Germany winning WW1 - best scenario for the 20th century?

Is Germany winning WW1 the most preferable outcome?

  • Yes. A German victory would have prevented the greatest horrors of the 20 century and saved millions

    Votes: 105 26.9%
  • No. A German victory would have made things as bad or worse than OTL

    Votes: 56 14.3%
  • Perhaps. Some things would have turned out better, some worse

    Votes: 245 62.7%

  • Total voters
    391
Because imperfect information sometimes results in imperfect decisions being made. In 1916/1917 CP powers were not fully aware of the imminent financial crisis facing the Entente, the CP powers were not fully aware of the crisis of manpower and morale facing the French army, or the imminent collapse of Imperial Russia.



If the US remains neutral (i.e. does not bankroll the Entente war effort), any one of the above matters could become critical/fatal to the Entente cause. Without the US, following the collapse of Imperial Russia, the CP powers would gradually recover while the Entente would gradually grow weaker.

Further, if the Entente can no longer afford to buy war material from the US, the 'pro-Entente' faction within the US may fade - others in the US will be demanding open trade with the CP powers...

So we are back to there needing to be a financial crisis for the Entente. Some sources with the relevant numbers would be good. Because one of the frustrating things about investigating this financial crisis of 1917 is outside some pop history speculation I am not finding much evidence for one.

I mean take the Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1 1917

On March 8 the Federal Reserve issues statement noting that it does not in fact intend for banks to not take any foreign securities but "American funds may, with advantage to the country's foreign trade and the domestic economic situation, be employed in the purchase of such securities."

It also notes later that "The past month has seen a resumption of offerings of foreign securities in the United States, some protected by collateral, others not."

Among these in particular it makes mention of $100,000,000 of French 5.5% notes.

Hardly a cry of don't buy.

It might be worth noting that bulletin was prepared before Wilson had gone to Congress to ask for a declaration of war, let alone Congress making up its mind on the matter.
 
I'd have thought nine months quite a long time, in a war that probably had less than two years to run.

Maybe, but the oil reserves for the Royal Navy (after taking some measures to economise) were forecast to last for more than 18 months; if the situation got worse due to losing more tankers to Uboats, or restricted supplies from the New World, then building more tankers to import from the Near East was a practical solution.
 

BooNZ

Banned
So we are back to there needing to be a financial crisis for the Entente. Some sources with the relevant numbers would be good. Because one of the frustrating things about investigating this financial crisis of 1917 is outside some pop history speculation I am not finding much evidence for one.

I recall Niall Ferguson dealt with the subject in some depth, but regretfully I do not have a physical copy of his book at hand.

I mean take the Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1 1917

On March 8 the Federal Reserve issues statement noting that it does not in fact intend for banks to not take any foreign securities but "American funds may, with advantage to the country's foreign trade and the domestic economic situation, be employed in the purchase of such securities."

Thanks for the reference - I think it is fair to say the statements made by the Federal Reserve in November 1916 were fueled in part by Wilson's frustration with Lloyd George and the British ignoring his attempts at peace making. That said, the April 1917 FR Bulletin does not endorse the investments in foreign loans, but suggested they should be treated as business decisions that required a significant amount of caution.

With the benefit of hindsight, we know OTL unsecured investments in war loans from 1917 onward were not easily repaid, so would have been questionable investments. Early in 1917 there may have been confidence the Entente would prevail and the extent of the Entente financial difficulties were not widely known. With the collapse of Imperial Russia, independent commercial interests would need to re-evaluate those assumptions - unsecured credit would become exceedingly difficult. OTL 40% of British war expenditure was being spent on supplies from North America, which will need to be funded on an ongoing basis to maintain the war effort.

It also notes later that "The past month has seen a resumption of offerings of foreign securities in the United States, some protected by collateral, others not."

Among these in particular it makes mention of $100,000,000 of French 5.5% notes.

Hardly a cry of don't buy.

It might be worth noting that bulletin was prepared before Wilson had gone to Congress to ask for a declaration of war, let alone Congress making up its mind on the matter.

