Germany winning WW1 - best scenario for the 20th century?

Is Germany winning WW1 the most preferable outcome?

  • Yes. A German victory would have prevented the greatest horrors of the 20 century and saved millions

    Votes: 105 26.9%
  • No. A German victory would have made things as bad or worse than OTL

    Votes: 56 14.3%
  • Perhaps. Some things would have turned out better, some worse

    Votes: 245 62.7%

  • Total voters
    391
Uh, no. If the Entente loses, then unsecured loans to them are a waste.

And quite possibly even if it wins. In that case America would get some interest, but there's no guarantee that the defaults will take a decade to happen.
 
This of course assumes that there was somehow not the money to pay for American tankers.

And if they would be available at any price.

According to Fayle [1], even after US entry into the war, US shipowners remained averse to risking their tankers in sub-infested waters, and it was several months before the Government gave itself power to compel their use.

Also, as late as Feb 12 President Wilson issued an order forbidding the sale or charter to a foreigner of any ship registered in the US, without the permission of the Shipping Board. [2]


[1] Seaborne Trade, Vol III, Ch XI pp175-6
[2] ditto Ch V, p82
 
Well, I was rather assuming the US would rather see democracies controlling chunks of Europe (France, Britain, Menshevik Russia as-was) rather than a large, victorious and highly militarized Germany controlling most of it.

Hindsight is always 20/20.

In April 1917, as far as Wilson knew he was joining the winning side. Beyond the immediate matters of USW and the ZT, he was concerned that if the war ended while America was still neutral, he would find himself excluded from the peace settlement - though it is far from clear that he would ever have gone to war for this alone. He wasn't particularly worrying about a German victory, which he didn't expect.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Hindsight is always 20/20.

In April 1917, as far as Wilson knew he was joining the winning side. Beyond the immediate matters of USW and the ZT, he was concerned that if the war ended while America was still neutral, he would find himself excluded from the peace settlement - though it is far from clear that he would ever have gone to war for this alone. He wasn't particularly worrying about a German victory, which he didn't expect.
You're correct about that, of course.

When I speak of America regretting, I am of course speaking with that kind of AH prognostication called "theoretical assumed hindsight" (that is, how will people feel in *1923 over their decisions in *1917?)

Decisions are made on information available at the time.

Of course, that said, I think it is genuinely very hard to get a German victory with the only change being a lack of American involvement (or loans) - the British had plenty of combat power in reserve OTL, held back by internal politics (the government didn't like Haig) and in an ATL where there's less troops in France from the US (i.e. none) you could see more troops being in France from Britain and hence no success in Michael; whereas if the Germans are more successful with USW, then that's a separate driver for American involvement.

In an ATL situation where the PoD is further back than 1917, and the Germans (if their position is stronger, such as knocking out Russia in 1916 or early 1917) look like they're going to win, then again there's a separate driver for German involvement.
 
My suspicion is that the US would do a lot of dithering trying to figure out what was in the US national interest (and also whether the UK was actually telling the truth about being out of ready cash and assets).

Indeed. Even after entry into the war, the US Treasury was at first sceptical, suspecting that John Bull was trying to con the US into paying for Britain's war effort as well as her own. We had to send Balfour across the pond in May to get the financial taps opened.


The Entente reaction to cessation of US loans is just as unclear. Throw everything into a final decisive assault? Or sit back and defend, conserving resources and emphasising the need for further support to the US. I feel that the latter is more likely, but that might be modern sensibilities speaking...

What exactly would they be waiting for?

In early 1917, the concern in British government circles was "whether the Army could win the war before the Navy lost it". They had no foreknowledge that convoying would thwart the U-boats. Even with America in the war, just standing on the defensive and "waiting for the Yanks" was deemed far too high a risk. How much more so if "the Yanks" had remained neutral.
 
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In early 1917, the concern in British government circles was "whether the Army could win the war before the Navy lost it". They had no foreknowledge that convoying would thwart the U-boats. Even with America in the war, just standing on the defensive and "waiting for the Yanks" was deemed far too high a risk. How much more so if "the Yanks" had remained neutral.

Well not quite but even assuming your interpretation is right (and that for example the British were not getting any letters from Germany detailing the effects of the blockade which in OTL they were) then at best you have the recipe for a peace on terms, quite favourable terms to both sides.

The problem with the claim that the US cutting off the supply of credit to the Entente would bring them to their knees is that it relies on not one but multiple jumps of logic. The Entente powers did not need to raise much money in 1917 on American markets prior to the US entering the war. That makes it rather difficult to assess evidence for either case. In addition though the British were raising dollars in London...though the annoying effect of this was to reduce the value of the pound relative to the dollar. On the other hand the US have a motive...one they understood at the time...not to force the Entente to pay them even more gold as this was driving inflation in the US, the dollar then being gold backed.

