Uh, no. If the Entente loses, then unsecured loans to them are a waste.
And quite possibly even if it wins. In that case America would get some interest, but there's no guarantee that the defaults will take a decade to happen.
Uh, no. If the Entente loses, then unsecured loans to them are a waste.
This of course assumes that there was somehow not the money to pay for American tankers.
Well, I was rather assuming the US would rather see democracies controlling chunks of Europe (France, Britain, Menshevik Russia as-was) rather than a large, victorious and highly militarized Germany controlling most of it.
You're correct about that, of course.Hindsight is always 20/20.
In April 1917, as far as Wilson knew he was joining the winning side. Beyond the immediate matters of USW and the ZT, he was concerned that if the war ended while America was still neutral, he would find himself excluded from the peace settlement - though it is far from clear that he would ever have gone to war for this alone. He wasn't particularly worrying about a German victory, which he didn't expect.
My suspicion is that the US would do a lot of dithering trying to figure out what was in the US national interest (and also whether the UK was actually telling the truth about being out of ready cash and assets).
The Entente reaction to cessation of US loans is just as unclear. Throw everything into a final decisive assault? Or sit back and defend, conserving resources and emphasising the need for further support to the US. I feel that the latter is more likely, but that might be modern sensibilities speaking...
In early 1917, the concern in British government circles was "whether the Army could win the war before the Navy lost it". They had no foreknowledge that convoying would thwart the U-boats. Even with America in the war, just standing on the defensive and "waiting for the Yanks" was deemed far too high a risk. How much more so if "the Yanks" had remained neutral.
Well not quite but even assuming your interpretation is right (and that for example the British were not getting any letters from Germany detailing the effects of the blockade which in OTL they were) then at best you have the recipe for a peace on terms, quite favourable terms to both sides.
The problem with the claim that the US cutting off the supply of credit to the Entente would bring them to their knees is that it relies on not one but multiple jumps of logic. The Entente powers did not need to raise much money in 1917 on American markets prior to the US entering the war. That makes it rather difficult to assess evidence for either case. In addition though the British were raising dollars in London...though the annoying effect of this was to reduce the value of the pound relative to the dollar. On the other hand the US have a motive...one they understood at the time...not to force the Entente to pay them even more gold as this was driving inflation in the US, the dollar then being gold backed.
Further though we have this logic jump of one offensive and then the west is done. Yet why? The Entente can still mount offensives but slower and if they take longer between attacks there is more oil for the fleet who anyway had a six month reserve (the worry was without American tankers they might eat into it but reduce Army needs and this issue is resolved). Yes the tempo of operations drops but the Entente is still on the offensive in the west and Germany is still under blockade.
So what we have is that by 1917 the necessary pre-requisite for German total victory regardless of other viable PODs is that the US Must cut off credit (and be entirely effective in doing so), that loss of credit must have an impact no later than 1918 and further than loss of credit must affect the ability of the Entente to defend themselves as well as mount offensives.
All of which is a bit of a stretch. I can see the Germans perhaps angling a peace with honour and maybe a few token gains balanced by a few token losses to keep everyone happy but otherwise pursuit of German victory needs a POD much earlier than 1917.
Well, I was rather assuming the US would rather see democracies controlling chunks of Europe (France, Britain, Menshevik Russia as-was) rather than a large, victorious and highly militarized Germany controlling most of it.
Apart from WW1, you mean - which, remember, resulted from the German defence plan starting and ending with invading Belgium and France regardless of the situation.As for being highly militarized, the Germans spent proportionately far less on military matters than either the French and/or Russians and had not be embroiled in a significant war since the German states defended themselves from French aggression in 1870-71 - over 40 years.
In 1917? Menshevik Russia is a liberalizing revolution which (at the time) looks moderately stable, and which seems to be a big improvement over Tsarism.I'm not sure the flaws of German democracy were significantly worse than the British, but both systems were markedly superior to what was on offer in Russia.
