Germany winning WW1 - best scenario for the 20th century?

Is Germany winning WW1 the most preferable outcome?

  • Yes. A German victory would have prevented the greatest horrors of the 20 century and saved millions

    Votes: 105 26.9%
  • No. A German victory would have made things as bad or worse than OTL

    Votes: 56 14.3%
  • Perhaps. Some things would have turned out better, some worse

    Votes: 245 62.7%

  • Total voters
    391
Reparations; i.e. what they offered in 1916.

Source for that claim?

See for example what the German ambassador told Wilson:
...restitution of the part of upper Alsace occupied by the French..gaining of a frontier that would protect Germany and Poland economically and strategically against Russia..restitution of German colonies...restitution of those parts of France occupied by Germany under reservation of strategical and economic changes of the frontier and financial compensations...restoration of Belgium under special guaranty for the safety of Germany which would have to be decided on by negotiations with Belgium..economic compensation for territories exchanged and for German business concerns and private persons who suffered by the war..abandonment of all economic agreements and measure which would form an obstacle to normal commerece and intercourse after the conclusion of peace..the freedom of the seas...

ie a German dominated Belgium
 
Far Canal! Have you?

To provide some actual context, I have included some extracts from Chapter 6...

"The reserves only fell below the six-month mark in the final quarter of 1916; alarms bells should have sounded though when deliveries consistently failed to match consumption - from the first quarter of 1916"

"Nevertheless, even if the U-boats had stayed at home the Navy's consumption was running ahead of delivery, and by the spring of 1917 had been doing so for a year. The U-boat campaign turned what was already destined to be a crisis into a panic."

"The Admiralty first requested American help on 13th April 1917, in the shape of eight tankers. On 5th May, this was increased to twelve tankers, totalling about 118,000 tons, and again three days later to 178,000 tons - more than was lost in 1917"

"The Army was fairing even worse, and in June 1917 was reduced to only four weeks reserve of petrol"

1. The British fuel crisis was a product of British bugling during a period 1914-1916 when they had ample time and resources to correct the problem - essentially a lack of tanker capacity.
2. The German USW essaibated the tonnage crisis in the immediate term, but in the short term additional US tanker tonnage from the US entry into the war far exceeded total tanker tonnage sunk - so the USW ultimately mitigated the underlying fuel crisis.
3. By the time the extent of the crisis was identified, it was probably too late to build new tanker capacity (i.e. if the tankers were not already being built before 1917, it was already too late). The majority of additional tonnage commissioned after the US entry did not appear until after the war's end - accordingly, the use of US controlled tankers was the vital ingredient to resolving the crisis.
4. The British Army was facing a fuel crisis in June 1917 even after the US entry to the war - the Michael offensives started in March 1918, so were unlikely to have been a contributing factor...



Thank you for the prod

Yes I have and the thing is by now people have realised you only interpret data as supporting your argument even when some of the data you present does not match your claims. The issue for the Admiralty was they wanted to have 6 months of absolute max oil usage on hand. What actually happened is that supplies of oil did not keep up with the rate of use. However and this is key the rate of excess was not so great that the Royal Navy was ever at the point of running out of oil reserves within less than a year and in fact could probably have managed more nearly two even in the worst period of shortfall.

This before taking measures like imposing a defensive pause to rebuild stocks....the 'crisis' was the fall in stocks, however at no point did the rate of fall in stocks mean the British were on a short term fuse, they never got to the point as the Germans did that they could not find resources to last beyond the next Christmas. The Germans were saved in 1917 by the collapse of Russia but nothing happened to save them in 1918 and the Russian collapse only prolonged things so far.

Hence the idea that Germans were going to last out the Entente does not bear close scrutiny.

Which would suggest you would be better off examining how Germany might look for a negotiated peace. Compared to OTL any peace negotiated while Germany still has some legs is going to look good and 'victory' is all in the presentation, Germany does not in fact need hold the territory of its foes and nor most likely can it. However I think your heart is set of total defeat for your perceived enemies and it has already been demonstrated than not simply at one point but at multiple single points of failure your model for German victory does not work and so you really need to find a new model.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Yes I have and the thing is by now people have realised you only interpret data as supporting your argument even when some of the data you present does not match your claims.

