Germany vs Soviet Union in 1939, who would win?

Who would win a 1v1 War that starts in October 1939?

  • Germany clearly wins, and easily

    Votes: 3 1.9%
  • Germany clearly wins, with difficulty

    Votes: 9 5.6%
  • Germany probably wins

    Votes: 33 20.4%
  • Probably a draw

    Votes: 30 18.5%
  • The Soviet Union probably wins

    Votes: 38 23.5%
  • The Soviet Union clearly wins, with difficulty

    Votes: 44 27.2%
  • The Soviet Union wins, and easily

    Votes: 5 3.1%

  • Total voters
    162

Deleted member 1487

General Motors.
Right, my mistake. Ford had their own factories in Germany, they never bought an existing company.

It was entirely due to Soviet skill. As late as 1944, the Germans were sending more then enough resources to the Eastern Front that they could have stopped the Red Army of ‘41-‘42. They just were no longer facing the Red Army of ‘41-‘42.
Right, there was no possible other factors in WW2 except for Soviet Super Skillz.
In 1944 German commitments to fronts other than the East were at their highest point in the war to that time. Strategic bombing was shattering the economy. The Luftwaffe was massacred by the USAAF in February. The German strategic reserves were fully committed to France in June, before Bagration.

No, it’s pretty much inevitable without the loot from Western Europe and imports from the USSR.
IOTL the loot was gone by 1942 and imports from the USSR were too. Yet they fought on for 3.5 more years while supplying Italy and occupied Europe.

By mid-1940, remaining German resources were depleted and hence insubstantial: just replacing their expenditures in Poland required they tap into emergency reserves.
You're basing that on...?

They had exhausted their foreign currency reserves, and hence their ability to import, the year before.
Except that no they did not.
https://www.researchgate.net/public...old_reserves_-_and_foreign_currency_1933-1939
This contribution, based on recently found new material, gives a description of the development of the gold and exchange stock in Nazi Germany. It shows that, despite a predominant and structural shortage of foreign exchange, Reichsbank president Schacht was able to secretly accumulate a substantive amount of gold, starting as early as 1934. Apart from an outline of the various measures taken by the Reichsbank in order to increase its stock (including forced sale of foreign securities held by German subjects and seizure of gold coins), the text brings new estimates on the gold and foreign exchange robbed from Austria and Czechoslovakia after the occupation of these countries and provides details on the organisational framework for the distribution of the foreign exchange. Based on these new data, the text eventually shows that, in summer 1939, the gold and exchange stock was bigger than hitherto assumed. Therefore, a critical shortage of foreign exchange cannot be considered as the decisive reason for the Nazi government to go to war at that particular time.

The Germany gold reserves - and foreign currency (1933-1939). Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/public...old_reserves_-_and_foreign_currency_1933-1939 [accessed May 27 2018].

Poland added almost nothing.
Poland had huge farmland areas, forests, Upper Silesia, and much more, like Galician oil:
https://www.mapsofworld.com/poland/poland-mineral-map.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galicia_(Eastern_Europe)#Oil_and_natural_gas_industry

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Polish_Republic#Agriculture
Statistically, the majority of citizens lived in the countryside (75% in 1921). Farmers made up 65% of the population. In 1929, agricultural production made up 65% of Poland's GNP.[26] After 123 years of partitions, regions of the country were very unevenly developed. Lands of former German Empire were most advanced; in Greater Poland and Pomerelia, crops were on Western European level.[27]
Polish food and farm labour was hugely important to the Germans IOTL.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Polish_Republic#Economy
Besides coal mining, Poland also had deposits of oil in Borysław, Drohobycz, Jasło and Gorlice (see Polmin), potassium salt (TESP), and basalt (Janowa Dolina). Apart from already-existing industrial areas, in the mid-1930s, an ambitious, state-sponsored project of Central Industrial Region was started under Minister Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski. One of characteristic features of Polish economy in the interbellum was gradual nationalization of major plants. This was the case of Ursus Factory (see Państwowe Zakłady Inżynieryjne), and several steelworks, such as Huta Pokój in Ruda Śląska – Nowy Bytom, Huta Królewska in Chorzów – Królewska Huta, Huta Laura in Siemianowice Śląskie, as well as Scheibler and Grohman Works in Łódź.[23]

Besides that Poland had a higher GDP per capita than the USSR did by 1937:
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/eas94postprint.pdf

It was Western Europe that was the huge windfall that gave Germany the ability to sustain the war for the next four years. Adam Tooze and Richard Overy documents this extensively. The rest of your post is basically based on a fantasy which does not match Germany’s actual economic situation in 1939 prior to the war, much less what it would be after furtger exhaustion in 1940-41 but no loot or imports to offset it. It did not remotely resemble their situation in 1942-43, when they had the resources of all of Europe under their control and were still burning through the stockpiles of Soviet imports from 1940-41. All your following numbers are based on that, not the Germany of early-1940 (with or without the war).
France comparatively was more important than Poland, due to being larger and richer, but Poland did not had 'almost nothing'.
Thing is too that with the occupation of France and Western Europe the Germans had to then feed all of the Europeans for years, occupy them, sustain their electrical grid defend them against potential British invasion (plus the air war), etc.
Add in then the expense of actually fighting Britain and being blockaded by them for years, which not having to deal with either MORE than offsets any losses from not occupying Western Europe. No naval war, no air war, and no defense of Europe against invasion, plus no invasion of the Balkans or fighting in the Mediterranean accounted for at least half of the German military budget even during Barbarossa. So yes, their loss hurts, but it is more than offset by not actually fighting the British for years on multiple fronts (from 1942 the US), having to feed occupied Europe, having to supply the Italians who are also blockaded by the British, and having to help feed the various allied Balkan states who were also blockaded.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi_...assistance_during_the_Agreement.27s_operation
In the summer of 1940, Germany grew even more dependent on Soviet imports.[62] German occupations of France, the Netherlands, and Belgium created additional demand while decreasing avenues for indirect supply.[62]

The Soviet invasions of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia[27][63] in June 1940 resulted in the Soviet occupation of states on which Germany had relied for 96.7 million Reichsmarks of imports in 1938.[13]

On August 11, the Soviet Union had shipped 190 million Reichsmarks of raw materials against just 90 million Reichsmarks of German deliveries.[3]
And there is the large amount of exports Germany had made to the USSR to pay for it's trade with the USSR IOTL that would be available to sell ITTL.

