Germany victory WW1 in first submarine offensive

At the moment this is a hope for discussion

How to bring this about is what I want. Typical of life, the notes I did last night seem to have saved to the harddrive not the pendrive

I think I am looking at 1915 here

I know this is a bit crap as a post, but want to get a discussion thread up before Monday afternoon (the next time I hacve access to the net)

So, please ideas and suggestions

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
Did they have enough submarines by 1915 to achieve this - given they'd have to go round Scotland, limiting the numbers of subs on active operations as opposed to transit? 4 torpedoes and a pop-gun won't allow for a lot of success in any case, especially if the British began arming more merchant ships as a preventative measure.


I can see the RN footdragging in its refusal to change to convoys in 1917 - a nod to it, but carrying on much as before - causing even worse problems than TTL, so that'd be my bet. Although I doubt it'd be allowed to cause Britain to sue for peace, if the shortages grew worse, to levels endured by the CP nations in 1918, it could cause more civil disorder and a lowering of morale, which could have knock-on effects.
 
Did they have enough submarines by 1915 to achieve this - given they'd have to go round Scotland, limiting the numbers of subs on active operations as opposed to transit? 4 torpedoes and a pop-gun won't allow for a lot of success in any case, especially if the British began arming more merchant ships as a preventative measure.

AFAIK, German submarines were based in Flanders and got through English Channel during most of the war. A succesful unrestricted U-boat campaign _might_ have been a success but would have required a build-up lasting for perhaps a year to construct and train sufficient number of U-boats for true shock effect. After all, U-boats did sunk some 881 000 tons in April 1917 when the force was sizeable and all gloves were taken off.

I think a best bet would be that German naval leadership in early 1915 recognizes a possibility of a long war and manages to order a large number of U-boats for it's purposes. If there's no, as in OTL, political justification for unrestricted campaign yet, this project can be presented as a way to attrite Allied naval strength through torpedo and mine attack campaign. Voila, by late 1915 there's a sub force ready for action which could be employed in a terrible swift stroke.

Torpedo attack boats (U-boats) from U-2 onwards had 6 torpedoes, U-66 type had 12 torps, and 88 or 105mm deck gun. Even coastal UB's had 6-10 torps from UB-II onwards.
 
You need a POD around 1910 to have the Germans build a greater number and more powerful subs. Say, Tirpitz realises that the Brits might conduct a wide blockade instead of risking their ships in a close blockade or a serious brush with the HSF - and thinks that submarine warfare is the adequate answer. (The possibility of the wide blockade was known to the Germans at that time but disregarded by the mainstream strategists.)
1915 is good, they'd need some time to develop doctrine and gain experience.
In 1915, the Channel mine barriers weren't up, so the subs could go two ways, through the Channel and around Scotland.
You'll need about 20 - 25 in the Irish Sea, that accounts for a sub fleet of more than 500
 
The world is full of paradoxes, and so should alternate history be. Tom's excellent "Operation Unicorn" is masterful at showing how a victory in one quarter can lead to or be balanced by a defeat in another. Everything is complex and inter-related, and rarely in OTL does a victory lead to a victory lead to a victory and so on. Sometimes a victory can be the cause of ultimate defeat...

I considered using the Scarborough raid as the POD for this, but decided that OTL events around and in the wake of Dogger Bank gave me a surer footing on the matter. True, Unrestricted Submarine Warfare was being put forward by Pohl (Chief of the German Naval Staff) in November 1914, but at that point it did not have the backing required. Perhaps, had Warrender caught Hipper after the Scarborough raid (and he had a good chance to, after Ingenohl went home with the rest of the HSF) then matters might have come to a head. But I can feel a bit more sure-footed if we use Dogger Bank, since in OTL that was the catalyst anyway

The Battle of Dogger Bank occurred on 24th January 1915, so this is where our tail begins. Singnalling confusion in OTL caused the British battlecruisers to break off their pursuit of their German counterparts, and return to focus on the already-dommed Blucher. The essence of the signalling confusion was Beatty's seemingly-inexplicable decision to turn away from the Germans on a North-Easterly course. Damage to the Lion precluded the possibility of using the wireless since the dynamos were all shut down, whilst the signal halywards had been reduced to two. Beatty therefore could only use brief signals, and not explain himself. To the other captains the whole thing was mysterious, and they tried to second-guess what he wanted, and why. In the final resort, once command had devolved by default to Admiral Moore on the New Zealand, he continued to try to second-guess Beatty and issued orders on the basis of what he assumed was being asked.

