As to the role of logistics in the Prussian general staff here is the US Green Book on logistics on the topic:
Not quite sure what you think that reference says. Its a US Army history of the role the US Army's Logistic efforts in 1940- 43, the world Prussia does not even appear in the index. ( oh and they get the role of a Quartiermeister in the Imperial German Army wrong, he is an NCO, GeneralQuartiermeister is the deputy to the Chief of Staff ( operations) in Imperial German terminology. Nothing to do with supplies that's the Intendent I believe.
If Hitler picks the people who weren't trained as logisticians and promoted them to be the only ones advising him directly, then it doesn't matter if the officers around Hitler were trained in the Prussian staff system (they were actually trained in the Imperial German system to be fully accurate and many were actually trained during the Reichswehr period), as they were promoted simply based on their subservience to Hitler (or at least their compliance given the web of bribery payments he was giving to 'his' generals) and not their competence or willingness to challenge 'Der Fuehrer'. Training/independent thought in that context didn't really matter as much as their 'Gleichschaltung' with their boss.
Not entirely sure of your point here.. The 'Hand Picked' 'totally subservient' 'Promoted on the basis of their subservience to Hitler' includes, Halder -fired for arguing, Brauchitsch fired Keitel, fair enough, Kluge, shot himself so as not to reveal his co conspirators, Leeb - fired for arguing, List Fired for arguing, Reichenau, ideological Nazi died of cross country running, Rundstedt fired for arguing, twice, Witzleben, shot for treason.
So one subservient lacky, two actual traitors (Brauchitsch and Halder were plotting early on as well) and all the rest fired for arguing, or dropped dead of exercise. Thats just the 1940 Field Marshals. Who in terms of competence, Conquered France, Poland the Balkans and most or European Russia. The normal reason for being fired was they were arguing for independence of action for the subordinate commander ( themselves) now Hitler may have ended up with a selection of apparent yes men, but they are not the guys hand picked in 1938- 42 ( or even 43/44).
To follow it down Halder is presented in November 1940 with a memorandum from Eduard Wagner chief of Amt IV OKH showing that the scale of army envisaged for Barbarossa can only be supplied for 20 days 200- 400 km from the Border ( at that date) at that point no one outside OKH is doing any planning for an invasion of the USSR and the planning assumed 20 -30 days to the Dvina line, 20 days to fight through it, then railway marches. That memorandum simply disappears from any future discussions on the subject. It is not relevant. So the CoS of OKH has a report from the senior logistician that says he cannot supply
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WD-Ops/index.html
All of it. its set out chronologically so you have to go through it to get the picture evolving over time. The rest of your comment misses the point. Yes there were failures to meet the supply needs from time to time. But those failures then constrained operations. So the WAllies did not launch a daring thrust to Tunis with the forces available because the logistic situation forbade it. They did not leave large sections of the forces in 44 stranded through lack of fuel, because it was a constraint ( as opposed to say Bock before Moscow who is willing to totally demotorise AGC in order to keep up the momentum of the advance, and Reinhardt who was willing to starve everyone else to keep one regimental sized group moving. The History in the reference I have given starts with the Operations guys recognising that the logistics are the constraint on operations the debate is around the best way to get that information to the planners precisely because it is a constraint.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WD-Ops/index.html
KStN 12 dated 01.10.1937 as revised to 1/9/39 with a note that 1 and XXI armeekorps have no supply commander.
And the Reichswehr had civilians because of the limits on manpower and then the limited trained manpower when rapid expansion under Hitler started
And out of 100,000 men they could not find 40 corps level supply officers but could split off ammo and equipment from each other and supply and put it in a different department. Later on adding an entirely new department at corps and army level for supply in the rear area and at no point before 1943 was it possible to commission them. Kinda seems supply as such was not a priority. The slightly later standard organisations for Army HQ follow the same pattern.
Source please, not that you're likely to find one that more than superficially backs up your claims above.
The Source on Guderians firefights in the rear areas is a letter to his wife, its in the Macksey version. The source on the fistfights ( wrong not AGC its Panzer Gruppe 3 KTB around mid late August and arguing amongst themselves about the spoils after Hitlers hand picked subservient lackeys ( Guderian, Hoth, Hoepner et al spend an afternoon screaming at him to release them - source OKW KTB Vol II.
Oh so many but lets start with Citino - the corpus, Wawro, Franco Prussian War et seq ( there is also some stuff on the Franco Austrian war in online dissertations of his students, Berhardi, Delbruck, div Prussian staff studies prior to WW1. Van Creveldt, Stahel, the corpus, Phillips O'Brian. Military testament of Fredrick the Great.
There is some good stuff out of the Canadian universities but their focus is obviously different but you do get to know why the germans were towing around broke down panthers all the while.
The main source on Barbarossa planning is Stahel, Barbarossa. There are 6 significant studies prior to the directive and the December Wargames and none make any meaningful assessment of the logistical issues. The closest is Paulus who at one point looks to an operational pause to refit and resupply the panzer forces but he also assumes ( and only him) significant soviet reinforcement of the frontier armies. The wargame, which seriously underestimates the size of the Soviet forces and scale of reinforcement, does make it clear that a pause will simply slow down the mobile forces to the point at which the Soviets can force them into an attritional war. So better to keep charging on. And all the other studies do not assume the same level of Soviet reinforcement. Lossburg makes a nod at Baltic ports but as he has nothing by way of timetable, capacity or numbers of any sort the study is meaningless except as a broad concept.