Germany's Allies in WWI and WWII

I have always wondered how successful Germany would have been in either WWI or WWII if they had had European allies worth their salt. In WWI, the Austro-Hungarians proved effective only in the Alps, and the lackluster performance of the Italian army of WWII is well-known.

WI either the Austro-Hungarians, the Italians, or a brand new German ally was strong enough to stand up to the Allies on their own and prosecute successful offensives? Would that have greatly changed anything in either war?
 
Operation Heinrich

I have always wondered how successful Germany would have been in either WWI or WWII if they had had European allies worth their salt. In WWI, the Austro-Hungarians proved effective only in the Alps, and the lackluster performance of the Italian army of WWII is well-known.

WI either the Austro-Hungarians, the Italians, or a brand new German ally was strong enough to stand up to the Allies on their own and prosecute successful offensives? Would that have greatly changed anything in either war?

As for Austria Hungary your sweeping statement is not completely accurate. The 1914 battles are a complex topic but to try to hit a few key points:

1] The different nationalities within their empire are not all Kaisertreu at least to the same degree. Histories written soon after the war claimed only the Germanic and Magyars were Kaisertreu but more recent works expand that to incl. the Croats, Slovenians, Bosnians and Poles at least in the early part of the war. However some of the other nationalities (eg. the Czechs) were very unenthusiastic.

2] Conrad was like a football coach who could come up with cute plays on the chalkboard but all too often they would go astray with a missed tackle. His most common problem he suffered a bad case of the spirit of offense, a problem not limited to AH. Further compounding matters a detailed summary of his secret war plans had been provided the Russians via espionage.

3] Still it is felt that the Russian Fifth Army led by the impetuous von Plehve was at one point in serious danger of encirclement and this is all by itself an extremely interesting possible POD. Instead Conrad let 2 gaps open in his front and the Russians exploited them at Rava Russka which was the battle that badly hurt the AH Army.

4] Still with AH with some German help recovered enough to stabilize the lines at year end.

5] Then Conrad went ahead and did a very stupid thing. He launched two suicidal counter offensives in the Carpathians in the winter to try to rescue Przemysl Fortress. These suffered huge casualties.

6] However despite these massive blunders it should be pointed out the great CP Gorlice-Tarnow offensive in 1915 was esp. in its early phases a predominantly AH offensive. Most of the divisions involved were AH and if the Germans get an A then the AH should get at least a B+ Even Conrad behaves himself up until mid Aug when he gets carried away again.

There is an Alt Hist story called Operation Heinrich where the AH does considerably better though not perfectly it can be found at

http://alternatehistoryfictory.yuku.com/forums/2/t/Alternate-History-Fiction.html

In my own Operation Unicorn the AH forces are doing better because 1914 ends with no encircling of Przemysl and therefore Conrad's suicidal Carpathian offensives are avoided. Right now there is even an AH division in a very unexpected place.
 

General Zod

Banned
Tom B has rather extensively covered the case of a more efficient A-H.

I would mention another case that might quite likely change the whole outcome of WWI and subsequent European history. Namely, Italy taking the side of the Central Powers.

The PoD for this will be Germany successfully persuading A-H to give Italy some territorial compensations (at least Trento, Gorizia-Gradisca, and Trieste shall be necessary). OTL, these negotiations took place, but floundered (and Italy therefore went to the Entente) because A-H dragged their feet about giving up any of their ethnically-Italian territories.

If at least part of their long-standing irredentist claims vs. A-H shall be satisfied, Italy loses her main motivation not to be true to her old alliance committments. They also have significant irredentist and colonial claims vs. France, which Germany and A-H will be as generous to promise satisfaction about, as the Entente was vs. A-H OTL.

Thre are two likely windows for CP Italy to enter the war, either August-September 1914 or April-May 1915. Both are possible, but the latter is more probable since it may need the realization WWI is not going to be a short war, for Germany to become sufficiently determined to get Italy in the war and overcome A-H resistance.

Anyway, differently from WWII, Italy's Army and Navy in 1914-15 were of a comparable quality to the other Great Powers and her entry changes the strategic balance in favour of the CP considerably. The bluk of the Italian Army will attack on the Alps, which were much less fortified than the Dolomites in 1914-15. This will force the Anglo-French to redeploy at least 25-30% of their manpower on the Alps.

If this happens in 1914, it has good potential to overstretch the French Army critically and cause its collapse in the Battle of the Marne. Otherwise, or if negotiations to secure Italy delay her entry till Spring 1915, the Alps front will most likely stabilize after limited Italian advances, and a long string of mountain trench warfare and inconclusive offensives will follow, much similar to OTL, only on the other side of the Alps.

However, this will drain French manpower rather faster and more severely, even with British assistance it may easily become exausted in 1916-17, especially if the Germans and the Italians start to coordinate their offensives, so that Anglo-French strategic reserves cannot be used to plug local CP breakthroughs.

German-Italian strategic cooperation is quite reasonable, since Triple Alliance had standing military protocols to transfer leftover Italian manpower on the German front in case of war since the 1890s, which only need to be dusted off ITTL. This, too, will heighten the pressure on the French.

