Germany under Kurt von Schleicher?

What if in early 1933, Kurt Von Schleicher outmanoeuvred Hitler and managed to remain in power as Chancellor. Perhaps he sent the Reichstag into recess in January. The Nazis meanwhile split between the Strasser and Hitler factions. Could Von Schleicher remain in power?

If he did, what does his regime resemble? Does he, like Hitler, merge the presidency and the chancellorship when Hindenberg dies? How right-wing and militarist is his regime? Do antisemitic laws come into place?
 
OTL he invited the Hohenzollern pretender to military maneuvers in the 1920's, and there was some support for a Restoration in the early 1930's. Ergo I think he would have reintroduced the monarchy after Hindenburg's death, to legitimize his rule and the eclipse of democracy.
The only 'achievements' of his OTL government were eliminating Versailles Treaty restrictions on weapons production and authorizing some public works (ur-autobahns).
I am mostly curious if He would have continued the Rapallo pact with the USSR, and what his attitude toward Austria was.
 

Cook

Banned
Ergo I think he would have reintroduced the monarchy after Hindenburg's death, to legitimize his rule and the eclipse of democracy.
The Treaty of Versailles expressly forbids the restoration of the German Monarchy. Not that the French would be willing to do anything about it, or that the British would disapprove, but it does need to be noted.
 
Well yeah, I have that happen in Dead By Dawn. Check it out if you wish. I don't think a reinstated monarchy was likely.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
von Schleicher was actually very worried about both the Nazis and the Communists and was lobbying with president von Hindeburg and other Conservatives for the right to launch a Coup. If he had launched a coup, we would probably see a Conservative Authoritarian regime installed. I have a vague timeline idea about a coup in early '33, that result in both Nazi and Commie uprisings, but von Schleicher being successful in putting them down (Hitler flees to Austria, but is arrested by the Austrian government). The new regime in Germany would be dominated by a triumvirate of Kurt von Schleicher, Franz von Papen and Ludwig Beck. they wouldn't like each other very much, and have many disagreements, but ultimately work together to strengthen Germany. However in the end they'd bring Germany into a alternate WW2, into a conflict they can't win.

However, I don't know when I will find time to do research for such a TL.
 

Eurofed

Banned
However in the end they'd bring Germany into a alternate WW2, into a conflict they can't win.

Not any likely. A Nationalist-Conservative Authoritarian Germany would not have any of Hitler's grandiose plans for creating a racist empire from Poland to the Urals, and would only care to end the reparations, re-establish German military parity with France/superiority with Poland, and enforce the German irredentist claims on Austria, the Sudetenland, and Danzig/the Corridor. They would do the latter with less diplomatic brutality than the Nazi regime, and they would leave rump Czechoslovakia alone once they gain the Sudetenland. Moreover, they would pursue German rearmament to a more economically-sustainable and less Entente-alarming pace (since they don't have any plans to invade the USSR). Therefore, the Entente would not give Poland military guarantees, and Warsaw would have to accept a Munich-like compromise, or fight alone (and lose).
 
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yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
Not any likely. A Nationalist-Conservative Authoritarian Germany would not have any of Hitler's grandiose plans for creating a racial empire from Poland to the Urals, and would only care to end the reparations, re-establish German military parity with France/superiority with Poland, and enforce the German irredentist claims on Austria, the Sudetenland, and Danzig/the Corridor. They would do the latter with less diplomatic brutality than the Nazi regime, and they would leave rump Czechoslovakia alone once they gain the Sudetenland. Moreover, they would pursue German rearmament to a more economically-sustainable and less Entente-alarming pace (since they don't have any plans to invade the USSR). Therefore, the Entente would not give Poland military guarantees, and Warsaw would have to accept a Munich-like compromise, or fight alone (and lose).
Yes, in my TL I plan having Germany stumbling into a war over her claims in Sudet or Poland. I also plan to have a more active right wing France that is not willing to give the Sudetenland to the Germans, thus leaving few other options than war open.
 
