Germany with another "military doctrines" in WWII.

Counterpoint: ISIL cleaned out the US trained and equipped post-Saddam Army with shocking ease

Which was predicted by my successors in the Marines Corps. Those who served in Iraq in the past two decades have been pretty negative about the Iraqi army. The descriptions or remarks indicated the Iraqis paid lip service to the training, things like clan or religious politics superseded any attention to professionalism. There were exceptions. One acquaintance, now retired from Special Forces, felt the ViP guard unit was really sharp. But since he lived and operated with them as a contractor perhaps he was biased.
 
Which was predicted by my successors in the Marines Corps. Those who served in Iraq in the past two decades have been pretty negative about the Iraqi army. The descriptions or remarks indicated the Iraqis paid lip service to the training, things like clan or religious politics superseded any attention to professionalism. There were exceptions. One acquaintance, now retired from Special Forces, felt the ViP guard unit was really sharp. But since he lived and operated with them as a contractor perhaps he was biased.

A lot of them might have been sympathetic to ISIL as well, particularly at the beginning. IIRC they improved later on. That could be because once ISIL gained power they proved to everyone how terrible they really were and lost sympathy everywhere, including the Iraqi Army.
 
As others have noted, the HoI doctrine trees are fantasies. (Though HoI 4 is at least better on this than HoI 1 and 2 were.) The doctrines the various warring powers used grew out of the histories, perceived needs, geographies, material capabilities and practice. Germany in OTL did well early in the war due to a combination of the historically aggressive Prussian approach to war (which is perfectly sensible for a land power in the middle of a continent), the perceived needs of the Nazi party (who had an expand or die outlook), having temperate European geography and a head start of several months in figuring out how all the new toys worked out on the battlefield.

It all conspired to create a brief historical window where "blitz" tactics looked really good. But as the war continued, the ideas of the French, British and Soviet thinkers would prove more correct that Guderian's ideas. And there's no doubt that if Germany had the material means, it would have developed their doctrine in similar ways to their opponents, since Guderian was hardly the only German officer who could think about what doctrine should look like and the Germans were as capable from learning from experience as their enemies. And the officers who commanded in the late war took different approaches, though still approaches rooted in the officer corps' historic culture.

So if we look at the SA... Well, for a start they aren't an army when Hitler disposes of them. So if they become an army, where do they get their battlefield officers from? As such, if the SA won and became the core of the German army, it may be an SA dominated by officers who have been nurtured in the Prussian officer culture, and thus are going to have the same eagerness to emphasize attack and ignore logistics. If this German SA army goes through the same steps of Rhinland, Anschluss, Sudetenland, Bohemia then Poland, just like the OTL German army they'll have the same first-learner advantage that meant that the Germans were just better at modern war than any enemy they faced until they'd beaten equal lessons into the British and Soviets.

Possibly Hitler opting to build his army around the SA will slow him down, however. The SA being the core of the army is a really big shake-up and it's hard to see that NOT meaning that Germany is some months behind their OTL curve... That could very well mean Germany ends up being unable to conquer Poland, as a few more months to arm up means the French, British and Poles are much stronger vis-a-vis Germany. If Germany somehow did manage to scrape through and beat Poland, they could easily stall against France. If they do pull through, they may not feel they can beat the Soviets, or if they do think they can, a few months delay could mean they face a far more equal Red Army.

In other words, I don't think a German army built on the SA would be THAT different from their OTL army, since they are still drawing on the same Germany, but the delay of breaking up the professional army and reshaping the Nazi Party's thug militia into the core of a serious army could SERIOUSLY change things. And most likely not for the better if you are a German.

fasquardon

I agree that HOI doctrine trees are fantasy but doctrines do exist all the same and for specific reasons, as you noted. If Hitler bases the army on the SA he does it for a reason. The most likely reason is Hitler suspects the army for trying to overthrow him. If that is the case then he won't recruit officers from the Prussian Officer schools as they are under suspicion. That means he probably recruits from the most ideological , fanatical members of the Nazi Party regardless of experience. That means you get the German equivalent of Italian Blackshirts.
 
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As such, if the SA won and became the core of the German army, it may be an SA dominated by officers who have been nurtured in the Prussian officer culture, and thus are going to have the same eagerness to emphasize attack and ignore logistics.

The Prussian Generalstab's military culture ignored logistics?
 
The Prussian Generalstab's military culture ignored logistics?
1870 involved living off the French Countryside as much as any early Pike and Shot Army of Eugene.

1914 sweeping Hook was a fantasy that required WWII USArmy GMC Trucks to have kept the lead elements in supply
 
I agree that HOI doctrine trees are fantasy but doctrines do exist all the same and for specific reasons, as you noted. If Hitler bases the army on the SA he does it for a reason. The most likely reason is Hitler suspects the army for trying to overthrow him. If that is the case then he won't recruit officers from the Prussian Officer schools as they are under suspicion. That means he probably recruits from the most ideological , fanatical members of the Nazi Party regardless of experience. That means you get the German equivalent of Italian Blackshirts.

