Germany with another "military doctrines" in WWII.

[RMcD94]

If France doesn't get knocked out and yet can't push because of their own doctrine deficiencies would we see negotiation? Neither side has done much that suggest unconditional surrender, there's been no sweeping through France.

Need every war end in one side dominating? Perhaps the Western powers want a strong Germany to use against Stalin

 

[Michele]

Pretty much no one in WWII got to the 'nobody walks' Divisional assault, excepting the 83rd ID, the Ragtag Circus that liberated everything with wheels for their dash towards Berlin.

And the Germans were the ones getting closer to that. It's not just a matter of having tanks and trucks, it's also a matter of wanting to use them at trucking speed. That is what the Panzerdivisionen (and the motorized infantry divisions too) were expected to do; whenever possible, they were to advance not at walking speed.

The French had tanks, and small motorized infantry units, yet they expected the infantry to dictate the speed of the advance (and you can see that by the top speeds of most tank models). Ditto for the British, initially. The other combatant that had doctrine, intention and vehicles for such things was the Soviet Union, but their vehicles were old, poorly maintained and crappy in the beginning, and anyway they lacked the strategic position and the leadership to immediately carry out such things - then they improved their motor pool and learned the ways.

If the Germans don't invest in a panzer force, they may well have lots of infantry, and a smaller number of tanks that will be, however, an adjunct to the infantry. I expect they'd be moving with the infantry, at the infantryman's pace. Additionally, one of the proposals is more artillery, which will probably be horse-drawn, another slowing-down factor. The infantry, in the proposal, is the main anti-tank force, and, understandably, the main weapon for this is the mine - another device that is not conducive to fast offensives.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Regardless of Doctrine - once the German Army has the Polish Campaign behind them - which they will win as they had all the advantage of Initiative, logistics, knowing when and where they aware attacking oh and having 68 Divisions worth of troops all mobilized and ready to go verses 39 Polish Divisions (24 of which had been mobilized on the day of the invasion) were none of the above - and so could draw on lessons learned from that campaign to work out what worked and what did not.

So come May 1940 whatever doctrine they started with will have changed following the Polish campaign.

So Germany would benefit from (in Ref to the subsequent campaign in 1940 and beyond)

• The Advantage of an earlier rearmament relative to France and Britain
• Much higher military expenditure (MEFO Bills and asset stripping 'occupied nations' plus making use of weapons and the war making capacity such as Czech Tanks etc)
• Seeing the Elephant and learning from it - OTL this included setting up a 'school' for Battalion Commanders and above to cascade learnings and best practices from the Poland campaign - a Stop/Start/Carry on as you were type thing
• And again in any Western campaign they had the advantage of knowing when and where etc they were going to attack so again retained the initiative

This would all place the German army into a higher quality bracket than the Allied Armies in the West - again regardless of whatever Doctrine they were using in Sept 1939

 

[Johnrankins]

Presumably Hitler would have realized that without a real army it might be challenging to invade their neighbours ? I can sort of envision a set of circumstances where Hitler might choose the SA over the Heer, I just don't see him launching wars of conquest until the SA has been transformed into something resembling a real army.

In which case he waits until at least the mid-'40s-early '50s to do that because you can't build a real army overnight. By which time the West likely has rebuilt theirs.

 

[Johnrankins]

Regardless of Doctrine - once the German Army has the Polish Campaign behind them - which they will win as they had all the advantage of Initiative, logistics, knowing when and where they aware attacking oh and having 68 Divisions worth of troops all mobilized and ready to go verses 39 Polish Divisions (24 of which had been mobilized on the day of the invasion) were none of the above - and so could draw on lessons learned from that campaign to work out what worked and what did not.

So come May 1940 whatever doctrine they started with will have changed following the Polish campaign.