Can you provide an example of the data not matching my claims as I pull apart your present 'assertions'...

The issue for the Admiralty was they wanted to have 6 months of absolute max oil usage on hand. What actually happened is that supplies of oil did not keep up with the rate of use. However and this is key the rate of excess was not so great that the Royal Navy was ever at the point of running out of oil reserves within less than a year and in fact could probably have managed more nearly two even in the worst period of shortfall.

A couple of extracts from the reference provided:

"...the peak had been reached in December 1915, when the Navy had over a year's wartime consumption of in reserve".

"Stocks had continued to fall in 1917 until by April they stood at less than four months consumption".

So from January 2016 through March 1917 (15 months), the Navy reserves went from over 12 months to less than 4 months i.e they had burnt through 8 month of oil reserves in only 15 months. At that deficit rate they would have burnt through their remaining oil reserves before November 1917. The state of the British army's oil fuel reserves were even worse.

This before taking measures like imposing a defensive pause to rebuild stocks....the 'crisis' was the fall in stocks, however at no point did the rate of fall in stocks mean the British were on a short term fuse, they never got to the point as the Germans did that they could not find resources to last beyond the next Christmas. The Germans were saved in 1917 by the collapse of Russia but nothing happened to save them in 1918 and the Russian collapse only prolonged things so far.

Firstly, what exactly is a 'defensive pause'? As outlined above, based on the Royal navy's management of oil in the 18 months to March 1917 (before the impact of German USW and US entry into the war), the oil reserves would have been spent well before Christmas 1917.

...that is assuming Britain would have sufficient foreign currency to purchase the oil, which is far from certain. An additional extract below:
Northcliffe was told the full extent of the oil crisis in July 1917, which he thought if disclosed `would cause a jump in the oil market as had never been known. The last thing a cash strapped Entente can deal with.

Hence the idea that Germans were going to last out the Entente does not bear close scrutiny.
I think you need a more considered argument - less rhetoric
 

BooNZ

Banned
Scenarios presented to Cabinet 30 June 1917:

It should be noted by 30 June 1917 the US had entered the war providing access to its tankers and extensive resources. It is comparing apples with oranges.

There were 20 tankers under construction in British yards to be available by the end of 1917, and a further 18 cargo ships converted into tankers by November 2017. Projected build time for heavy oil tankers was 8 months.

So based on an 8 month build time, the British expected tankers to be completed by the end of 1917. The reference provided suggested average build times of 314 and 411 days respectively for the designs being produced. That would indicate actual delivery some time in 1918, which might be too late if the British do not have access to American tankers in the interim...

The situation was not as bad as it appeared and the British were already taking action, with the crisis resolved by the autumn.

It was resolved with the use of American tankers, resources and cooperation. The British might still had muddled through the fuel crisis by themselves, but they would have had to perform far better than OTL. The lack of US credit represents an altogether bigger and more formidable issue.
 
It should be noted by 30 June 1917 the US had entered the war providing access to its tankers and extensive resources. It is comparing apples with oranges.

And unrestricted submarine warfare which was having a much bigger impact - sinking IIRC an average of 3 tankers/month.

So based on an 8 month build time, the British expected tankers to be completed by the end of 1917. The reference provided suggested average build times of 314 and 411 days respectively for the designs being produced. That would indicate actual delivery some time in 1918, which might be too late if the British do not have access to American tankers in the interim...

I used a different PhD for the 8 month build time; you've ignored the conversions; and what will the US tankers be doing in the meantime (or the British could just buy them outright)?
 
The lack of US credit represents an altogether bigger and more formidable issue.

