Germany winning WW1 - best scenario for the 20th century?

Is Germany winning WW1 the most preferable outcome?

  • Yes. A German victory would have prevented the greatest horrors of the 20 century and saved millions

    Votes: 105 26.9%
  • No. A German victory would have made things as bad or worse than OTL

    Votes: 56 14.3%
  • Perhaps. Some things would have turned out better, some worse

    Votes: 245 62.7%

  • Total voters
    391
USW was only inevitable once H-L forced their way into power. So long as Falkenhayn survives in power USW doesn't happen, but once H-L get in they can force it through.

Germany went into war with a "win fast" strategy because it lacked strategic depth. France and England had their empires, and ultimately the international financial system to lean back on for a sustained war. Russia had Russia. The central peers were cut off, and forced to put an increasingly unbearable pressure on their populations just to stay in the race.

Falkenhayn asked for a reasonable peace in IIRC 1915. Denied that he tried to break the French and force peace. He was perfectly aware of the seriousness of the situation.

If not for USW and the hope of victory, the German empire might have collapsed to internal pressure before the soviet revolution presented the German people with an additional false hope.
 
Well yes. But the two appear to be so linked as to almost be the same - it seems to me that Falkenhayn was forced out because he wouldn't accede to USW and it's not clear how he could have survived much longer.



True, but going to war is a political decision that needs political assent. And if the political will is absent then dithering and indecision in the US might have been able to draw things out long enough for the CP to benefit.

By 1917 nobody was looking for an acceptable peace anymore. The clear and present danger of a CP win would have forced US public opinion to contemplate a post CP win post Soviet revolution world and that would have done the trick. Those resisting the US entry into the war were convinced that the Allies would win or that there would be a stalemate. A CP win only seems plausible with hindsight (of the soviet revolution). It was very difficult for an objective observer to expect it in 1916.
 

Deleted member 1487

Germany went into war with a "win fast" strategy because it lacked strategic depth. France and England had their empires, and ultimately the international financial system to lean back on for a sustained war. Russia had Russia. The central peers were cut off, and forced to put an increasingly unbearable pressure on their populations just to stay in the race.

Falkenhayn asked for a reasonable peace in IIRC 1915. Denied that he tried to break the French and force peace. He was perfectly aware of the seriousness of the situation.

If not for USW and the hope of victory, the German empire might have collapsed to internal pressure before the soviet revolution presented the German people with an additional false hope.

Falkenhayn respected civilian authority and the civilian government didn't want to piss off the Americans with USW until H-L forced them into it. Both H-L and the public had been badly misinformed by media reports about the effectiveness of USW, so were willing to go along, the government with Falkenhayn still in power would have been able to stave off public calls for USW forever due to the Russian Revolution once it happened, they just needed to wait a few more months. USW wasn't even agreed to until AFTER the RR anyway IOTL. After that victory is assured without US enter, the Russian disorder was the beginning of the end for the Entente. Once they also run out of collateral they are screwed if the US doesn't enter the war. The German public was able to wait until 1917 for USW and without the Hindenburg Program fucking up the German economy they'd be sated by the Russians falling apart if USW doesn't happen then.

Well yes. But the two appear to be so linked as to almost be the same - it seems to me that Falkenhayn was forced out because he wouldn't accede to USW and it's not clear how he could have survived much longer.
To be extremely blunt that is not why Falkenhayn forced out; it was not even an indirect cause, let alone a proximate one. He was removed due to the bloody Verdun campaign and the start of the Somme, plus then being wrong about Romania staying out of the war. That was the final straw. He was ending Verdun when the Somme started IOTL, so if there is a POD where Romania doesn't enter the war then he can cling to command and then reap the benefits of defeating the Somme offensive, the Brusilov offensive and the Russian Revolution which would secure his position completely. Plus if he stays in power there is no Hindenburg Program and a resulting economic mess (part of which was the Turnip Winter and strikes by labor unions), which would help things stay much more socially stable than they were IOTL by 1917.
 