And all this because Beatty thought he saw a periscope ! Which, considering the scope and subject matter of this thread, is really rather ironic. Let us, therefore, remove this outbreak of periscopitis (no one else on Lion's bridge saw anything and one assumes it was a nervous reaction from the admiral who had just had his flagship shot up around him, and was understandably anxious about whether the whole battle was in fact a trap). In the alternative I am proposing, Beatty doesn't see a shadow out of the corner of his eye, or whatever he mistook for a periscope, and allows the pursuit of the German battlecruisers to continue. The Blucher is clearly doomed, and can be left for later - it is the badly-damaged Seydlitz, and the damaged Derfflinger which are the prizes here.

Thus the Battle of Dogger Bank is a tremendous British victory - the Blucher, Seydlitz and Derfflinger are sunk, along with the German destroyers which Hipper throws into action in an attempt to drive off the pursuit (OTL he gave this order then rescinded it after the British turnaway which he assumed was in response). Moltke and escorting cruisers flee home, but Hipper is dead, and the German battlecruiser force shattered. The Kaiser is apoplectic (which is surprisingly hard to spell) and although he doesn't do a Hitler-like "Scrap the fleet" rant, there are elements of it in his ravings.

OTL the decision was made to begin Unrestricted Submarine Warfare on 4th February, with the offensive beginning in earnest on the 22nd. Presumably these are more or less the earliest dates possible, give or take a few days at the start. One assumes there were various councils, meetings, discussions etc, but here the Kaiser is likely to be more forceful, and to meet less opposition so the dates could be advanced by a few days. I doubt the interval can be much-changed, since it presumably is made up of time to get the submarines on station, responding to new orders etc. If we advance things by a couple of days, then USW could begin on the 19th February, the same day as the Allied attempt to force the Dardanelles begins.

OTL the problem is three-fold -
-1- not enough submarines to properly pursue the offensive
-2- not enough new submarines being built to replace losses, or allow for a gradual increase in the offensive
-3- the protests of the United States (and other neutrals)

OTL again (since we are dealing with divergences we need to know what really happened) the first period of USW lasted from the latter part of February 1915 to early June 1915; on the 7th May the Lusitania was sunk, and on the 5th June under US pressure, Germany decreed that it would no longer attack large liners.

This second period of USW lasted from early June to the end of August, when after the sinking of the Arabic on the 19th August, and increased US pressure, Germany decreed on the 27th August that it would no longer attack any liners whatsoever *(which considering that converted liners were being used as armed merchant cruisers and troopships was a bit of a blow). The third stage of USW staggered into September, before it was formally ended.

With the advantage of hindsight one can wonder what a reluctant US declaration of war in 1915 would be like - there would not have been the build-up that had occurred before the OTL declaration in 1917, and various problems would remain unresolved - not least the US intervention in Mexico, and the lack of an army. There are also, of course, less US dreadnought battleships around to risk sending to Europe.

German naval building commitments continued to include battleships and battlecruisers that would never see service, or if they did would never see action. What I am proposing is that the Kaiser demands that anything which cannot be completed in 12 months or so be cancelled - this would allow the Lutzow to complete, and (with the usual optimistic lies of people caught in a corner) work on Baden and Bayern to continue. But not only would the Ersatz Hertha and the Mackensens, Sachsen and Wurttemberg, be delayed, they would be effectively cancelled. The Ersatz Yorcks will never get off paper, and no material is going to be gathered for these ships. Thus, slips, resources and manpower is going to be available for a major building effort to expand the submarine fleet

A comparison with Britain might be useful here. When Fisher returned to the Admiralty in November 1914 he convened a conference to look at Royal Naval building and threw a huge number of new contracts about. Specifically relevant here, he demanded new construction on submarines, not sign-off on new construction, but the start of new construction. He also threw large orders to Bethlehem for additional submarines, which were delivered within six months. Whilst its unlikely that the Germans know the details of any of this, they do have the capacity to crash-build such units if they can gather the will to do so.