In all likelihood the German resumption of USW created a climate where Entente Securities were more palatable - i.e. the Germans had put themselves squarely on Wilson's shit list.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
With the collapse of Imperial Russia, independent commercial interests would need to re-evaluate those assumptions - unsecured credit would become exceedingly difficult. OTL 40% of British war expenditure was being spent on supplies from North America, which will need to be funded on an ongoing basis to maintain the war effort.
But it should be noted that a lot of what the British were spending money on was:

1) Things that would be sent on to Russia - the collapse of Russia's war effort means that goes away.
2) Things the US has no other viable buyer for.
(Consider what happens if the arms industry which the British have been buying so much from for the past three years suddenly has no buyer at all - the result is quite painful)

What this means is that a cessation of loans would result in the British not sending so much (or anything) to Menshevik Russia - thus being a clear cause of the Russian war effort falling apart and looking like the cause of the rise of the Bolsheviks - and also result in $75 million per week not being spent on US goods, with basically the entire arms industry (and much else) abruptly out of work unless the US government buys their goods instead... at close to the same price, at least in the short term.

Further, if the Entente can no longer afford to buy war material from the US, the 'pro-Entente' faction within the US may fade - others in the US will be demanding open trade with the CP powers...

The US cannot trade with the Central Powers without breaking the blockade. The US cannot break the blockade without declaring war.
 
I am in possession of a copy of Nial Ferguson's The Pity of War so would be interested as to which portions are relevant as I can then dig through specific tables and text to see what he is actually saying on the subject.

As to the Fed's statements one interpretation is that they were fulfilling their fiduciary duty to warn small investors of the risks. The big boys know the risks and the attitude of the era was that they were free to take them. Also note the timing, the March 8 statement comes at about the time the impact of the November statement would show up in the quarterly figures. Thus it is far more likely that the Fed were moving to avert unintended consequences on the US economy than simply perform the President's bidding, the latter being somewhat in conflict with the Federal Reserve's mandate.

As to Fed specifically mentioning the French bonds, well it was sufficiently understood by 1917 that if an authoritative institution mentioned a product that does tend to be taken as a signal to buy.

Now one of the points of actually digging up actual primary sources is that they are open the interpretation. However I would point out that most interpretations for one reason or another of the Fed statement point away from there being a financial crisis for the Entente.

Further though US loans were not the only source of Entente funds and thus the impact of the actual depth of any 'financial crisis' is worth looking at in light of that. The Fed statement I noted in post #221 of this thread gives indicators of the nature of the Entente's financial resources and yes more information is available in The Pity of War and other texts.

Further though has anyone actually read Chapter 6 of the Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies 1898-1939? Because it is rather important to note the context and nature of that 'crisis' . The Navy still had four months of fuel reserves (out of six) after some 32 months of war and some four months into the unlimited submarine warfare campaign which had reduced the number of available tankers and this also at a time when the Army was calling on more oil than usual to beat the Michael Offensives which notably they did.

Thus for this fuel oil criss to have the impact required it seems we need both American suppression of credit and USW. I think most participants acknowledge you can have one or the other but not both.

Finally though if we are going to use The Pity of War as a resource it might be worth pointing that Ferguson is among the scholars that notes the relative death tolls between the British and the Germans had shrunk to 0.7 to 1 in favour of the British by 1918. Now there are at least three explanations for this

1: the British had gotten better
2: the Germans had gotten worse
3: the Germans were engaged in more offensive operations in 1918 pushing up their losses

Any and all of which could apply but this does call into question somewhat the idea that a victorious Kaiserreich offensive was about to grind the western Entente into the dust.
 

BooNZ

Banned
But it should be noted that a lot of what the British were spending money on was:

1) Things that would be sent on to Russia - the collapse of Russia's war effort means that goes away.
2) Things the US has no other viable buyer for.
(Consider what happens if the arms industry which the British have been buying so much from for the past three years suddenly has no buyer at all - the result is quite painful)

In the first instance, by 1917 the British were not spending money, but seeking credit that we know would not be repaid. Secondly, port access and rail infrastructure mean that only a small portion of the US supplies acquired by Britain would find the way to Russia. Thirdly, what duty of care does a neutral US owe to an unknown socialist Russian leadership? Fourthly, OTL in 1918 the US had to rely on French industry to ensure its armies were competently equipped - so the US arms industry was scarcely material and would have been on notice from November 1916.