Ferguson The Pity of War;

The Dollar Crisis

It is often assumed that foreign lending made a decisive difference to the outcome of the First World War. This is partly because of the histrionics which surrounded British financial negotiations with the United Satets, especially in the period between November 1916 and April 1917, which may have led some writers to exaggerate the economic importance of American money to the Allied war effort


He then goes into a rant against John Maynard Keynes then we return to the meat of the matter

There is no doubt that it assisted Britain to be able to purchase essential war supplies in the United States at an over-valued rate, shored up by loans raised on Wall Street. It would not only have been embarrassing but inflationary if the pound had slipped much below $4.70. [53] But it is too much to claim that a weakening of the pound, which was was pegged at around $4.76 (2 per cent below par) for most of the war, would have been as fatal for the British war effort as Keynes claimed. It must be remembered that although Britain borrowed more than $5 billion in the USA during the war, it did not end the war a net debtor, but remained a net creditor.

nb note 53 refers to Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War page 64

Again people can interpret that as they will.

However we have a situation where once again the core argument goes that the Entente Blockade must be ineffective, that the Americans must cut off credit and that such a cut off must be decisive and that USW must go ahead...as the pressure on oil only even begins to look like it might be enough with both applied as either more British or more American tankers resolve the issue, further but the Allies both must not mechanise thereby making themselves more effective in battle but at the same time mechanise to create the pressure on oil stocks. The problem with the total CP victory scenario even ignoring the fact that the Hapsburgs were going down and knew it and the Germans only beat them to quitting by forestalling the AH first effort at seeking terms, relies too heavily on too many things all having to be true even when they are often in binary opposition.

That does not mean the CP could not perhaps win but it does rather suggest you need a different POD and perhaps different victory terms.

The funny thing is that if the proponents of Credit to Total Victory actually thought their argument stood up to the rebuttals which are myriad then they would have moved on already to look at other ways the Central Powers might have achieved various victory scenarios. We are stuck with some people trying to make an unworkable scenario work rather than looking for what does work.
 

BooNZ

Banned
And unrestricted submarine warfare which was having a much bigger impact - sinking IIRC an average of 3 tankers/month.

3 per month in May and June, but only 1 per month after the introduction of convoys from July 1917 onward. By May 1917 the British had already requested 18 additional tankers from the US.


I used a different PhD for the 8 month build time; you've ignored the conversions; and what will the US tankers be doing in the meantime (or the British could just buy them outright)?

It appeared you may have been relying on a British report projecting build times and delivery dates - actual delivery dates are probably somewhere. The original reference provided indicated that the majority of the total tankers built during the war were delivered in the final months of the war.

By 1917 the British would be reliant on credit, so who would fund the tanker purchase. Per the original reference provided, the oil shipping rates had become huge, so no-one with commercial goals would consider selling a private tanker for a fair price - the British were also projecting an ordinary shipping crisis/ breakdown by mid 1917, which would not have been helped by oil conversions.
 
3 per month in May and June, but only 1 per month after the introduction of convoys from July 1917 onward. By May 1917 the British had already requested 18 additional tankers from the US.

The oil crisis for the RN was caused mainly by the sinking of tankers, which has a huge cumulative impact.

I provided numbers earlier that showed that the RN could avoid an oil crisis before the end of 1918 by reducing consumption, even if oil tanker sinkings continued at 3/month. The reduction in sinkings meant that the crisis was only temporary. The request for US oil tankers was effectively contingency planning if sinkings had not reduced.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The oil crisis for the RN was caused mainly by the sinking of tankers, which has a huge cumulative impact.

I provided numbers earlier that showed that the RN could avoid an oil crisis before the end of 1918 by reducing consumption, even if oil tanker sinkings continued at 3/month. The reduction in sinkings meant that the crisis was only temporary. The request for US oil tankers was effectively contingency planning if sinkings had not reduced.

How do you explain the British oil reserves going from 12 month to 4 month from Jan 16 to Mar 17 (15 months) - before the German USW took effect. That trend terminates the Entente war effort before 1918...
 