Further though we have this logic jump of one offensive and then the west is done. Yet why? The Entente can still mount offensives but slower and if they take longer between attacks there is more oil for the fleet who anyway had a six month reserve (the worry was without American tankers they might eat into it but reduce Army needs and this issue is resolved). Yes the tempo of operations drops but the Entente is still on the offensive in the west and Germany is still under blockade.

So what we have is that by 1917 the necessary pre-requisite for German total victory regardless of other viable PODs is that the US Must cut off credit (and be entirely effective in doing so), that loss of credit must have an impact no later than 1918 and further than loss of credit must affect the ability of the Entente to defend themselves as well as mount offensives.

All of which is a bit of a stretch. I can see the Germans perhaps angling a peace with honour and maybe a few token gains balanced by a few token losses to keep everyone happy but otherwise pursuit of German victory needs a POD much earlier than 1917.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Well not quite but even assuming your interpretation is right (and that for example the British were not getting any letters from Germany detailing the effects of the blockade which in OTL they were) then at best you have the recipe for a peace on terms, quite favourable terms to both sides.

Yeah-nah. It was not until the US entry eliminated sources of the German imports that the Blockade became truly effective - to the extent it could ultimately, eventually, win the war. Without US (and Imperial Russia in the East) the CP powers were going to win a battle of attrition - clearly with the benefit of hindsight.

The problem with the claim that the US cutting off the supply of credit to the Entente would bring them to their knees is that it relies on not one but multiple jumps of logic. The Entente powers did not need to raise much money in 1917 on American markets prior to the US entering the war. That makes it rather difficult to assess evidence for either case. In addition though the British were raising dollars in London...though the annoying effect of this was to reduce the value of the pound relative to the dollar. On the other hand the US have a motive...one they understood at the time...not to force the Entente to pay them even more gold as this was driving inflation in the US, the dollar then being gold backed.

Again the benefit of hindsight illustrates the British OTL were unable to repay the war loans they racked up prior to the US entry into the war - despite being assisted by German reparations after the Entente victory (i.e. best case scenario). Accordingly, any further unsecured loans racked up by Britain in 1917 and 1918 in an ATL would simply not have been repaid. OTL this appeared to be understood by the American regime at the time.

Can you please reference the suggestion the US did not want to receive any more gold - sounds rather peculiar. In the first instance, a strong dollar would subdue inflation to the extent goods could be imported - perhaps from Asia. Similarly, excessive exports of material from the USA would create greater scarcity within the US economy - and thereby inflation. I suspect none of this is relevant to the OTL US administration decision not to extend credit where it cannot be repaid.

Further though we have this logic jump of one offensive and then the west is done. Yet why? The Entente can still mount offensives but slower and if they take longer between attacks there is more oil for the fleet who anyway had a six month reserve (the worry was without American tankers they might eat into it but reduce Army needs and this issue is resolved). Yes the tempo of operations drops but the Entente is still on the offensive in the west and Germany is still under blockade.

The looming oil shortage was a symptom of the Entente war effort, not the only problem to solve. A "low tempo" offensive sounds rather interesting - could you describe how this would differ from high intensity offensive. Without US complicity, the blockade is always going to continue be half arsed and increasingly ineffectual as imports start to trickle in from the East and manpower is released for the home front.

So what we have is that by 1917 the necessary pre-requisite for German total victory regardless of other viable PODs is that the US Must cut off credit (and be entirely effective in doing so), that loss of credit must have an impact no later than 1918 and further than loss of credit must affect the ability of the Entente to defend themselves as well as mount offensives.

If the US or independent interests did decide to extend unsecured credit to the Entente in 1917 the costs are going to escalate dramatically. If you are expecting US suppliers to cover the severe credit risk, then yesterday's $4 rifle will cost $5 today, then $6 next week. As the total war debt mounts it will become obvious quite quickly that no-one will be getting paid. So however you cut it, to continue an effective war into 1918, the Entente will effectively require the US to actively bankroll the Entente war effort with the express purpose to eliminate Germany and with no expectations it would be repaid - not exactly the actions of a neutral power.

All of which is a bit of a stretch. I can see the Germans perhaps angling a peace with honour and maybe a few token gains balanced by a few token losses to keep everyone happy but otherwise pursuit of German victory needs a POD much earlier than 1917.

As outlined by Wiking, OTL the US administration and finance sector had already effectively already cut off unsecured credit to the Entente war effort in early 1917, so no stretching required...
 

BooNZ

Banned
Well, I was rather assuming the US would rather see democracies controlling chunks of Europe (France, Britain, Menshevik Russia as-was) rather than a large, victorious and highly militarized Germany controlling most of it.