What this means is that a cessation of loans would result in the British not sending so much (or anything) to Menshevik Russia - thus being a clear cause of the Russian war effort falling apart and looking like the cause of the rise of the Bolsheviks - and also result in $75 million per week not being spent on US goods, with basically the entire arms industry (and much else) abruptly out of work unless the US government buys their goods instead... at close to the same price, at least in the short term.

With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Britain OTL was unable to repay loans from 1917 onward, even after winning the war and after active US participation. If the US remains neutral, any unsecured loans advanced to Britain will certainly not be repaid. 1916 is not 2006 and the Arms and Finance sectors did not have the same level of control/influence over the US administration to secure such onerous corporate welfare...

The US cannot trade with the Central Powers without breaking the blockade. The US cannot break the blockade without declaring war.

The British blockade featured multiple breaches of the London Declaration 1909, which the British had described as the best representation of contemporary naval law of the day. OTL the US demanded that participants of the war abided by the Declaration (i.e. respect the rights of neutrals). Germany initially agreed, but Britain was silent. The Declaration was not ratified by the signatories, so not technically enforceable by law, but the USA could have used its economic leverage to enforce respect of neutral shipping - effectively killing the blockade.

OTL Wilson viewed British navalism no differently from German militarism - Wilson also resented Lloyd George (PM) for not supporting his earlier peace initiatives. On 15 November 1916 Wilson stated "if the Allies wanted war, we would not shrink from it...".
 

Saphroneth

Banned
unknown socialist Russian leadership?
Okay, I kept saying Menshevik and apparently you're not paying attention.

The British blockade featured multiple breaches of the London Declaration 1909, which the British had described as the best representation of contemporary naval law of the day.
Want to name them?
OTL the US demanded that participants of the war abided by the Declaration (i.e. respect the rights of neutrals).
Respecting the rights of individuals does not mean letting them through the blockade. A blockade gives you the legal right to stop neutral shipping.
You don't seem to be understanding this.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Okay, I kept saying Menshevik and apparently you're not paying attention.

Mensheviks were a leading part of the socialist movement in Imperial Russia - hence Menchevik = "socialist leadership". Socialist is not actually much of an insult outside the US.

Want to name them?

A few from memory. Treating raw materials and food stuffs as contraband unless it can be demonstrated they were destined for the military or proven representatives thereof. Detaining any vessel headed to a neutral port, unless it can be proven the ultimate destination of that vessel was destined for a belligerent power and that vessel conveyed contraband goods. A distant blockade (i.e. beyond close proximity to ports) is also a breach. An effective blockade is more-or-less impossible under the Declaration of London

Respecting the rights of individuals does not mean letting them through the blockade. A blockade gives you the legal right to stop neutral shipping.
You don't seem to be understanding this.

Can you reference this "legal right" to blockade for us all?
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Treating raw materials and food stuffs as contraband unless it can be demonstrated they were destined for the military or proven representatives thereof.
Incorrect statement of the declaration.
The British had evidence that all food was being taken by the government for redistribution, thus meaning it can be siezed:

Art. 33. Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress. This latter exception does not apply to a consignment coming under Article 24 (4).

Incidentally the British had access to pre-war shipping patterns; they could detect breaches of the rules regarding how much raw material neutrals imported.

Detaining any vessel headed to a neutral port, unless it can be proven the ultimate destination of that vessel was destined for a belligerent power and that vessel conveyed contraband goods.
Incorrect statement of the declaration - it's the goods not the vessel which must be ultimately destined for the enemy.

Art. 30. Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails transhipment or a subsequent transport by land.

A distant blockade (i.e. beyond close proximity to ports) is also a breach.
Not the case. A blockade must be effective; it does not have to be close.
Art. 2. In accordance with the Declaration of Paris of 1856, a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective -- that is to say, it must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coastline.

