Germany winning WW1 - best scenario for the 20th century?

Is Germany winning WW1 the most preferable outcome?

  • Yes. A German victory would have prevented the greatest horrors of the 20 century and saved millions

    Votes: 105 26.9%
  • No. A German victory would have made things as bad or worse than OTL

    Votes: 56 14.3%
  • Perhaps. Some things would have turned out better, some worse

    Votes: 245 62.7%

  • Total voters
    391

Perkeo

Banned
Good luck in trying to find terms that both sides find reasonable eg what should Germany offer Belgium?

They'd have to say the four magic words: "Status quo ante bellum".

If we explicitly demand a German victory, it could look like:
  • OTL Brest-Litowsk, plus the assurance that (Congress)Poland Ukraine and the Baltics become independent, not annexed by Germany or Austria.
  • Status quo ante peace in the west (but let the French sign a document that A-L is once and for all German)
  • Status quo ante in the colonies
  • Germany gives a compensation for the war crimes in Belgium (but none to anyone else, unlike the other bellingerents - it is indisputed that Belgium carries no war guilt, plus certain concessions to Belgium help Britain save their face)
  • No reparations
  • A kind of European Union ("Mitteleuropa") to ensure an ordered reconstruction and a lasting peace.
 

BooNZ

Banned
You may note the losses to British shipping, the vast majority of which would not have occurred without unlimited submarine warfare.

Nope - this is becoming a habit

In the months leading up to the German USW the losses of shipping to U-Boats had been increasing significantly. Experts in the British Board of Trade to predicted a complete breakdown in shipping before June 1917 if those trends continued. The USW did create an initial spike in shipping losses, but within six months the introduction of the US navy and convoy systems resulted the reduction of shipping losses below pre USW levels. Uboat losses doubled after the introduction of the convoy system.

Without USW there would be no US navy or convoy system - if the [Jan 1917] existing trend of increasing shipping losses had continued, Britain would have faced both a shipping and fuel crisis in June 1917. If the increases in shipping losses become more moderate, then the British still would have lost more shipping than the OTL USW by the end of 1918. The British had done almost nothing to rectify the impending shipping and fuel crisis before 1917 - arguably the USW was needed to wake them up.

As an aside, the USW initially resulted in a disproportionate increase in the number of tankers sunk - did the USW remove some protection previously afforded or claimed by tankers?
 
How is a miltary defeat before the all conquering German supermen a position of strength?

The Germans don't need to be "all-conquering supermen". As already pointed out they just need to hold their own until the Entente governments and/or their troops lose hope of dislodging Germany from the territory she holds. Absent the prospect of massive US reinforcements to the Entente, this aim is perfectly achievable.
 
The Germans don't need to be "all-conquering supermen". As already pointed out they just need to hold their own until the Entente governments and/or their troops lose hope of dislodging Germany from the territory she holds. Absent the prospect of massive US reinforcements to the Entente, this aim is perfectly achievable.

This gives you two embittered sides attempting to negotiate but getting nowhere because each side's demands are ridiculous. Now what?

Or, rather, how long do you think this would go on for before something breaks?
 
This gives you two embittered sides attempting to negotiate but getting nowhere because each side's demands are ridiculous. Now what?

Or, rather, how long do you think this would go on for before something breaks?


That's why I said "governments and/or troops".

At some point the men in the trenches are going to decide that their side's objectives are unattainable. Either the German soldiers despair of holding their ground or the Entente ones despair of expelling them. When this happens, the government concerned has to start talking, or else risk a collapse of morale in their army, leading to defeat and a dictated peace. Of course there will be a risk of that happening anyway, but there'll be no option but to hope for the best.

As to how long, at most I can't see it being much beyond the end of 1918 - possibly a lot sooner. Both sides were getting tired, and it's a question of whose men have had enough first.
 
Nope - this is becoming a habit

In the months leading up to the German USW the losses of shipping to U-Boats had been increasing significantly. Experts in the British Board of Trade to predicted a complete breakdown in shipping before June 1917 if those trends continued. The USW did create an initial spike in shipping losses, but within six months the introduction of the US navy and convoy systems resulted the reduction of shipping losses below pre USW levels. Uboat losses doubled after the introduction of the convoy system.

Without USW there would be no US navy or convoy system - if the [Jan 1917] existing trend of increasing shipping losses had continued, Britain would have faced both a shipping and fuel crisis in June 1917. If the increases in shipping losses become more moderate, then the British still would have lost more shipping than the OTL USW by the end of 1918. The British had done almost nothing to rectify the impending shipping and fuel crisis before 1917 - arguably the USW was needed to wake them up.

