Gibraltar falling in 1940, then Malta, etc

[sharlin]

Yes. The RN would pritty much have to fight to defend Malta, its a vital location and if you're doing this before Crete falls etc, the real threats of aircraft against warships at sea with AA guns is not understood and is under estimated. Also since we're assuming this is an Italian show the Italians would also face the FAA's fighters, and as rubbish as they are, they are barely capable of intercepting the RA's planes.

Also don't discount the defences on Malta itself.

 

[King Augeas]

Malta was essential for the North Africa convoys. Ivan

No, it wasn't. Almost all of the convoys went round the Cape. Gibraltar and Malta falling changes little with regard to the defence of Egypt.

And you haven't addressed the fundamental political problem of German intrusion into the Italian sphere of influence. Mussolini will not accept German occupation of Italian-claimed or Italian-owned territories, without having first suffered a Compass-scale defeat.

 

[BlairWitch749]

BLINK BLINK

Are you seriously suggesting that the British have their BB's hang out around Malta in range of aircraft operating out of Sicily?

Michael

such an idea would likely result in the ships being heavily damaged (if not sunk) to say nothing of considerable risk of submarine attack

 

[ivanotter]

oops. I did think about the GERMAN convoys to North Africa. Malta is essential to those. sorry!

reg,

 

[MattII]

Actually it doesn't. How many resources is this going to actually take? If Franco goes along in terms of ground forces the answer is not very much.

1 Mech Corps for Libya (1 panzer and 1 motorized divisions)
2 Air Mobile Divisions for Malta
2 Infantry Corps for Gibraltar (6 infantry divisions and heavy artillery support for LOC and actual attack)

Ten divisions total, no problem in 1940.

As soon as that lot comes in range of British guns though (25 km off The Rock if there's at least one battleship/battlecruiser in port), there'll be hell to pay. And up until then the Luftwaffe hadn't been much good at anti-shipping work.

The drain of this plan is the Luftwaffe forces. Its going to take a full Luftflotten for the Med option at least, more likely 2. One for Malta / North Africa and second for Gibraltar. In 1940 that leaves 2 for Germany. So that makes doing anything other than harassment over England problematic.

And this gives the game away, the RN knows they can beat the Kriegsmarine in a slugging match, and so knows that the Luftwaffe has to hit hard, and if they fail to do that then they'll know the Germans aren't going to move that way.

In late 1940 the British are short of kit for much of their troops and need time to build up equipment. The advantage of a 1940 is the British simple do no have the time produce new gear and then ship it out.

The Germans aren't in a much better position, what with the limits of the Italian ports.

Once Germans committee air troops to Malta that is a clear sign that they aren't going to go into England but by then its too late to be honest.

No, as soon as the Germans make a poor bid for Air Supremacy the British are going to realise it, and in 1940 the Fallschirmjäger were barely better equipped than normal infantry.

1) Look a map, British are on the wrong end of 12,000 NM supply line to Egypt. Once Malta and Gibraltar are under attack Western Med is closed to RN. 50 days for standard convoy (8 knots) to make that trip.

OTL this was exactly the problem, and OTL it didn't matter because the Italian ports were so limited that the German position was no better.

2) Germans can use rail to Italian ports and then 600 nm jump to ports in Eastern Libya. Sorry the way I see it the Germans have the shorter logistical tail here, not the British.

Again, the Libyan ports are a sticking point, they weren't developed properly pre-war, and so can only unload slowly compared to Egypt, besides which moving between Italian ports requires trucks, which use petrol, whereas the British were running trains out to Mersa Matruh, and trains mostly ran on coal.

Does it matter if the British can build more Crusader and Matilda tanks when it takes the British two months to get them to the front in Egypt?

Since the Germans didn't begin to move until basically November/December, then yes it does. Also, the British had plenty of tanks in Egypt already.

How many troops do you think going into Spain is going to take? Then consider how many troops Germany has. THEN consider how many troops Germany needs to meet its other needs.

Before tou talk about a lightning conquest, remember that the Germans will face the same logistical issues in Spain as they faced in Russia (essential a rail network they'll struggle to use, and a shortage of trucks).