Art. 3. The question whether a blockade is effective is a question of fact.

Art. 4. A blockade is not regarded as raised if the blockading force is temporarily withdrawn on account of stress of weather.

Can you reference this "legal right" to blockade for us all?
Art. 5. A blockade must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations.

Art. 8. A blockade, in order to be binding, must be declared in accordance with Article 9, and notified in accordance with Articles 11 and 16.

Art. 9. A declaration of blockade is made either by the blockading Power or by the naval authorities acting in its name.

It specifies --

(1) The date when the blockade begins;

(2) the geographical limits of the coastline under blockade;

(3) the period within which neutral vessels may come out.

Art 10. If the operations of the blockading Power, or of the naval authorities acting in its name, do not tally with the particulars, which, in accordance with Article 9(1) and (2), must be inserted in the declaration of blockade, the declaration is void, and a new declaration is necessary in order to make the blockade operative.

Art. 11. A declaration of blockade is notified (1) To neutral Powers, by the blockading Power, by means of a communication addressed to the Governments direct, or to their representatives accredited to it;

Art. 16. If a vessel approaching a blockaded port has no knowledge, actual or presumptive, of the blockade, the notification must be made to the vessel itself by an officer of one of the ships of the blockading force. This notification should be entered in the vessel's logbook, and must state the day and hour, and the geographical position of the vessel at the time.

If through the negligence of the officer commanding the blockading force no declaration of blockade has been notified to the local authorities, or, if in the declaration, as notified, no period has been mentioned within which neutral vessels may come out, a neutral vessel coming out of the blockaded port must be allowed to pass free.

An effective blockade is more-or-less impossible under the Declaration of London

It would take an extraordinary reading of the text to conclude from this that blockades were supposed to be impossible.
Further, the US government (in the person of the Secretary of State) concluded that the British were doing little the Union hadn't done in the Civil War.

The United States has made earnest representations to Great Britain in regard to the seizure and detention by the British authorities of all American ships or cargoes bona fide destined to neutral ports, on the ground that such seizures and detentions were contrary to the existing rules of international law. It will be recalled, however, that American courts have established various rules bearing on these matters. The rule of "continuous voyage" has been not only asserted by American tribunals but extended by them. They have exercised the right to determine from the circumstances whether the ostensible was the real destination. They have held that the shipment of articles of contraband to a neutral port "to order," from which, as a matter of fact, cargoes had been transshipped to the enemy, is corroborative evidence that the cargo is really destined to the enemy instead of to the neutral port of delivery. It is thus seen that some of the doctrines which appear to bear harshly upon neutrals at the present time are analogous to or outgrowths from policies adopted by the United States when it was a belligerent.


Mensheviks were a leading part of the socialist movement in Imperial Russia - hence Menchevik = "socialist leadership". Socialist is not actually much of an insult outside the US.
But you used "socialist" as an explanation to why the US would owe nothing to the Russians. Surely you realize that a democratically elected parliament is preferable (for the US) to either Tsardom or one party dictatorship?
 
But you used "socialist" as an explanation to why the US would owe nothing to the Russians. Surely you realize that a democratically elected parliament is preferable (for the US) to either Tsardom or one party dictatorship?

On the contrary, history suggests that Americans almost always prefer dictatorship to any democracy that even approaches being left-wing. World War Two was a rare exception because the leftists were relatively passive compared to Fascism.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Of course, something else it's worth noting is that the rules of blockade required the blockader to either take the ship in to a port to be handled by a prize court, or in the event this was not possible then compensation was mandatory unless the papers of the ship showed that it would be considered contraband.
And, given the note on effectiveness of blockade (and that the German one was not, as proven by the way most British cargo runs reached their destinations) then if the US requires everyone to stand by the rules of blockade as stated:

1) The British need to pay compensation for a few more improperly seized ships.
2) The Germans need to pay for every ship they've sunk (5,000 ships totalling 13 million GRT, plus 15,000 sailors killed), as they did not establish an effective blockade in the first place and their sinking policy was ridiculously bloody by the standards of the laws of the sea. (Correct behaviour is to surface, stop the ship, inspect papers and search the vessel. If this sounds like it would result in lots of attempted stops being interrupted, it should - blockade is intentionally made to be hard, because of the scope of the legal powers granted to a blockader. It's the sheer might of the RN which lets it actually enforce this.)