Hopefully, I am giving them that will. Six months for new construction would take us into August, but a dedication to construction would mean that existing contracts would get a boost, and that new submarines capable of pursuing the offensive would be available somewhat earlier than OTL.

In addition, in the face of the loss of face (I hate it when that happens!) of Dogger Bank, Germany is less concerned with the reaction of the USA. It is increasingly clear that Wilson's neutrality favours the Entente powers, and that the USA is making credit and armaments available. Sure, there were words to the effect that the USA would trade with anyone, but how can Germany or Austria-Hungary manage this in the face of the British blockade? Its obvious that the US is aware of this, and that Wilson is aware that his policies favour the Entente. Its not too large a step for German leaders over Summer 1915 to reckon that even if the USA is pushed into a declaration of war the actual help that it can give the Entente powers won't be much more than they are already giving them. Perhaps twelve months later it would, but by that time USW can have won the war

The knock-on from Dogger Bank is unlikely to change much in terms of dates of anything in the first part of 1915 - Italy will sign the Treaty of London on 26th April, and will declare war around a month later. Possibly it will be slightly earlier than OTL, both due to Dogger Bank and to what might be happening in the Dardanelles

Operations there began on the 19th February, and in OTL the landings at Gallipoli took place on the 25th April. What one has to wonder though, is whether the removal of two additional German battlecruisers has had any effect on British policy - OTL the decision to send the Queen Elizabeth and two older battlecruisers to the Dardanelles caused major arguments within the British naval heirarchy, based on considerations and fears of relative strength back in the North Sea. Here, that ratio is better, tho one assumes that in addition to Lion, another two British battlecruisers probably need urgent and perhaps lengthy dockyard treatment after Dogger Bank. Thus, overall, the active ratio may not be much altered. I do think, tho, that the boost of Dogger Bank and the existence, even if in dockyard hands, of a superiority in numbers, would have lessened the force of the argument.

Paradoxically, that might have led to the Queen Elizabeth remaining at the Dardanelles longer and being torpedoed. Paradoxically back (!), she is likely to survive, and the German focus on attacking her will in turn mean that a couple of old battleships that were sunk in OTL survive, and that British prestige is not damaged by their loss. The limping into dockyard hands of the Queen Elizabeth looks like a blow but is not as bad as it could have been

Thus things are not MUCH changed - yes to a few dates, yes to a few details, but the operation to pass the Straits still fails, and the landings at Gallipoli take place. Italy views things as clearly flowing the Entente's way, and enters the war, probably a week or so earlier than OTL since it would take somewhat less to convince everyone in this scenario.

Meanwhile Handelskrieg (literally "trade warfare" but applied by the Germans to USW) continues unabated. Large liners continue to be targets, and perhaps we can posit another one sunk in July, with American loss of life. This ratchets up the pressure, already at the boil after the Germans apparently ignored US protests over the Lusitania. But high Summer is when USW can really begin to come into its own as numbers of submarines available start to increase dramatically, and beter materiele, better tactics, etc all have an added effect.

The pre-dreadnoughts are probably also decommissioned in this scenario too. What use a load of old battleships when the decision has been made to win the war under the sea ? No doubt this causes resignations and argument, but it does free up a large number of crews for the submarines. Utilising the Kiel Canal, the High Seas Fleet can continue to maintain a dual focus on the Bight and the Baltic, and the loss of the older ships simply means that it has given up on the idea of forcing a battle in the North Sea in favourable circumstances - Dogger Bank will be cited to show that favourable circumstances are not likely to occur !