Wiking, once again, just no.
The decision to start USW was taken in january 1917. The revolution we are talking about is the October one, that brought forward the clear possibility of Russia leaving the war. The March revolution could not be counted as guaranteeing Russia exiting the war. It gave hope, but in April the US had entered the war.

But let's assume that the OHL presents a study to the Reichstag in December 1916 that predicts the Russian collapse, followed by a PR miracle and no huge US support.
Would the Allies still launch the OTL spring offensive?
Or would they get ready for the long haul, and prepare to absorb the weight of the German offensives and wear the CP out. A massive win in 1917 failed to knock Italy out of the war. A better 1918 offensive would not knock France out of the war.

Germany could not win a long war.
 
Falkenhayn was forced out because everybody (in charge of the CPs) believed the war was lost after the Romanian entry. Bethmann wanted H-L (or rather H, nobody knew L at the time), because he believed that only with him at the military helm the German people would accept even very bad peace terms. - It had nothig to do with Verdun, the Somme or any other purely military operation, although most military commanders didn't appreciate F.'s style of leadership. - F. never ended Verdun, even H-L didn't, until the French had retaken most of the ground. - The Hindenburg Programme certainly was an economic mess of sorts, but it truly wasn't the cause of the Turnip Winter; the 1916 harvest was poor all over the nothern hemisphere, and in Germany potato rot added to the poor crop. Nothing one could blame L for.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wiking, once again, just no.
You can say that all you want, it doesn't make you right.

The decision to start USW was taken in january 1917. The revolution we are talking about is the October one, that brought forward the clear possibility of Russia leaving the war. The March revolution could not be counted as guaranteeing Russia exiting the war. It gave hope, but in April the US had entered the war.
USW was launched in January the decision was made in December 1916 or perhaps even a bit earlier. The February Revolution was what mattered, as it set up H-L was geniuses with the public. The October Revolution was even better militarily and politically, but there was a major publicity boost from the February revolution too. That convinced the public that Russia was on the way out. If Falkenhayn can make it until then his position is secured. Russia is on the defensive until the Kerensky offensive in July and if the US stays out combined with no Hindenburg Program Germany is sitting very pretty. In April the Nivelle offensive is shattered and the French go into mutiny. The British are a problem, but Russia is ticking time bomb and without US entry from April on the Entente is financially screwed and the Kerensky offensive might not even happen.

But let's assume that the OHL presents a study to the Reichstag in December 1916 that predicts the Russian collapse, followed by a PR miracle and no huge US support.
Would the Allies still launch the OTL spring offensive?
Or would they get ready for the long haul, and prepare to absorb the weight of the German offensives and wear the CP out. A massive win in 1917 failed to knock Italy out of the war. A better 1918 offensive would not knock France out of the war.

Germany could not win a long war.
Yes the Entente would still launch their Spring offensives in hope of breaking Germany before finances kill them. They know that is their last gamble to win because over the long haul they lose. That is their version of the 1918 Peace offensive. The Entente financially cannot last into 1918.
 

tenthring

Banned
One big thing to consider is that in 1914 and 1915 the German army was clearly superior to the French and British. 1916 the Entente start to learn and by 1917 they are a match for the Germans. Honestly, by 1918 they may actually be better man for man. Certainly they have way better equipment and well fed soildiers.

The kill ratios back of this assessment.

1914, 1916, and 1917 were all bad years for the Germans (excepting the very end of 1917). Only 1915 was truly a year of victory. They really needed to find a way to knock Russia out during the great retreat.
 
If the wheels did come off the Entente supply train in 1917, due to a lack of American goods, then you'd expect their quality to take a nosedive in 17-18. Throw in worse morale building off of the OTL mutinies, and the picture gets uglier.
 

Perkeo

Banned
Germany didn't regain Alsace-Lorraine or a ton of territory in Eastern Poland before 1939, and missed out on a lot of economic growth. You handwave this by saying those weren't "real" German territories, but that seems a bit weak no?