The purpose of the British blockade was not to starve Germany so much as to give them a choice - either divert resources from the front line (as Britain was with her navy), or negotiate, or suffer consequences as a result. Relatively little German food was imported - it's just that, well, a lot of the men were off fighting a war, and the Germans could have demobbed men to work in the fields instead. (This would reduce their war effectiveness - that's what makes it a war fighting tactic.)


Compare with the Union blockade of the Confederacy. Under the rules of blockade some people give for the WW1 era, ships with cotton, food or clothing in them would have to be let through by the Union blockaders, and I think we can all agree that if that was the case the Confederacy would have been in a much better position than OTL! (Well fed, well clothed and well rich, for starters.)


On the contrary, history suggests that Americans almost always prefer dictatorship to any democracy that even approaches being left-wing.
I suppose that is sadly the case in reality; the fact that the US spent the 19th century with their closest allies being either Napoleon Bonaparte or the Autocrat of All the Russias does rather indicate it's not even a recent phenomenon.




ED: (via RobCraufurd)

The first sinking of a British merchant vessel by a U-Boat was the SS Glitra on 20 October 1914, carrying coal, iron plate, and oil to neutral Norway.
None of its goods were absolute contraband per the Declaration of London, none were for the use of enemy civilians (let alone the military) and yet the ship was sunk.
The German government later turned down a claim by the neutral owners of those goods for compensation.


This is... not good by any means. Norway was not blockaded; the ship carried no absolute contraband; none of the goods were for the use of the enemy; compensation was not paid. This pretty much contravenes every aspect of how blockade is supposed to work.
For the record, the U-boat commander responsible was promonted six months later.
 
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BooNZ

Banned
Incorrect statement of the declaration.
The British had evidence that all food was being taken by the government for redistribution, thus meaning it can be siezed:

No.

You appear to be referring to Article 30, which states Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails transhipment or a subsequent transport by land. Absolute contraband is listed under Article 22 and does not include foodstuffs, so Article 30 has no applications in the circumstances you describe.

Further, in case of 'absolute contraband' (eg guns and ammunition) Article 31 places the onus of proof (i.e. evidence) on the blockading party that the Absolute contraband is to be delivered to an enemy port or armed forces. If the paperwork says the ultimate destination is a neutral party, then the shipment must be let through.

Incidentally the British had access to pre-war shipping patterns; they could detect breaches of the rules regarding how much raw material neutrals imported.

It is doubtful the British could collate useful information without complicity of neutral powers and even then the British had no power under the Declaration to detain anything destined for a neutral port unless the cargo was absolute contraband - and in those instances the British would require more than shipping patterns as evidence.

Incorrect statement of the declaration - it's the goods not the vessel which must be ultimately destined for the enemy.

No.

Article 19 states Whatever may be the ulterior destination of a vessel or of her cargo, she cannot be captured for breach of blockade, if, at the moment, she is on her way to a non-blockaded port.

Therefore any vessels destined for a neutral port cannot be held to be in breach of the blockade.

Not the case. A blockade must be effective; it does not have to be close.

No.

You omitted Article 1 that states the blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy.

Also Article 9(2) requires the blockading party to specify the geographical limits of the coastline under blockade - not ocean.

Also Article 18 states the blockading force may not block access to neutral ports or coasts.

The OTL distant blockade of access points to the North Sea effectively blockaded neutral Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Dutch ports, which would have been illegal under multiple articles of the Declaration.

It would take an extraordinary reading of the text to conclude from this that blockades were supposed to be impossible.
Further, the US government (in the person of the Secretary of State) concluded that the British were doing little the Union hadn't done in the Civil War.