Plus then they don't have to deal with British and American economic warfare driving up international prices for needed metals and other goods, while cutting Germany off from her various barter agreements international, which was the majority of her foreign trade (i.e. not nations in Europe). Plus too the Baltic states aren't lost as trade partners ITTL in 1940:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Background_of_the_occupation_of_the_Baltic_states
The Germans responded to the banking crisis of 1931 by introducing the policy of Grossraum wirtschaft. It was a clearing agreement where states exchanged material goods instead of money. This increased German trade with the Baltic states and it integrated their economy with Germany, but it never dominated their trade as effectively as in the Balkans.[20]

That compromises their ability to produce war equipment and sustain their forces. Military production falls apart, their frontline forces run out of adequate munitions, Soviets breakthrough, war ends in Soviet victory. They can’t afford to cut back mobilization in the midst of a colossal war for survival any more then they could IOTL 1942-45. Plus, the politics of the matter means a transition to a export-economy would be useless: by the end of 1938 was that Germany had already antagonized the trading partners (Britain, France and America) she would have needed to make any sort of trade economy work. After Munich and Anschluss the Western Allies would not have passed on the opportunity to throttle Germany's economy. In that vein I can also observe that your claims of no economic warfare by the WAllies without war with them is false: economic warfare by them was already under way in 1939 before the war and would have further ramped up in response to the invasion of Poland.
Only if you're looking at a fraction of the ledger and cherrypicking stats...which you didn't even provide BTW to back up your assertions. Thing is Germany didn't need to cut back on it's mobilization to survive, as history demonstrated. Germany was not dependent on British, US, or French trade pre-1939, they had partners all over Europe, offset a lot of them by occupying Central Europe in toto, and of course having trade with many other countries around the world. The German export markets were primarily not to any of the major Allied nations as it was and besides France and Britain also needed German trade otherwise they wouldn't have gone out of their way to help Germany in the run up to the war:
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/31/bank-of-england-and-nazis-stolen-gold

http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1939030900
Barter Methods and Bilateral Trade Balancing
Handicapped by a shortage of foreign exchange, Germany has devised numerous expedients for obtaining the supplies needed from abroad. While direct barter transactions have been limited in extent, other methods followed have amounted to indirect barter. The nation's commercial arrangements with foreign countries are based primarily on the principle of bilateral trade balancing, Germany paying for purchases of raw materials from a particular country by sales to that country of an equivalent value of its manufactured goods. Complicated regulations and restrictions govern the whole conduct of the country's foreign commerce.

In seeking to expand its exports, the Reich has made its most intensive efforts in Southeastern Europe and Latin America. By offering attractive prices for the raw materials of countries in those regions, it has been able to expand its export markets there to the disadvantage of other exporting nations.

All of which were paid for by the minority of the loot left over following the expenditures of the Eastern Front. None of that loot exists ITTL.
Not really. Do you have sources to back that up? Certainly some captured military equipment was used on the Atlantic Wall, but the concrete and metal for defenses, sub pens, flak towers, etc. came from Germany.
 
Right, there was no possible other factors in WW2 except for Soviet Super Skillz.

It certainly was the dominant factor in Europe.

In 1944 German commitments to fronts other than the East were at their highest point in the war to that time. Strategic bombing was shattering the economy. The Luftwaffe was massacred by the USAAF in February.

At the start of 1944, strategic bombing had not shattered their economy, the Luftwaffe was not yet massacred, and most of their forces were in the east. They were still losing massively.

IOTL the loot was gone by 1942 and imports from the USSR were too. Yet they fought on for 3.5 more years while supplying Italy and occupied Europe.

It was not gone. It was depleted, but not remotely gone. As late as 1945, German troops were still receiving equipment that had been taken from Western Europe in 1940. Until late into 1944, French, Low Countries, and Balkan mines worked for Germany, as did their factories. French, Low Countries, and Balkan slave labor worked in German factories in enormous numbers.

You're basing that on...?
...
Except that no they did not.

Except yes they did. German imports crashed in spring of 1939, with concurrent impact on German production: the Luftwaffe's aluminum access fell by 2/3rds and copper to a measly 1/5th. (Adam Tooze, "The Wages of Destruction," pp. 304-305). Overall German ammunition production had fallen to a mere 25% of 1938 levels by the summer of 1939, again, due to resource shortages. (Tooze, p. 314). Tank, artillery, and small arms production tell similar stories. All told, German currency reserves on the eve of war were only enough to finance 1/10 of their peacetime imports (H.E. Volkmann, The National Socialist Economy in Preparation for War, Pg 365).

Poland had huge farmland areas, forests, Upper Silesia, and much more, like Galician oil:

Which was all a drop in the bucket. Not even enough to replace German losses to Poland. Again: they had to tap into their emergency reserves for that.

Polish food and farm labour was hugely important to the Germans IOTL.

And yet not remotely as important as the combined labor pools they got out of Western Europe, Southern Europe, and the USSR. Germany loses out on all of those first two and even the gross majority of the last one (owing to picking up only a fraction of the land, along with ).

France comparatively was more important than Poland, due to being larger and richer, but Poland did not had 'almost nothing'.

Compared to France? Yeah it did. Not enough to even make up for the Germans own losses fighting Poland.

Thing is too that with the occupation of France and Western Europe the Germans had to then feed all of the Europeans for years, occupy them, sustain their electrical grid defend them against potential British invasion (plus the air war), etc. The German strategic reserves were fully committed to France in June, before Bagration.

Germany didn't even attempt to feed all of Europe for years. Had they done so, they would have collapsed years earlier. They mostly let Europe starve. Such draconian measures were precisely how the Germans managed to squeeze out the maximum of Western Europe over the next four years: by exporting the hardship onto occupied territories. The expenses of occupation only outpaced the costs in the later years of the war, as did defenses. And besides, the Germans are still gonna have to hold back huge forces against the Soviets to guard against a Anglo-French attack anyways. Without all the loot from Western Europe, Germany won't even have a strategic reserve by 1941, much less later.

Add in then the expense of actually fighting Britain and being blockaded by them for years, which not having to deal with either MORE than offsets any losses from not occupying Western Europe. No naval war, no air war, and no defense of Europe against invasion, plus no invasion of the Balkans or fighting in the Mediterranean accounted for at least half of the German military budget even during Barbarossa. So yes, their loss hurts, but it is more than offset by not actually fighting the British for years on multiple fronts (from 1942 the US), having to feed occupied Europe, having to supply the Italians who are also blockaded by the British, and having to help feed the various allied Balkan states who were also blockaded.

Much of the expenses of fighting Britain, along with the naval, air, defense of Europe, invasion of the Balkans, fighting in the Mediterranean, and even fighting the Soviet Union was financed by the loot from Western Europe. Not being blockaded doesn't mean anything if one doesn't have the cash to import anyways and can't afford to spare anything for export. Fighting the USSR took up overwhelming German resources, which themselves were greatly inflated by the capture of Western Europe.

And there is the large amount of exports Germany had made to the USSR to pay for it's trade with the USSR IOTL that would be available to sell ITTL.

Compared to what the Germans were getting, what they had to export, most of which wasn't even sent, was a pittance. The IOTL trade deals were grossly favorable to Germany. In the end, any of the theoretical savings on those exports gets swallowed up by the industrial demands of actually fighting the Soviets, exactly as happened IOTL. The latter was exorbitantly more expensive then the former.

Thing is Germany didn't need to cut back on it's mobilization to survive, as history demonstrated.

History demonstrates that a Germany even fully mobilized couldn't survive and that is with the massive loot, industrial and otherwise, from Western Europe.

