Germany winning WW1 - best scenario for the 20th century?

Is Germany winning WW1 the most preferable outcome?

  • Yes. A German victory would have prevented the greatest horrors of the 20 century and saved millions

    Votes: 105 26.9%
  • No. A German victory would have made things as bad or worse than OTL

    Votes: 56 14.3%
  • Perhaps. Some things would have turned out better, some worse

    Votes: 245 62.7%

  • Total voters
    391

BooNZ

Banned
Well that is what you get for trusting a computer search, it seems the only people with the exact text are the National Archives at Kew who claim not to have digitised it.

However there are other sources who mention the Order in Council...lots of them here is just one, that it is a bit of a long winded and full on historical examination.

The interesting thing about the March 11, 1915 declaration is that although it describes a blockade its specific legal justification is in the concept of reprisal. However it was also recognised as stated above that British blockade practice conformed with earlier American usage and practice. Anyway worth recalling that you asked if the British declared a blockade and " Reprisals Order in Council 11th March 1915. Measures to prevent commodities of any kind reaching or leaving Germany" is that declaration.

Yes - suffice to say the British were not comfortable describing their actions as a blockade. It was simply a case the Germans could not prevent it and the US chose to ignore it, which is consistent with the US blockade of the CSA. However, ignoring the existing law or rights of neutrals only works if the neutrals are either complicit or lack the ability to effectively protest.
 
Yes - suffice to say the British were not comfortable describing their actions as a blockade. It was simply a case the Germans could not prevent it and the US chose to ignore it, which is consistent with the US blockade of the CSA. However, ignoring the existing law or rights of neutrals only works if the neutrals are either complicit or lack the ability to effectively protest.

Complicit would see to be the case then...

The Navicert System During the World War

Among other things but Annexe B (from page 37 in document) lists a sting of agreements between the British and various neutral agencies. In addition there are the contraband orders but it also seems it has a copy of the text of the 11th March 1915 Order in Council page 51 in document (59 in the pdf) interestingly as stated although the legal basis was reprisal it is worded according to the rules for a blockade....Note article III and article IV explicitly exempts vessels that sailed prior to 1st March 1915... and the fact that the rules are to be enforced by Prize Courts.

So either complicity with the world or perhaps just a recognition that the rules by which the British were operating were in line with recognised international practice.

One might be harsh and suggest the British were quite happy to call a blockade a blockade but the Germans by their actions had granted them an even stronger legal case by their actions thus enabling the whole matter to be justified as a state of reprisal.
 
Just reading this thread , seems a few posters are trying to twist a possible German win by stretching facts beyond breaking point. By B-L in 1917 Germany is doomed, its out of food, infrastructure to distribute is collapsing and its own social cohesion is breaking down. The stabbed in the back myth could not have taken hold if there was not a bit of truth mixed in.
Britain is not in the best place but just going on the defensive would solve a lot of the money issues. The blockade is not costing it all that much ( the grand fleet which is taking the money is not part of it , its job is to counter a HSF sortie ). There is still more money left than the CP has , the Ottomans are being clearly beaten , A-H is already incapable of offensive action without German support and confidence is there that its a matter of time.
Germany on the other hand knows its got one shot left , its not trying to win anymore, its trying to get a white peace in the west at best. France is in worst shape but its soldiers will still defend like cornered rats, its attacking that has issues. Mass production of tanks is happening which would help with that ( promise of reducing casualties and breaking the deadlock).
Looking at the 1918 German offensive , its hard to see how it would have got much further , it was outrunning its logistics and men/ammunition expenditure was crippling. The German home front still collapses at around the same time regardless of how much of France the army holds. All in all , history continues as OTL but with a weaker France and Britain , an even more isolationistic USA but Germany and the CP if anything in a worse state ( no Wilson to rein in France ).

If you want to get a German win then the POD has to be 1914 or 1915. 1916 is probably a white peace on all fronts but later its not possible.
 