As an aside, the USW initially resulted in a disproportionate increase in the number of tankers sunk - did the USW remove some protection previously afforded or claimed by tankers?
Why would no USW lead to no convoy system? Once the losses got large enough convoy would be reconsidered by Britain and adopted in desperation, as OTL. Wouldn't convoy be even more effective against "cruiser" rules submarine warfare as surfaced u-Boats would be far more vulnerable to Q ships or even lightly armed escorts?
 

BooNZ

Banned
Why would no USW lead to no convoy system? Once the losses got large enough convoy would be reconsidered by Britain and adopted in desperation, as OTL. Wouldn't convoy be even more effective against "cruiser" rules submarine warfare as surfaced u-Boats would be far more vulnerable to Q ships or even lightly armed escorts?

OTL there was strong resistance to implementing convoys, largely due to miscalculations. It was thought the navy lacked the resources to effectively escort convoys - those calculations over-estimated the volume of shipping and the relative proportion of escorts required. Clearly convoys would put more strain on port facilities (needing to load-up and unload at the same time), which was likely to create downtime. Quicker merchantmen might not appreciate being limited to the slowest member of the convoy - time is money.

Also the navy did not like the idea of surrendering the initiative to the uboats (i.e. defending convoys). Despite the success of convoys in WW1 the Royal navy had to relearn those lessons again in WW2.
 
Why would no USW lead to no convoy system? Once the losses got large enough convoy would be reconsidered by Britain and adopted in desperation, as OTL. Wouldn't convoy be even more effective against "cruiser" rules submarine warfare as surfaced u-Boats would be far more vulnerable to Q ships or even lightly armed escorts?


OTL there was strong resistance to implementing convoys, largely due to miscalculations. It was thought the navy lacked the resources to effectively escort convoys - those calculations over-estimated the volume of shipping and the relative proportion of escorts required. Clearly convoys would put more strain on port facilities (needing to load-up and unload at the same time), which was likely to create downtime. Quicker merchantmen might not appreciate being limited to the slowest member of the convoy - time is money.

Also the navy did not like the idea of surrendering the initiative to the uboats (i.e. defending convoys). Despite the success of convoys in WW1 the Royal navy had to relearn those lessons again in WW2.

The thing is though convoys had been implemented for some tasks...mostly it should be mentioned for short hops in the Channel and to the Netherlands but those that had been were highly effective.

Certainly Boonz is right to mention some of the perceived problems of convoys raised as objections at the time.

One thing though

Tonnage%20sunk%20copy.jpg


The key point is the rise in losses to submarines prior to the introduction of unlimited rules of engagement. It should be noted that half of the Allied losses occurred in the Mediterranean during 1916 where the Germans had concentrated just over a fifth of their operational boats, some 23 out 105...now over the course of 1917 they would in OTL manage to push the numbers of operational U-boats to 120 but the effect outside the Med might one suspects be more limited...they only bagged 3 Oil tankers on Admiralty service in the whole of 1916 suggesting strongly the effect on Atlantic routes was reduced. Thus it is not even a question of introducing trans-Atlantic convoys but Mediterranean ones.
 
OTL there was strong resistance to implementing convoys, largely due to miscalculations. It was thought the navy lacked the resources to effectively escort convoys - those calculations over-estimated the volume of shipping and the relative proportion of escorts required. Clearly convoys would put more strain on port facilities (needing to load-up and unload at the same time), which was likely to create downtime. Quicker merchantmen might not appreciate being limited to the slowest member of the convoy - time is money.

Also the navy did not like the idea of surrendering the initiative to the uboats (i.e. defending convoys). Despite the success of convoys in WW1 the Royal navy had to relearn those lessons again in WW2.

Yes, but this doesn't address the question of why no USW would lead to no convoys.
 
OTL there was strong resistance to implementing convoys, largely due to miscalculations. It was thought the navy lacked the resources to effectively escort convoys - those calculations over-estimated the volume of shipping and the relative proportion of escorts required. Clearly convoys would put more strain on port facilities (needing to load-up and unload at the same time), which was likely to create downtime. Quicker merchantmen might not appreciate being limited to the slowest member of the convoy - time is money.

Also the navy did not like the idea of surrendering the initiative to the uboats (i.e. defending convoys). Despite the success of convoys in WW1 the Royal navy had to relearn those lessons again in WW2.
Yes, I appreciate the reluctance iOTL and its reasons. But we know that when desperate the British simply did it anyway. So there has to be some justification why they don't take that step in a similar position. The US not being involved in the war shouldn't change their reasoning on the issue so what is different?
 
Top