BooNZ

Banned
However we have a situation where once again the core argument goes that the Entente Blockade must be ineffective, that the Americans must cut off credit and that such a cut off must be decisive and that USW must go ahead...as the pressure on oil only even begins to look like it might be enough with both applied as either more British or more American tankers resolve the issue, further but the Allies both must not mechanise thereby making themselves more effective in battle but at the same time mechanise to create the pressure on oil stocks.

Wrong.

You ignored my last post. Between Jan-15 and Mar-17 (15 Months) the British Navy oil reserves went from over 12 month to less than 4 months. That was before the German USW took effect. At that rate the British reserves would have been fully spent before the end of 1917.

You also missed an early post where British trade experts were projecting a total shipping breakdown by June 1917 - again before the Germans commenced the USW.
 
The oil crisis for the RN was caused mainly by the sinking of tankers, which has a huge cumulative impact.

I provided numbers earlier that showed that the RN could avoid an oil crisis before the end of 1918 by reducing consumption, even if oil tanker sinkings continued at 3/month. The reduction in sinkings meant that the crisis was only temporary. The request for US oil tankers was effectively contingency planning if sinkings had not reduced.


The thing is the rest of paragraph quoted states:

In light of these figures and increases in available shipping, Tothill was informed the Cabinet would dispense with further oil returns 'unless the position again becomes acute'. The situation continued to improve and by the end of October oil stocks stood as 839,000 tons.

In other words the crisis passed even with USW and critically before US tankers became available in numbers, by September 1917 the British War Misison had engaged for just 19 voyages. It is also worth noting that the claim that the build days given were estimates is false, they are clearly stated in the text to refer to the 'ZO' that took an average of 314 days to build, and the 'AO' that averaged 411 days. This can be checked by looking at the bottom of page 154 and top of page 155 of The Royal Navy Fuel Supplies 1898-1939.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The funny thing is that if the proponents of Credit to Total Victory actually thought their argument stood up to the rebuttals which are myriad then they would have moved on already to look at other ways the Central Powers might have achieved various victory scenarios. We are stuck with some people trying to make an unworkable scenario work rather than looking for what does work.

In the first instance, I am not a proponent of a total CP victory.

Secondly, ignoring opposing arguments is not "rebuttal".
 

BooNZ

Banned
The thing is the rest of paragraph quoted states:

In light of these figures and increases in available shipping, Tothill was informed the Cabinet would dispense with further oil returns 'unless the position again becomes acute'. The situation continued to improve and by the end of October oil stocks stood as 839,000 tons.

In other words the crisis passed even with USW and critically before US tankers became available in numbers, by September 1917 the British War Misison had engaged for just 19 voyages. It is also worth noting that the claim that the build days given were estimates is false, they are clearly stated in the text to refer to the 'ZO' that took an average of 314 days to build, and the 'AO' that averaged 411 days. This can be checked by looking at the bottom of page 154 and top of page 155 of The Royal Navy Fuel Supplies 1898-1939.

Prima facie 19 tanker voyages would equate to over 180,000 tons. 839,000 tons, less 180,000 tons = 659,000 tons. The reserve was 747,000 tons in April 1917 so without the US tankers the crisis would not have passed.

Aber was citing estimates from another source - I cited the above numbers as averages - no foul
 
Prima facie 19 tanker voyages would equate to over 180,000 tons. 839,000 tons, less 180,000 tons = 659,000 tons. The reserve was 747,000 tons in April 1917 so without the US tankers the crisis would not have passed.

Aber was citing estimates from another source - I cited the above numbers as averages - no foul

Yet without USW and here is the pointed point, those 19 and more voyages get made anyway in the same time frame just by the six tankers that would not be sunk in May and June as before USW the annual sinkings of tankers were pitiful. If you read it as 19 tankers then fine but 19 voyages makes it very clear USW must apply.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Yet without USW and here is the pointed point, those 19 and more voyages get made anyway in the same time frame just by the six tankers that would not be sunk in May and June as before USW the annual sinkings of tankers were pitiful. If you read it as 19 tankers then fine but 19 voyages makes it very clear USW must apply.