Late August would see a substantial increase in the number of submarines at sea at any one time, but also likely see the US decision to enter the war. In German eyes it would become a race - to starve Britain out over the next few months before the US can make their entry into the war count.

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
Fellatio Nelson said:
Did they have enough submarines by 1915 to achieve this - given they'd have to go round Scotland, limiting the numbers of subs on active operations as opposed to transit? 4 torpedoes and a pop-gun won't allow for a lot of success in any case, especially if the British began arming more merchant ships as a preventative measure.


I can see the RN footdragging in its refusal to change to convoys in 1917 - a nod to it, but carrying on much as before - causing even worse problems than TTL, so that'd be my bet. Although I doubt it'd be allowed to cause Britain to sue for peace, if the shortages grew worse, to levels endured by the CP nations in 1918, it could cause more civil disorder and a lowering of morale, which could have knock-on effects.

Yes, this is what I am aiming at.

Its going to look as if a combination of disasters and setbacks have been topped by a submarine blockade that is slowly strangling the British Isles in Autumn/Winter 1915.

The submarines used for this offensive will be mostly the larger ones ordered in February/March, now coming into full commission, with a full replacement programme in place, the shipyards having worked up to it, and the crews from the pre-dreadnoughts available to provide sufficient experienced officers, and younger eager men alike.

Whilst German SW Afrika surrendered in July 1915, fighting continues on in Cameroon all through the Summer and Autumn, and into January 1916, so whilst the newspapers are reporting steady, if very expensive, victories for Entente forces there, they are not able to report the victorious close of the campaign. German E Afrika is, of course, another case altogether

October has seen Mackensen's joint German-Austrian offensive against Serbia, with the fall of Belgrade on the 8th, and the entry into the war of Bulgaria a couple of days later sealing the fate of the Serb emergency capital in Nish, which falls to them on November 5th. Thereafter, the Serbs retreat Westwards, from the 23rd November entering the Albanian hills and withdrawing towards the sea.

Now, it could be said that the changes that the Germans have made to their naval priorities have had some positive side-effects for the British, but its difficult to see these being decisive. The decommissioning of the pre-dreadnoughts, and the use of the dreadnoughts in the Baltic, as well as the Bight, has made it pretty clear that Germany has given up the, rather forelorn, hope of fighting a fleet engagement in advantageous circumstances. When the British admiralty finally accept this (and one imagines it would take them some time due to scepticism etc) they are thus able to remove entire battle squadrons from the Grand Fleet.

If Churchill and Fisher were still in charge there's the POSSIBILITY that they would resurrect their grand plan of entry into the Baltic, but the Dardanelles and Gallipoli went pretty much according to OTL here. The Suvla Offensive was in early August 1915 and failed to achieve much in terms of overall gains. The landings at Salonika occur in early October, whilst the successful evacuation of forces from Gallipoli occurs from mid November to late December (early January for Helles).

Its going to look to the British public that their forces have got very good at managing retreats - from Gallipoli, on the one hand, and the evacuation of the Serbs via Albania on the other. True, both evacuations end up with reinforcement for Salonika, but the front there is bogged down from the start.

Additional British battlesquadrons in the Med, Ionian Sea and Aegean are unlikely to achieve any greater gains - they would be a DISINCENTIVE for the Austrians, or the Ottomans, to come out in fleet strength. Paradoxically, if Britain does send some additional dreadnoughts to these theatres they may well simply provide additional targets for submarines, and we might be talking about the loss of the Monarch off Corfu, for example, as an almost by-the-by event in this timeline.