Well not quite but even assuming your interpretation is right (and that for example the British were not getting any letters from Germany detailing the effects of the blockade which in OTL they were) then at best you have the recipe for a peace on terms, quite favourable terms to both sides.
The problem with the claim that the US cutting off the supply of credit to the Entente would bring them to their knees is that it relies on not one but multiple jumps of logic. The Entente powers did not need to raise much money in 1917 on American markets prior to the US entering the war. That makes it rather difficult to assess evidence for either case. In addition though the British were raising dollars in London...though the annoying effect of this was to reduce the value of the pound relative to the dollar. On the other hand the US have a motive...one they understood at the time...not to force the Entente to pay them even more gold as this was driving inflation in the US, the dollar then being gold backed.
Further though we have this logic jump of one offensive and then the west is done. Yet why? The Entente can still mount offensives but slower and if they take longer between attacks there is more oil for the fleet who anyway had a six month reserve (the worry was without American tankers they might eat into it but reduce Army needs and this issue is resolved). Yes the tempo of operations drops but the Entente is still on the offensive in the west and Germany is still under blockade.
So what we have is that by 1917 the necessary pre-requisite for German total victory regardless of other viable PODs is that the US Must cut off credit (and be entirely effective in doing so), that loss of credit must have an impact no later than 1918 and further than loss of credit must affect the ability of the Entente to defend themselves as well as mount offensives.
All of which is a bit of a stretch. I can see the Germans perhaps angling a peace with honour and maybe a few token gains balanced by a few token losses to keep everyone happy but otherwise pursuit of German victory needs a POD much earlier than 1917.
I don't think you understand the situation as of March 1917. The US government issued it's advisement to the banks, only JP Morgan was still lending, but it was a limited account and winding down. No one else was lending and Wilson was putting the screws to the Entente for refusing to negotiate when he made his attempt to mediate in December 1916. London fully realized that they had lost any sort of good will from Wilson and credit was not coming from the US government, who would be the only source possible now that they had run out of collateral. They fully understood that credit was winding down and would be gone very shortly even from Morgan. There was no debate in the US about what to do, Wilson had already decided, so had the banks in response to the Treasury announcement. Morgan was in the process of limiting his exposure as his credit account was the only one left.
Hum quick question...if the blockade is not working why did Germany go to USW? See a purely battlefield history of World War 1 would suggest they were winning, 1915 they beat Serbia, 1916 they beat Romania....though it had not happened yet surely they might have suspect 1917 they were going to beat someone on the Entente side. So given that it was not the blockade what was it that forced the Germans' hand?
I think it was the realisation that victory in the West, if possible at all, would be long and bloody. USW offered the hope of victory in six months at low cost... a tempting idea in the face of stalemate.
I think it was the realisation that victory in the West, if possible at all, would be long and bloody. USW offered the hope of victory in six months at low cost... a tempting idea in the face of stalemate.
Actually if he cannot then Warwick Michael Brown can. He details the experience in chapter six (page 134 in document, 135 of the pdf) of this piece with the elegant title The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies 1898-1939; The Transition From Coal to Oil....well okay it is a academic title but still.
And if they would be available at any price.
According to Fayle [1], even after US entry into the war, US shipowners remained averse to risking their tankers in sub-infested waters, and it was several months before the Government gave itself power to compel their use.
Also, as late as Feb 12 President Wilson issued an order forbidding the sale or charter to a foreigner of any ship registered in the US, without the permission of the Shipping Board. [2]
[1] Seaborne Trade, Vol III, Ch XI pp175-6
[2] ditto Ch V, p82
Hum quick question...if the blockade is not working why did Germany go to USW? See a purely battlefield history of World War 1 would suggest they were winning, 1915 they beat Serbia, 1916 they beat Romania....though it had not happened yet surely they might have suspect 1917 they were going to beat someone on the Entente side. So given that it was not the blockade what was it that forced the Germans' hand?
The funny thing is that the less the Entente do the longer they last because they are not under blockade...it does make an awesome difference.
Given that the British could build new tankers in 9 months, a little planning ahead removes these issues.