Germany was not dependent on British, US, or French trade pre-1939, they had partners all over Europe, offset a lot of them by occupying Central Europe in toto, and of course having trade with many other countries around the world. The German export markets were primarily not to any of the major Allied nations as it was and besides France and Britain also needed German trade otherwise they wouldn't have gone out of their way to help Germany in the run up to the war:

Any export program would be quite dependent on British, US, and French cooperation as much of the economic activity went through them. This was recognized by German economists in the pre-war, which is why the proponents of an export emphasized good relations with those countries. Most other countries simply were not wealthy enough to otherwise make up for it. By 1939, the Anglo-French and American governments were already engaged in active economic warfare with Germany. That rogue corporates acted without their consent and against their interests does not change that. Neither France or Britain needed German trade nor did they "go out of their way to help" Germany, something neither of your links even claim much less demonstrate. I’m fact, the latter link says the opposite of everything you’ve been claiming to the point I wonder if you even bothered to read it, given as it says that both German overall exports had been in constant decline from 1932 onwards while imports rose up from 1936 through to 1938, a clear indication of a country burning through it’s currency reserves, before starting to decline in January 1939 (the article doesn’t cover any further, when imports start to fall off a cliff).

Not really. Do you have sources to back that up? Certainly some captured military equipment was used on the Atlantic Wall, but the concrete and metal for defenses, sub pens, flak towers, etc. came from Germany.

Adam Tooze, Wages of Destruction goes into extensive details. Some of the material for the Atlantic Walls, and literally every other part of the Germany War effort, came from Germany. Some of it came from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Low Countries, or the Balkans. Some of it came from Germany, but the raw materials and manpower to make them came from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Low Countries, or the Balkans.

Your claims of Germany's economic state in 1939 simply bear no relation to the actual reality: They were in AWFUL shape in 1939 even before the war began and had they not achieved such an easy victory against France, total economic implosion would have occurred by 1941 regardless of how blockaded they were. A protracted fight against the Soviets would have seen them collapse as assuredly as one against the Anglo-French.
 
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Deleted member 1487

It certainly was the dominant factor in Europe.
You're entitled to your own opinion, but not your own facts. The dominant factor was Germany fighting a multi-front war against multiple major opponents, each of which outnumbered her alone; it is no mystery that the Soviet 'skillz revival' happened right as the Luftwaffe was being pulled off to other fronts and Germany was facing US forces on the ground.

At the start of 1944, strategic bombing had not shattered their economy, the Luftwaffe was not yet massacred, and most of their forces were in the east. They were still losing massively.
I didn't say it had completed it by January 1st 1944, but over the course of 1944 inflicted fatal damage to it; in 1943 it had struck serious wounds on the economy that were felt into 1944, the Ruhr bombing for instance blunting any growth in armaments production for months, which Tooze describes in detail in his book.

It was not gone. It was depleted, but not remotely gone. As late as 1945, German troops were still receiving equipment that had been taken from Western Europe in 1940. Until late into 1944, French, Low Countries, and Balkan mines worked for Germany, as did their factories. French, Low Countries, and Balkan slave labor worked in German factories in enormous numbers.
Scrapping the bottom of the barrel in 1945 to dredge up some obsolete gear to fight a war that was already over is hardly proof of the importance of Western European resources. Captured fuel was used up by the end of 1941, raw material stocks were as well, France and Western Europe yielded food through 1944, but most of that was used to feed the occupied peoples and occupying forces; remove the need to occupy Western Europe and you lose the need for the vast majority of the weapons used, plus Hitler building up a bunch of new divisions for planned use on other fronts instead of supplying the forces in the East during Barbarossa.
Without war with anyone but the Soviets the barter agreements with the Lowlands, Balkans, Latin America, Baltic States, etc. continue while the need to maintain as large an army as IOTL is not needed. Not having to conquer and occupy Yugoslavia would be a HUGE boon (same with not having to conquer France and lose the Battle of Britain) in terms of resources saved, which were not offset by the gains of conquest, especially as the insurgency in the Balkans and Western Europe grew and threats grew with the recovery of the British and entry of the US.
Before Germany conquered Europe workers from foreign countries, especially the Dutch, Italians, and various Balkans people worked in Germany on contracts because pay was better; without war that would continue (the Italians continued working in Germany, but the flow of workers was cut off by the entry of Italy in the war and the need for that labor at home IOTL).

Except yes they did. German imports crashed in spring of 1939, with concurrent impact on German production: the Luftwaffe's aluminum access fell by 2/3rds and copper to a measly 1/5th. (Adam Tooze, "The Wages of Destruction," pp. 304-305). Overall German ammunition production had fallen to a mere 25% of 1938 levels by the summer of 1939, again, due to resource shortages. (Tooze, p. 314). Tank, artillery, and small arms production tell similar stories. All told, German currency reserves on the eve of war were only enough to finance 1/10 of their peacetime imports (H.E. Volkmann, The National Socialist Economy in Preparation for War, Pg 365).
Did you totally ignore the article (from 1938 BTW) I posted about how the Germans were mostly not financing imports with cash? They had a series of barter agreements to get around the cash crunch, which were actually more effective at leveraging weaker economies into being permanent raw material suppliers to Germany at an unfavorable rate. Beyond that new evidence demonstrated that claims about cash stocks being low was exaggerated, which was even then bolstered by Czech gold taken in March 1939. That and the Czech raw materials, military equipment, and industry. Much like Poland would yield once they were occupied and exploited, including their labor, as the Poles were an important source of farm labor and agricultural goods, a major import item.

Tooze doesn't really explain how then the Luftwaffe production rapidly recovered and expanded beyond previous highs as soon as war was declared (show on Tooze's chart P.305), but before Poland was conquered/exploited and certainly many months before France was able to be plundered. With the lack of need for naval construction, huge savings were already present there, same with being able to cut back on civilian air defense spending if war with the west wasn't on the table. Then goes on to talk about how important the trade deal with Romania was in 1939, which supplied Germany with resources on barter rather than paid with cash.

Also on P.333 Tooze has a chart showing imported industrial inputs to Germany, which were rising and peaked in August 1939, collapsing due to the start of the war and blockade, never thereafter rising to pre-war levels. Even at the peak of importing during the war from I assume occupied countries and the Soviet trade deal pre-1941, it was only 80% of the pre-war importing peak. It fell from January 1941 on throughout the rest of the war, despite German war production increasing from 1941 on to all time highs; 1944 was as low or lower an import bottom as January 1940, but production in 1944 was at an all time high. How the hell did that work if pre-war the import situation was collapsing as Tooze claims, and the peak import period after the war started ended by January 1941?
Per your claims that would have ONLY been a period of collapsing production rather than increasing output as actually happened IOTL throughout 1940-44.

Tooze:
tooze p.333.jpg


As Tooze himself says the German economy not only avoided economic collapse, but was able to increase war output to new highs. War with the Soviets isn't going to change that especially with being able to cancel OTL naval construction, avoid the losses in the war with Britain, not face blockade, not lose access to barter deals outside of Europe, not lose trade from nations like the Baltic states, and so on.