Another big favourable effect for the CPs from the Italian alliance will be that the full military potential of A-H, once Serbia is dealt with, can be used on the Russian front. Also the Germans and the Italians can transfer more of their forces on the Russian front. This will increase the severity and quickness of Russian casualties and accelerate the collapse of Russia.

The third, only slightly less important, effect is that the Italian, Turkish, and A-H Navies, in cooperation, can certainly give serious problems to the Entente in the Mediterranean. Moving colonial troops from French Africa to Europe becomes rather more problematic, and the British Navy will be forced to either give up the Mediterranean to a large extent, or weaken the North Sea Fleet.

The fourth effect, not so decisive, but still significant, is that Serbia shall collapse rather more quickly and even more decisively, since Italy will most likely land an expedition corps in Albania and Motenegro and backstab Serbia. This may cause her collapse in late 1914, or the complete destruction of the Serbian Army in 1915. There will be no Salonicco front, and the Ottomans can redeploy more of their forces in the Caucasus.

In sum, the most probable outcome of this alliance is the collapse of either France or, most likely, Russia in 1916. Germany will have no good reason to employ unrestricted submarine warfare, so no USA help for the Entente. The full combined manpower (minus whatever occupation armeis for the defeated Entente nation) of DE-AU-IT shall be redeployed on either Russia or, most likely, France in 1917 causing a strategic breakthrough, despite British help.
 
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The biggest problem with Italy in the CP is coal. They were heavily dependent on Britain for coal and it will be difficult for them to get the minimum they need from Germany instead in the long term by rail in WWI. Italy in the CP is something like a closer in baseball. If the game is already going against the Entente they can and will enter in the 9th inning. Probably along with Rumania and Sweden.
 

General Zod

Banned
The biggest problem with Italy in the CP is coal. They were heavily dependent on Britain for coal and it will be difficult for them to get the minimum they need from Germany instead in the long term by rail in WWI. Italy in the CP is something like a closer in baseball. If the game is already going against the Entente they can and will enter in the 9th inning. Probably along with Rumania and Sweden.

No difficulty that cannot be overcome with the full militarization of railways and some crash-building of additional railways, something that was well within the possibilities of the almost-dictatorial governments all the Great Powers set up in WWI (except the Russian state was too primitive to exploit this effectively). The distance to be covered between German coalfields and Italy is relatively short, also given that Italian industry is concentrated in Northern Italy and ITTL coastal shipping is going to be relatively safe for Italy.

It's not a sufficient reason to assume that CP Italy won't enter the war when its military potential will be most effective to wear down France and Russia, in 1914 or 1915, as soon as her ruling elites can be persuaded that a sufficient booty can be gained for the lesser part from a needy A-H and for the greater from gangbanging defeated France. It is true that Britain on the other side can well make them hesitate in August-September 1914, but joining their old CP Allies was something Italy knowingly contemplated and planned for in late 1914 and early 1915. Italy made an auction for their help with both the CPs and the Entente, it's just that the latter made a better offer when A-H dragged their feet about giving up Trento and Trieste. If Germany can persuade A-H, Italy shall enter no late than Spring-Summer 1915.

As it concerns Sweden, they will enter either very late indeed, when Russia looks like on her knees and the liberation of Finland beckons, or very early. There is an interesting PoD, in 1914, when the gung-ho Russian commander of the Baltic Fleet almost made an ultimatum to the Swedish Fleet to vacate its bases, on his own initiative. Had not he be called back at the last minute, a naval battle might easily have ensured, which quite likely would have angered the Swedish Parliament into greenlighting the Pro-German King and Army and declaring war on Russia. By itself, this, differently from Italy, is not significant enough to tip the whole strategic balance of the war in favor of the CP decisively. However, it opens another front in Finland for Russia, makes the Finns very unreliable for Russia, and creates a standing strategic threat on St. Petersburg, which shall require substantial troops to cover. This has at least the potential to accelerate the Russian collapse by six months-one year.

Romania, indeed, looks like they shall side with the CP, if ever, only if Russia looks well on her way to collapse by early 1916 at the latest, which would require a different PoD.

A rather strategically-interesting TL can be developed, if you combine two of the above PoDs and put both Italy and Sweden in the CPs by 1914-15. A truly Central Powers block, stretching the middle of the Continent from the Arctic Circle to Sicily and branching out to the Middle East. The ultimate interior lines position.
 
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Sweden entering the war early might hurt the CP war economy; weren't they transiting foodstuffs and other strategic resources to Germany as a neutral? I don't remember the exact figures, but didn't those resources count for something?

The military diversion wouldn't be too large, IMHO; what could Sweden realistically have fielded back then? A dozen divisions, tops, and with antiquated equipment at that?
 
... or a brand new German ally was strong enough to stand up to the Allies on their own and prosecute successful offensives? Would that have greatly changed anything in either war?

Well first I think these lines are appropriate for the sad state of German allies and diplomacy during these eras.