Just reading this thread , seems a few posters are trying to twist a possible German win by stretching facts beyond breaking point. By B-L in 1917 Germany is doomed, its out of food, infrastructure to distribute is collapsing and its own social cohesion is breaking down. The stabbed in the back myth could not have taken hold if there was not a bit of truth mixed in.
Britain is not in the best place but just going on the defensive would solve a lot of the money issues. The blockade is not costing it all that much ( the grand fleet which is taking the money is not part of it , its job is to counter a HSF sortie ). There is still more money left than the CP has , the Ottomans are being clearly beaten , A-H is already incapable of offensive action without German support and confidence is there that its a matter of time.
Germany on the other hand knows its got one shot left , its not trying to win anymore, its trying to get a white peace in the west at best. France is in worst shape but its soldiers will still defend like cornered rats, its attacking that has issues. Mass production of tanks is happening which would help with that ( promise of reducing casualties and breaking the deadlock).
Looking at the 1918 German offensive , its hard to see how it would have got much further , it was outrunning its logistics and men/ammunition expenditure was crippling. The German home front still collapses at around the same time regardless of how much of France the army holds. All in all , history continues as OTL but with a weaker France and Britain , an even more isolationistic USA but Germany and the CP if anything in a worse state ( no Wilson to rein in France ).

If you want to get a German win then the POD has to be 1914 or 1915. 1916 is probably a white peace on all fronts but later its not possible.

Well, first, B-L was signed in March 1918, and nobody denies that that's way too late of a POD. Honestly, I don't think anyone really thinks a post-1916 one is particularly feasible, but anything that prevents American entry and the subsequent embargo of Germany significantly alleviates the supply issues you mention, as has already been mentioned more than once.
 
That WW1 took place is the greatest catastrophy of the 20th century, but is Germany losing WW1 the second?

Because if Germany wins WW1 then there:

Is most likely no Communism since the Germans will not tolerate the Bolsheviks since they will be perceived as a threat. This means that Communism doesnt spread around the globe. As a result around 100 million people are spared their slaughter by Communist dictatorships.

Is most likely no National Socialism. Hitler would not have gotten the shock of a German surrender so there would have been no motivation of going into politics and even if he had entered politics he would never have gotten to the top. This means there is no Holocaust and around 20 million people are spared their slaughter by the National Socialist dictatorship.

Is most likely no WW2. A German dominated Europe from 1918 onwards would have made another World War very unlikely. This means that there is no WW2 - or at worst a greatly reduced WW2- and around 50 million people are spared their violent deaths in the war.

So for the period 1918-1948 a German win in WW1 would have prevented the death of some 100 million people and prevented the destruction of countles cities, villages, houses, factories ect As a result the world - or at least Europe would be much wealthier and the world would most likely be more stable and more peacefull than today.

Thoughts?[/QUOTE
Germany would become a superpower and that may not sit well with the British and French which could mean another war. You could have the French or British version of Hitler. I don't see all of communists being stopped just going somewhere else. Valid points though
 
Just reading this thread , seems a few posters are trying to twist a possible German win by stretching facts beyond breaking point.

That seems very disingenuous to claim, considering several people from the pro-CP crowd have backed up their assertions with actual history books while most of the pro-Entente crowd have mostly been up to hyperbole, snark and endless rationalisations.

Britain is not in the best place but just going on the defensive would solve a lot of the money issues. The blockade is not costing it all that much ( the grand fleet which is taking the money is not part of it , its job is to counter a HSF sortie ). There is still more money left than the CP has , the Ottomans are being clearly beaten , A-H is already incapable of offensive action without German support and confidence is there that its a matter of time.
Germany on the other hand knows its got one shot left , its not trying to win anymore, its trying to get a white peace in the west at best. France is in worst shape but its soldiers will still defend like cornered rats, its attacking that has issues. Mass production of tanks is happening which would help with that ( promise of reducing casualties and breaking the deadlock).
Looking at the 1918 German offensive , its hard to see how it would have got much further , it was outrunning its logistics and men/ammunition expenditure was crippling. The German home front still collapses at around the same time regardless of how much of France the army holds. All in all , history continues as OTL but with a weaker France and Britain , an even more isolationistic USA but Germany and the CP if anything in a worse state ( no Wilson to rein in France ).