Which was all a drop in the bucket. Not even enough to replace German losses to Poland. Again: they had to tap into their emergency reserves for that.
Tooze shows that despite all those losses, pre-France invasion outputs only increased despite imports utterly collapsing:
tooze 1939.jpg


tng.jpg



And yet not remotely as important as the combined labor pools they got out of Western Europe, Southern Europe, and the USSR. Germany loses out on all of those first two and even the gross majority of the last one (owing to picking up only a fraction of the land, along with ).
Without war they could continue to contract foreign labor as they had been pre-war and they were during the war, especially from Italy. Slave labor wasn't particularly good, especially considering the sabotage of material rates, but in huge bulk it had utility; the thing is without needing to fight any other conflict but the Eastern Front they didn't need the huge bulk of slave labor used IOTL. Depending on how far they get and how many Soviet soldiers they capture, much of that labor would still be available.

Compared to France? Yeah it did. Not enough to even make up for the Germans own losses fighting Poland.
Got some numbers to show things one way or the other? Don't forget to factor in the costs associated with occupying France, feeding it (both food and industry), defending it, and dealing with the resistance.

Germany didn't even attempt to feed all of Europe for years. Had they done so, they would have collapsed years earlier. They mostly let Europe starve. Such draconian measures were precisely how the Germans managed to squeeze out the maximum of Western Europe over the next four years: by exporting the hardship onto occupied territories. The expenses of occupation only outpaced the costs in the later years of the war, as did defenses. And besides, the Germans are still gonna have to hold back huge forces against the Soviets to guard against a Anglo-French attack anyways. Without all the loot from Western Europe, Germany won't even have a strategic reserve by 1941, much less later.
In 1944 they let them starve in the west; in most of Europe they did actually feed most people for most of the war except in parts of Poland and the USSR per the Generalplan Ost; in Poland Poles and Jews were fed, though very little; more was rationed for the Poles than the Jews, while Poles working for the Germans were able to get more, which apparently led to a large number of Poles signing up to work in Germany where there was enough food, but terrible treatment. So while Poland isn't going to meet Germany's needs on it's own, it would have been a huge help due to it's surpluses, that is what existed naturally from production and the artificial 'surpluses' created by enacting the Hunger Plan in the General Government area. That genocidal policy then means reduced import requirements compared to the pre-war period and increased long term sustainability of the war effort against the Soviets.
Without Italy being in the war there is also the possibility to source labor and food from Italy, like Germany did with Spain during WW2:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spain_during_World_War_II#Resources_and_trade
https://books.google.com/books?id=Y...wDg#v=onepage&q=spain German ww2 food&f=false

But again Germany can continue it's barter agreements internationally without the blockade.
Plus the ex-pat German communities around the world sent Germany food during the war, but were cut off by the blockade eventually:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade_of_Germany_(1939–1945)#Gruss_und_Kuss
Gruss und Kuss
From the war's beginning, a steady stream of packages, many marked Gruss und Kuss ("greetings and kisses!") had been sent from the United States through neutral countries to Germany by a number of US-based organisations, euphemistically termed 'travel agencies', advertising special combinations of gift packages in German-language newspapers.[30] Despite high prices, one mail company, the Fortra Corporation of Manhattan admitted it had sent 30,000 food packages to Germany in less than three months, a business which exceeded US$1 million per year. The British said that, of 25,000 packages examined in three months, 17,000 contained contraband of food items as well as cash in all manner of foreign currency, diamonds, pearls, and maps of "potential military value." When a ton of air mail from the Pan American Airlines (PAA) flying boat American Clipper was confiscated in Bermuda, the American government banned outright the sending of parcels through the US airmail. During this period, the Italian Lati Airline, flying between South America and Europe was also used to smuggle[31] small articles such as diamonds and platinum, in some cases, concealed within the airframe, until the practice was ended by the Brazilian and US governments and the airline's assets in Brazil confiscated after the British intelligence services in the Americas engineered a breakdown in relations between the airline and the Brazilian government. The US travel agencies were eventually closed down along with the German consulates and information centres on 16 June 1941.

During the early months of the war—the Phoney War—the only place where there was any real fighting was at sea.[4] News of the successes achieved by the men of Contraband Control were rarely out of the newspapers, and provided useful propaganda to shore up civilian morale. In the first 15 weeks of the war the Allies claimed to have taken 870,000 tons of goods, equal to 10% of Germany's normal imports for an entire year. This included 28 million US gallons (110,000 m3) of petrol and enough animal hides for 5 million pairs of boots, and did not take account of the loss to Germany from goods that had not been shipped at all for fear of seizure.

There would be no need to also rely on the Soviets to transship materials for them either to get around the blockade:
the Soviets – 'Belligerent Neutrals' in Churchill's words – also accepted large quantities of wheat, tin, petrol and rubber from America into its ports in the Arctic and Black Sea and, rather than transport them over the entire continent, released identical volumes of the same material to Germany in the west.

Plus Germany was still exporting even after the war started IOTL in 1939 and trade was still extremely valuable, so without blockade and war a lot of revenue can be raised even if not to finance pre-war levels of imports:
From early December 1939 the British began preventing German exports as a reprisal for the damage and loss of life caused by the German magnetic mines.[32]
Before the war, 70% of Germany's export trade was with European countries, mostly the Netherlands, France and England, but the Ministry estimated that Germany's remaining annual exports were worth £44m to South America, £19m to the Far East, £15m to the US, and that although nothing could be done to prevent the overland exports to Scandinavia, Italy, Russia and the Balkans, it was believed that German sea trade could be reduced by 45% by the measure.

Regardless of that Germany was still able to buy in 1940 via friendly neighbors:
A third of Dutchmen derived their livelihood from German trade, and Dutch traders were long suspected of acting as middle men in the supply of copper, tin, oil and industrial diamonds from America. Official figures showed that in the first 5 months of war, the Netherlands' imports of key materials from the US increased by £4.25m, but also Norway's purchases in the same area increased threefold to £3m a year, Sweden's by £5m and Switzerland's by £2m. Prominent in these purchases were cotton, petrol, iron, steel and copper – materials essential for waging war. While some increases may have been inflationary, some from a desire to build up their own armed forces or to stockpile reserves, it was exactly the type of activity the Ministry was trying to prevent.

During the last 4 months of 1939, exports from the USA to the 13 states capable of acting as middlemen to Germany amounted to £52m compared to £35m for the same period in 1938. According to a writer in the New York World Telegram, exports to the 8 countries bordering Germany exceeded the loss of US exports previously sent directly to Germany.

The Germans actually don't have to hold back huge forces against France and Britain, mainly because both of those powers don't want the Soviets to win the war and because their mobilization would take time and give time to properly man defenses. Like throughout the Polish campaign the western border could be held with old conscripts unfit for campaigning with old equipment on the West Wall in case the Allies declared war for whatever reason.

Much of the expenses of fighting Britain, along with the naval, air, defense of Europe, invasion of the Balkans, fighting in the Mediterranean, and even fighting the Soviet Union was financed by the loot from Western Europe. Not being blockaded doesn't mean anything if one doesn't have the cash to import anyways and can't afford to spare anything for export. Fighting the USSR took up overwhelming German resources, which themselves were greatly inflated by the capture of Western Europe.
Some of it was...in 1940-41. But some of it was from Germany (not to mention all the manpower other than Italy) and beyond 1941 nearly all of it was from Germany. All that could be saved without having to fight, while the gains from continuing to export and import would be enormously more beneficial than fighting off of looted stockpiles that didn't even meet usage needs.
Germany was still exporting in 1939 and beyond, including to the USSR and various other states with barter agreements with Germany; Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden among others were dependent on German coal for their electrical networks and they actively aided German trade to get around the blockade before May 1940.

