammal scenario.

Naturally that's utterly irrelevant anyway, because their task was to prowl distant oceans, where they would slither away from actual warships and hunt for defenseless isolated merchant ships. Thus in the fall of 1940 the Orion was in the Indian Ocean, the Komet was at the Bering Strait, the Widder was in mid Atlantic, the Atlantis was in the Southern Atlantic, the Kormoran was in sea trials etc. etc.

I doubt that the Kriegsmarine's actual plan for the pinniped intended to call these back from their actually useful roles to deploy them in a suicidal mission in the Channel. I could flip out my reference books, but I suspect it would be yet another pointless waste of time.

 

[Saphroneth]

I doubt that the Kriegsmarine's actual plan for the pinniped intended to call these back from their actually useful roles to deploy them in a suicidal mission in the Channel. I could flip out my reference books, but I suspect it would be yet another pointless waste of time.

To be fair, Michele, the whole Seamammal would be a case of collective suicide for the Kriegsmarine, so why should the AMC crews think any different?

Actually, though, I have to wonder if they'd have enough crew to even RUN this whole armada while also providing sea-trained Germans for the thousand-plus motor boats and the hundreds of barges providing the actual transit. I mean, the MBs alone will soak up equivalent numbers to the crew of the Bismarck at a minimum.

 

[WillieB]

I had missed this idea before. Calling these "auxiliary cruisers" is functionally correct, but the more realistic definition is "armed merchant ships" - they were civilian cargoes with a few guns stuck on them.
And yes they were proven, in the sense that IF they were lucky with their gunnery, and IF they could deceive the enemy warship into thinking they were harmless neutral merchantmen, that could work - a non-extant chance in a sea mammal scenario.

Naturally that's utterly irrelevant anyway, because their task was to prowl distant oceans, where they would slither away from actual warships and hunt for defenseless isolated merchant ships. Thus in the fall of 1940 the Orion was in the Indian Ocean, the Komet was at the Bering Strait, the Widder was in mid Atlantic, the Atlantis was in the Southern Atlantic, the Kormoran was in sea trials etc. etc.

I doubt that the Kriegsmarine's actual plan for the pinniped intended to call these back from their actually useful roles to deploy them in a suicidal mission in the Channel. I could flip out my reference books, but I suspect it would be yet another pointless waste of time.

Yes Michele it would indeed be a total waste of time because you keep bringing up OTL history/facts into an alternative history topic and use these to 'prove' that nothing else could have happened.

Wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that in a desperate situation- which Seelowe was without a doubt- these assets would have been used in a different role?
Since most of these commerce raiders left their ports early 40, with just the slightest of PODs they could have been easily uparmoured (even with concrete if you wish) and have served as 'armoured' coastal monitors.

As for 'civilian cargoes with a few guns stuck on them'?
I wouldn't call a 6 x 6 inch battery (or rather 5.9 inch) a 'few' guns.
And that's not counting the secondary 4 inch guns on most of them or even mentioning the torpedo tubes.
That's double the firepower of any RN DD at a much longer range and almost as much as a CL.

Those omnipresent 700+ armed trailers that always seem to crop up in any Seelowe conversation would find a confrontation with any such ships rather interesting.

Of course I'm just waiting to be told that since these ships are practically unarmoured they would be an easy prey to any RAF or FAA airplane flying about. Why, an Anson with a handgrenade could take it out for sure.
Never mind the heavy FlaK guns on board that vessel. Their gunners would have to be very lucky to hit a plane.

BTW at least one of the auxilary cruisers( yes I keep caling them just that) was in fact earmarked for Operation Seelowe as a minelayer.

Sorry for the less than amiable tone Michele. No personal offence meant, but I can't help subscribing to the saying: If we all leave this meeting with the same idea we haven't been using all of our brain power.

 

[Saphroneth]

As for 'civilian cargoes with a few guns stuck on them'?
I wouldn't call a 6 x 6 inch battery (or rather 5.9 inch) a 'few' guns.
And that's not counting the secondary 4 inch guns on most of them or even mentioning the torpedo tubes.

The reason Michele uses that terminology is as follows:

A warship is not built like a cargo ship. The two requirements diverged sometime in the 1700s and have kept getting further apart since.

A warship is built with redundant systems, armour, damage control, the ability to "take a licking and keep on ticking" in general. It is also built with high powered engines, a long and narrow hullform optimized for speed, multiple rudders, and (crucially) turrets.
Turret barbettes are very complex things, and basically can't be refit easily - you more or less have to build the ship around them. Turrets allow a ship to engage targets that are all around.