You`ve contradicted yourself here. If Britain goes on the defensive to solve their "money issues" then the French are doing the same, which means they are not attacking. I know you have already admitted to believing in the stab in the back myth, but real history actualy tells us that Germany agreed to the armistice when their armies could no longer fight in the field because they were beaten by the Entente in 1918. If the Entente are on the defensive, then they are obviously not attacking and not breaking through the Hindenburg line and not routing the German Army. And frankly, given what has been said about the importance of US materials for the Entente cause, I`m not seeing how they are replicating their OTL sucess with less firepower across the board and no morale boost from US entry.

If you want to get a German win then the POD has to be 1914 or 1915. 1916 is probably a white peace on all fronts but later its not possible.

Even if the Germans can`t score a total victory after 1916. is finished, I`d say that with no US entry and with Russia out neither can the Entente score a total victory anymore. So the most probable outcome is peace by mutual exhaustion. Whatever peace treaty is signed in 1917., 1918. or 1919., it is not going to look anything like Versailles.
 

BooNZ

Banned
I am in possession of a copy of Nial Ferguson's The Pity of War so would be interested as to which portions are relevant as I can then dig through specific tables and text to see what he is actually saying on the subject.

As to the Fed's statements one interpretation is that they were fulfilling their fiduciary duty to warn small investors of the risks. The big boys know the risks and the attitude of the era was that they were free to take them. Also note the timing, the March 8 statement comes at about the time the impact of the November statement would show up in the quarterly figures. Thus it is far more likely that the Fed were moving to avert unintended consequences on the US economy than simply perform the President's bidding, the latter being somewhat in conflict with the Federal Reserve's mandate.

As to Fed specifically mentioning the French bonds, well it was sufficiently understood by 1917 that if an authoritative institution mentioned a product that does tend to be taken as a signal to buy.

Say what? That's like saying the Surgeon General endorses smoking because of all those messages he puts on cigarette packets...

Now one of the points of actually digging up actual primary sources is that they are open the interpretation. However I would point out that most interpretations for one reason or another of the Fed statement point away from there being a financial crisis for the Entente.

OTL by 1917 the British were bankrolling the Entente war effort, but had run out of cash and collateral and therefore required unsecured credit to continue to purchase war supplies from North America. OTL 40% of the British war budget was spent on supplies from North America. The Nov-1916 statement from the Federal Reserve effectively destroyed British Credit in the US until the German USW and subsequent US entry into the war. OTL during 1917-1918 the British was able to borrow an additional $4 billion from the US, which it subsequently struggled to repay - despite winning the war and the US belated contribution to the war effort. The US spent $27 billion on the War, which prima facie would either not have gone towards the Entente war effort or would needed to have also been borrowed by the British.

Without the German USW decision, the British would have been wholly reliant on the US private finance sector to fund the purchase of its war supplies from the US. Private money does not judge, it balances risk and reward. The extent of the Entente financial crisis was not initially widely known, so initially private money would be available to cover the breach. However, the sheer scale of the Entente credit requirements mean the appetite of the private financial market for war debt would be sated relatively quickly and interest rates would need to rise to maintain demand. This only works if creditors are comfortable with the certainty of Entente victory, but there is on ongoing risk that news of a shipping crisis, manpower crisis, morale crisis and collapse of the Russian front trickle to the US money markets. If confidence is lost in an Entente victory, any further lines of credit in the US will be promptly cut.

Further though US loans were not the only source of Entente funds and thus the impact of the actual depth of any 'financial crisis' is worth looking at in light of that. The Fed statement I noted in post #221 of this thread gives indicators of the nature of the Entente's financial resources and yes more information is available in The Pity of War and other texts.

