Give me all the information and statistics I need to prove that Japan cannot win WWII

Shortly after a declaration of war, instead of before, would make it much less of a "sneak attack". I don't think you can conclude that the aircraft would have been slaughtered, though more casualties are quite possible.
Any real preparedness is bad for the attacking a/c IMO, & IJN can't afford to take losses in aircrew, with such a dismally low replacement rate.
This sometimes does irritate me about certain AH explorations - the idea that a setback is going to make things better for the US than OTL. (It's often the US.) The torpedo issues aren't going to just go away, and so the first year or so is going to be poorly managed
No argument. OTOH, Nimitz (Kimmel?) is going to be without both his starting CVs (lost in the Battle of Oahu to a much better-prepared, & more experienced, Kido Butai). So he'll have to rely on his subs more, which means English might make small changes, like concentrating on Luzon Strait, or putting tankers on higher priority, earlier than OTL. If either happens (never mind both), Japan loses sooner...
if things are rolling into the end of 1942, after six months of defeats for the US followed up by no apparent movement for another six months (and with the best estimates being that the US will only have more fleet carriers than Japan 36 months after ordering, that is to say in another two years - that being the ordering to commission time of the historical CV-12 Hornet...) - it's a hard thing to wait for a long time without any success.
I'm taking you to mean there's pressure on Nimitz (should I just say "CinCPac"?) to produce something like a victory. Okay, there's likely to be the stupid Doolittle Stunt, attacking Tokyo. There's a chance the Makin Raid still happens, with pernicious effects later.:eek: Maybe, tho, Nim-CinCPac:openedeyewink: uses the MC Raiders at Tulagi, instead, pre-empting Japan's building an airbase & provoking a CV action, akin Coral Sea, which the U.S. wins. (A strategic draw would work.)

Or the MC could adopt the F4U a bit sooner... Or the AAF could get P-38s in SWPA sooner... Or somebody in English's command could actually listen when his skippers complain the f*king Mark 14s/Mark 6s aren't working & fix them before September 1943.:mad: (This isn't technically hard; what's hard is English & Co getting their heads out of their asses.:rolleyes::mad:)

See, it's really easy to screw up Japan's OTL outcomes without really trying...
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I'm taking you to mean there's pressure on Nimitz (should I just say "CinCPac"?) to produce something like a victory.
Not really. I will certainly admit that the course of events I describe is unlikely, but it's hardly impossible:

1) The US does not order new carriers until after the war begins.
2) Pearl is not a national outrage but merely an attack at the commencement of a war.
3) The US loses most of their carriers in a pretty-much-OTL sequence of events, apart from an ATL defeat at Midway in which they lose the lot (leaving them with only Saratoga in proper fleet CVs, or even losing Sara as well if she turns up in time to be sunk at Midway)
4) Since the US did not order any carriers until over a year after OTL, this means that in June 1942 the US is facing being unable to seriously contest the Pacific until early 1944; the Japanese peace terms are essentially "confirm our conquests of the Philippines and go away".

Under these circumstances, then I think it's at least plausible that the US might peace-out at that time (mid 1942) or possibly as a result of the Mid-Term Elections showing a "peace wave".

I will make clear that this course of events requires what amount to multiple PoDs. But it should not be actually impossible.
 
2) Pearl is not a national outrage but merely an attack at the commencement of a war.
3) The US loses most of their carriers in a pretty-much-OTL sequence of events, apart from an ATL defeat at Midway in which they lose the lot (leaving them with only Saratoga in proper fleet CVs, or even losing Sara as well if she turns up in time to be sunk at Midway)
4) Since the US did not order any carriers until over a year after OTL, this means that in June 1942 the US is facing being unable to seriously contest the Pacific until early 1944; the Japanese peace terms are essentially "confirm our conquests of the Philippines and go away".

Under these circumstances, then I think it's at least plausible that the US might peace-out at that time (mid 1942) or possibly as a result of the Mid-Term Elections showing a "peace wave".
I think all these are reasonable, tho I have my doubts the U.S. would abandon the war. I'm also thinking Midway, as OTL, may not even happen; if it does, it's likely to be no worse than a draw, given MAGIC & Yamamoto's buggered dispositions.:eek::rolleyes:
The US does not order new carriers until after the war begins.
Except, IIRC, the Essexes are already building, as are the Gatos, in sufficient numbers to give Japan real headaches. More to the point, as already noted, if there are fewer CVs in the pipeline, what do FDR, Marshall, & King not do? Do they restrict SWPA ops? Do they give priority to a Central Pacific thrust, & relegate SWPA to support? And if CinCPac is, until the Essexes start arriving, required to rely on other means, as I've been presuming, what is he doing with the force he does have? Because you can bet he's not just sitting on his hands... As said, it only takes quite small changes in Sub Force operations to bugger Japan even worse than OTL, & if CinCPac hasn't got anything else... And that's disallowing bigger changes; if it isn't Nimitz in command, IMO, all bets are off, & it's possible to screw Japan so royally...:eek:
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Except, IIRC, the Essexes are already building, as are the Gatos, in sufficient numbers to give Japan real headaches.
Yes, but my point was:


If the Japanese had won Midway and the first Essex wasn't due until late 1943 or early 1944 (i.e. ordered after the war began), I could see the US considering peace if the Japanese terms weren't too onerous. Would probably require Pearl to be different, though.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Except, IIRC, the Essexes are already building, as are the Gatos, in sufficient numbers to give Japan real headaches.
Yes, but my point was:


If the Japanese had won Midway and the first Essex wasn't due until late 1943 or early 1944 (i.e. ordered after the war began), I could see the US considering peace if the Japanese terms weren't too onerous. Would probably require Pearl to be different, though.

More to the point, as already noted, if there are fewer CVs in the pipeline, what do FDR, Marshall, & King not do? Do they restrict SWPA ops? Do they give priority to a Central Pacific thrust, & relegate SWPA to support?
OTL they allowed the ops they did even when the first new carrier would not see operational deployment until May 1943 (a year down the line). Midway was a heck of a gamble.
As for the question about which thrust they support - um, neither, with only one carrier?

And if CinCPac is, until the Essexes start arriving, required to rely on other means, as I've been presuming, what is he doing with the force he does have?
What he doesn't do is convince the US public that they're currently winning. Sub campaigns are of necessity slow and attritional.
 
OTL they allowed the ops they did even when the first new carrier would not see operational deployment until May 1943 (a year down the line). Midway was a heck of a gamble.
For the U.S.? Less than it might have looked. Fletcher had approximate parity OTL (& so long as Midway is in U.S. hands, he could have lost all three of his carriers & called it a strategic win: he'd have been able to save his fliers by recovering there). TTL, what makes you think Japan even bothers to attack Midway? The U.S. has already lost two carriers, & as far as Yamamoto knows only has one (or two) left in PTO, with probably one (perhaps both) claimed by IJN aviators (probably wrongly) around Tulagi or New Guinea at *Coral Sea. So, Midway less attractive?
As for the question about which thrust they support - um, neither, with only one carrier?
Sorry, no, there will be changes to the strategic decision-making. If you mean, "neither right now", maybe, but...
What he doesn't do is convince the US public that they're currently winning. Sub campaigns are of necessity slow and attritional.
And he doesn't have to convince the public of anything. They don't get a vote. If FDR is satisfied...& with (maybe) Makin, Tulagi, & a program of 1 or 2-carrier "tip & run" raids until the Essexes arrive, selling FDR on, "This is all I can do, Mr. President" shouldn't be too hard. Besides, the main U.S. effort is in ETO/MTO anyhow... The bigger problem will be fending off MacArthur, & he won't be asking for carriers in any event. It's not like there will be nothing else going on.

So, the question remains, in my mind: if Nagumo does better 7 Dec, does CinCPac (& ComSubPac) still allow the Asiatic Fleet boats be sent to Oz, or does he pull them all back to Pearl? If they're all at Pearl, it's bad news for Japan, & it can only get worse. My thinking is, the worse outcome for Kimmel 7 Dec encourages a more "conservative" approach by CinCPac (or, at least, ComSubPac), which leaves defense of Oz to MacArthur, since subs are really lousy for defending continents anyhow.:rolleyes: Do you really disagree with that proposition?
 

Saphroneth

Banned
TTL, what makes you think Japan even bothers to attack Midway? The U.S. has already lost two carriers, & as far as Yamamoto knows only has one (or two) left in PTO, with probably one (perhaps both) claimed by IJN aviators (probably wrongly) around Tulagi or New Guinea at *Coral Sea. So, Midway less attractive?
Because the US would have the same number of active carriers as at this point OTL? I've not posited any extra carrier sinkings until Midway.

So, the question remains, in my mind: if Nagumo does better 7 Dec, does CinCPac (& ComSubPac) still allow the Asiatic Fleet boats be sent to Oz, or does he pull them all back to Pearl?
Why are you assuming Pearl goes better for the Japanese? Did I say "better"? I did say "different", as in "the Japanese attack after a declaration of war instead of before" but I don't think I said "better" at any point.


And he doesn't have to convince the public of anything. They don't get a vote.
They do in November 1942 (or, in other words, over a year before any new US carriers show up and considerably before any sub program starts showing results - while the European section of the war has nothing much going on either, even Torch takes place too late for the election.
 
They do in November 1942 (or, in other words, over a year before any new US carriers show up and considerably before any sub program starts showing results - while the European section of the war has nothing much going on either, even Torch takes place too late for the election.