Indeed I do say that Eastern Poland wasn't a truly German territory and would have caused nothing but trouble. Alsace-Lorraine is culturally mixed - judging from language at the time clearly German, judging from the contribution to the French revolution clearly French. I would have loved to see the result of a referendum, but since neither Germany nor France ever asked, we'll never know.

But don't forget: With the Austrian Anschluss, Germany has a net gain in territory.

And last but not least I do not think that Germany missed any economic growth, it just postponed it. Just look here: https://ourworldindata.org/gdp-growth-over-the-last-centuries/, figure "Real GDP per capita around the world (PPP adjusted), since 1600". If you fit an exponential through the years 1600-1914, you see that Germany got back to the long-term trend in the 1930s and once again in the 1970s.
 
Last edited:
The British had other methods of managing the issue: reducing the use of oil by the Grand Fleet (only a minority of battleships were oil-fired); convoying tankers to reduce losses, building new tankers and reducing civilian use. In any case the demand reduction would extend stocks to last through mid 1918 without any increase in supply.


However, if I remember Massie correctly all the destroyers were oil-fired, and I gather the Grand Fleet couldn't do very much without its destroyer screen.
 
Of course the other point it why would America cut off credit? The economy of the US needs to sell and Entente are buying, if the Entente cannot buy then the US economy suffers. Further but the main beneficiaries in 1917 of the US stifling credit are the Germans who are competitors who want to lock the Americans out of as many markets as they can rather than competitors who are free traders as well and thus have markets open to American goods.

Because by 1917 any further loans would have to be unsecured due to lack of available collateral, and as the Fed quite correctly pointed out, such loans were high-risk.

America staying out of the war is entirely imaginable and would probably have been the smart move, let the Europeans bleed. America imploding its economy to aid the Kaiserreich out of a big and deepening hole...this needs to be further explained.

Not sure what you mean. Of course there would be a recession when all these wartime orders ended, but the war couldn't last forever, so that was going to happen whatever. The only question is when, and from the pov of Wilson and his Democratic Party I'd have thought that 1917-18 was preferable to a year ir two later, as the earlier date would leave time for a recovery before the 1920 elections.
 
However, if I remember Massie correctly all the destroyers were oil-fired, and I gather the Grand Fleet couldn't do very much without its destroyer screen.

Like to put some numbers and dates on your claims for oil shortages for the Royal Navy?
 
Because by 1917 any further loans would have to be unsecured due to lack of available collateral, and as the Fed quite correctly pointed out, such loans were high-risk.



Not sure what you mean. Of course there would be a recession when all these wartime orders ended, but the war couldn't last forever, so that was going to happen whatever. The only question is when, and from the pov of Wilson and his Democratic Party I'd have thought that 1917-18 was preferable to a year ir two later, as the earlier date would leave time for a recovery before the 1920 elections.

No you completely miss the point. Credit it a normal part of doing business...so is risk but actually the risks to the US economy in 1917 are higher from refusing the Entente credit. The Entente might default a decade hence but by then at 5% returns they will have repaid a sum equivalent to half the principal back to individual creditors and a sum equal to close to the whole of the principal will already have been added to the US economy. The Fed gave good advice to individual investors but going further would have been detrimental to the US economy and not just those supplying the Entente such as farmers and manufacturers but the providers of goods and services to those suppliers.

As to deliberately causing a recession ever winning anyone an election....erm colour me a sceptical rodent. Normal business cycles hurt politicians badly enough because they pretend to more control of them than they have but deliberately hurting the economy just makes enemies as people know full well it is their own hard work that produces any recovery.
 
Like to put some numbers and dates on your claims for oil shortages for the Royal Navy?

Actually if he cannot then Warwick Michael Brown can. He details the experience in chapter six (page 134 in document, 135 of the pdf) of this piece with the elegant title The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies 1898-1939; The Transition From Coal to Oil....well okay it is a academic title but still.

Oh be warned the front piece is smaller than the rest of the document so you may need to resize to read the whole more easily.