So Germany would benefit from (in Ref to the subsequent campaign in 1940 and beyond)

• The Advantage of an earlier rearmament relative to France and Britain
• Much higher military expenditure (MEFO Bills and asset stripping 'occupied nations' plus making use of weapons and the war making capacity such as Czech Tanks etc)
• Seeing the Elephant and learning from it - OTL this included setting up a 'school' for Battalion Commanders and above to cascade learnings and best practices from the Poland campaign - a Stop/Start/Carry on as you were type thing
• And again in any Western campaign they had the advantage of knowing when and where etc they were going to attack so again retained the initiative

This would all place the German army into a higher quality bracket than the Allied Armies in the West - again regardless of whatever Doctrine they were using in Sept 1939

Why? They won't have a real army. Beating the Poles is not a given under the circumstances as the Poles will have a professional army and the Germans won't. That is assuming the West lets Germany get that far. They are going to be a lot less reluctant to go to war with Germany if they see it as weak.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Why? They won't have a real army. Beating the Poles is not a given under the circumstances as the Poles will have a professional army and the Germans won't. That is assuming the West lets Germany get that far. They are going to be a lot less reluctant to go to war with Germany if they see it as weak.

You have lost me.

How does a change in Doctrine = not having a real army or appearing weaker?

 

[Blue cat]

In which case he waits until at least the mid-'40s-early '50s to do that because you can't build a real army overnight. By which time the West likely has rebuilt theirs.

I suppose the timing would depend on how the transition occurs.

 

[Blue cat]

You have lost me.

How does a change in Doctrine = not having a real army or appearing weaker?

This thread seems to have evolved from the Germans change their doctrine, to the Germans (Hitler) replace the Heer with the SA whom Hitler then expects to replicate what the Heer historically did without taking the time to transform the SA into something resembling a real army.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

This thread seems to have evolved from the Germans change their doctrine, to the Germans (Hitler) replace the Heer with the SA whom Hitler then expects to replicate what the Heer historically did without taking the time to transform the SA into something resembling a real army.

Ahhh I see

My answer was directed to the OP - just to be clear

 

[Johnrankins]

This thread seems to have evolved from the Germans change their doctrine, to the Germans (Hitler) replace the Heer with the SA whom Hitler then expects to replicate what the Heer historically did without taking the time to transform the SA into something resembling a real army.

If he goes with the SA it means he doesn't want a real army, probably because he worries that a real army would overthrow him so he goes with a political one. It makes no sense to get rid of the Heer just to transform the SA into the Heer.

 

[Blue cat]

If he goes with the SA it means he doesn't want a real army, probably because he worries that a real army would overthrow him so he goes with a political one. It makes no sense to get rid of the Heer just to transform the SA into the Heer.

I doubt the SA would be transformed into something resembling the Heer, but I would expect Hitler would at least want to transform the SA into something that could credibly be expected to help defend Germany (along with the Luftwaffe and the Navy.)


I suppose if Hitler felt the Heer represented an immediate threat to him he might gamble that the SA could remove / replace the Heer (which is by no means a given in my view) and then be transformed into something that could at least help defend Germany before Germany's neighbours decided to invade ? A lot of what if's Still if Hitler is certain the Heer is about to depose him he might decide he has nothing to loose by trying

Edit to add:
Maybe the Luftwaffe could help remove / replace the Heer and the Navy could be pursuaded to at least remain neutral ? I suppose the role of the Luftwaffe depends on the timing ?

 

[Blue cat]

Ahhh I see

My answer was directed to the OP - just to be clear

No worries I was about to make a general post along those lines and your inquiry prompted me to do so.

 

[fasquardon]

Let's say that Hitler has it's way with the SA, the wehrmacht is not created and the SA becomes the german army while SA men is given posts to replace the purged wehrmacht.

How much of a catastrophe the german war effort would be?

As others have noted, the HoI doctrine trees are fantasies. (Though HoI 4 is at least better on this than HoI 1 and 2 were.) The doctrines the various warring powers used grew out of the histories, perceived needs, geographies, material capabilities and practice. Germany in OTL did well early in the war due to a combination of the historically aggressive Prussian approach to war (which is perfectly sensible for a land power in the middle of a continent), the perceived needs of the Nazi party (who had an expand or die outlook), having temperate European geography and a head start of several months in figuring out how all the new toys worked out on the battlefield.

It all conspired to create a brief historical window where "blitz" tactics looked really good. But as the war continued, the ideas of the French, British and Soviet thinkers would prove more correct that Guderian's ideas. And there's no doubt that if Germany had the material means, it would have developed their doctrine in similar ways to their opponents, since Guderian was hardly the only German officer who could think about what doctrine should look like and the Germans were as capable from learning from experience as their enemies. And the officers who commanded in the late war took different approaches, though still approaches rooted in the officer corps' historic culture.