One supposes that Britain could also pay off some more of its pre-dreadnoughts and use their crews in anti-submarine warfare

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
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By late 1915 it will be looking as if everything is going wrong for the Entente and Allied powers. Additional to the details posted in my previous post (eek it happened again !), we also have

- Italy in its Isonzo offensives.
The Second is halted by Cadorna on 2nd August, after losing 60,000 men, compared to 45,000 amongst the Austro-Hungarians
The 3rd Isonzo Offensive takes place from October to 3rd November 1915, and is completely unsuccessful
The 4th Isonzo Offensive begins on 10th November and lasts to early December without achieving anything

- Russia
Initial gains against Austria-Hungary are reversed with the German-led Gorlice-Tarnow offensive of April-June 1915, which sees the fall of Przemysyl on 4th June, the Russian evacuation of Galicia during June, and the German recapture of Lemberg/Lvov on 22nd June

It is interesting to note that apart from some minor bulges in and out here and there, the Russian line in the Polish theatre does not much change from 1915 to 1917, and thus by 1915 is more or less as bad as it is going to get (for some time)

Russia also launches a November/December 1915 offensive from Bessarabia, which is finally abandoned 10th January 1916 after proving a total failure and incurring losses of around 50,000 men


It will seem to people that combining this with the collapse of Serbia, the evacuation from Gallipoli, and the stalemate at Salonika, plus little movement on the Western Front is presenting a picture of almost relentless Allied failure.

Even the entry of the USA into the war in Autumn 1915 won't have an immediate effect - it might SEEM to, since the JP Morgan loan it floated for the Entente in OTL, will now become associated in people's minds with the accession of the USA as a co-belligerent. But compared to OTL, its not going to provide much more in terms of material aid to the British.

In fact, the entry of the USA into the war may well cause significant changes in China. During 1915, Japan presented its infamous Twenty-One Demands to Yuan Shih'kai's presidential government, and in so doing made both Britain, and to a greater extent the USA very antagonistic. Japan's response to British pressure was along the lines of a belief that it was necessary to push things now, because once Britain was free from its major commitments in Europe it would come back to the Far East with a vengeance. Regarding US pressure, in OTL Japan agreed to ameliorate its terms, and backed down somewhat - but that was with the USA as a potentially problematic neutral. With the US as a co-belligerent, Japan may well decide that it has less to fear, and adopt a belief similar to that with regard to Britain - that pushing things now is the best choice, for the US will have more than words available in the future

Remember paradoxes ? The US entry into the war could thus REDUCE US influence over the situation in China, and push Japan towards increasing their bellicose attitude towards Peking

These tensions are going to be evident, and add to the general feeling of uncertainty in late 1915

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
Just to add a little extra, again from OTL, things are not going so well for British and Indian forces in Mesopotamia by the end of 1915. Their advance halted at Ctesiphon, the British have withdrawn to Kut and from early December 1915 come under heavy siege from Ottoman forces

Whilst on the grand scale this may not be important in itself, it could be seen as another hammer blow against Britain, in the right circumstances even as the straw that breaks the camel's back

Mention can also be made, of course, of the split in the Greek body politic, following Venizelos' fall from power in September 1915, the Salonika landings which essentially created a rebel Greek government in the North, and growing pressure on King Constantine's court to declare for the Central Powers. One could see a balance of increases in this timeline - USW is beginning to bite hard on Britain as Autumn comes, but Britain can also send battleships of a modern and imposing nature to the Aegean. The deadlock would continue, but with both sides (Greek royalist, and Entente/Allied) having ratcheted up the pressure.

The USA, entering the war in Summer 1915, also has unfinished business of a seriously problematic nature in Mexico. Carranza has established a shaky regime in mid 1915, a US client that Washington hopes will stabilise the situation and act in its interests. But 'Pancho' Vila remains at large in the North, with his own rebel government, repeatedly evading Carranza's attempts to capture him. OTL US-Mexican tensions would come to a head in Spring 1916, but with the US a co-belligerent of the Entente and Allied powers from Summer 1915, it is quite possible that Vila might seek to make reality of rumour and seek some sort of help from the Germans. Whether or not any is forthcoming might not actually matter since Vila in OTL managed to avoid engagement with Pershing's vastly superior force throughout Spring and Summer of 1916.