Hmm. That's true. Hitler going with the SA could mean a Hitler that values political purity much more.

The Prussian Generalstab's military culture ignored logistics?

Yup. For example, for the whole build-up to Barbarossa the Wehrmacht's logisticians were telling their bosses that Barbarossa would fail due to supply problems. They didn't have the importance in the command chain so they were kept sidelined and their reports filed away in filing cabinets where no-one would see their attempts to ground the army in practicality. It was a small department staffed by relatively junior officers and ending up in logistics was not a good route to higher ranks and greater responsibilities.

Compare this to all of the victorious Allied armies, where not only was the logistics department an important part of the organization, it was a path to higher ranks so they were much more closely integrated.

fasquardon
 

Deleted member 1487

Yup. For example, for the whole build-up to Barbarossa the Wehrmacht's logisticians were telling their bosses that Barbarossa would fail due to supply problems. They didn't have the importance in the command chain so they were kept sidelined and their reports filed away in filing cabinets where no-one would see their attempts to ground the army in practicality. It was a small department staffed by relatively junior officers and ending up in logistics was not a good route to higher ranks and greater responsibilities.

Compare this to all of the victorious Allied armies, where not only was the logistics department an important part of the organization, it was a path to higher ranks so they were much more closely integrated.

fasquardon
Thing is...that wasn't the Prussian General Staff, that was Hitler's personal general staff who he basically handpicked. Remember when he purged OKW and OKH pre-war? Officers even told Hitler the challenges of an Eastern campaign and he ignored them. The only reason they lacked stature within the chain of command was simply by dint of Hitler choosing who he wanted to listen to rather than them lacking actual importance in the chain of command. There were certainly flaws in some regard in their conduct and organization, especially not including Reichsbahn officials in the planning for and conduct of the rail road reconstruction during Barbarossa which they were eventually forced to do, but it wasn't as if historically logistics weren't a very serious and important part of Prussian General Staff team. The problem of Wehrmacht logistics issues was a function of Hitler dismantling of the old Prussian professional system for a system of corrupt personal patronage that dictatorships are notorious for.
 
Thing is...that wasn't the Prussian General Staff, that was Hitler's personal general staff who he basically handpicked. Remember when he purged OKW and OKH pre-war? Officers even told Hitler the challenges of an Eastern campaign and he ignored them. The only reason they lacked stature within the chain of command was simply by dint of Hitler choosing who he wanted to listen to rather than them lacking actual importance in the chain of command. There were certainly flaws in some regard in their conduct and organization, especially not including Reichsbahn officials in the planning for and conduct of the rail road reconstruction during Barbarossa which they were eventually forced to do, but it wasn't as if historically logistics weren't a very serious and important part of Prussian General Staff team. The problem of Wehrmacht logistics issues was a function of Hitler dismantling of the old Prussian professional system for a system of corrupt personal patronage that dictatorships are notorious for.

Evidence that.

Hitler may have hand picked the personnel but they are products of the Prussian Staff system and often originally commissioned in the Prussian army and those that did not were part of and trained by either the GGS or Truppenamt interwar. None of the loggies had anything like the stature in any Allied armed forces where the usual complaint was operations were subordinate to the supply services. There is a whole section in the US official history about the tension - loggies win.

The quartermaster function lacks stature because it lacked stature. The general corps level structure up to 39, is CoS, Command Division ( Ops and Intel) Quartermaster Division subdivided into Quartermaster Section ( ammo and equipment) and Supply Section ( everything else) which section is headed by a civil servant not a soldier. That system stays generally in place until late war when some of the Officials were commissioned. Noone growing up in the Reichswehr is going to regard the Clerk in Charge of Supply as having a place in military planning.

The Operational planning for Barbarossa is essentially no existent, we will beat the entire Red army in 6 weeks then do what we like. Everything within the 6 Weeks is devolved to the component formations everything after is on the assumption that it will be a railway march against trivial opposition. At that level including Reichsbahn officials is an irrelevancy the campaign will be won by the component formations using their own supply columns, which it was, shame about the rest of the Red Army. And while it might address the firefights that arose between german units siphoning fuel off the wrecks several hundred km behind the lines it certainly does not address the fistfights between panzergruppe commanders over the 6 tank engines then available in Germany.

Historically logistics was not in the least bit important to the Prussian army compared with operations and manoeuvre see, well the entire history of the Prussian army. Sometimes they got forced into paying attention. But frankly they moved heaven and earth to avoid the issue.
 