I agree Spain is in poor shape it was the official reason Franco gave for not wanting anything to do with the idea. At the same time to do the attack on the Rock the Germans are going to support a CORPS level operation, they can handle the logistics on that level. Its not like they need to support an Army group 300 miles from rail heads like they were doing in USSR.

Check again, there's over 9 inches of difference in the Gauge between Standard and Iberian, compared to less than 3 1/2 inches between Standard and Russian. Assuming you can go from San Sebastian, it's more like 800 km, and the Spanish roads sure aren't highways. Best way to do it is a slow advance down the coast, that way you can avoid having to deal with those poor roads and incompatible rails.

 

[BlairWitch749]

the lw in 1940 wasn't good at hitting ships at sea

however if the fleet is at anchor and they catch the British by surprise they could inflict a decent amount of damage (at least to the lighter ships)

 

[King Augeas]

oops. I did think about the GERMAN convoys to North Africa. Malta is essential to those. sorry!

reg,

Haha, right.

The military importance of Malta is difficult to understand, I think. Certainly in late 1941 Force K sunk a lot of supplies heading to Tripoli. But I think that Supplying War suggests that, in summer 1942 (and hence for any attempt to break the Alamein line), the restricting issue was not interdiction from Malta but simply port capacity and the difficulty of transport from Tripoli to the front, with supplies accumulating in Tripoli faster than they could be moved forward. If that's right, then taking Malta does not particularly help in breaking the Alamein position. Instead it would help more in a defensive strategy based in Tripolitania, with the fighting much closer to Tripoli.
http://www.google.co.uk/books?id=Tu3XZTx_s84C&printsec=frontcover&dq=supplying+war&cd=1

 

[MattII]

however if the fleet is at anchor and they catch the British by surprise they could inflict a decent amount of damage (at least to the lighter ships)

Thing is, it's the battleships they need to take out, and even at anchor (especially in a harbour, what with the extra guns and anti-torpedo nets) those are going to be tough. In addition, they can't call on the Italian navy really until Malta's gone.

Really, the main target should be Malta, taking out Gibralter offers the Germans little, Force H is going to be a tough nut to crack, and few convoys flowed through it anyway (and at that, pretty much only to Malta), whereas taking Malta would allow mostly uninterrupted supply lines to the Axis forces in North Africa, and would make invasion of Sicily more difficult due to not having a forward air-base and staging-post (Pantelleria would still be an issue, but not so much of one, since an Axis Malta would allow a concentration of the Luftwaffe in the Eastern end of Sicily)

 

[ivanotter]

Matt, good comments, thanks.

If Malta is the the only target , not Gibraltar, Torch can still be a reality.

If Gibraltar is gone, I cannot see Torch being attempted; hence my suggestion: Gibraltar to close the Med, Malta to protect the GERMAN convoys to North Africa.

Yes, if more material was shipped to North Africa, the logistics challenge is still to get it to the right place.

That said, it would be more of a positive challenge than looking at missing supplies as they were sitting at the bottom of the Med.

I am also startiong to see that Felix wass much more of a chalenge than my first impression:

1) Franco not playing ball means no transit through Spain
2) Opening a new theatre of war - Spain - is not smart. It will suck up more forces than the outcome would justify
3) Landing a seaborne invasion force at Gibraltar is near suicide as the German hardly had any major experience in these things.
4) Landing further away, but still in Southern Spain, exposes the whole thing to a RN intervention
5) LW is stretched as it is.

It is one of those paradigms. Victory is there, but only if you can get the forces in place, which you can't.

On the RN question: What if the Italian navy is extremely courageous? What impact? Could Germany have sailed a few more ships into the Med? Past RN?

Going South through the channel? with what?

Would it have to be an attemtp to take the French navy in the Med? So Churchill was right in his bombardment of the French navy?

Ivan

 

[MattII]

Getting Gibraltar is much harder, not actually very rewarding (at least, until Torch is needed, and even the, the Western Task Force would be mostly unaffected), and was actually prepared for by the British. Additionally, taking Malta first allows the Italian navy to offer its support to the eventual taking of Gibraltar.