What it could well mean, though, is that US entry into the war not only does not, but cannot, brnig with it the promise of large numbers of US forces for commitment to the European theatre. Its a point worth noting that there ARE NOT large numbers anyway, and that Pershing was using the National Guard in Mexico in 1917. It would take conscription measures and another year in OTL before an army was ready for deployment en masse in 1918

Thus, Wilson's government might well find itself faced with the unpalatable choice of having to go along with Theodore Roosevelt's call for mass volunteer formations to go to France. 1915 is at the beginning of the Preparedness Movement, with its insistence upon the adoption of UMT&S (Universal Military Training and Service, apparently a typical Americanism in being a mouthful of acronym to mean "conscription"). Wilson in OTL was initially willing to consider an entirely voluntary approach when war dawned in 1917, but after Roosevelt's offer to lead volunteers to France, he turned against this purely for political reasons. In 1915, with the Mexico situation worsening, and the debate within the USA never having covered the ground of OTL, he might feel constrained to adopt a volunteer approach in the short-term, and work on a draft system for the longer

Thus, we could indeed see, Theodore Roosevelt leading a force of perhaps 10-15,000 volunteers to France. Pershing most probably has to deal with Vila in Mexico, whilst the US tries to sort out a draft and a training programme to create a professional army for the 1916-1917 campaigning season - if it ever comes

Thus (for the third paragraph in a row!) the entry of the USA into the war has little immediate detrimental effect on the Central Powers. What there is was coming anyway, even if they did not fully know it, whilst TR's volunteer force whilst no doubt welcome for its propaganda value, is miniscule compared to corps-size deployments on the Western Front.

Hopefully, therefore, I have prepared the ground for the Autumn/Winter submarine offensive to break the back of Great Britain :)

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
The Western Front appears even more depressing for Britain in late 1915, with Joffre's massive Loos offensive failing at great cost, and caught up in it the new British divisions which suffered great casualties. Joffre persisted in his attack beyond the point of logic, and tens of thousands of shells were used to little strategic effect.

In this timeline, this is coming on top of increasing depradations by German submarines, beginning to break down the fragile home front coalition, not just on the political front, but in that of labour, and the unions.

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
Another alternative

A better way to go about this is might be:

Instead of the historical total blockade of the Bauer memorandum Tirpitz backs a USW zone limited to the eastern half of the Channel and the Thames estuary. Add to this a German U-Boat buildup starting early in the war plus the weakness of the Dover Barrage realized a lot earlier (perhaps tied to this are night raids by German TB's based in Flanders on the Dover Barrage) These more limited goals could be attained by the limited KM sub fleet. It would also greatly reduce the US protests.
 
The real question is whether the German sinking of British (&c) merchant ships would in any way be compensated by the direct entry of US merchant ships in the Allied cause ?

That may sound like a logical conclusion, but the question has to be what are these merchant ships doing in OTL otherwise? They certainly aren't trading with the Central Powers, and any neutral trade is going to continue. The question comes down to whether there is spare capacity, or the potential to swiftly increase capacity ? I'm not sure that either one is true

All that might be, is that in an emergency the US government might be able to require shipping companies to divert tonnage from neutral countries towards Entente ones, Britain especially. One assumes that it can. But perhaps not in enough of a concentration to offset losses

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
You'll need about 20 - 25 in the Irish Sea, that accounts for a sub fleet of more than 500
:confused: By my count, 20 on station means 60 operational, plus maybe 30-40 in the training pipeline...

Grey, have you considered the impact of DF & crypto? Rm 40 was reading HSF messages, & could tell when HSF was going to sortie; with increased pressure, I imagine they'd soon get onto knowing when U-boats are sailing. Also, I'd expect RN to mine the approaches to Kiel Canal posthaste, knowing U-boats are using it...

Also, I'm not really sure QE would survive being torpedoed, considering Aboukir & Crecy... (And Dunbar-Naismith got a Turk BB, name of which I can't recall, too...)

In addition, I'm unconvinced sinking a couple of liners is enough to bring the U.S. in. Now, a real (or rumored) U-boat massacre of passengers, of women & children...except, AFAIK, there never was one, nor do I think USG is going to respond to HMG propaganda claiming one. Of course, if it was a mistake, a U-boat skipper firing to KO a liner & hitting a lifeboat full of women/kids in error...
 