At a prewar diplomatic conference, the Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop "sniffed" to Eden and Churchill that if there was another war, the Italians would be on Germany's side!To which Churchill supposedly replied: "that seems only fair, we had them last time!"

As for your question. Just think of the possibilities if the Germans had focused on keeping France isolated or at the very least took the steps to build an alliance with Russia instead of the fragmented A-H. A rare Bismarck error imo. At the very least Germany (Kaiser) should have renewed the reinsurance treaty with Russia but more logically they should have been bending over backwards to supply the Russians with cash, technology and loans (instead of the French) any chance they could get. A Russo-German alliance in my opinion is unbeatable in the WW1 timeline for a variety of reasons.
 
The military diversion wouldn't be too large, IMHO; what could Sweden realistically have fielded back then? A dozen divisions, tops, and with antiquated equipment at that?
It might allow the HSF to be slightly more of a threat to the Royal Navy, due to Sweden's navy being modern and big enough to take up a little bit of slack in the Baltic.
Of course, the Royal Navy being the Royal Navy, slightly is a very slight thing indeed...
 

General Zod

Banned
Well first I think these lines are appropriate for the sad state of German allies and diplomacy during these eras.

At a prewar diplomatic conference, the Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop "sniffed" to Eden and Churchill that if there was another war, the Italians would be on Germany's side!To which Churchill supposedly replied: "that seems only fair, we had them last time!"

Is it at all possible to have ONE debate about Italy and WWI that is not plagued by that loathsome quote ??? :mad::mad::mad:

First, even admitting the quote was truly spoken, it comes from the same foolhardy inept strategist that gave Gallipoli, Tobruk, and Narvik to the UK. Second, Italian military preparedness and performance in WWII was nowhere nearly as good as it was in WWI. At the onset of WWII, Mussolini had let the military capability of Italy degrade woefully, in comparison to the other Great Powers. At the onset of WWI, Italian Army and Navy were of comparable quality to the other Great Powers. Not as good as German Army or British Navy, of course, but nothing truly inferior to France or A-H.

As for your question. Just think of the possibilities if the Germans had focused on keeping France isolated or at the very least took the steps to build an alliance with Russia instead of the fragmented A-H. A rare Bismarck error imo. At the very least Germany (Kaiser) should have renewed the reinsurance treaty with Russia but more logically they should have been bending over backwards to supply the Russians with cash, technology and loans (instead of the French) any chance they could get. A Russo-German alliance in my opinion is unbeatable in the WW1 timeline for a variety of reasons.

As it would have been a British-German alliance for pretty much all the opposite reasons. It was the result of the singularly spectacular diplomatic ineptitude of William the Boor and his yes-men Chancellor that Germany managed to alienate both UK and Russia. Even for an immortal Bismarck, it would have been probably impossible to keep both rival Great Powers friendly to Germany, given their growing rivalry in the 1890s. However, any reasonably competent Kaiser and Chancellor could have forged a strong alliance with their choice of London or St. Petersburg.

And yes, it was a rare mistake of Bismarck not to pursue the partition of the Hapsburg Empire with Russia, Italy, and Hungary instead of shackling Germany to uphold a decaying dynastic state. Germany could have exchanged one decaying 2nd-tier great power ally with one decaying 1st-tier great power ally, a united 2nd-tier great power ally and a not-so-disunited 3rd-tier ally, and made themselves significantly stronger in the process. However, it was not a mistake to balance Germany between Russia and UK until their rivaly became too severe. It kept France isolated in Europe.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
The reason Bismarck did not pursue the partition of Austria- Hungary was because he did not want any more Catholics in the Protestant Prussian dominated German Empire.
 

burmafrd

Banned
The only ally that could have helped the Germans in WW2 (outside of the Japanese perhaps attacking on end of the Suez Canal while Rommel attacked the other- or coordinating their assaults on Egypt and India at the same time- putting more pressure on England)
Would have been convincing Turkey to Join Germany in its assault on Russia. That had possibilities. If nothing else allowing the Luftwaffe bases to attack the oil fields.
 

General Zod

Banned
The reason Bismarck did not pursue the partition of Austria- Hungary was because he did not want any more Catholics in the Protestant Prussian dominated German Empire.

Hmm, I'm really perplexed whether this was the reason (I'm quite skeptical about the real weight of such religious divisions in the power politics of the German unification period) or simply the fact he did not detect a sufficiently safe political opportunity, hence my judgement that this was the worst long-term political mistake this otherwise supremely talented and insightful statesman made. Prussian Junkers' best interests were to make the German Empire as strongest as possible without a general European war, and not to shackle the GE to a decaying dynastic state that made long-term reliable alliances with Russia and Italy both much more difficult.

GE Cisleithania would not have tilted the political balance of the Empire so radically, Catholics would still have been half of the population of the empire, not really enough to threaten the Prussian leadership who had built the nation. Much like the Social Democrats, the Center Party took decades to grow in a position where it could made a bid for political leadership, and a post-partition Hapsburg member Kingdom would not have been a serious challenge to the Hohenzollern, especially not under the lukewarm leadership of the Victorian Hapsburg scions.
 
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