Meanwhile, how do you avert the Nov-1916 projected breakdown of shipping before June 1917 - particularly with the additional resources being consumed by substitutes for tankers - scarce resources since the US is neutral.

Edit: Aside from the appearance of American tankers, what OTL enabled the British navy to turn the corner in respect of oil fuel was the use of ships with double bottoms. This did not commence until June 1917, but by the end of November 1917 had contributed approximately 243,519 tons. That option would not be available if the predicted shipping crisis arose as predicted - in the absence of US belligerence.
 
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Meanwhile, how do you avert the Nov-1916 projected breakdown of shipping before June 1917 - particularly with the additional resources being consumed by substitutes for tankers - scarce resources since the US is neutral.

Edit: Aside from the appearance of American tankers, what OTL enabled the British navy to turn the corner in respect of oil fuel was the use of ships with double bottoms. This did not commence until June 1917, but by the end of November 1917 had contributed approximately 243,519 tons. That option would not be available if the predicted shipping crisis arose as predicted - in the absence of US belligerence.


But without US belligerence you do not have the seizure of hulls under construction in the US

But let us assume the Germans have their best year ever of sinkings without USW let us say they bag 11 tankers at the rate of 1 a month till November equalling their total up until 1917 under a mix of cruiser and occasional bouts of USW prior to 1917...

We still find that in march 1 less ship is sunk meaning even if we assume break bulk rates of turn around (and the whole point of bulk transports like oil tankers is that they turn around faster) 1 extra voyage by end June and that assuming the ship would have been sunk empty on OTL...April there are 4 fewer ships sunk likely meaning at least 2 extra deliveries plus another 4 by end July, May: 3 less sinkings, so probably 1 or more extra deliveries and at least 3 extra on top by end August, June 2 less sinkings so possibly an extra delivery and certainly 2 more by end September and an additional 1 from the vessel not sunk IITL in March.

That is with a really harsh set of assumptions 14 of 19 deliveries get made but...did the US entry into the war actually ease the shipping burden?

Well perhaps a look at the War With Germany, A Statistical Summary might shed some light?

Well it turns out that a lot of American troops were carried in British transports which were also carrying cargo for said troops rather than for British use. So we have British ships carrying some 49% of the US troops and amounting to nearly 100,000 tons of deadweight shipping diverted to American needs....this without the impact on the neutral merchant fleets being now employed by the US rather than being available for British contracts...see map3 from the War With Germany

So we have the diversion of 150,000 deadweight tons from Scandinavia, 200,000 deadweight tons from the Far East and remember Japan is a British ally and a third of a million deadweight tons of Dutch shipping rendered unavailable for British contracts...the idea that American entry made everything easier is not quite as clear cut as some presume.

The suggestion can be made that in fact the use of double bottoms might have been even cheaper in both money and opportunity cost had the US not entered the war.
 

BooNZ

Banned
But without US belligerence you do not have the seizure of hulls under construction in the US

But let us assume the Germans have their best year ever of sinkings without USW let us say they bag 11 tankers at the rate of 1 a month till November equalling their total up until 1917 under a mix of cruiser and occasional bouts of USW prior to 1917...

We still find that in march 1 less ship is sunk meaning even if we assume break bulk rates of turn around (and the whole point of bulk transports like oil tankers is that they turn around faster) 1 extra voyage by end June and that assuming the ship would have been sunk empty on OTL...April there are 4 fewer ships sunk likely meaning at least 2 extra deliveries plus another 4 by end July, May: 3 less sinkings, so probably 1 or more extra deliveries and at least 3 extra on top by end August, June 2 less sinkings so possibly an extra delivery and certainly 2 more by end September and an additional 1 from the vessel not sunk IITL in March.

The Entente credit crisis is going to be far more effective at cutting off British war supplies from the US than the German Navy. Notwithstanding this, I cited a prediction from a British subject matter expert that Britain would be facing a crisis/ breakdown in total shipping by mid-1917 that was based on German activity in 1916. The Germans had very little to do with creating the British Navy oil fuel crisis - that was mostly mismanagement, solved ultimately by almost unlimited resources.

