Speaking first on the 1906 diversion -
I have one more item to add to the anti-German side of the ledger-
On the other hand:
- Germany had done less logistical planning
- Germany only had a handful of super heavy artillery pieces and therefore would have to mask many Belgium fortresses
- If the war lasts longer than a few months the Dutch might be compelled to actually attack the Germans in some capacity.
- If the war lasts longer than 12 months the British navy is likely to starve Germany of nitrates.
- The French won't sacrifice excessive forces attempting to mount offensives beyond their capabilities.
---getting back to the OP, which I presume means that the Germans in *1914* deploy their actual forces in at least the same *proportions* as in the Schlieffen Plan (strong right wing, weaker left wing, pretty much no Russian wing) and advance through the southeast Netherlands.
In that case, I don't think the logistics are there to support a successful envelopment of Paris in the opening campaign. Greater forces in Belgium may assist in the later "race to the sea".
French forces may well make more substantial progress against the weaker German left-wing, regaining much of Alsace and Lorraine.
This has the net effect of lengthening the entire western front battle-line. That should ultimately be an advantage for the more numerous side.
It makes it more likely one side or the other is successfully flanked. Perhaps the French interrupt the rail lines at Metz and compound German logistical problems to an impossible level.
Or, with the longer battle-line and a political commitment to hold on to liberated Alsace-Lorrainer territory, in follow up battles in the autumn, the Germans may be able to push south in Champage, east of Paris, but west of the fortress line, and cut off the French right-wing. After defeat of the right-wing in detail, in follow-on campaigns the French do not have enough to hold back the Germans. It is probably 1915 or so by this point.
This is what Liddell Hart speculated would have happened. That the benefit of the Schlieffen Plan was the *weak* German left-wing yielding ground to the French, rather than a stronger right wing. Once overcommitted to the east, the Germans can cut them off, just as they were able to cut off the French of 1940 who were overcommitted to northwest Belgium.
The factor of the Dutch army however is a wildcard. If they do or even threaten mobile counter-attacks, that is a bad wrinkle for the Germans.
In the east, the Germans as in OTL should be able to stun the Russians and stop them in their tracks even without reinforcement of the west, as they did in OTL.
By the way, ever heard of Terence Zuber's argument that the conventional understanding of what the Schlieffen Plan actually was is incorrect?
http://www.amazon.com/Inventing-Schlieffen-Plan-Planning-1871-1914/dp/0198718055
http://www.historytoday.com/terence-zuber/schlieffen-plan-fantasy-or-catastrophe