I'm not sure the flaws of German democracy were significantly worse than the British, but both systems were markedly superior to what was on offer in Russia. As for being highly militarized, the Germans spent proportionately far less on military matters than either the French and/or Russians and had not be embroiled in a significant war since the German states defended themselves from French aggression in 1870-71 - over 40 years.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
As for being highly militarized, the Germans spent proportionately far less on military matters than either the French and/or Russians and had not be embroiled in a significant war since the German states defended themselves from French aggression in 1870-71 - over 40 years.
Apart from WW1, you mean - which, remember, resulted from the German defence plan starting and ending with invading Belgium and France regardless of the situation.


I'm not sure the flaws of German democracy were significantly worse than the British, but both systems were markedly superior to what was on offer in Russia.
In 1917? Menshevik Russia is a liberalizing revolution which (at the time) looks moderately stable, and which seems to be a big improvement over Tsarism.
 
Well not quite but even assuming your interpretation is right (and that for example the British were not getting any letters from Germany detailing the effects of the blockade which in OTL they were) then at best you have the recipe for a peace on terms, quite favourable terms to both sides.

What did the letters tell them? Certainly that a lot of German civilians were having a miserable time of it, but nothing to suggest that Germany was even remotely likely to collapse in any foreseeable time frame.

Incidentally how do you arrive at a peace on "quite reasonable terms to both sides"? Germany holds huge chunks of conquered territory, while the Entente has only a sliver of Upper Alsace and a few worthless German colonies. So any negotiations are going to be distinctly one-sided.

The problem with the claim that the US cutting off the supply of credit to the Entente would bring them to their knees is that it relies on not one but multiple jumps of logic. The Entente powers did not need to raise much money in 1917 on American markets prior to the US entering the war. That makes it rather difficult to assess evidence for either case. In addition though the British were raising dollars in London...though the annoying effect of this was to reduce the value of the pound relative to the dollar. On the other hand the US have a motive...one they understood at the time...not to force the Entente to pay them even more gold as this was driving inflation in the US, the dollar then being gold backed.

Did the British Exchequer share your optimism? That's not the impression I get from what I've read.

Further though we have this logic jump of one offensive and then the west is done. Yet why? The Entente can still mount offensives but slower and if they take longer between attacks there is more oil for the fleet who anyway had a six month reserve (the worry was without American tankers they might eat into it but reduce Army needs and this issue is resolved). Yes the tempo of operations drops but the Entente is still on the offensive in the west and Germany is still under blockade.

They had a six-month reserve at the start of the year. By May 31 it was below three months and still falling. No doubt economies in other areas will help, but that means less fuel for aircraft, tanks, trucks etc.


So what we have is that by 1917 the necessary pre-requisite for German total victory regardless of other viable PODs is that the US Must cut off credit (and be entirely effective in doing so), that loss of credit must have an impact no later than 1918 and further than loss of credit must affect the ability of the Entente to defend themselves as well as mount offensives.

All of which is a bit of a stretch. I can see the Germans perhaps angling a peace with honour and maybe a few token gains balanced by a few token losses to keep everyone happy but otherwise pursuit of German victory needs a POD much earlier than 1917.

There is no way to keep everyone happy. Either the Germans hand back all their conquests without any compensation (which their people will see as defeat) or the Entente has to let them keep a substantial part of their conquests and pay (in cash and/or colonial territory) for the return of the remainder - which their people will see as defeat. And when one side or the other sees itself as having lost, the resulting collapse of morale is apt to turn this belief into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
 
I don't think you understand the situation as of March 1917. The US government issued it's advisement to the banks, only JP Morgan was still lending, but it was a limited account and winding down. No one else was lending and Wilson was putting the screws to the Entente for refusing to negotiate when he made his attempt to mediate in December 1916. London fully realized that they had lost any sort of good will from Wilson and credit was not coming from the US government, who would be the only source possible now that they had run out of collateral. They fully understood that credit was winding down and would be gone very shortly even from Morgan. There was no debate in the US about what to do, Wilson had already decided, so had the banks in response to the Treasury announcement. Morgan was in the process of limiting his exposure as his credit account was the only one left.

I do understand it. But you've ignored my point that opinions in the US are capable of changing in response to external developments, that the Entente governments would be working to achieve that, and that I don't think it's in the US national interest to see the Entente collapse, as it would greatly change the global balance of power. While I don't dispute your summary of the situation in March, I do think that you're being excessively rigid about how it would develop after that point, particularly if things drag on as long as 1918 as you suggest.