So if we look at the SA... Well, for a start they aren't an army when Hitler disposes of them. So if they become an army, where do they get their battlefield officers from? As such, if the SA won and became the core of the German army, it may be an SA dominated by officers who have been nurtured in the Prussian officer culture, and thus are going to have the same eagerness to emphasize attack and ignore logistics. If this German SA army goes through the same steps of Rhinland, Anschluss, Sudetenland, Bohemia then Poland, just like the OTL German army they'll have the same first-learner advantage that meant that the Germans were just better at modern war than any enemy they faced until they'd beaten equal lessons into the British and Soviets.

Possibly Hitler opting to build his army around the SA will slow him down, however. The SA being the core of the army is a really big shake-up and it's hard to see that NOT meaning that Germany is some months behind their OTL curve... That could very well mean Germany ends up being unable to conquer Poland, as a few more months to arm up means the French, British and Poles are much stronger vis-a-vis Germany. If Germany somehow did manage to scrape through and beat Poland, they could easily stall against France. If they do pull through, they may not feel they can beat the Soviets, or if they do think they can, a few months delay could mean they face a far more equal Red Army.

In other words, I don't think a German army built on the SA would be THAT different from their OTL army, since they are still drawing on the same Germany, but the delay of breaking up the professional army and reshaping the Nazi Party's thug militia into the core of a serious army could SERIOUSLY change things. And most likely not for the better if you are a German.

fasquardon

 

[Gukpard]

As others have noted, the HoI doctrine trees are fantasies. (Though HoI 4 is at least better on this than HoI 1 and 2 were.) The doctrines the various warring powers used grew out of the histories, perceived needs, geographies, material capabilities and practice. Germany in OTL did well early in the war due to a combination of the historically aggressive Prussian approach to war (which is perfectly sensible for a land power in the middle of a continent), the perceived needs of the Nazi party (who had an expand or die outlook), having temperate European geography and a head start of several months in figuring out how all the new toys worked out on the battlefield.

It all conspired to create a brief historical window where "blitz" tactics looked really good. But as the war continued, the ideas of the French, British and Soviet thinkers would prove more correct that Guderian's ideas. And there's no doubt that if Germany had the material means, it would have developed their doctrine in similar ways to their opponents, since Guderian was hardly the only German officer who could think about what doctrine should look like and the Germans were as capable from learning from experience as their enemies. And the officers who commanded in the late war took different approaches, though still approaches rooted in the officer corps' historic culture.

So if we look at the SA... Well, for a start they aren't an army when Hitler disposes of them. So if they become an army, where do they get their battlefield officers from? As such, if the SA won and became the core of the German army, it may be an SA dominated by officers who have been nurtured in the Prussian officer culture, and thus are going to have the same eagerness to emphasize attack and ignore logistics. If this German SA army goes through the same steps of Rhinland, Anschluss, Sudetenland, Bohemia then Poland, just like the OTL German army they'll have the same first-learner advantage that meant that the Germans were just better at modern war than any enemy they faced until they'd beaten equal lessons into the British and Soviets.

Possibly Hitler opting to build his army around the SA will slow him down, however. The SA being the core of the army is a really big shake-up and it's hard to see that NOT meaning that Germany is some months behind their OTL curve... That could very well mean Germany ends up being unable to conquer Poland, as a few more months to arm up means the French, British and Poles are much stronger vis-a-vis Germany. If Germany somehow did manage to scrape through and beat Poland, they could easily stall against France. If they do pull through, they may not feel they can beat the Soviets, or if they do think they can, a few months delay could mean they face a far more equal Red Army.

In other words, I don't think a German army built on the SA would be THAT different from their OTL army, since they are still drawing on the same Germany, but the delay of breaking up the professional army and reshaping the Nazi Party's thug militia into the core of a serious army could SERIOUSLY change things. And most likely not for the better if you are a German.

fasquardon

Not satisfied with being the expert on the soviet union alone, Fasquardon moves to be the master of other subjects too.

Thanks for your comment, I got the point and I also like everyone else contribution.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

One thing to note about the SA is that a lot of the early members were former soldiers so they would have some basis in military discipline if these older members were in the chain of command by 1940.

Discipline would help & I believe a SA controlled army could be disciplined, but like so many ideologically based militaries they are unlikely to put enough attention to practical skills. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is a recent example. Crazy motivated, disciplined by enthusiasm, but third rate at soldierly skills. They could barely cope with the Iraqi army.