Not any likely. A Nationalist-Conservative Authoritarian Germany would not have any of Hitler's grandiose plans for creating a racist empire from Poland to the Urals, and would only care to end the reparations, re-establish German military parity with France/superiority with Poland, and enforce the German irredentist claims on Austria, the Sudetenland, and Danzig/the Corridor. They would do the latter with less diplomatic brutality than the Nazi regime, and they would leave rump Czechoslovakia alone once they gain the Sudetenland. Moreover, they would pursue German rearmament to a more economically-sustainable and less Entente-alarming pace (since they don't have any plans to invade the USSR). Therefore, the Entente would not give Poland military guarantees, and Warsaw would have to accept a Munich-like compromise, or fight alone (and lose).

And lose? Germany was a military paper tiger in 1938 and only truly became a fighting force after it gained Czechoslovakia and was pushed to the limit by Hitler's military expansions. Without either of those a war with Poland alone will be a much closer run thing. With both of them Germany's defeat is all but assured against Poland who actually had quite the strong military; unfortunately it took far too long to mobilize. In any case, the Western Allies aren't going to accept a German invasion of Poland, particularly once they realize that if Germany is no match for Poland they can take it down fairly easily. If there's a Non-Aggression Pact as IOTL (Very unlikely) with the USSR then Germany will still lose to Poland because Stalin never intended to attack until he knew that the Poles would be defeated and the Red Army wouldn't have to face major resistance.
 
And lose? Germany was a military paper tiger in 1938 and only truly became a fighting force after it gained Czechoslovakia and was pushed to the limit by Hitler's military expansions. Without either of those a war with Poland alone will be a much closer run thing. With both of them Germany's defeat is all but assured against Poland who actually had quite the strong military; unfortunately it took far too long to mobilize. In any case, the Western Allies aren't going to accept a German invasion of Poland, particularly once they realize that if Germany is no match for Poland they can take it down fairly easily. If there's a Non-Aggression Pact as IOTL (Very unlikely) with the USSR then Germany will still lose to Poland because Stalin never intended to attack until he knew that the Poles would be defeated and the Red Army wouldn't have to face major resistance.

A non-Nazi right-wing government in Germany would be dominated by the military or men with close ties to the military. IOTL, the generals were against Hitlers gamble in Czechoslovakia. ITTL, they wouldn't go for war unless they're prepared after economically sustainable rearmament. That will not be in 1939.
 

Eurofed

Banned
And lose? Germany was a military paper tiger in 1938 and only truly became a fighting force after it gained Czechoslovakia and was pushed to the limit by Hitler's military expansions. Without either of those a war with Poland alone will be a much closer run thing. With both of them Germany's defeat is all but assured against Poland who actually had quite the strong military; unfortunately it took far too long to mobilize.

What Mont Burns said. It's going to take longer than OTL, but a non-Nazi Germany can surely manage a slower, economically-sustainable rearmament that is still going to make it much stronger than Poland, without any need to conquer Czechoslovakia.

In any case, the Western Allies aren't going to accept a German invasion of Poland, particularly once they realize that if Germany is no match for Poland they can take it down fairly easily.

But Germany shall not be any weaker than OTL, see above. With the balance of forces similar to OTL, and without Hitler's overt betrayal and Munich and diplomatically ham-fisted management of the Danzig crisis, the Entente shall not be any willing to shed its blood to prop up the territorial integrity of Versailles Poland, which Britain was always rather dubious about. It took Hitler's brutality and duplicity to provoke a quite reluctant Entente to drop appeasement and side with Poland.

If there's a Non-Aggression Pact as IOTL (Very unlikely) with the USSR then Germany will still lose to Poland because Stalin never intended to attack until he knew that the Poles would be defeated and the Red Army wouldn't have to face major resistance.

Non-Nazi right-wing Germany are just as capable as Hitler to see the vast opportunist benefits of a temporary alliance of convenience with Soviet Russia to take down Versailles Poland. In all likelihood, they would limit the M-R partition deal to Poland alone, but even so, it would be beneficial enough for Stalin to accept it. The German military managed a fairly extensive covert cooperation with Soviet Russia during the 1920s, so the notion of a German-Soviet anti-Polish pact would be hardly outlandish to them.
 