OTL Britain struggled to repay the $4 billion it borrowed - if the USA remains neutral, Britain has to borrow a lot more from private creditors - probably on worse terms - ultimately, with the benefit of hindsight, we know those additional creditors are not going to be repaid. To continue the Entente war effort, the British most continue to dupe additional private investors into believing they are going to be repaid. That process cannot continue indefinitely.

Further though has anyone actually read Chapter 6 of the Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies 1898-1939? Because it is rather important to note the context and nature of that 'crisis' . The Navy still had four months of fuel reserves (out of six) after some 32 months of war and some four months into the unlimited submarine warfare campaign which had reduced the number of available tankers and this also at a time when the Army was calling on more oil than usual to beat the Michael Offensives which notably they did.

Sorry, no I have not

Thus for this fuel oil criss to have the impact required it seems we need both American suppression of credit and USW. I think most participants acknowledge you can have one or the other but not both.

Apparently not

Walter Runciman, the president of the Board of Trade, issued a dire warning in early November [1916]. "My expert advisors believe I am far too sanguine in advising the War Committee that the complete breakdown in shipping will come in June 1917; they are convinced it will come much sooner than June". These estimates were based on the questionable assumption that Germany planned to continue with limited as opposed to all-out U-boat warfare. Trial by Friendship, Woodward

It should be noted that alternatives to US credit and supply rested with empire, requiring additional shipping which was, according to the above experts, close to breaking point prior to the German USW decision. On a brighter note, I guess with no credit the Entente would need less shipping...

Finally though if we are going to use The Pity of War as a resource it might be worth pointing that Ferguson is among the scholars that notes the relative death tolls between the British and the Germans had shrunk to 0.7 to 1 in favour of the British by 1918. Now there are at least three explanations for this

1: the British had gotten better
2: the Germans had gotten worse
3: the Germans were engaged in more offensive operations in 1918 pushing up their losses

The trend sounds reasonable. I would add with the entry of the USA the Entente had an abundance of everything, while by 1918 the US embargo would be impacting heavily on every aspect of German life. If the US was neutral and the Entente did not have access to generous credit, that trend would be reversing...

I think by 1918 technology and doctrines had eroded the advantage of the defensive.

Any and all of which could apply but this does call into question somewhat the idea that a victorious Kaiserreich offensive was about to grind the western Entente into the dust.

The Entente manpower crisis was not confined to the French. The British Army Council warned the British faced a crisis in 1917. Unless extraordinary measures were taken to bring in more men, it would be impossible after April to keep the armies up to strength - one of those extraordinary measures being advocated was drafting men up to 55 years of age. So, "who do you think you are kidding Mr....". Oops, wrong war.
 
Sorry, no I have not

It is online at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/2932258/408161.pdf

BTW, in addition to Ch 6, it is worth noting the statement on page 7 that "Why Britain was nearly brought to its knees in 1917 by a shortage of one type of fuel when it had massive reserves of what had been only a few years before the world's best maritime fuel is an important question." and on p156 that without American oil the situation would have been "catastrophic".


The trend sounds reasonable. I would add with the entry of the USA the Entente had an abundance of everything, while by 1918 the US embargo would be impacting heavily on every aspect of German life. If the US was neutral and the Entente did not have access to generous credit, that trend would be reversing...

The First Liberty Loan by itself was about equal to all the previous loans since 1914. We are talking about financial support orders of magnitude greater than could have been looked for had the US remained neutral.


I think by 1918 technology and doctrines had eroded the advantage of the defensive.

And it may be academic anyway. Without the looming prospect of massive American manpower reinforcing its enemies, Germany has no particular need to launch the huge offensives whose failure OTL broke the morale of its army. The Germans can perfectly well remain on the defensive themselves [1], as they are standing on enemy soil almost everywhere, so that for them a stalemate implies a win.



[1] Though they could still launch smaller attacks similar to those which Petain was doing to revive French morale - perhaps one toward Belfort to evict the French from the strip of Upper Alsace which they held - not strategically important, but with a symbolic significance as the only part of Germany in enemy hands.

I understand that General Wetzel advocated small attacks of this kind even OTL.
 