 

[ivanotter]

Interesting comments. I have always looked at Gibraltar as the first priority, closing off the Med.

I can see that a Malta first makes a lot of sense, especially insofar as the Italian navy is concerned.

OK, So:

1) No BoB
2) August 1940 = Malta
3) October/November 1940 = Gibraltar? Or Crete? or Greece?

Ivan

 

[miketr]

Interesting comments. I have always looked at Gibraltar as the first priority, closing off the Med.

I can see that a Malta first makes a lot of sense, especially insofar as the Italian navy is concerned.

OK, So:

1) No BoB
2) August 1940 = Malta
3) October/November 1940 = Gibraltar? Or Crete? or Greece?

Ivan

Why go after Greece / Crete? What does it do for the Germany / Axis?

With Central / Eastern Med closed to RN German / Italian subs are about as secure as you are going to get till / if Egypt falls.

UK is going to use the railnet in Egypt to transship supplies from the ports to front line.

Real question is WHEN can Germany get a Mech Corps into Libya? If you go purely off DAK arrival dates you are looking at 2 months per division. You can advance that a bit as long as you start before Operation Compass. As Germany had to use Tripoli to unload and then try to retake the eastern Libyan ports (Bengazi and Tobruk). Its been a while but I believe that Bengazi and Tobruk had as much loading capacity combined as Tripoli did; perhaps a bit less. In THEORY Germany, after Italy gives the OK, could get a Mech Corps to North Africa in 2 months, maybe a bit more. Figure a month to burned to do staff work and decide what to do at all. Then how much time to get Mussolini on board?

July lost on Staff Work / Planning?
August - September Moving German Corps
October Germans have a field force in place and ready for operations

Move out the ready date if Mussolini doesn't play nice or if you think the logistics of moving the troops are more difficult.

Michael

 

[King Augeas]

Interesting comments. I have always looked at Gibraltar as the first priority, closing off the Med.

I can see that a Malta first makes a lot of sense, especially insofar as the Italian navy is concerned.

OK, So:

1) No BoB
2) August 1940 = Malta
3) October/November 1940 = Gibraltar? Or Crete? or Greece?

Ivan

It sounds like the right way to do it on paper, but political difficulties between Italy and Germany will get in the way, along with the unreadiness of Italy for war - she only joined to get a seat at the table at the imminent peace conference. Because of this, she didn't try to invade Malta OTL, despite being fully aware of its threat to Italian convoys to Libya. Changing this requires changes to Italy a few years in advance. Alternatively, she could ask for German help, but I don't think this is politically acceptable for fascist Italy, particularly with the somewhat cool personal relationship between Mussolini and Hitler.

I think the most plausible outcome is that in summer 1940 Germany asks for basing rights in Sicily to perform the attack on Malta. Italy responds by asking for silly amounts of materiel and fuel oil, as Malta is her island and she believes that she is quite capable of taking it herself, and negotiations drag on for weeks. Meanwhile, Mussolini decides to invade Malta himself, and drops the Greece plans to concentrate on Malta. But how soon can an Italian attack on Malta be performed? Is December too soon? Taranto is planned for October-Novemeber and may fatally interfere with Italian planning.

Clearly the Italian invasion of Egypt will still go ahead in September, and be defeated in Operation Compass. In a best-case for Italy, Compass falls short of Tripoli as per OTL, but Malta is taken - but does this mean that, with a secure convoy route to Tripoli, Mussolini feels no need to ask Germany for help at this point, resulting in a long stalemate in the desert? The worst-case would be that the attack on Malta fails or is delayed because of Taranto, while the absence of the Italian invasion of Greece means that the British push on in Compass and take Tripoli, at which the Med strategy is over.

Getting the Med strategy to work is difficult because you need an early Italian victory to get Malta, but you also need an early Italian defeat to persuade Italy to ask for German help! I'm not sure how you can get both.

 

[BlondieBC]

Getting the Med strategy to work is difficult because you need an early Italian victory to get Malta, but you also need an early Italian defeat to persuade Italy to ask for German help! I'm not sure how you can get both.