The Declaration was intended to clarify and agree international law and used simple English that is very difficult to misinterpret - but you have managed to anyway. The Declaration makes it impossible to blockade a continental power that has access to neutral ports. The Declaration was intended to replace the inconsistent application of [international] common law where the blockading navy would generally do whatever it's navy was capable of, to the extent the neutral powers would not complain or intervene.

Obviously, Britain would be severely disadvantaged if the US decided to enforce Articles of the declaration, but probably no more so than the CP powers in the OTL US decision not to challenge the hardships placed on neutral shipping. The OTL US decision not to challenge the blockade was likely influenced by the significant ongoing purchase orders received from the Entente - if those purchases dry up and the Entente continue to refuse to talk peace, the rights of neutral shipping are likely to be more forcefully supported by a frustrated Wilson.

But you used "socialist" as an explanation to why the US would owe nothing to the Russians. Surely you realize that a democratically elected parliament is preferable (for the US) to either Tsardom or one party dictatorship?

No. I was merely observing a the rise and fall of whoever Russia leadership happened to be should be of no consequence to a Neutral US. Frankly I have no idea what their preferences would have been, but Wilson would certainly not risk war over Russian leadership
 

BooNZ

Banned
The purpose of the British blockade was not to starve Germany so much as to give them a choice - either divert resources from the front line (as Britain was with her navy), or negotiate, or suffer consequences as a result. Relatively little German food was imported - it's just that, well, a lot of the men were off fighting a war, and the Germans could have demobbed men to work in the fields instead. (This would reduce their war effectiveness - that's what makes it a war fighting tactic.)

No and No

"The British blockade, treated the whole of Germany as if it were a beleaguered fortress, and avowedly sought to starve the whole population — men, women, and children, old and young, wounded and sound — into submission." Winston Churchill, England's first lord of the admiralty 1914

All food consigned to Germany through neutral ports was to be captured and all food consigned to Rotterdam was to be presumed consigned to Germany - The War Orders given by the Admiralty on 26 August 1914

In 1908 the Netherlands imported 1,793,000 tons of grain were imported by the Netherlands - of that amount, 1,384,000 tons was exported overland to Germany.
 
The OTL US decision not to challenge the blockade was likely influenced by the significant ongoing purchase orders received from the Entente - if those purchases dry up and the Entente continue to refuse to talk peace, the rights of neutral shipping are likely to be more forcefully supported by a frustrated Wilson.

Since the US had decided to to not challenge the blockade long before Entente purchases ramped it is rather more likely that


The United States has made earnest representations to Great Britain in regard to the seizure and detention by the British authorities of all American ships or cargoes bona fide destined to neutral ports, on the ground that such seizures and detentions were contrary to the existing rules of international law. It will be recalled, however, that American courts have established various rules bearing on these matters. The rule of "continuous voyage" has been not only asserted by American tribunals but extended by them. They have exercised the right to determine from the circumstances whether the ostensible was the real destination. They have held that the shipment of articles of contraband to a neutral port "to order," from which, as a matter of fact, cargoes had been transshipped to the enemy, is corroborative evidence that the cargo is really destined to the enemy instead of to the neutral port of delivery. It is thus seen that some of the doctrines which appear to bear harshly upon neutrals at the present time are analogous to or outgrowths from policies adopted by the United States when it was a belligerent.

This explanation as entered into the record of this debate by Saphroneth is essentially correct. The US did not dispute Britain's interpretation of blockade law as it both matched that of the US and would be a useful interpretation to the US in the future.

Wilson is in fact even less of the sole overlord of the US than Kaiser Wilhlem is of Germany, several other institutional bodies have an impact on what the President can and cannot do and he must spend his political capital wisely. His own people were telling him the British blockade was lawful, only those looking at the matter purely from a "how does this help the Kaiserreich?" viewpoint would be confident that it was illegal but then their base assumption that international law was simply there to help the Kaiser's minions was and is a rather minority one.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Since the US had decided to to not challenge the blockade long before Entente purchases ramped it is rather more likely that

No, the USA initially demanded Germany and Britain abide by the Declaration of London - a demand that was ignored. [flip-flop?]

This explanation as entered into the record of this debate by Saphroneth is essentially correct. The US did not dispute Britain's interpretation of blockade law as it both matched that of the US and would be a useful interpretation to the US in the future.