Deleted member 1487

Evidence that.
You literally did not provide a single source yourself for any of the claims below. In terms of Hitler handpicking his staff see Ian Kershaw's biography of Hitler or read up on the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blomberg–Fritsch_affair#Reorganisation_of_army

As to the role of logistics in the Prussian general staff here is the US Green Book on logistics on the topic:
https://books.google.com/books?id=BG1NAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq=role+of+logistics+prussian+general+staff&source=bl&ots=dViVR09fGO&sig=ACfU3U2rbhJbm21pAzfDFlCpf2Pt_MpO3g&hl=en&ppis=_e&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjMwYHIs7_lAhUIca0KHf8ECXAQ6AEwEXoECCwQAQ#v=onepage&q=role of logistics prussian general staff&f=false

Hitler may have hand picked the personnel but they are products of the Prussian Staff system and often originally commissioned in the Prussian army and those that did not were part of and trained by either the GGS or Truppenamt interwar.
If Hitler picks the people who weren't trained as logisticians and promoted them to be the only ones advising him directly, then it doesn't matter if the officers around Hitler were trained in the Prussian staff system (they were actually trained in the Imperial German system to be fully accurate and many were actually trained during the Reichswehr period), as they were promoted simply based on their subservience to Hitler (or at least their compliance given the web of bribery payments he was giving to 'his' generals) and not their competence or willingness to challenge 'Der Fuehrer'. Training/independent thought in that context didn't really matter as much as their 'Gleichschaltung' with their boss.

None of the loggies had anything like the stature in any Allied armed forces where the usual complaint was operations were subordinate to the supply services. There is a whole section in the US official history about the tension - loggies win.
Care to quote that? Because there was a bunch of logistical 'hiccups' during the North African campaign and the 'solution' to logistics issues was simply the ramping up of production to allow for an avalanche of anything desired. During the Korean War logistics similarly were pretty crappy (1950-51) until US war production ramped up to flood the zone with material. It's less of an issue of loggies winning the debate, there were plenty of examples when that wasn't the case, including as late as 1944 in France, but of virtually unlimited US material and manpower allowing for the papering over of the cracks when they appeared, especially as the enemy was engaged by two other world powers who brought their own industry and manpower to the equation and overloaded their opponent. When that material advantage couldn't be brought to bear things got pretty rough for the US, as in North Africa and early in the Korean War.

The quartermaster function lacks stature because it lacked stature. The general corps level structure up to 39, is CoS, Command Division ( Ops and Intel) Quartermaster Division subdivided into Quartermaster Section ( ammo and equipment) and Supply Section ( everything else) which section is headed by a civil servant not a soldier. That system stays generally in place until late war when some of the Officials were commissioned. Noone growing up in the Reichswehr is going to regard the Clerk in Charge of Supply as having a place in military planning.
Source please.
And the Reichswehr had civilians because of the limits on manpower and then the limited trained manpower when rapid expansion under Hitler started. And it is funny that you're saying how little logistics mattered to them, but then the invasion of France really didn't have serious logistical challenges and a lot of work was put into keeping the rapid advance sustained. The book "Blitzkrieg Legend" covers this specifically to challenge the notion that logistics didn't matter to them or that the campaign was run 'off the land'.

The Operational planning for Barbarossa is essentially no existent, we will beat the entire Red army in 6 weeks then do what we like. Everything within the 6 Weeks is devolved to the component formations everything after is on the assumption that it will be a railway march against trivial opposition. At that level including Reichsbahn officials is an irrelevancy the campaign will be won by the component formations using their own supply columns, which it was, shame about the rest of the Red Army. And while it might address the firefights that arose between german units siphoning fuel off the wrecks several hundred km behind the lines it certainly does not address the fistfights between panzergruppe commanders over the 6 tank engines then available in Germany.
Source please, not that you're likely to find one that more than superficially backs up your claims above.

Historically logistics was not in the least bit important to the Prussian army compared with operations and manoeuvre see, well the entire history of the Prussian army. Sometimes they got forced into paying attention. But frankly they moved heaven and earth to avoid the issue.
Source please.
 
As to the role of logistics in the Prussian general staff here is the US Green Book on logistics on the topic:

Not quite sure what you think that reference says. Its a US Army history of the role the US Army's Logistic efforts in 1940- 43, the world Prussia does not even appear in the index. ( oh and they get the role of a Quartiermeister in the Imperial German Army wrong, he is an NCO, GeneralQuartiermeister is the deputy to the Chief of Staff ( operations) in Imperial German terminology. Nothing to do with supplies that's the Intendent I believe.