Anyway the big issue was not so much the RN's own consumption as the mechanisation of both the armies and home fronts of the Entente meant that war time oil requirements were much higher than expected. However rather than give up the Navy's destroyers the Army could have reduced the deficit by making less use of its trucks...this would have made for fewer offensive but there would still be the vehicles to surge for defensive operations and counter-offensives.

This of course assumes that there was somehow not the money to pay for American tankers.
 
No you completely miss the point. Credit it a normal part of doing business...so is risk but actually the risks to the US economy in 1917 are higher from refusing the Entente credit. The Entente might default a decade hence but by then at 5% returns they will have repaid a sum equivalent to half the principal back to individual creditors and a sum equal to close to the whole of the principal will already have been added to the US economy. The Fed gave good advice to individual investors but going further would have been detrimental to the US economy and not just those supplying the Entente such as farmers and manufacturers but the providers of goods and services to those suppliers.

As to deliberately causing a recession ever winning anyone an election....erm colour me a sceptical rodent. Normal business cycles hurt politicians badly enough because they pretend to more control of them than they have but deliberately hurting the economy just makes enemies as people know full well it is their own hard work that produces any recovery.

So, basically, nobody in America would consider the possibility of the Entente losing, ever. Because that would expedite defaults rather significantly, and make unsecured loans a complete waste of money. No matter what initial POD leads to no USW or how badly the Entente is doing, they'd still be seen as a safe investment. Uh-huh.
 
You can say that all you want, it doesn't make you right.


USW was launched in January the decision was made in December 1916 or perhaps even a bit earlier. The February Revolution was what mattered, as it set up H-L was geniuses with the public. The October Revolution was even better militarily and politically, but there was a major publicity boost from the February revolution too. That convinced the public that Russia was on the way out. If Falkenhayn can make it until then his position is secured. Russia is on the defensive until the Kerensky offensive in July and if the US stays out combined with no Hindenburg Program Germany is sitting very pretty. In April the Nivelle offensive is shattered and the French go into mutiny. The British are a problem, but Russia is ticking time bomb and without US entry from April on the Entente is financially screwed and the Kerensky offensive might not even happen.


Yes the Entente would still launch their Spring offensives in hope of breaking Germany before finances kill them. They know that is their last gamble to win because over the long haul they lose. That is their version of the 1918 Peace offensive. The Entente financially cannot last into 1918.
Regarding the first point, February 1917 comes after December 1916, so I don't possibly see how you can say you're right in your initial claim that the decision to implement USW came after the Russian revolution.( In your #163 post)
The 1917 offensive was sold to the British government as being essential to stop USW and supporting Russia. Assuming that the allies would risk everything on a breakthrough or bust offensive without financial resources or a plan B would only be possible if they were being led by Hindenburg and Ludendorff clones.

And even in the event of the allies making a total mess of things France 1917 is not France 1940. The French would fight to the knife, and keep on fighting from their colonies if necessary. Clemenceau is the Churchill of WW1.
So unless you're willing to bank on implausible behaviour followed by a successful 1919 Sealion while the Russian Civil war set the whole of Eastern Europe on fire there is no way Germany would win.

USW was the second worst mistake of the the War. But the worst was starting the war and led to it. The only alternative would be to go on the defensive and accept a lighter defeat. No victory, but no Versailles either.
 
Britain and France conquered the world. Russia was the most brutal slave state in Europe. Hell, even poor little Belgium created hell on earth in the Congo. These powers were empires in the true sense of the word, subjecting countless millions to their will. Militaristic? Pro-Conquest? They all were. This was a realpolitik war between a bunch of powers operating under the same basic philosophical assumptions.

I agree, the rose tinting of our glasses should be cleared up by looking at the British and French as they were pre-WWI, not the countries they became, there were few "good" guys in this war, it was the last war in a very long series between Kings backed now by modern industrial economies, WWI was the decrepit elite from another century in command of what would become modern nations of liberals, socialists and the technology revolution.