It is a tricky POD to write. You need a series of POD or a POD with a series of butterflies to do a Med Strategy. It is easy to get a POD where the Axis take Malta at some point, or at least attempt to. And any taking of Malta without very heavy losses gives small plus to the Axis. And this will add several months delay to the Allies clearing North Africa and may well extend the war by weeks. Not really a big deal, but that is what we get when we do a secondary theater and a secondary battle POD.

And then there is a related topic of a Med Strategy, which people normally mean "a strategy to knock out or cripple the UK in WW2". This is an entirely different beast, and the King points are largely correct. And I think it takes an early POD than he suggests in many ways. Lets go back to WW1, where the Germans/Austrians had a 2 front or 4 front war depending on how you look at things. They could have easily beat either Russia or France. And Falkenhayn and to a lesser extent Hindenburg focused on knocking out small powers (Serbia, Romania) and then focusing on one power at a time. In the WW1 environment, Russia out of the war and only fighting France and the UK at the beginning translates to a curb stomping of the Entente. So in many ways, Hitler achieve with a stroke of a pen what the Kaiser/Falkenhayn/Moltke could only dream of. And it WW1, with Russia out of the war and France conquered, the war would be basically over, even if the USA decided to join at some point. This attitude was taken into WW2, and there was little serious, high-level thought given to how we finish off the UK after France. A lot of the the issues with not taking Malta, or Wiking's various ideas for an airwar with the UK, or OTL North Africa reflect this attitude carried over from WW1. IMO, it is almost mandatory that you have a simple POD that is horribly complex to write due to butterflies. You need some competent naval officers focused on the UK to join the Nazi party and have a stature of the same ballpark as Goering. It will not get you a larger budget, but it will get you a focused plan, and more importantly, it gets you to start the ground work. IOTL, by the time the Germans had overcome the shock of "my god, France fell that fast" and started to come up with a strategy, the UK had recovered from "OMG, France fell that fast" and they too had a plan. Luck is where opportunity met preparation. The fall of France provided the golden opportunity of the UK focusing on saving England with lightly defended Malta and other areas. The Germans were not prepared, at least organizationally. If if quite crude and basic, the Germans having a War Plan Take Out UK drafted by the navy and approved by Hitler by 1/1/1939 goes a long way towards fixing the issues.

You also have the issues of Italy. I think it is also solvable from the perspective of writing a TL. And I see the POD being more in Germany than Italy. Germany had a lot of contempt for Italy, and IMO treated Italy badly in the treaty where France surrendered. Once you have the POD where German takes the Med seriously or defeating the UK before France is invaded, you have several routes to accomplish the desired effect.

1) Closer co-operation between Germans and Italians Navy after Munich. You can lay the seeds of Italy/German having a plan to handle the situation in the Med here. Now Hitler likely needs a personality transplant, but once that happens it is doable.

2) After the Hitler is surprised to see France and the UK enter the war, he can realize that help is very useful. Again, without a POD going way back, it requires a personality transplant for Hitler, but to look at the effects. With say October 1939 to April 1940 to get a plan together, you could have a competent Italian entry to the war.

3) Now to more what the thread is asking for, you have a situation where France falls and then we have the "OMG, France fell so fast", but we have a competent, rapid response. If you are serious on taking the UK out, you have Italy at the table and you get the demands on France focused more on how to take the UK out. You get less reparations, better treatment of POW and you get concession that help the naval war. You get serious about trying to figure out how to get the French Fleet in Axis hands without the UK being able to sink it. (Yes, this is very hard since UK gives max effort). You concentrate on basing rights in Africa. You concentrate on France not just going neutral but switching sides until the UK leaves. We don't really think about it much, but you could have French forces actively help fortify West Africa or western North Africa. We call it a Med strategy, but a Med strategy does not take the UK out of the war. You need a "Shut the Suez, shut the South Atlantic" strategy to win unless you want to take 4-5 years to do it. And with Italy at the table, you can give Italy more, and get cooperation. The details can vary, but think Tunisia, Corsica, and Chad for Italy in exchange for being OK with some German help. And Italy gets to have Suez after it is capture.