I think that in 1917 the German Empire had chance to win the Great War
But with allot of PODs in Russia, Irland, Britain, USA and France, what german force could have use to brake true frontline a move toward Paris.
this would be a Pyrrhic victory for one, in German Empire face a Political uprise of Socialist and Communist
Second reason, another big war with France or USSR (or them together) against German Empire in 1940s
after the German treaty who is degradation for France and USSR
so analog to the Treaty of Versailles what drive Germany 21 years later to Invade France, so in 1940s the German Empire could be at war
This war could let to another in 1960s or to Cold war with other nation.
like WW1 outcome let to WW2 and this to cold War until 1991
 
Without the looming prospect of massive American manpower reinforcing its enemies, Germany has no particular need to launch the huge offensives whose failure OTL broke the morale of its army. The Germans can perfectly well remain on the defensive themselves [1], as they are standing on enemy soil almost everywhere, so that for them a stalemate implies a win.

Eeeh. No "particular", need, sure, but there's still the general need to exit the war and, if the Entente isn't willing to negotiate, then it must be forced to the table.

Now that doesn't necessarily require a land offensive - there's still those naval types yelling about how submarines can win the war at minimal cost in months. But this needs to be avoided in a US-stays-out situation. TBH, if the Entente is suffering a financial and industrial crisis and yet refuses to negotiate, then Germany must attack.
 
Eeeh. No "particular", need, sure, but there's still the general need to exit the war and, if the Entente isn't willing to negotiate, then it must be forced to the table.

Now that doesn't necessarily require a land offensive - there's still those naval types yelling about how submarines can win the war at minimal cost in months. But this needs to be avoided in a US-stays-out situation. TBH, if the Entente is suffering a financial and industrial crisis and yet refuses to negotiate, then Germany must attack.

Not necessarily. Germany was in possession of huge chunks of conquered territory, while the Entente had next to nothing except some largely worthless bits of Africa. So Germany effectively wins if the Entente is unable to dislodge her from her conquests.

In the end its all about morale. The war will go on until one side or the other loses hope - either Germany despairs of holding her conquests, or the Entente despairs of ever breaking the stalemate and expelling her from them. So it is the Entente, not Germany , which needs a battlefield victory. All Germany has to do is fight her enemies to a a standstill, which would have been feasible but for the anticipated arrival of American manpower. It was that more than anything that compelled Ludendorff to launch the offensives - he had to win before the Americans made it impossible. Without that, he could have just let the Entente bash its head against his lines until their troops got fed up with it.
 
Not necessarily. Germany was in possession of huge chunks of conquered territory, while the Entente had next to nothing except some largely worthless bits of Africa. So Germany effectively wins if the Entente is unable to dislodge her from her conquests.

In the end its all about morale. The war will go on until one side or the other loses hope - either Germany despairs of holding her conquests, or the Entente despairs of ever breaking the stalemate and expelling her from them. So it is the Entente, not Germany , which needs a battlefield victory. All Germany has to do is fight her enemies to a a standstill, which would have been feasible but for the anticipated arrival of American manpower. It was that more than anything that compelled Ludendorff to launch the offensives - he had to win before the Americans made it impossible. Without that, he could have just let the Entente bash its head against his lines until their troops got fed up with it.

It's about actually exiting the war. Until that happens, the blockade still stands. Even if it is less than watertight, it is still making life quite unpleasant for Germany. If the Entente is suffering financial problems, then it'll be quite happy to sit there for a bit while trying to recover and reorganise, thinking that the blockade will be doing its job. If neither side is attacking, there's no particular pressure on the Entente to come to the table. Germany would be foolish not to attack while having such advantages of industry and manpower.
 
It's about actually exiting the war. Until that happens, the blockade still stands. Even if it is less than watertight, it is still making life quite unpleasant for Germany. If the Entente is suffering financial problems, then it'll be quite happy to sit there for a bit while trying to recover and reorganise, thinking that the blockade will be doing its job. If neither side is attacking, there's no particular pressure on the Entente to come to the table. Germany would be foolish not to attack while having such advantages of industry and manpower.