That is with a really harsh set of assumptions 14 of 19 deliveries get made but...did the US entry into the war actually ease the shipping burden?

Really? Do you not know the answer?
Well perhaps a look at the War With Germany, A Statistical Summary might shed some light?

...

Well it turns out that a lot of American troops were carried in British transports which were also carrying cargo for said troops rather than for British use. So we have British ships carrying some 49% of the US troops and amounting to nearly 100,000 tons of deadweight shipping diverted to American needs....this without the impact on the neutral merchant fleets being now employed by the US rather than being available for British contracts...see map3 from the War With Germany

Of the 2 million US troops, only 194,000 arrived in Europe in 1917. Diagram 14 provided with your reference illustrates that the number of US troops delivered to Europe in June, July, August 1917 was scarcely material. It was from May 1918 that the heavy lifting was done.

The start was made by chartering a few American merchant steamers and by the 1st of July there were in service seven troop ships and six cargo ships with a total deadweight capacity of 94,000 tons. ...from these small beginnings a great transport fleet which aggregated by the end of 1918 three and one-quarter million deadweight tons of shipping.

Based on your reference, a British contribution of 100,000 tons would represent less than 3% of the total shipping the US dedicated to the trans Atlantic transport fleet. The transport of troops is a niche role, that represents mere fraction of the tonnage to support a 'modern' army. The US shipped almost 7.5 million tons of cargo to support its troops in Europe alone.

Cargo Movement

The first shipment of cargo to support the forces abroad was made in June, 1917, and amounted to 16,000 tons. After the first two months the shipments grew rapidly and steadily until they were in excess of 800,000 tons in the last month of the war. These facts are shown in diagram 19.

The shipment of cargo differs from that of troops in that it was done almost entirely by American ships. Less than 5 per cent of the cargo carried was transported in allied bottoms. The great bulk of the cargo was carried in the cargo ships shown in diagram 15. Relatively small amounts were carried in the troop ships.


So we have the diversion of 150,000 deadweight tons from Scandinavia, 200,000 deadweight tons from the Far East and remember Japan is a British ally and a third of a million deadweight tons of Dutch shipping rendered unavailable for British contracts...the idea that American entry made everything easier is not quite as clear cut as some presume.

Actually it is - shipping costs money - the US paid those shipping costs to private owners.

The suggestion can be made that in fact the use of double bottoms might have been even cheaper in both money and opportunity cost had the US not entered the war.

Cheaper than nothing? - because that is essentially what Britain paid

Shipping rates would have certainly been cheaper because the Entente would have struggled to get half the OTL 1917-1918 US war supplies without the $4 billion line of credit given to Britain - that is not including the $27 billion spent by the US themselves on the war, which dwarfs the Anglo-French war budgets. Again, feel free to continue to ignore the facts...
 
War Expenditures

Great Britain $43.8 Billion, USA $36.8 billion, France $28.2 Billion, British Empire exclusive of Britain $5.8 Billion.

Expenditures for 1917/18 Britain $12.704 Billion, France $7.794 Billion, USA $13.791 Billion.

Expenditures for 1918/19 Britain $12.611 Billion, France 10.116 Billion, USA $18.351 Billion

Drawn from Nail Ferguson The Pity of War Table 41 for total military spending, Table 36 for fiscal year military spending.

Shipping Tonnages per Abraham Berglund The War and the World's Mercantile Marine...can be accessed free on Jstor, that is a direct link but joining is free for holding up to three texts at a time.
Figures in gross tons drawn from table 2
United Kingdom June 1914: 18,892,000
June 1919:16,345,000
British Empire June 1914: 1,632,000
June 1919: 1,863,000

US Sea Going Vessels June 1914: 2,027,000
June 1919: 9,773,000

You may note the losses to British shipping, the vast majority of which would not have occurred without unlimited submarine warfare.
 
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