Why are these important?

Well, the Armed Merchant Cruisers are built like cargo ships (because they were until last year). Their guns are basically broadside-only, because her intended use is to whip out the guns and use them to overawe enemy merchant ships, or to surprise the occasional enemy warship she might have to fight - this means that her vulnerable aspects are, basically, her entire port and stern arcs. (The bow torpedo tubes of e.g. Kormoran can only be fired at three knots or less - basically a dead stop.)
She can't take any significant amount of damage without it severely impeding or even crippling her fighting ability. That means that, yes, she can hurt a cruiser - but one or two shells is going to have a high chance of killing her.
She's slow compared to a warship. (This compounds the vulnerable aspect problem - any enemy warship will have her choice of engagement range, time and angle, and the choice is going to be "best range for my guns compared to theirs", "when I'm good and ready" and "from the front or rear".) Adding armour compounds this problem and also increases top weight.

All of these mean that, yes, an armed merchant cruiser could theoretically, if shooting by surprise at close range, sink a cruiser. (The only case of this actually happening, the Sydney sinking, only proved that a warship which was not closed up for action stations, at close range, expecting to be meeting a Dutch merchant vessel in the middle of the sea, could be shot at by six inch guns and sunk. It is notable that, despite this huge advantage - the equivalent of attacking someone who was basically asleep - the Kormoran was still damaged badly enough she had to scuttle.). But all of these are unlikely if the damn things are being used in a Seamammal situation.

 

[WillieB]

Absolutely correct Saproneth, I do realise that an aux cruiser is no match for even a CL.
What the Kormoran incident showed was that given almost ideal circumstances an aux cruiser could severely damage a warship. Nothing more, nothing less. In 99% of the confrontations the auxilary cruiser would be well and truly trounced. I suspect that the sheer stupidity or at least negligence of Sydney's commander also had something to with it.

But one simply can't go as far as dismiss them in a thread like this. They could have been there in whatever capacity, and they would have been a force to be reckoned with one way or the other. Worst case scenario is that would have soaked up valuable RN or RAf or FAA effort before being sunk, at best they could have killed numerous smaller RN warships or auxilary vessels.
And since the number of truly available RN DD's seems to be shrinking almost daily they might have been a force multiplier.

Just imagine a group of say 4 DD's bearing down upon a group of hapless barges. They don't stand a chance obviously.

But all of a sudden these barges appear to be escorted by a ship that has the capacity of lobbing a few 6 inch shells on those same DD's minutes before they themselves can open fire. After that it's conjecture what happens, as there are too may factors to take into account, but it won't be the same scenario as the original one.

And as such we have an alternate history.

 

[Saphroneth]

But all of a sudden these barges appear to be escorted by a ship that has the capacity of lobbing a few 6 inch shells on those same DD's minutes before they themselves can open fire. After that it's conjecture what happens, as there are too may factors to take into account, but it won't be the same scenario as the original one.

...All of a sudden?
You mean, of course, that the eight thousand ton AMC will be sailing in company with them. And since it's got better fire control, the RN ship will have an effective range quite comparable with the AMC.

Now, let's talk availability.
Orion (HSK-1): left Germany April 1940. May or may not be available, since the Fall of France was after this date and as such any serious Sealion preparations before this date jeopardize the Fall of France.
Atlantis (HSK-2) - left Germany in 1939.
Widder (HSK-3) - left Germany 6 May 1940. See above.
Thor (HSK-4) - Began cruise on 6 June. Available.
Pinguin (HSK-5) - Began cruise on 15 June. Available.
Stier (HSK-6) - not converted until after Sealion was cancelled. Is a mine layer as of Sealion.
Komet (HSK-7) - Left Germany July 1940. Available.
Kormoran (HSK-8) - not commissioned until 9 October 1940. Still being converted as of Sealion.
Michel (HSK-9) - conversion finishes 1941. Not available.
Coronel (HSK-10) - a minelayer as of Sealion; not an armed merchant cruiser until 1941.
Hansa (HSK 5(II)) - converted 1943. Very not available.


So, if you never send out any raiding missions, then you get HSK 1-5 and 7, but you have all the RN hunter groups back home. Net loss.
If you simply hold the AMC which would have left after Dunkirk, you get... three. HSK 4, 5 and 7.

Better than the original scenario, by a little, but let's not fool ourselves into thinking that three AMC are going to do anything other than increase the casualty count on both sides.