4) Now to what the thread really ask for. We get to July 1, and we try to figure out what to do. It takes months for a multi-million man organization to switch focus. Overall, the Germans adapted pretty well to the changes until they went into Russia. And like I started with, sure Malta falls. Maybe you can bribe/threaten Franco into letting you attack Gibraltar. You can probably find a way to use the Eastern Libyan ports not Western with lower losses than OTL. Maybe you can be strong enough to get the Allies to cancel torch, and if so, Italy is a huge winner, but the war does not really last that much longer. Probably 2-4 months. If not, you will have the USA pouring low quality but well supplied divisions into western North Africa and the Monty commands grows in power each month. The end is inevitable, even though you may well delay the process long enough to have the USA not invade Sicily.

 

[ivanotter]

This is getting very involved. It is suddenly not simple anymore.

The US were not keen on Med. They also veiwed the Med as totally inadequate for naval operations. Shallow, narrow and so on. If I remember a few books correctly, Brooke actually wanted another landing further into the Med, which Marshall was veto'ing. Too afraid of getting stuck.

Apparantly the US doubted that it would be possible to sail the amount of ships into the Med without getting nailed badly by LW.

If Gibraltar is gone and Malta is gone, I cannot see where US would like to invade.

Maybe Marshall will insist on invasion of France in 1942 or latest in 1943? with un-tried troops and all. Not a good prospect.

Would the closure of the Med be a war-winner? Blondie is leading up to a discussion about that.

If Gib gone. Malta gone and stalemate in Egypt, sort of just neutralising the Suez, well, Med is not a theatre anymore, is it. Alexandria is of course abandoned by RN.

If we somehow find a way to get Italy into it, and tempt Franco to at least play ball, then the Med "drain" is not there.

Can it impact Barbarossa? Not into a "southern" attack on Russia, I think we have killed that plan a few times.

The key question is really: Is it possible to close the Med to any and all Allied shipping?

Ivan

 

[Athelstane]

Thing is, it's the battleships they need to take out, and even at anchor (especially in a harbour, what with the extra guns and anti-torpedo nets) those are going to be tough. In addition, they can't call on the Italian navy really until Malta's gone.

Really, the main target should be Malta, taking out Gibralter offers the Germans little, Force H is going to be a tough nut to crack, and few convoys flowed through it anyway (and at that, pretty much only to Malta), whereas taking Malta would allow mostly uninterrupted supply lines to the Axis forces in North Africa, and would make invasion of Sicily more difficult due to not having a forward air-base and staging-post (Pantelleria would still be an issue, but not so much of one, since an Axis Malta would allow a concentration of the Luftwaffe in the Eastern end of Sicily)

Well said.

The advantage of taking Malta was not nearly so much denying the British ability to shipping through the Mediterranean - they could too easily reinforce around the Cape or from India - but in giving the Axis essentially secure ability to ship their own men and material to Libya. Carried out early enough, it would not have been the costly operation that Crete proved to be.

That doesn't make Rommel's job a slam dunk by any means. Even from Benghazi he has a brutal supply line vulnerable to air attack from Egypt, and neutralizing Malta doesn't make Libya able to adequately support a much bigger force structure for the Axis. But even a reasonably stable logistical line improves his odds markedly. For this reason it would clearly have been a far better use of Axis air and sea resources than Crete or the Unmentionable Sea Mammal.

And if Rommel gets a lucky break or two and manages to reach the Nile Delta, that might even topple Churchill's government. At worst, he can probably prolong a stalemate in the Western Desert, and that might have caused the Allies to revisit Torch in some manner.

 

[BlondieBC]

The US were not keen on Med. They also veiwed the Med as totally inadequate for naval operations. Shallow, narrow and so on. If I remember a few books correctly, Brooke actually wanted another landing further into the Med, which Marshall was veto'ing. Too afraid of getting stuck.

Apparantly the US doubted that it would be possible to sail the amount of ships into the Med without getting nailed badly by LW.

If Gibraltar is gone and Malta is gone, I cannot see where US would like to invade.

