Part II
The next day
The reaction to the previous day's strikes was mixed. US lawmakers roundly supported the strike and applauded the death of Osama Bin Laden. Speaker Gingrich said “This was the right thing to do, Bin Laden was a murderer and needed to go” But some Republicans also raised concerns of the Presidents intentions, that perhaps the strikes were also designed to distract the public from the Monica Lewinsky affair and frequent comparisons to
Wag the Dog were abound (A film where a president uses a fictional foreign war to distract from a sex scandal). If that were the objective it had mixed results. The strikes and the accompanying news of Bin Ladens death were heavily covered by the media when polled nearly 90% of Americans said they had followed the story closely and overwhelmingly supported the presidents actions over 80 percent in favour. Indeed for most Americans it was the first and last day they would hear about Osama Bin Laden. However upwards of 40% of Americans pinned the Presidents actions to the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and Clintons good news would have little effect on his poll numbers he received a 5 point bump that week however it had entirely faded by September and the release of the Ken Starr report. [1]
The administration spent the day revelling in its victory. Secretary Albright and Cohen gave a joint press conference where they gave the run down on Bin Laden. Describing him as “A terrorist, with the fullest intentions to kill Americans and innocent people wherever they can find them” Said Albright. Reporters asked just how successful the strikes were in Afghanistan but still the full picture was not available, Cohen was only able to confirm that
“much damage has been done, the extent is yet to be determined but as per information a terrorist meeting was struck and numerous leaders including Bin Laden were killed”
Clinton himself briefly spoke via radio address, declaring that
“The United States efforts against terrorism will not begin and end with a single man, or a single strike” And called his death
“Justice for the destruction he sewed and the death he brought”
Internationally the reaction was worse, while the US’s traditional allies, Britain, Australia, Germany and Israel were largely supportive. Others were sceptical of the US’s reasoning and unilateral action such as France and then there were those against it, the most outraged was of course the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the group accused by the US for harbouring Bin Laden. Its leader Mullah Omar (who had a close relationship with Bin Laden) released a screed which denounced the United States for its
“Assassination” and hailed Bin Laden as a martyr and that the
“The strength of the Islamic world will not be weakened” despite the deep sadness. It was potentially the first third party confirmation of Bin Ladens death as Al-Qaeda had yet to comment on the strikes officially. Similar reactions were shared by Islamic organisations across the globe including Hamas, the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt and Hezbollah several even swore to avenge his death.
Sudan’s president Omar El-Bashir was similar to Omar in his anger, issuing vague threats to
“respond to the American attack using all necessary measures”. El-Bashir denied any accusations that the plant was being used to produce chemical weapons. The anger and pain in Sudan was high. the Al-Shifa plant was hit at approximately 5.30PM Sudanese time and was totally destroyed, with the workday only having just ended 85 workers were still present and killed in the strike while hundreds of others were injured. The outrage led the Sudanese government to pull its diplomats from Washington and gave an ultimatum to the US’s allies to withdraw support from the attack or have their diplomats expelled which it did so with Britain and Australia. Arab leaders supported El-Bashir, including Muammar al-Gaddafi who led one of the many anti US rallies that day, Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei who denied any usage of the chemical plant, and Pakistani officials who had received literal last-minute notice of the strikes, verbally attacked the US for illegally using its and Afghanistan’s air space and claimed that a missile hit a Pakistani village and killed half a dozen Pakistanis.
Indeed by the 22nd it seemed the only reaction no one had heard from was Al-Qaeda the supposed target. The reason was paralysis. US intelligence was partially correct regarding the Afghanistan strike there was indeed a meeting of Al-Qaeda on the day of the attack though it was not as large or as high level as US intelligence believed. Neither had the strike coincided with the meeting instead it took place during evening prayers and one of the first buildings to be destroyed within the complex was the Mosque which Bin Laden and a select few associates had been attending at the time of the strike. The US estimated that around 100 militants had been killed in the attack though other than Bin Laden confirmation of other Al-Qaeda fatalities was far slower. The US believed they confirmed the death of Said Al-Adl (Mohammed Ibrahim Makkawi) a chief Al-Qaeda military leader. Saeed al-Masri, Al-Qaedas financial chief. Abu Jandal (Nasser al-Bahri) one of Bin Laden"s bodyguards/lieutenants. And a few other notable members including Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri a relative of an embassy bomber, and Abu Basir a Yemeni secretary to Bin Laden. [2]
View attachment 685203
The other dead (Left to Right) Said Al-Adl Saeed al-Masri, Abu Jandal, Abd al-Rahim al Nashiri
A complete casualty list would never be possible and several that were presumed killed in the strike resurfaced years later most notably Osama’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri who the CIA believed was dead for 2 years turned out to be in Kabul at the time of the strike. And Abu Zubaydah who ran a training camp was possibly injured but not fatally in the attack.
Later examinations of the strike’s success have uncovered mixed results 20 percent of the missiles had little to no impact at all some failing to detonate altogether. Neither was the complex totally destroyed, unlike the Sudanese plant. Far from the decapitation that Clinton had been pitched most who were present at the camp were not Al-Qaida leadership and most present had not been killed.
Though did any of this matter? casualties were relatively few, but the cost was high. The organisations founder was dead, and without him, as the CIA’s prediction read the organisation was supposedly doomed. Alec Station (the Bin Laden desk) effectively closed following Bin Laden's death, and there was no intended follow-up to the strikes, all were convinced that the organisation would collapse like a
“house of cards” as per CIA head George Tenet. President Clinton who begrudgingly ordered the strikes expressed little belief himself that Al-Qaeda was much of a threat. The former head of Alec Station Michael Scheuer wrote that.
“After Bin Laden, the blinders went back up, we (Alec station) wanted to press on and finish off what was left of Al-Qaeda, but instead they shut us down”.[3]
[1] Domestically the death of Bin Laden has little effect now at least. Osama Bin Laden was barely a blip on the public radar and would certainly see this as the sideshow to Lewinsky.
[2] It's impossible to know what members of Al-Qaeda were where when. Hell if the CIA couldn't do it. So here is a mix of UBL close associates and a few wrong place wrong timers.
[3] I see the CIA and the US, in general, to have been incredibly naive of Al-Qaeda who since 9/11 many have attempted to rewrite themselves as geniuses who saw the whole thing coming. Tenet gets the shaft here.
Hi. I'll try to update when I can every few days if possible. I like to write these on the fly no planning, chaos theory in action. See you next time.