Fighting the USSR never took the majority of German resources or even manpower if you factor in all the Wehrmacht personnel in uniform, but not deployed to the East. "How the War Was Won" p.23 has tables showing that the bulk of armaments and especially ammunition were allocated to the air force and navy, the vast majority of which were fighting the Wallies throughout the war except for a period in 1941 for the air force.

Compared to what the Germans were getting, what they had to export, most of which wasn't even sent, was a pittance. The IOTL trade deals were grossly favorable to Germany. In the end, any of the theoretical savings on those exports gets swallowed up by the industrial demands of actually fighting the Soviets, exactly as happened IOTL. The latter was exorbitantly more expensive then the former.
190 million RM imports from the USSR, 90 Million exports to the USSR. The Soviets in large part were just making up for the loss of Baltic imports when they took over that region (90m RM per year pre-war). The results of getting needed industrial inputs would result in much more war material outputs in terms of value than they'd spend getting the inputs. Plus all the capacity not used up building naval and other materials used IOTL to fight the Wallies can be used for exports to raise money for raw material imports, while specializing war industry for volume production of land war materials for the East, which Germany was not able to do IOTL due to the multi-front war the were fighting, all on what they could produce themselves (not import) or loot. Theoretical savings gets turned into exports to get much more quality raw material imports; beyond that it allows for savings by not having to build up as much synthetic materials industry, as they can import rubber and natural oil instead of having to make only synthetic versions. That a lot of extra coal, iron/steel, and chemicals they can export.

History demonstrates that a Germany even fully mobilized couldn't survive and that is with the massive loot, industrial and otherwise, from Western Europe.
Against the British Empire, the USA, the USSR, and various assorted allies, plus the partisan movements. ITTL we're only talking about fighting the USSR alone, not the rest of the entire United Nations plus occupied nations. Plus of course the loot taken from occupied Europe never approached what Germany was importing pre-war, nor did it even approach offsetting the cost of war spending for even a single year.

Any export program would be quite dependent on British, US, and French cooperation as much of the economic activity went through them. This was recognized by German economists in the pre-war, which is why the proponents of an export emphasized good relations with those countries. Most other countries simply were not wealthy enough to otherwise make up for it. By 1939, the Anglo-French and American governments were already engaged in active economic warfare with Germany. That rogue corporates acted without their consent and against their interests does not change that. Neither France or Britain needed German trade nor did they "go out of their way to help" Germany, something neither of your links even claim much less demonstrate. I’m fact, the latter link says the opposite of everything you’ve been claiming to the point I wonder if you even bothered to read it, given as it says that both German overall exports had been in constant decline from 1932 onwards while imports rose up from 1936 through to 1938, a clear indication of a country burning through it’s currency reserves, before starting to decline in January 1939 (the article doesn’t cover any further, when imports start to fall off a cliff).
Not really, there was plenty of other nations to trade with besides them; it was easier to trade with neighbors right next door, but if there wasn't war, blockade, and expensive economical warfare then they aren't stopping trade around the world. Good relations with major trade partners in a pre-war context is different than wartime trade. The financial problems of the war will hit Germany hard once the war is over, but during the war there are plenty of workarounds to keep the war going at full tilt, especially as the war against the Soviets would only cost a fraction of what was necessary IOTL to also fight the US and UK. Plus friendly neutrals can transship, like the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Spain, etc.
Also the Brits and French don't like the Soviets either, so don't want to see them win and overrun Germany; having to deal with Hitler was bad enough to them, having to deal with a victorious Stalin dominating Central Europe was unacceptable. Leaving Germany alone to ruin herself fighting to a stalemate while crippling Stalin was about the best possible outcome for the French and Brits.

The 1939 economic trade policies of the French, British, and US were nowhere near active trade war; they were defensive moves to defend their trade markets. Per Tooze's table German imports in August 1939 were the highest they had in the pre-war period, so it's not really obvious that any such policy of peacetime 'active economic warfare' was doing anything.

Adam Tooze, Wages of Destruction goes into extensive details. Some of the material for the Atlantic Walls, and literally every other part of the Germany War effort, came from Germany. Some of it came from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Low Countries, or the Balkans. Some of it came from Germany, but the raw materials and manpower to make them came from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Low Countries, or the Balkans.
And any of it from Germany would have been totally saved. None of it would have been necessary. Same with the FLAK towers, Subpens, etc.

Your claims of Germany's economic state in 1939 simply bear no relation to the actual reality: They were in AWFUL shape in 1939 even before the war began and had they not achieved such an easy victory against France, total economic implosion would have occurred by 1941 regardless of how blockaded they were. A protracted fight against the Soviets would have seen them collapse as assuredly as one against the Anglo-French.
Except Tooze actually demonstrates otherwise. Despite never even getting close to pre-war imports except for a very short period at the end of 1940, the German war economy did not implode at all, rather it only continued to increase output despite the damage of the strategic air war and collapsed imports. At the point that imports were the lowest German war output was the highest (in 1944). How does your argument make sense then? Certainly looting did help, but it never even came close to approaching pre-war imports and even at it's very peak from September 1940-December 1940 was only 80% of pre-war import levels; after that importing collapsed to a tiny fraction of pre-war imports, yet Germany was still able to increase output in all categories from 1939 on (before the occupation of western Europe) and even after burning up the loot in 1941 and losing Soviet trade (the war in the East cost vastly more than they ever got from looting Eastern Europe...actually same with the war in the West vs. the looting of Western Europe).
 
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Long bloody war. Likely the Soviets keep up existing production rather than try to replace their existing medium models with a totally new design, while the Axis has already phased in the PzIII and IV for production. KV-1s show up though, as they were already about to enter production and they weren't nearly as disruptive to put into production. But that ignores the realities of things like air combat, where the Germans had much more advanced models in production than the Soviets at the time, so the Soviets don't really get a chance to phase in their 1941 types and they have to keep on with the I-16s for a while. Aircraft like the IL-2, Yak-1, Sturmovik, LaGG-3, Pe-2, MiG-3 were either introduced in 1941 or in late 1940, so too late for this sort of war. The Germans will retain a pretty major edge in the air for a while, especially if the Allies stay out and watch the Totalitarians beat each other to a pulp. So the Soviets face the full brunt of German power (perhaps also Romania and a few other nations like the Baltic states if they get dragged in), but lose a lot less land up front, so can leverage their industry more than IOTL...but then don't get foreign aid, potentially have to face German allies like Japan and Romania and Italy, while also being unable/unwilling to disrupt existing production to put more advanced designs into production.
Short answer then is the war is a blood bath without a clear winner. I think stalemate is the most likely outcome in the end, especially if the Allies stay out. If Japan gets in along with other European allies of Germany things get interesting, as the Allies then will have reason to get involved at some point due to the Soviets likely losing.
In that case I-185 may very likely make it into production.
 