That assumes that the Germans would suffer more than the Entente from continued stalemate. That's a very complicated question to answer in terms of the reality of the situation, but perception matters more, and nobody ever believes that time is on their side in a war. Besides, the Entente was pretty much committed to constantly attacking Germany, lest they use their central position to defeat the alliance in detail. Not attacking is abandoning Russia, and all that.
 
The discussion over whether the CP could have won WW1 with no intervention by the US is very fascinating but a bit off topic given the OP and poll.

To try to return to that, my vote was that the 20th century would be better in some ways, worse in others. The detail depends on when the CP victory occurs, an early one with little blood loss would be the best outcome. A "white peace" that asserts German dominance without creating the same kind of bitterness that Versailles did would be possible. The Niall Ferguson view that Germany would then use its powers to create an early and less democratic version of the EU would be a good outcome but I fear not the base case. The Septemeber War Aims Programne suggests Germany could equally easily seek large territorial gains in Europe and elsewhere. Could Germany continue to prevent any coalition challenging it later? I doubt that as the UK and France, probably Russia too, would seek to show how German power threatened the US and play up any confrontatations over commercial rights. China maybe as a 1930s flashpoint?

A late CP victory would probably lead to a Versailles in reverse. The way this might be temporarily better is that it's unlikely any of Britain, France or Russia could recover sufficiently to challenge Germany economically or militarily. But Europe could be a very sullen and unfriendly place. And would Germany be content with this dominance or seek to challenge the US?

OK, who thinks this analysis is completely wrong, which it could well be!
 
It's about actually exiting the war. Until that happens, the blockade still stands. Even if it is less than watertight, it is still making life quite unpleasant for Germany. If the Entente is suffering financial problems, then it'll be quite happy to sit there for a bit while trying to recover and reorganise, thinking that the blockade will be doing its job. If neither side is attacking, there's no particular pressure on the Entente to come to the table. Germany would be foolish not to attack while having such advantages of industry and manpower.


OTOH if the front is quiescent, that makes the blockade quite a bit less serious.

A lot of Germany's problems stemmed less from the absolute amount of food than from the difficulty of transporting it. With locomotives and rolling stock tied up serving the front, and huge numbers of horses requisitioned by the army, getting food from the farms to the cities was a nontrivial problem. Of course, the German authorities always played this down, preferring to attribute every shortage to the wicked British and that evil blockade.

In fact quite a few Germans might still have been going hungry even had there been no blockade at all. But if the front is quiet, trains and horses can be released to transport food. They'd still be on far shorter rations than the Entente, but most of them knew nothing about conditions in Entente countries, so weren't making that comparison.

Yes, the blockade made life miserable for many German civilians, but it wasn't an immediate threat to Germany in the way that the AEF was.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Further though has anyone actually read Chapter 6 of the Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies 1898-1939? Because it is rather important to note the context and nature of that 'crisis' . The Navy still had four months of fuel reserves (out of six) after some 32 months of war and some four months into the unlimited submarine warfare campaign which had reduced the number of available tankers and this also at a time when the Army was calling on more oil than usual to beat the Michael Offensives which notably they did.

Far Canal! Have you?

To provide some actual context, I have included some extracts from Chapter 6...

"The reserves only fell below the six-month mark in the final quarter of 1916; alarms bells should have sounded though when deliveries consistently failed to match consumption - from the first quarter of 1916"

"Nevertheless, even if the U-boats had stayed at home the Navy's consumption was running ahead of delivery, and by the spring of 1917 had been doing so for a year. The U-boat campaign turned what was already destined to be a crisis into a panic."