If we assume that credit is cut off and the Nivelle etc. fails, then the most likely course of events would seem to be a renewed call for peace by Wilson. This suits the Entente, as it would give them an excuse for a static front. Negotiations will be slow and painful and may fail entirely. If they fail and the US blames Entente intransigence, then further support is improbable and Germany will have to win via force of arms, which is probably doable in spring 1918. Yet if Germany is blamed instead, then opportunities reopen - and it's worth remembering that US opinion steadily turned against Germany as the war progressed. Alternatively Germany might shoot herself in the foot at any point by succumbing to the pressure to reimplement USW... after all, it'll guarantee victory in a few months without any bloody offensives...
 
Hum quick question...if the blockade is not working why did Germany go to USW? See a purely battlefield history of World War 1 would suggest they were winning, 1915 they beat Serbia, 1916 they beat Romania....though it had not happened yet surely they might have suspect 1917 they were going to beat someone on the Entente side. So given that it was not the blockade what was it that forced the Germans' hand?

As to oil and trucks, trucks don't die if you don't feed them everyday. This means building up to an offensive you can rely more heavily on horse transport from the railheads...coal and fodder which the Entente have plenty of. This trades time as horse do not shift loads as quickly as trucks but they are still there if 1) you need to react to a German offensive or b) when you open your offensive.

The funny thing is that the less the Entente do the longer they last because they are not under blockade...it does make an awesome difference.
 
Hum quick question...if the blockade is not working why did Germany go to USW? See a purely battlefield history of World War 1 would suggest they were winning, 1915 they beat Serbia, 1916 they beat Romania....though it had not happened yet surely they might have suspect 1917 they were going to beat someone on the Entente side. So given that it was not the blockade what was it that forced the Germans' hand?

I think it was the realisation that victory in the West, if possible at all, would be long and bloody. USW offered the hope of victory in six months at low cost... a tempting idea in the face of stalemate.
 
I think it was the realisation that victory in the West, if possible at all, would be long and bloody. USW offered the hope of victory in six months at low cost... a tempting idea in the face of stalemate.

Well there is some evidence for that but at the same time that the blockade is having an effect upon Germany: Admiral von Holtzendorf submitted a strategic analysis in which he concluded "The war demands a decision by autumn 1917, if it is not to end with a general exhaustion of all parties and thus disastrously for us."

Now if blockade is not having much of an effect then Germany ought as has been suggested above to be able to negotiate from a position of strength if everyone is equally exhausted. However if the blockade is effective then Germany will come out the worst in any talks even if the others are equally worn down on the battlefront. This rather suggests that the gamble weighing the required quick victory against US intervention, which was understood to entail inevitable defeat, seemed like a plan because of the effects resulting from the blockade.
 
I think it was the realisation that victory in the West, if possible at all, would be long and bloody. USW offered the hope of victory in six months at low cost... a tempting idea in the face of stalemate.


I think "if possible at all" are the operative words.

1916 had been an "annus horribilis" for Germany, and 1917 threatened to be worse. The British Army would be more seasoned than the previous year, and Russia's armament production was rising. The slipping morale of the French Army was not yet Given the heavy weather which Germany had made of 1916, this pointed to defeat before the end of 1917. So Holtzendorff's promise of a victory in six months was a gift horse which they were reluctant to look in the mouth.
 
And if they would be available at any price.

According to Fayle [1], even after US entry into the war, US shipowners remained averse to risking their tankers in sub-infested waters, and it was several months before the Government gave itself power to compel their use.

Also, as late as Feb 12 President Wilson issued an order forbidding the sale or charter to a foreigner of any ship registered in the US, without the permission of the Shipping Board. [2]


[1] Seaborne Trade, Vol III, Ch XI pp175-6
[2] ditto Ch V, p82

Given that the British could build new tankers in 9 months, a little planning ahead removes these issues.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Hum quick question...if the blockade is not working why did Germany go to USW? See a purely battlefield history of World War 1 would suggest they were winning, 1915 they beat Serbia, 1916 they beat Romania....though it had not happened yet surely they might have suspect 1917 they were going to beat someone on the Entente side. So given that it was not the blockade what was it that forced the Germans' hand?

Because imperfect information sometimes results in imperfect decisions being made. In 1916/1917 CP powers were not fully aware of the imminent financial crisis facing the Entente, the CP powers were not fully aware of the crisis of manpower and morale facing the French army, or the imminent collapse of Imperial Russia.

The funny thing is that the less the Entente do the longer they last because they are not under blockade...it does make an awesome difference.

If the US remains neutral (i.e. does not bankroll the Entente war effort), any one of the above matters could become critical/fatal to the Entente cause. Without the US, following the collapse of Imperial Russia, the CP powers would gradually recover while the Entente would gradually grow weaker.

Further, if the Entente can no longer afford to buy war material from the US, the 'pro-Entente' faction within the US may fade - others in the US will be demanding open trade with the CP powers...

 
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