Deleted member 1487

In that case I-185 may very likely make it into production.
What makes you think that?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polikarpov_I-185
The I-185, designed in early 1940, was based on the I-180, which was itself a development of the I-16, but was virtually a new design.
It was designed around engines that weren't ready, which is why it was dropped, and started after the POD/war starts. Plus it didn't sound like it had a particularly lucky testing history, which was dependent on engines not really ready until 1942-43.
 
What makes you think that?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polikarpov_I-185

It was designed around engines that weren't ready, which is why it was dropped, and started after the POD/war starts. Plus it didn't sound like it had a particularly lucky testing history, which was dependent on engines not really ready until 1942-43.
They would be pushed to keep I-180 going on and not to cancel it. From that eventually some version of I-185 would come.
Meanwhile I—16 would be soldiering on.
 

Deleted member 1487

They would be pushed to keep I-180 going on and not to cancel it. From that eventually some version of I-185 would come.
Meanwhile I—16 would be soldiering on.
Sounds like Stalin had a personal dislike for the aircraft/designer, while the Aviation Ministry wanted a liquid cooled engine aircraft:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polikarpov_I-180
According to some recent historians, such as Mikhail Maslov, the cancellation of the I-180 was caused by personal and non content-related reasons and might be considered an error.[4][7] Especially after Chkalov's death, the Soviet authorities started to promote young designers, in preference to Polikarpov, despite the fact that the I-180 was the best performing Soviet fighter at the time of its cancellation and that it was faster than the Bf 109.
How do you mitigate against Stalin being Stalin?
Certainly the I-180 sounds like a winner.
 
How do you mitigate against Stalin being Stalin?
Early war against Germany? I-180, even if still bit troubled it is only available modern aircraft at the time hostility starts. Even Stalin OTL did some surprising turnarounds when necessary.

I-180 was last development of I-16. I am curious if it had at least some common parts with it.
 

Deleted member 1487

Early war against Germany? I-180, even if still bit troubled it is only available modern aircraft at the time hostility starts. Even Stalin OTL did some surprising turnarounds when necessary.
Perhaps, but assuming a 1939 start it wasn't available yet and still needed development, plus had accidents in it's future (loss of another prototype/pilot on September 5th 1939).

Plus given the fetishization of the Bf109 that happened IOTL anyway and the likelihood of it happening even more given the rough handling Soviet pilots were going to get in 1939, it might be marginalized anyway in favor of the LaGG-1/3 and Yak-1.

Without a doubt Stalin could change his mind, but often he didn't and he could be destructively stubborn:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purge_of_the_Red_Army_in_1941#1941_Purge

I-180 was last development of I-16. I am curious if it had at least some common parts with it.
Wikipedia made it sound like basically a new aircraft from production standpoint.
 
Perhaps, but assuming a 1939 start it wasn't available yet and still needed development, plus had accidents in it's future (loss of another prototype/pilot on September 5th 1939).

Plus given the fetishization of the Bf109 that happened IOTL anyway and the likelihood of it happening even more given the rough handling Soviet pilots were going to get in 1939, it might be marginalized anyway in favor of the LaGG-1/3 and Yak-1.

Without a doubt Stalin could change his mind, but often he didn't and he could be destructively stubborn:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purge_of_the_Red_Army_in_1941#1941_Purge


Wikipedia made it sound like basically a new aircraft from production standpoint.
It may be marginalized. On other side it was flying much sooner then LaGG or Yak. Especially LaGG had much trubled start and 2100 modification were requsted.

Yes. At least two prototypes crashed. Interestingly Bf 109 prototypes had their shares of crashes and problems too.

Interestingly according to wikiPolikarpov was sent to Germany in late 1939. If relations are worst trip may not happen. While he was in Germany Gureyvich proposed I-200 (MiG) project and was placed in Mikojan design office. This could be butterflied too or if not Polikarpov may have bit more time to iron I-180 problems.
 

Deleted member 1487

It may be marginalized. On other side it was flying much sooner then LaGG or Yak. Especially LaGG had much trubled start and 2100 modification were requsted.

Yes. At least two prototypes crashed. Interestingly Bf 109 prototypes had their shares of crashes and problems too.

Interestingly according to wikiPolikarpov was sent to Germany in late 1939. If relations are worst trip may not happen. While he was in Germany Gureyvich proposed I-200 (MiG) project and was placed in Mikojan design office. This could be butterflied too or if not Polikarpov may have bit more time to iron I-180 problems.
Perhaps, butterflies could go all sorts of ways.
 

Deleted member 1487

Indeed. But I guess even if everything goes well for Polikarpov and I-180 it wouldn’t be showing in units sooner then early summer 1940.
Depending on the build quality too; early 1941 modern Soviet aircraft had a lot of quality control problems.
 
Unless the Germans stop being German the partisans in conquered areas of Poland and the USSR are still going to be a problem too.
 

Deleted member 1487

Unless the Germans stop being German the partisans in conquered areas of Poland and the USSR are still going to be a problem too.
When did the partisan problem become serious in Poland? As it was the Germans would have substantially more resources to dedicate to suppressing those problems than IOTL without occupying the Balkans or Western Europe. As it was it seems the AK (Polish Home Army) wasn't founded until 1942. They were created out of a previous organization, but seem to have been pretty much dormant from 1939-42 in part due to mass arrests and suppression by the Germans. They mostly focused on intelligence gathering, counterintelligence, and organizing for a later mass uprising with minor sabotage in the meantime, as early attempts to attack occupation forces ended badly for the partisans and civilians. Later sabotage operations ran into that same problem, so that while successful the price paid by civilians was no something the Home Army was willing to accept. The first such large operation was in August 1942 according to Polish wikipedia. The next major one I can find was efforts in mid-1943 to attack German army outposts in Southern Poland and efforts to resist mass expulsions from 1942-44.
I'm not sure what if any impact Polish resistance would have on the war ITTL; Soviet partisan resistance as a factor would depend on how deep the Germans actually get ITTL.
 
Well there were more then AK or Zwiazek walki zbrojnej.

And of course there was pro communist, Soviet Supported Guardia Ludowa/ Armia Ludowa created in 1942.

Of course partisan activities, as much as annoying can’t really do much demage if not supplied properly.

Taking into consideration reaction of Germans against civilian population in Eastern Europe after attacks...

In this scenerio Everything depends how much support they can be given by Soviets in case GL/ AL.
Very likely GL/ AL would absorb many other organizations if there is not support from west. Of course not all due political differences.

Even OTL significant support - air drops from Britain for AK was possible only later when bombers with longer range got into service.

Brits calculated that support of 45000 resistance fighters would require 2000 sorties a year. AK had some 300000 men. Plus there were other resistance groups. So 13333 sorties a year of would be required.

OTL Special service Squadrons Flew 13500 in entire war. That’s includes Lysander flights to France, flights to support other resistance movements, from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to Norway or Netherland.
 