"The Admiralty first requested American help on 13th April 1917, in the shape of eight tankers. On 5th May, this was increased to twelve tankers, totalling about 118,000 tons, and again three days later to 178,000 tons - more than was lost in 1917"

"The Army was fairing even worse, and in June 1917 was reduced to only four weeks reserve of petrol"

1. The British fuel crisis was a product of British bugling during a period 1914-1916 when they had ample time and resources to correct the problem - essentially a lack of tanker capacity.
2. The German USW essaibated the tonnage crisis in the immediate term, but in the short term additional US tanker tonnage from the US entry into the war far exceeded total tanker tonnage sunk - so the USW ultimately mitigated the underlying fuel crisis.
3. By the time the extent of the crisis was identified, it was probably too late to build new tanker capacity (i.e. if the tankers were not already being built before 1917, it was already too late). The majority of additional tonnage commissioned after the US entry did not appear until after the war's end - accordingly, the use of US controlled tankers was the vital ingredient to resolving the crisis.
4. The British Army was facing a fuel crisis in June 1917 even after the US entry to the war - the Michael offensives started in March 1918, so were unlikely to have been a contributing factor...


Thank you for the prod
 

Perkeo

Banned
A German victory in WWI is probably better not because of who wins, but due to how the war is won. If the war is fought to the last man standing, that man will never ever be a German. I don't think the Schlieffen Plan was ever close to success, neither was USW or any other German strategies.

But why should the Entente fight on if Germany offers reasonable terms before the collapse? A German victory has to be a negotiated one, based on the understanding that fighting to the last man for reasons that no one really remembers after the war is wrong.

Unfortunately, the Germans didn't understand that the only winning move is not to play - before during and after WWI.
 
Far Canal! Have you?

To provide some actual context, I have included some extracts from Chapter 6...

"The Admiralty first requested American help on 13th April 1917, in the shape of eight tankers. On 5th May, this was increased to twelve tankers, totalling about 118,000 tons, and again three days later to 178,000 tons - more than was lost in 1917"

Scenarios presented to Cabinet 30 June 1917:

Forecast and actual month end naval oil reserves, tons.

Month Statement A
Jun-17 593,000
Jul-17 472,000
Aug-17 358,000
Sep-17 275,000
Oct-17 189,000
Nov-17 104,000
Dec-17 33,000
Jan-18 0
Feb-18 0
Mar-18 0
Apr-18 0
May-18 0
Jun-18 0

Month Statement B
Jun-17 593,000
Jul-17 502,000
Aug-17 418,000
Sep-17 365,000
Oct-17 309,000
Nov-17 254,000
Dec-17 213,000
Jan-18 175,000
Feb-18 145,000
Mar-18 110,000
Apr-18 102,000
May-18 92,000
Jun-18 78,000

Month Statement C
Jun-17 593,000
Jul-17 512,000
Aug-17 528,000
Sep-17 665,000
Oct-17 889,000
Nov-17 1,204,000
Dec-17 1,605,000
Jan-18 2,081,000
Feb-18 2,631,000
Mar-18 3,242,000
Apr-18 3,946,000
May-18 4,714,000
Jun-18 5,544,000

Month Actual
Jun-17 593,000
Jul-17 614,000
Aug-17 655,000
Sep-17 700,000
Oct-17 839,000

Sources: CAB 24/18 G.T. 1233 'Oil Fuel Situation', Fourth Sea Lord, 30/6/1917,
CAB 24/28 G.T. 2246, 'Naval Oil Fuel Situation', M. P. A. Hankey, 10/10/1917,

Basis of forecasts
Statement A = current rate of use and tanker loss rate
Statement B = 30,000 tons/month reduction in use and current tanker loss rate
Statement C = 30,000 tons/month reduction in use and reduced tanker loss rate due to convoying tankers

There were 20 tankers under construction in British yards to be available by the end of 1917, and a further 18 cargo ships converted into tankers by November 2017. Projected build time for heavy oil tankers was 8 months.

The situation was not as bad as it appeared and the British were already taking action, with the crisis resolved by the autumn.
 
.
But why should the Entente fight on if Germany offers reasonable terms before the collapse? A German victory has to be a negotiated one, based on the understanding that fighting to the last man for reasons that no one really remembers after the war is wrong.

Good luck in trying to find terms that both sides find reasonable eg what should Germany offer Belgium?
 
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