I am open to be corrected, but I do not believe Britain even declared a formal blockade, so there was no interpretation to dispute. Britain effectively ignored any protests regarding its treatment of neutral shipping and the commentary Saphroneth/ you provided highlighted that the US had previously ignored international law itself in its blockade of the CSA (the 1856 Paris convention also did not provide for distant blockades). That report was in early 1915, but in 1917 Wilson was looking for a stick to force/encourage Britain to talk peace and Britain was increasingly economically reliant on the good graces of the US.

Wilson is in fact even less of the sole overlord of the US than Kaiser Wilhlem is of Germany, several other institutional bodies have an impact on what the President can and cannot do and he must spend his political capital wisely. His own people were telling him the British blockade was lawful, only those looking at the matter purely from a "how does this help the Kaiserreich?" viewpoint would be confident that it was illegal but then their base assumption that international law was simply there to help the Kaiser's minions was and is a rather minority one.

Wilson probably had more effective power than the Kaiser - certainly from 1916 onward. I doubt anyone could honestly describe the British 'blockade' as lawful, but some within the US administration were certainly advising Wilson not to challenge it - especially early on when Wilson would have just been ignored by the British anyway. OTL German diplomacy was awful and the underlying Anglo-US relationship strong. Despite this, in late 1916 Lloyd George managed to seriously maim Anglo-US relations, but was saved by even worse German diplomacy. If the Germans had played it differently, it is probable Wilson would have continued to apply economic leverage against Britain.

Laws are usually in place to protect those who cannot protect themselves - and clearly do not work if they are ignored by those in power.
 
I am open to be corrected, but I do not believe Britain even declared a formal blockade, so there was no interpretation to dispute.

"Reprisals Order in Council 11th March 1915. Measures to prevent commodities of any kind reaching or leaving Germany." Such a lovely short title however it is the legal basis for and declaration of British blockade and you will find references to it as such in many scholarly works.

Now I am sorry this is not the easiest way to view the text but at least you can see it is an official copy of the original document

http://studylib.net/doc/11231528/-c--crown-copyright-catalogue-reference-cab-23-1-image-re...

If you scroll or advance down to page 6 in document(7 of 9 pdf count) you will find the legal outline of the British blockade...what is interesting is that it clearly states that the British will only be seizing cargoes....this contrasts with the German tendency to sink the whole ship.
 

BooNZ

Banned
"Reprisals Order in Council 11th March 1915. Measures to prevent commodities of any kind reaching or leaving Germany." Such a lovely short title however it is the legal basis for and declaration of British blockade and you will find references to it as such in many scholarly works.

Thanks, but I note the following:
- it's dated February 1917
- no legal basis provided for recommended actions is mentioned
- no mention of blockade in the text

Edit:

I think I remember now - the British never declared a formal blockade, since their application of trade restrictions were probably too 'innovative' to comply with contemporary or traditional interpretations of what constituted a 'blockade'. Instead the British relied on a doctrine of retaliation and declared the North Sea a war zone and dictated the conduct of neutral shipping therein.
 
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Laws are usually in place to protect those who cannot protect themselves - and clearly do not work if they are ignored by those in power.

Not really - otherwise segregation in the US would never have been legal, for example. Laws are made by those in power.
 
Thanks, but I note the following:
- it's dated February 1917
- no legal basis provided for recommended actions is mentioned
- no mention of blockade in the text


Well that is what you get for trusting a computer search, it seems the only people with the exact text are the National Archives at Kew who claim not to have digitised it.


However there are other sources who mention the Order in Council...lots of them here is just one, that it is a bit of a long winded and full on historical examination.

The interesting thing about the March 11, 1915 declaration is that although it describes a blockade its specific legal justification is in the concept of reprisal. However it was also recognised as stated above that British blockade practice conformed with earlier American usage and practice. Anyway worth recalling that you asked if the British declared a blockade and " Reprisals Order in Council 11th March 1915. Measures to prevent commodities of any kind reaching or leaving Germany" is that declaration.
 
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