Maybe Marshall will insist on invasion of France in 1942 or latest in 1943? with un-tried troops and all. Not a good prospect.

If we somehow find a way to get Italy into it, and tempt Franco to at least play ball, then the Med "drain" is not there.

Can it impact Barbarossa? Not into a "southern" attack on Russia, I think we have killed that plan a few times.

The key question is really: Is it possible to close the Med to any and all Allied shipping?

Ivan

Marshall fears are not irrational. Having 3 divisions say land in Sicily for operation Torch and then being isolated and captured is a serious risk with serious down sides. It makes elections hard. It makes it harder to maintain the demand for unconditional peace for the USA. It make the USA look weaker to Stalin, and will make him more likely to demand more resources and/or make a separate peace. It lowers domestic morale. The navy would be forced to do a max effort to keep the sea lanes open to Sicily, even if it means stripping naval forces from the Pacific. After all, one army corp is more important than one marine division. We might lose carriers to land based airpower or U-boats. IMO, Torch was the best option available IOTL.

With Malta and Gibraltar lost will not stop FDR determination for a second front, Stalin from demanding some action, or the need to get some combat experience for our horribly green Army. And there are some options available.

1) We can add our force to Monty and try a push there. Low risk, low gain option.

2) The same inland roads that allow the Nazi to send some units to Dakar also allow American forces to flow the other way. Logistics are horrible, we are probably building multiple railroads over horrible terrain, but we can do it. It means just landing farther down the coast. The G-2 thought Germany using West Africa as bases was logical, so it makes sense to stop the Nazi advance. The area will be lightly defended. This is the most likely IMO.

3) Norway.

4) D-Day in 1943 is possible. It might work, but it could be a fiasco for the allies.


Yes, you can close the Med to allied shipping. Gibraltar is quite hard to force. And the Suez if shut is the only way out east. If you lose either one, what is the point of sending merchant ships into the Med. Now you may keep allied submarines going. Haifa for example makes a nice sub base.

And, no it is not a war winner, baring odd/unlikely butterflies like Stalin making peace with Germany.

 

[hipper]

what was really going on in 1940

July 1940


9th - At daylight WARSPITE was 60 miles west of Sapientza LH, SW Greece, with 4 light cruisers of Vice Admiral Tovey’s 7th CS ahead and air reconnaissance placed the Italian Fleet 145 miles ahead.
At 1200 hours, when 90 miles east of the Italian Fleet, Cunningham in WARSPITE decided to proceed at WARSPITE’s best speed of 24 knots, leaving MALAYA and ROYAL SOVEREIGN behind.
At 1448 hours off Punta Stilo ORION sighted the Italian Fleet, but the first sighting report was made by NEPTUNE.
WARSPITE catapulted off one of her Walrus aircraft which acted as artillery spotter.
At 1517 hours the Italian Fleet opened fire at 23500 yards, concentrating on the 4 cruisers of the 7th CS, thus commenced what became know as the Battle of Punta Stilo or the Action off Calabria.
At 1526 hours WARSPITE opened fire on 4 Italian Heavy cruisers that were attacking the 4 light cruisers of the 7th CS, causing the Italian cruisers to turn away under smoke.
At 1552 hours 30 miles west of Punta Stilo WARSPITE and the Italian Battleship GIULIO CESARE opened fire on each other at 26,000 yards.
At 1559 hours two 15in shells from GIULIO CESARE overshot WARSPITE and landed 400 yards over causing slight damage to DECOY and HEREWARD.
At 1600 hours a 15in shell from WARSPITE hit GIULIO CESARE amidships, near the funnel, causing damage on the upper deck, putting 4 out of 8 boilers out of action, reducing her speed to 18 knots and causing 115 casualties of which at least 24 were killed. The tactical result of this hit was immediate, the Italian Fleet turned away under smoke covered by their destroyers and headed for the Strait of Messina.
Twice during the action the WARSPITE changed course to allow the slower MALAYA to catch up, but MALAYA never got within range.
By 1700 hours the enemy was no longer in sight and WARSPITE was within 25 miles of the Calabrian coast. The Fleet turned south for Malta under high level bombing attacks from Italian SM 79’s. No hits were scored but there were several near misses.
(Note: Enemy ships could not be closed owing to lack of speed.)
(For details of operations during 1940-43 see ENGAGE THE ENEMY MORE CLOSELY by C. Barnett, THE BATTLE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN by D. MacIntyre, THE NAVAL WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN by J Greene and A Massignani and the Naval Staff History (HMSO-2001)