Which was, historically, a period where the Senate and the House shifted to the Republicans, who went in and enacted a law allowing the government to virtually nationalize any institution which was vital to the war effort.

The war hasn't even proceeded for a year yet, so there's not any real fatigue that has been setting in, either. The US hasn't been fighting since 1939, as the British have; there hasn't been time for that to wear on public morale. The lack of any victories at all would be concerning (especially as it basically means that the Japanese have horseshoes up their rears for the amount of luck that would take), but Congress isn't going to rescind the declaration of war simply because things haven't gone well, yet.
 

Deleted member 96212

Before I begin, I must make it absolutely clear that I am very, very aware that a stupidly large number of 'How can Japan win' threads have been made in the past. However, this one is not asking whether there is any way in which Japan can defeat the Allies of WWII. Instead, it seeks to compile all necessary facts and data to conclusively prove that Japan cannot defeat the Allied Powers, 'period' (as I believe the American expression is).

To put it bluntly, I have a friend who is under the mistaken impression that a Japanese victory at Midway would lead to Japan defeating the United States. There are several (serious) problems with this theory, but his reasoning is something like: 'If Japan takes Midway, they can then take Hawaii, which means that they can blockade Panama with carriers and destroy the American industrial base on the West Coast'.

Yes, I realise how wrong he is.

Therefore, I humbly request all available statistics, figures, troops deployment/strength records, military-industrial capacity data, geographic factors and so on; that I might decisively prove my mistaken friend wrong without room for argument.

Direct relevance to the described scenario is desirable but not required of any input, given that he believes that the Allies as a collective would be unable to defeat Japan had they taken Midway.

Putting the source in there would be helpful, if possible.

Thanks in advance!

May I ask why this matters to you so much (or even at all)? Let him be wrong, because proving his ignorance doesn't actually achieve anything. I once knew a guy who believed colonialism was a net positive for Africa, and I got into arguments with him all the time. I realized with hindsight that these arguments were a titanic waste of time at best and that it would've been better if I had never confronted him about it.
 
Courtesy of our very own @BobTheBarbarian
Russian Far East is Siberia as far as I'm concerned :p
Even with insufficient shipping the total capacity exceeded what IJA would have been capable of in an invasion of Transbaikal.

I wrote a wiki article on this subject to avoid having to re-write the same posts all the time: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kantokuen

The long story short is that the Japanese probably could have overrun the Soviet Far East east of Blagoveshchensk and Skovorodino had they committed the necessary resources, but doing so would have precluded an offensive against SEA and only deepened economic conflict with the US (the main reason why such a notion was abandoned in the first place). Japanese plans on the Trans-Baikal Front only consisted of a holding action couple with a modest counteroffensive to gain a bit of territory on the Western side of the Grand Khingan, but IJA logistics planners rightly concluded that they had no way of actually pushing to Lake Baikal or dealing a knockout blow to the USSR - they would be reliant on Germany for that.

Even if the Japanese somehow found it in them to attack the USSR, US policy on the matter was such that they were prepared to send direct material aid to the Soviets and Chinese to prevent Japanese aggression, a move that doubtlessly would have been coupled with whatever remaining economic punishment the Roosevelt Administration could have cooked up. This would have inevitably lead to conflict with the US anyway, with the latter and its Allies in a much stronger position to absorb the impact of a belated Japanese attack in 1942 than they were in 1941. In the end, Japan is still lashed with nuclear weapons and is probably in even worse shape than in OTL thanks to the ongoing war in Siberia.
 
Because the US would have the same number of active carriers as at this point OTL? I've not posited any extra carrier sinkings until Midway.

Why are you assuming Pearl goes better for the Japanese? Did I say "better"? I did say "different", as in "the Japanese attack after a declaration of war instead of before" but I don't think I said "better" at any point.
You didn't. I did, in my initial post on U.S. response to IJN attack after DoW, a response, & outcome, that's reasonable IMO.

I also wonder why you think there would be additional sinkings at Midway, the least likely occasion, & not at Pearl, the most likely...:confused:
They do in November 1942
And that does not decide what CinCPac is going to do, in any fashion: FDR does, alone. So long as he's happy with what CinCPac's doing...
Which was, historically, a period where the Senate and the House shifted to the Republicans, who went in and enacted a law allowing the government to virtually nationalize any institution which was vital to the war effort.

The war hasn't even proceeded for a year yet, so there's not any real fatigue that has been setting in, either. The US hasn't been fighting since 1939, as the British have; there hasn't been time for that to wear on public morale. The lack of any victories at all would be concerning (especially as it basically means that the Japanese have horseshoes up their rears for the amount of luck that would take), but Congress isn't going to rescind the declaration of war simply because things haven't gone well, yet.
That sums it up pretty well. Also, FDR's not Winston. He's not so inclined to fire people if there aren't immediate victories. There aren't immediate disasters, so he really has no reason to complain.
 
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