Deleted member 1487

Well there were more then AK or Zwiazek walki zbrojnej.

And of course there was pro communist, Soviet Supported Guardia Ludowa/ Armia Ludowa created in 1942.

Of course partisan activities, as much as annoying can’t really do much demage if not supplied properly.

Taking into consideration reaction of Germans against civilian population in Eastern Europe after attacks...

In this scenerio Everything depends how much support they can be given by Soviets in case GL/ AL.
Very likely GL/ AL would absorb many other organizations if there is not support from west. Of course not all due political differences.

Even OTL significant support - air drops from Britain for AK was possible only later when bombers with longer range got into service.

Brits calculated that support of 45000 resistance fighters would require 2000 sorties a year. AK had some 300000 men. Plus there were other resistance groups. So 13333 sorties a year of would be required.

OTL Special service Squadrons Flew 13500 in entire war. That’s includes Lysander flights to France, flights to support other resistance movements, from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to Norway or Netherland.
Plus that was while at war with Germany; good luck trying to fly secret missions on that scale while at peace. Apparently while the Polish intelligence service was in exile in Paris they only had tenuous contact with the resistance movement in Poland and it was only later after getting fully established in Britain that they were able to get reliable contact.
 
You're entitled to your own opinion, but not your own facts. The dominant factor was Germany fighting a multi-front war against multiple major opponents, each of which outnumbered her alone; it is no mystery that the Soviet 'skillz revival' happened right as the Luftwaffe was being pulled off to other fronts and Germany was facing US forces on the ground.

Of course it's no mystery. After all, the improvement in Soviet tactics and operational conduct in late-1942 is a well documented phenomenon. The other explanations, however, do not hold up to scrutiny: the no German ground units in 1942 who faced the Americans were pulled from the USSR and the diversion of Luftwaffe air power did not affect the strength of the Luftwaffe where and when it mattered most (that is, at Stalingrad).

I didn't say it had completed it by January 1st 1944, but over the course of 1944 inflicted fatal damage to it; in 1943 it had struck serious wounds on the economy that were felt into 1944, the Ruhr bombing for instance blunting any growth in armaments production for months, which Tooze describes in detail in his book.

Tooze also describes how the loss of territory and the concurrent resources in 1944 was an even bigger blow to German industry then anything the WAllied bombing offensive managed to achieve.

Scrapping the bottom of the barrel in 1945 to dredge up some obsolete gear to fight a war that was already over is hardly proof of the importance of Western European resources. Captured fuel was used up by the end of 1941, raw material stocks were as well, France and Western Europe yielded food through 1944, but most of that was used to feed the occupied peoples and occupying forces; remove the need to occupy Western Europe and you lose the need for the vast majority of the weapons used, plus Hitler building up a bunch of new divisions for planned use on other fronts instead of supplying the forces in the East during Barbarossa.

The equipment issued in 1945 was the last of the loot from 1940, but the key words there is LAST. Raw material stocks from the occupied territories were not used up until late-1944, as the Germans were exploiting Western and the Balkan territories right up until they were overrun. Without the occupation of Western Europe and the Balkans, you lose the ability to manufacture even larger quantities of weapons then what was used as well as the manpower for those new divisions.

Did you totally ignore the article (from 1938 BTW) I posted about how the Germans were mostly not financing imports with cash?

No, I just noted how it doesn't support your argument that Germany could afford to increase exports in the midst of a massive war. Rather the opposite, actually: it states that exports FELL during the course of German peacetime rearmament, with the biggest drops occurring in 1938. "Exports suffered a sharper decline in 1938" and while "there were signs of improvement in world trade in the final quarter of the year" that clearly was not shared by the German economy given that "the monthly total for January, 1939, was 12.5 per cent below that for December, 1938." Indeed, the article alludes to the imminent collapse of the shell import/export game Germany was playing when it states: "In striving to increase her sales abroad, moreover, Germany is meeting stronger resistance from competing exporters and from purchasers of her products who have begun to discover the disadvantages of trading, under the conditions imposed by the Reich." (emphasis added) If Germany couldn't sustain it's export program in the face of it's peacetime rearmament, then it certainly isn't going to be able to while waging a war to the death against the USSR.

Then there is the political issue. Given that Germany is going to be engaged in a life-or-death struggle where the military is going to be screaming for every ounce of industry to be devoted to providing it with the weapons and munitions to hold off the Bolsheviks reinforced by Hitler's antipathy to world trade as anything more then a short-term measure*, the Nazis are not likely to make the decision to divert any industry to export measures.

*"While Hitler, for economic reasons, uttered token gestures of support towards Germany’s exporters throughout the 1930s, he harboured, in fact, a deep antipathy towards the notion of world trade. To Hitler, foreign trade was to function as a “short-term means to overcome a crisis” not as a major long-term economic strategy." -"Export or Die"; Foreign Trade in the Third Reich, Christian Leitz.

Tooze doesn't really explain how then the Luftwaffe production rapidly recovered and expanded beyond previous highs as soon as war was declared (show on Tooze's chart P.305),

Yes he does: by the release of Germany's emergency reserves of resources in July of 1939.

Also on P.333 Tooze has a chart showing imported industrial inputs to Germany, which were rising and peaked in August 1939, collapsing due to the start of the war and blockade, never thereafter rising to pre-war levels. Even at the peak of importing during the war from I assume occupied countries and the Soviet trade deal pre-1941, it was only 80% of the pre-war importing peak. It fell from January 1941 on throughout the rest of the war, despite German war production increasing from 1941 on to all time highs; 1944 was as low or lower an import bottom as January 1940, but production in 1944 was at an all time high. How the hell did that work if pre-war the import situation was collapsing as Tooze claims, and the peak import period after the war started ended by January 1941?

Per your claims that would have ONLY been a period of collapsing production rather than increasing output as actually happened IOTL throughout 1940-44.

Tooze:
View attachment 389254

Tooze himself says the German economy not only avoided economic collapse, but was able to increase war output to new highs.

The chart you posted shows, contrary to your claim, as the peak being in January 1939 and not August. It shows an abrupt drop in February, followed by flatlining in the summer before the war begins. And Tooze makes clear that the German increasing output of IOTL 1940-44 was achieved via the exploitation of occupied territories that Germany has not occupied IATL. That German imports continued to fall from January 1941 was offset and then some by ruthless exploitation of occupied territories.

Tooze shows that despite all those losses, pre-France invasion outputs only increased despite imports utterly collapsing:
View attachment 389255

View attachment 389260

That would be when Germany was burning through it's emergency reserves. Tooze also makes clear that it would not have been sustainable without the occupation of Western Europe. Not for nothing is the relevant chapter titled "Going for Broke".

Without war they could continue to contract foreign labor as they had been pre-war and they were during the war, especially from Italy. Slave labor wasn't particularly good, especially considering the sabotage of material rates, but in huge bulk it had utility; the thing is without needing to fight any other conflict but the Eastern Front they didn't need the huge bulk of slave labor used IOTL. Depending on how far they get and how many Soviet soldiers they capture, much of that labor would still be available.