10th - At 0830 hours EAGLE flew off a strike force against shipping in Augusta roads.
At 2030 hours off Malta ROYAL SOVEREIGN and attendant destroyers detached to refuel at Malta. WARSPITE, MALAYA, EAGLE and attendant destroyers proceeded to the south of Malta to await ROYAL SOVEREIGN.

11th - At 1000 hours ROYAL SOVEREIGN and attendant destroyers rejoined. Following which the combined Fleet consisting of WARSPITE, MALAYA, ROYAL SOVEREIGN, EAGLE, GLOUCESTER, DAINTY, DEFENDER, HASTY, HEREWARD, HERO, HOSTILE, HYPERION and ILEX set course for Alexandria covering convoy MS1 (MS1 had sailed from Malta early on 10/7/40)

12th - Between 0850 and 1150 hours, WARSPITE was attacked by high level bombers but sustained no damage.

You see the RN had no real trouble operating around malta in 1940, It was the italian navy which had to evacuate its bases in the central Mediteranian due to the threat of RN air power.

Later after the germans had intervened in force they were still able to operate off crete in the face of stiff air attack - and operating off malta they would have the benefit of easy access to resuply of AA ammunition which was their biggest problem

an Axis Invasion of Malta in 1940 or 41 is a Dubious proposition at best.

cheers

Hipper

 

[BlondieBC]

You see the RN had no real trouble operating around malta in 1940, It was the italian navy which had to evacuate its bases in the central Mediteranian due to the threat of RN air power.

Later after the germans had intervened in force they were still able to operate off crete in the face of stiff air attack - and operating off malta they would have the benefit of easy access to resuply of AA ammunition which was their biggest problem

That is why the thread has discussed using up to 1/4 of the Luftwaffe to establish air superiority over Malta. It is an intense, but fairly short period of air operations for the Germans. If the Germans had had good naval aviation, we are talking about many fewer planes. And you give one date, but the RN has to stay in the area continuously as the invasion forces build up, and even a fairly in accurate Luftwaffe will wear down the RN.

As to hitting with the BB guns, the vast majority of rounds ever fired have missed. On that day the UK hit first, but it just as easily could have been the Italians hitting first and the UK retiring from the field. On large battles like Jutland, the law of averages will dominate, but on smaller engagements like this one, it is a much luck as anything. If say 1 in 30 shots hit the enemy and we have 30 BB fighting 20 BB, then it is easy to see who wins. But on a 1 v 1, it is mostly luck. Out of the 8-9 shots fired per volley, there is about a 1/4 chance of one hitting. And if it hits, there are a certain % duds, certain % will be defeated by armor and certain % will cause catastrophic damage. Say maybe 1/4 hits can be expected to do crippling damage to a ship. The battle you list is just the luck of the draw.

High level bombers were notoriously inaccurate for all sides in the war. It would be a mix of airpower if the Germans go for a Med strategy. If we have the Luftwaffe air group in the area, the ships would not have been attacked just once, but all day. Probably 5-10 attacks by high level bombers, torpedo runs, and dive bombers from both German and Italy. And the Italians likely have more ships in the area, so it will be a very tough day if this size fleet is used by the RN. Now the RN can bring a lot more ships and try to force a decisive battle, but this is not a wise move. The RN at best can only deter the invasion, and at worst loses a large % of its capital ships. The RN would be fighting on the terms most favorable the the Axis.

 

[hipper]

operations off crete

May 1941

20th - At 0530 hours Force A1 was 100 miles west of Crete covering the light forces working inshore.
At 0800 hours the German airborne attack on Crete began. From their position the ships of Force A 1 could see the Ju 52 transports and gliders carrying the German assault forces.
At 2200 hours IMPERIAL and KIMBERLEY detached to join Force D.