Although I can see German building the atomic bomb first, it would not be the Nazi-led Germany who wielded it, nor is this more or less dangerous than the British having it first. For all the propaganda the Prussian General Staff was very subordinate to its chain of command, Kaiser to Chancellor and ultimately the people, its taking control in crisis is no more aberrant than how Generals in every other belligerent responded to the perceived grid lock of parliamentary debate, it becoming a state inside the state under Weimar was a response to Versailles, in fact what we wanted was the Generals who would not obey the elected Hitler government in contradiction to our own notions of the subordination of generals to elected civilians, and sweeping away the convenient post-war finger pointing, Prussia become under Weimar an SPD led state with one of the most liberal constitutions in Germany, Berlin was no friend to the Nazis and a hot bed of free expression, so I am not convinced that a surviving Kaiserreich is destined to go right-wing conquer all crazy as is simplistic chauvinism, if anything the pressure cooker of reform would boil over with as many butterflies as can be imagined. Britain and France were quite unlike themselves post-war as victors once we get a few decades on, I suspect that the Liberals would finally shake off their kowtowing to the Junker class and the SPD would finally assert itself given the true power of the working class in numbers, the Weimar Republic shows us just how far the Liberals and Social Democrats were ready to go to build a democracy, one in many ways more progressive than the UK or USA or France, the modern FRG shows us the strength of the 1848 revolution and its legacy, there is just as much foundation to have a surviving Kaiserreich evolve in fits and starts to be anything but a dystopia despite the popularity of such fiction.

Now I am under no illusion that Germany would fail to misstep all over East Europe and the Poles especially, would resume to assert itself on the global arena, are there dangers of another war, yes, this would be no less dangerous or complex world, but I see it as remaining multi-lateral and less likely to settle into an American dominated versus USSR dominated paradigm, in some ways more stable and in some way less stable, but once the weaponry goes nuclear I see the same end to conflict resolution via direct warfare we accept as obvious, all sides maintain big military establishments as they fight proxy wars just as we saw through the Cold War. This Germany shed of its colonies moves to the same logic the USA did, the old Empires must die to break open markets and free trade to let the over productive domestic industry gain markets, a liberalized Reichstag would support independence movements globally and Germany would have our track record of dubious relations with right leaning despots the world over as the USSR pours on the support for the revolution, the USA and Kaiserreich have an oddly parallel destiny.
 
Regarding the first point, February 1917 comes after December 1916, so I don't possibly see how you can say you're right in your initial claim that the decision to implement USW came after the Russian revolution.( In your #163 post)
The 1917 offensive was sold to the British government as being essential to stop USW and supporting Russia. Assuming that the allies would risk everything on a breakthrough or bust offensive without financial resources or a plan B would only be possible if they were being led by Hindenburg and Ludendorff clones.

I think his point about timing meant that H-L would be able to point to the Russian Revolution as vindication for their new strategies. As for the Entente, the financial troubles would weaken their ability to defend as well, so attack may still seem preferable. They'd have to attack eventually to win regardless.
 
So, basically, nobody in America would consider the possibility of the Entente losing, ever. Because that would expedite defaults rather significantly, and make unsecured loans a complete waste of money. No matter what initial POD leads to no USW or how badly the Entente is doing, they'd still be seen as a safe investment. Uh-huh.


Actually I would be very interested in a POD that explains why the USA might choose to harm its own economy in the short term and its long term interests to help Germany. All I am hearing so far is outrage at the idea that the US did not exist simply to throw itself on a chevaux de frise for the good of the Kaiser.
 
Actually I would be very interested in a POD that explains why the USA might choose to harm its own economy in the short term and its long term interests to help Germany. All I am hearing so far is outrage at the idea that the US did not exist simply to throw itself on a chevaux de frise for the good of the Kaiser.

Uh, no. If the Entente loses, then unsecured loans to them are a waste. Explain why this possibility would be dismissed out of hand without the snark and innuendo or go away. You are not advancing the discussion like this.
 
Top