Your gonna have to prove that the quantities of contract foreign labor, in addition to ultimately to being afforable for Germany's depleted currency reserves to maintain, reaches the numbers the German industry needed. Slave labor may not have been "good" but it was the only feasible option given Germany's manpower situation. And yes, they will very much need similar levels of slave labor as that was what provided them with the manpower to manufacture much of the weapons used for just the Eastern Front IOTL, never mind the rest of the fronts. And no, only a fraction of the labor from the USSR itself would be available as the Germans only have a capacity to take a fraction of the land and prisoners.

In 1944 they let them starve in the west; in most of Europe they did actually feed most people for most of the war except in parts of Poland and the USSR per the Generalplan Ost;

Incorrect. German systematic starvation started as early as 1941 and even in the west rations, if not at starvation levels, were lower then in Germany itself.

But again Germany can continue it's barter agreements internationally without the blockade.

Barter agreements that are inadequate to get it to the production level it achieved in 1941-45.

Plus Germany was still exporting even after the war started IOTL in 1939 and trade was still extremely valuable, so without blockade and war a lot of revenue can be raised even if not to finance pre-war levels of imports:

Unfortunately, without those imports Germany can only manage a quarter of what it managed in 1942.

Regardless of that Germany was still able to buy in 1940 via friendly neighbors:

Yes, it was able to buy inadequate quantities, with the gap having to be made up with the

The Germans actually don't have to hold back huge forces against France and Britain

Yes they do. Those are furiously rearming powers and even if they don't have the slightest intention of attacking Germany first, there isn't any way for the Germans to truly know that and thus Hitler will be compelled to retain significant forces to guard against the possibility of an attack from 1941 onwards. The Germans do not have a crystal ball allowing them to divine their enemies intentions with perfect clarity.

Some of it was...in 1940-41. But some of it was from Germany (not to mention all the manpower other than Italy) and beyond 1941 nearly all of it was from Germany.

Beyond 1941, much of the resources were provided came from the occupied territory even if indirectly (like in the extraction). The manpower too was only available because of the mass drafting of slave labor, which freed up German workers for the fronts in both the east and west that otherwise would have had to work in the factories.

Fighting the USSR never took the majority of German resources or even manpower if you factor in all the Wehrmacht personnel in uniform, but not deployed to the East. "How the War Was Won" p.23 has tables showing that the bulk of armaments and especially ammunition were allocated to the air force and navy, the vast majority of which were fighting the Wallies throughout the war except for a period in 1941 for the air force.

Fighting the USSR took up the majority of German resources from 1941 through to 1944. Only the vast majority of the navy was fighting the WAllies. For the Luftwaffe, the amount devoted was 57% which while a majority is not a VAST majority. Furthermore, the charts you have already posted clearly shows that nearly half of the armaments and ammunition was allocated to the ground forces, with the air force being allocated a somewhat smaller slice and the navy receiving the rest. And in any case, much of these resources will not be available IATL as they were derived, directly or indirectly, from the exploitation of occupied territories.

190 million RM imports from the USSR, 90 Million exports to the USSR.

A woeful underestimate. For 1940-41, Soviet imports constituted 720 million RM. This included key resources that Germany did not have the finances to acquire, such as oil, rubber, and others. Much of the payment that was promised to the USSR, in turn, was never sent.

And any of it from Germany would have been totally saved. None of it would have been necessary. Same with the FLAK towers, Subpens, etc.

Resources available from Germany in 1943-45 cannot be applied to a war in 1939-1942, even ignoring how much of that is indirectly owed to exploitation of occupied territories.

Except Tooze actually demonstrates otherwise. Despite never even getting close to pre-war imports except for a very short period at the end of 1940, the German war economy did not implode at all, rather it only continued to increase output despite the damage of the strategic air war and collapsed imports. At the point that imports were the lowest German war output was the highest (in 1944). How does your argument make sense then?

You claim Tooze "demonstrates otherwise", but that just shows you either haven't read his book or haven't understood it. The very basis of Wage's of Destruction's thesis is that the ruthless exploitation of the very same occupied territories that Germany does not have access too IATL was what sustained the German war output through 1941-1944. Hell, much of the expansion of German war industry in 1941-42 that allowed it to achieve the production levels of 1943-44 was likewise financed with the loot from Western and Central Europe.

Nazism's brutality allowed it to squeeze the maximum amount of blood from the stone or, as Tooze puts it, "The key to this awful resilience of the Third Reich lay precisely in the alliance formed in the aftermath of Moscow between some of the most brutal exponents of Nazi ideology and the key powerholders of the German economy." (Tooze, "The Wages of Destruction," pp.550-551) IATL, the stone is much smaller and so thus so is what the Nazis can get out of it.
 
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Deleted member 1487

'Nuker I'm working on a reply, but it is taking a while.

For the sake of grounding the discussion a bit in specific scenario, for OP and everyone else still bothering with the thread, is the situation that the Allies (Britain+France) for whatever reason choosing not to give Poland a guarantee, so when Hitler invades in September they stay neutral, but are unhappy about it, while Stalin takes a hard line and declares war against the Germans after they have conquered most of Poland by October? As a result of the Nazi-Soviet war then the Allies decide to sit back and watch how things turn out and rebuild their militaries in case they need to intervene one way or another? What is Japan doing here then? Nomonhan was only temporarily resolved by a cease fire on September 16th, so it is possible that the Japanese Army is able to leverage Tokyo into resuming hostilities once the fighting in Europe breaks out, knowing that the Soviets will be preoccupied. Their neutrality pact wasn't signed until April 1941.

So clashes happening in October means that the Germans pretty much have taken most of Poland (IOTL they had taken the oil fields in the South producing some 600,000 tons of oil per year) and Brest Fortress by September 15th) when the Soviets strike back. Given their OTL performance against the Poles they probably won't do so well, but the Germans have blown through most of their ammo stockpiles and are pretty far forward of their rail heads given the planning for the campaign, so likely nothing spectacular is going to happen before Spring 1940. IOTL the Germans had plenty of juice to fight the French, British, Belgians, Dutch, and Norwegians in May 1940 mostly before getting any Soviet trade and here they are likely to have kept the Polish oil fields in total plus the agricultural areas of East Poland, not to mention trade on the world market, which was ongoing even through the blockade IOTL.

The question is how far does an April-May 1940 German offensive get in the East given that Romania is probably neutral (maybe not if Stalin attacks) as are the Baltic States (again unless Stalin attacks or Hitler tries to leverage them into the war), while the Stalin Line is intact? Seems like both sides would have some serious issues trying to push each other out of their positions by 1940 given that the Soviets will be well prepared to defend by then, despite their deficits, while the Germans also have Polish forts to use in East Poland and a dearth of rail lines/roads/good defensive terrain to hold the line to the East. Flanking moves by either military through neutrals on either side is likely to bring a lot of problems with it in terms of international reaction or just being met by additional resistance from the locals and help from the other side. Seems like a ripe situation for a stalemate and negotiated peace.

Topgraphic map:
https://maps.geshergalicia.org/galicia/poland-interwar-1939-2/

23f6a067599ae98276b159b7685c0abf_XL.jpg


poland_1939.jpg
 
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