If Hitler picks the people who weren't trained as logisticians and promoted them to be the only ones advising him directly, then it doesn't matter if the officers around Hitler were trained in the Prussian staff system (they were actually trained in the Imperial German system to be fully accurate and many were actually trained during the Reichswehr period), as they were promoted simply based on their subservience to Hitler (or at least their compliance given the web of bribery payments he was giving to 'his' generals) and not their competence or willingness to challenge 'Der Fuehrer'. Training/independent thought in that context didn't really matter as much as their 'Gleichschaltung' with their boss.

Not entirely sure of your point here.. The 'Hand Picked' 'totally subservient' 'Promoted on the basis of their subservience to Hitler' includes, Halder -fired for arguing, Brauchitsch fired Keitel, fair enough, Kluge, shot himself so as not to reveal his co conspirators, Leeb - fired for arguing, List Fired for arguing, Reichenau, ideological Nazi died of cross country running, Rundstedt fired for arguing, twice, Witzleben, shot for treason.

So one subservient lacky, two actual traitors (Brauchitsch and Halder were plotting early on as well) and all the rest fired for arguing, or dropped dead of exercise. Thats just the 1940 Field Marshals. Who in terms of competence, Conquered France, Poland the Balkans and most or European Russia. The normal reason for being fired was they were arguing for independence of action for the subordinate commander ( themselves) now Hitler may have ended up with a selection of apparent yes men, but they are not the guys hand picked in 1938- 42 ( or even 43/44).

To follow it down Halder is presented in November 1940 with a memorandum from Eduard Wagner chief of Amt IV OKH showing that the scale of army envisaged for Barbarossa can only be supplied for 20 days 200- 400 km from the Border ( at that date) at that point no one outside OKH is doing any planning for an invasion of the USSR and the planning assumed 20 -30 days to the Dvina line, 20 days to fight through it, then railway marches. That memorandum simply disappears from any future discussions on the subject. It is not relevant. So the CoS of OKH has a report from the senior logistician that says he cannot supply

Care to quote that?

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WD-Ops/index.html

All of it. its set out chronologically so you have to go through it to get the picture evolving over time. The rest of your comment misses the point. Yes there were failures to meet the supply needs from time to time. But those failures then constrained operations. So the WAllies did not launch a daring thrust to Tunis with the forces available because the logistic situation forbade it. They did not leave large sections of the forces in 44 stranded through lack of fuel, because it was a constraint ( as opposed to say Bock before Moscow who is willing to totally demotorise AGC in order to keep up the momentum of the advance, and Reinhardt who was willing to starve everyone else to keep one regimental sized group moving. The History in the reference I have given starts with the Operations guys recognising that the logistics are the constraint on operations the debate is around the best way to get that information to the planners precisely because it is a constraint.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WD-Ops/index.html

Source please.

KStN 12 dated 01.10.1937 as revised to 1/9/39 with a note that 1 and XXI armeekorps have no supply commander.

And the Reichswehr had civilians because of the limits on manpower and then the limited trained manpower when rapid expansion under Hitler started

And out of 100,000 men they could not find 40 corps level supply officers but could split off ammo and equipment from each other and supply and put it in a different department. Later on adding an entirely new department at corps and army level for supply in the rear area and at no point before 1943 was it possible to commission them. Kinda seems supply as such was not a priority. The slightly later standard organisations for Army HQ follow the same pattern.


Source please, not that you're likely to find one that more than superficially backs up your claims above.

The Source on Guderians firefights in the rear areas is a letter to his wife, its in the Macksey version. The source on the fistfights ( wrong not AGC its Panzer Gruppe 3 KTB around mid late August and arguing amongst themselves about the spoils after Hitlers hand picked subservient lackeys ( Guderian, Hoth, Hoepner et al spend an afternoon screaming at him to release them - source OKW KTB Vol II.


Source please.

Oh so many but lets start with Citino - the corpus, Wawro, Franco Prussian War et seq ( there is also some stuff on the Franco Austrian war in online dissertations of his students, Berhardi, Delbruck, div Prussian staff studies prior to WW1. Van Creveldt, Stahel, the corpus, Phillips O'Brian. Military testament of Fredrick the Great.

There is some good stuff out of the Canadian universities but their focus is obviously different but you do get to know why the germans were towing around broke down panthers all the while.

The main source on Barbarossa planning is Stahel, Barbarossa. There are 6 significant studies prior to the directive and the December Wargames and none make any meaningful assessment of the logistical issues. The closest is Paulus who at one point looks to an operational pause to refit and resupply the panzer forces but he also assumes ( and only him) significant soviet reinforcement of the frontier armies. The wargame, which seriously underestimates the size of the Soviet forces and scale of reinforcement, does make it clear that a pause will simply slow down the mobile forces to the point at which the Soviets can force them into an attritional war. So better to keep charging on. And all the other studies do not assume the same level of Soviet reinforcement. Lossburg makes a nod at Baltic ports but as he has nothing by way of timetable, capacity or numbers of any sort the study is meaningless except as a broad concept.
 
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