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:confused: By my count, 20 on station means 60 operational, plus maybe 30-40 in the training pipeline...

I had been wondering where the number came from; maybe it just gained an extra zero in the typing.

Numbers is the next thing I am going to try to look into, but it may take several days before I get anything up

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
:

Also, I'm not really sure QE would survive being torpedoed, considering Aboukir & Crecy... (And Dunbar-Naismith got a Turk BB, name of which I can't recall, too...)

Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue are ancient armoured cruisers by 1914 that were manned primarily by reserves and where completely unaware until too late that they were being attacked by a submarine.

The loss of HMS Audacious is more to keep in mind, tho I suspect that the Queen Elizabeths had better compartmentalization than the previous classes of British superdreadnoughts.
 
Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue are ancient armoured cruisers by 1914 that were manned primarily by reserves and where completely unaware until too late that they were being attacked by a submarine.

The loss of HMS Audacious is more to keep in mind, tho I suspect that the Queen Elizabeths had better compartmentalization than the previous classes of British superdreadnoughts.
I wouldn't rule out her surviving, not knowing the conditions; if I were a U-boat skipper firing at a battlewagon, I'd give her all 4 bow tubes, & unless she's at Condition Z (or RN equiv), that could do it. Even 1 hit in her mag & she does an imitation of Hood.
 

The Sandman

Banned
If the British are more willing to risk their battleships due to no longer needing to be ready for an HSF sortie, what are the chances that they try to push the Queen Elizabeth into the Dardanelles and get her sunk by Turkish mines?

Also, to what degree would the German USW effort focus on cutting the cross-Channel links between Britain and France?
 
Even 1 hit in her mag & she does an imitation of Hood.

No, there wouldn't be any imitation of the loss of the Hood. Magazine explosions aboard British battleships and battlecruisers were directly related to the stability of the cordite and the following of proper safety precautions, which the Battlecruiser Force didn't follow in order to sustain rapidity of fire. The battleships did face similar problems with anti-flash doors and other safety proceedures - tho HMS Vanguard and several other warships were lost because of deteriorating cordite.
 
25 subs in the Irish Sea will not be all, 25 from the Flanders stations for the Channel and South-East England, 10 around Scotland, 10 in the Baltic, and 20 in the Mediterranean, 90 on station in all, accounts for 360 boats, add the training requirement and you easily arrive at 500.
IOTL the estimation was 200 boats for 48 battle stations, but that was not sufficient because the subs didn't carry enough torpedos. (And 50% of the torpedos didn't hit.)
 
Tom B said:
A better way to go about this is might be:

Instead of the historical total blockade of the Bauer memorandum Tirpitz backs a USW zone limited to the eastern half of the Channel and the Thames estuary. Add to this a German U-Boat buildup starting early in the war plus the weakness of the Dover Barrage realized a lot earlier (perhaps tied to this are night raids by German TB's based in Flanders on the Dover Barrage) These more limited goals could be attained by the limited KM sub fleet. It would also greatly reduce the US protests.

Tom, thanks for the idea

Had I known it at the beginning, I would certainly have considered it, but after all my research and postulations it seems a bit like cheating to suddenly change the original idea. Besides, it seems worthwhile to consider where my original idea might have gone

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
rast said:
25 subs in the Irish Sea will not be all, 25 from the Flanders stations for the Channel and South-East England, 10 around Scotland, 10 in the Baltic, and 20 in the Mediterranean, 90 on station in all, accounts for 360 boats, add the training requirement and you easily arrive at 500.
IOTL the estimation was 200 boats for 48 battle stations, but that was not sufficient because the subs didn't carry enough torpedos. (And 50% of the torpedos didn't hit.)

How did you go from 90 to "accounts for 360 boats" ? And why on Earth would they 140 in training ???

Also you have to define "was not sufficient" because it basically translates as "did not do it in the circumstances then prevailing", and those are not an absolute. You have to take into account :-

- state of merchant ships awareness of the threat
- state of British navy's reponses and counter-measures
- British credit, stockpiles and emergency measures
- morale

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
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