21st - At 0530 hours Force A 1 was 60 miles west of the Anti Kithera Strait steaming west to RV with Force D.
At 0800 west of the Kithera Strait Force D, comprising cruisers DIDO, AJAX, ORION and destroyers ISIS, IMPERIAL, JANUS and KIMBERLEY joined Force A 1.
In the forenoon AJAX was damaged by a near miss.
During the day Force A 1 remained to the south west of Kithera prepared to prevent any attempt by the Italian Fleet to support the attack on Crete.
At 1800 hours Force D comprising DIDO, AJAX, ORION, HASTY, HEREWARD, JANUS and KIMBERLEY detached from Force A 1 to attack enemy troop convoys.
At 2000 hours Force B comprising GLOUCESTER, FIJI, GREYHOUND and GRIFFIN detached to patrol off Cape Matapan.
Throughout the day Force A 1 was under heavy air attack.

22nd - At 0530 hours Force A 1 was 45 miles south west of the Kithera channel steaming north west.
At 0700 hours Force D, comprising DIDO, AJAX, ORION, HASTY, HEREWARD, JANUS and KIMBERLEY rejoined Force A 1.
At 0830 hours Force B, comprising GLOUCESTER, FIJI, GREYHOUND and GRIFFIN rejoined Force A 1.
Forces A1, B and C patrolled 20 to 30 miles west of the Kithera Channel as Rear Admiral Rawlings stated in his report 'serving a useful purpose by attracting enemy aircraft'.
At 0930 hours WARSPITE’s HA ammunition was down to 66%.
By 0945 hours all the British naval forces were under sustained attack from 650 German aircraft.

At 1225 hours Admiral Rawlings received a message from CS15, Rear Admiral King, stating that the NAIAD had been badly damaged and he was in need of support. On receipt of the report Rawlings decided to go to the assistance of King and course was set westward at 23 knots into the Aegean.
At 1332 hours just as the combined force was entering the Kithera Channel WARSPITE was attacked by three Me 109 fighter bombers each armed with a 250Kg semi-armour piercing bomb. By manoeuvring the first two bombs missed but the third hit the starboard after 4in gun and penetrated the deck to explode in the starboard quarter 6in battery. 38 of ship's company were killed and 31 injured causing extensive damage, fires and the temporary evacuation of one boiler room. Her speed was reduced to 18 knots.
(The Messerschmitt Bf 109 Es were from Luftwaffe unit 111/Jg 77 which was based at Molai, in the Elos Peninsula, about 60 miles from the position where WARSPITE was hit. The bomb that hit WARSPITE was dropped from a plane flown by Wolf Dietrich Huy or Kurt Ubben).
WARSPITE’s Executive Officer Commander Charles Madden took charge of the damage control and fire- fighting parties, clearing up a gun battery which looked and smelled like an abattoir.
After putting out the fires and some temporary repairs WARSPITE stayed with the Fleet.
At 2230 hours CS7 sent a most immediate signal to the CinC Mediterranean Fleet reporting the loss of GLOUCESTER and FIJI and stating that the AA ammunition situation in all vessels was very low, the battleships had run out of pom pom ammunition.

23rd - At 0408 hours the CinC ordered all warships to withdraw to Alexandria.


in 1941 off Crete the RN operated for two days under air attack on the scale you mentioned. 650 planes - 1/4 of the luftwaffe, about right.

in those two days they could defeat any italian amphibious invasion, or carry reinforcemets tohelp defeat any airborne assault on malta, also they would be able to refuel and restock with AA amunition from Malta,

The Luftwaffe would also not benefit from specifically trained anti ship air groups and bombs - those SAP 250 Kg bombs that hit the warspite for example. -these were created after a the relative inefficiency of the Lufwaffe's attacks on shipping in the Battle of britain, here they would be discovering the defficiency.

The difference between the RN and the Regia Marina is that the RN does not turn away after been hit once.

NB Admiral Cunninghams wife was living on malta at the time being discussed I think he would be motivated to relieve malta at all costs

cheers Hipper