 

[Johnrankins]

Discipline would help & I believe a SA controlled army could be disciplined, but like so many ideologically based militaries they are unlikely to put enough attention to practical skills. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is a recent example. Crazy motivated, disciplined by enthusiasm, but third rate at soldierly skills. They could barely cope with the Iraqi army.

That is what I see as the problem, the SA is likely to be far more ideological and less professional than the Heer. The head of the SA is Rohm and he is not one to inspire confidence in me that he can run a real army. His likely replacements are similar. Hitler would go with the SA because he wants a politically reliable, ideological army not a professional one. He already had a professional one and that is the Heer.

 

[Blue cat]

Discipline would help & I believe a SA controlled army could be disciplined, but like so many ideologically based militaries they are unlikely to put enough attention to practical skills. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is a recent example. Crazy motivated, disciplined by enthusiasm, but third rate at soldierly skills. They could barely cope with the Iraqi army.

A numerically large, disciplined and fanatical army (that was lacking advanced solidering skills) might still sort of work in a defensive setting where the supereme commander often issued "no retreat" orders. If there was a small cadre of officers who at least could make sensible choices about what positions to hold until all the soliders holding them were killed or captured the SA might be able to exhaust the UK and the French ? I suspect the Soviets would eventually manage to grind thru the SA.

Edit to add: I suppose a lot would depend on what training the SA rank and file received and if there were enough reasonably competent leaders who could be sacrificed along with the rank and file. Presumably there would be some World War One veterans who might have a reasonable grasp of how to defend a static position.

 

[Johnrankins]

A numerically large, disciplined and fanatical army (that was lacking advanced solidering skills) might still sort of work in a defensive setting where the supereme commander often issued "no retreat" orders. If there was a small cadre of officers who at least could make sensible choices about what positions to hold until all the soliders holding them were killed or captured the SA might be able to exhaust the UK and the French ? I suspect the Soviets would eventually manage to grind thru the SA.

Edit to add: I suppose a lot would depend on what training the SA rank and file received and if there were enough reasonably competent leaders who could be sacrificed along with the rank and file. Presumably there would be some World War One veterans who might have a reasonable grasp of how to defend a static position.

Defending Germany would certainly be easier than attacking Poland, not talking France.

 

[marathag]

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is a recent example. Crazy motivated, disciplined by enthusiasm, but third rate at soldierly skills. They could barely cope with the Iraqi army.

Counterpoint: ISIL cleaned out the US trained and equipped post-Saddam Army with shocking ease

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

There is a important factor here concerning doctrines & tactics that folks are walking past, both in a general way & in the specific historical examples raised. That is having a good doctrine does not make a good army. Being trained to execute the doctrine & technical skills well makes a good army. To use the specific historical example:

For economic reasons the French were tied to a 18 month conscript training regime, & a 24 month regime for new lieutenants. Refresher training was at a minimum for reservists. So was advanced training for the reservists promoted in rank. The Chamber of Deputies was dominated by fiscal conservatives, other than during the Popular Front period, & that lot were not inclined to pay for extended training. Conversely the German initial conscription training was longer, basic officer training 50% longer, follow on training longer. The auto biography of a artillery officer Seigfried Knappe illustrates this. Knappe originally was trained as a conscript for artillery service. Along the way he was promoted to NCO & which obligated a extension of active service. As that ran its course Knappe was recommended for the basic officers training & was promoted to Lieutenant. When the war with Poland came in 1939 Knappe had well over four years continual service tho technically he was a reservist. This was not unusual for the growing Wehrmacht, where nazi deficit spending ensure increasing training.

In a earlier post I referred to the necessity to be throughly trained, drilled to oblivion in the tedious details of servicing a weapon, squad tactics, or staff tasks, before successful fancy operations can be consistently successful. This was a huge part of the early war German success. The officers & NCOs of the early mobilization wave formations may as well been long service regulars, considering the amount of training they accumulated. The French were not much different from anyone else of the 1930s. The reservists received a year or two of training and follow up. In the case of the French the intent was to play catch up & run the mobilized reservists through 6-12 months of catch up training. That plan was incomplete in May 1940 when the battle came. The Active Series units were well along, the Series A formations were engaged in a training regime, but the Series B formations were no better trained that in September 1939, and demoralized from labor duties during the winter and overtaxed leaders. These were the formations that failed catastrophically in May 1940