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Eurofed

Banned
Yes, in my TL I plan having Germany stumbling into a war over her claims in Sudet or Poland. I also plan to have a more active right wing France that is not willing to give the Sudetenland to the Germans, thus leaving few other options than war open.

Well, if you are going to implement ad hoc butterflies that make France substantially more aggressive than OTL, it changes the whole game.

I would however point out that if Germany is simultaneously more reasonable, and France more aggressive, than OTL, Britain may well push for a diplomatic compromise instead of backing France and its Czechoslovak or Polish allies in a fight to the death.

Moreover, and more importantly, a non-Nazi Germany would not choose to fight for the Sudetenland or the Corridor if war with the Entente seems likely. That's a given. During the Munich crisis, the Wehrmacht was willing and ready to overthrow Hitler in such a case.

Basically, it takes a Hitler to drive Germany and the Entente in a WW2. After the massacres of WW1, the appetite of the European powers to let 1914-style diplomatic screw-ups drag them in another general war had been substantially curtailed.
 
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A non-Nazi right-wing government in Germany would be dominated by the military or men with close ties to the military. IOTL, the generals were against Hitlers gamble in Czechoslovakia. ITTL, they wouldn't go for war unless they're prepared after economically sustainable rearmament. That will not be in 1939.

The problem with that is both Poland and the British and French were becoming more hostile to Germany and less likely to practice appeasement, especially once Chamberlain and his supporters are gone, Germany also lacks the rhetorical and negotiating ability of Hitler to bully opponents into making incredibly lopsided deals. Germany won't be ready for war by 1942, but by then it'll almost certainly face opposition from all three parties. Plus by 1942 Britain and France would be militarily much stronger than they were in 1939, while Germany would be similar to or weaker than it was in 1939. The end of appeasement was due to a combination of factors, including Germany's aggressive foreign policy and rearmament, right wing government, poor international standing, the annexation of Czechoslovakia, and a public much more supportive of war than it was in the early-mid 30s. Only one of those factors won't still be around.

What Mont Burns said. It's going to take longer than OTL, but a non-Nazi Germany can surely manage a slower, economically-sustainable rearmament that is still going to make it much stronger than Poland, without any need to conquer Czechoslovakia.

But Germany shall not be any weaker than OTL, see above. With the balance of forces similar to OTL, and without Hitler's overt betrayal and Munich and diplomatically ham-fisted management of the Danzig crisis, the Entente shall not be any willing to shed its blood to prop up the territorial integrity of Versailles Poland, which Britain was always rather dubious about. It took Hitler's brutality and duplicity to provoke a quite reluctant Entente to drop appeasement and side with Poland.

Non-Nazi right-wing Germany are just as capable as Hitler to see the vast opportunist benefits of a temporary alliance of convenience with Soviet Russia to take down Versailles Poland. In all likelihood, they would limit the M-R partition deal to Poland alone, but even so, it would be beneficial enough for Stalin to accept it. The German military managed a fairly extensive covert cooperation with Soviet Russia during the 1920s, so the notion of a German-Soviet anti-Polish pact would be hardly outlandish to them.

I heavily disagree with your second two paragraphs. The first is pretty accurate, though I feel that Poland would still fight much better than OTL. In any case, The assumption that Germany's direct actions alone lead to an end to appeasement rather than a variety of political, social, and economic factors is incorrect. As I mentioned above, while Czechoslovakia was an important turning point, even before that the public was increasingly hostile towards Germany and was only going to get more radical. By 1942 Britain and France would be capable of war and would have publics and cabinets willing to declare it in support of Poland. This would be less out of love for Poland and more to stop an expansionist and blatantly aggressive Germany, which would exist with or without Hitler and would be disliked by Britain and France.

I disagree with your third paragraph because Nazi Germany had an extreme effect on Soviet foreign policy; prior to its genesis Soviet policy was almost totally isolationist beyond military cooperation with Weimar Germany, which was quickly becoming unnecessary, and trade with various nations. Nazi Germany forced it to seek allies in the face of an aggressive Germany which sought its destruction. A less right wing but still authoritarian Germany would likely cool tensions with the Soviet Union considerably, but not to the jarring degree Hitler did IOTL. This leaves the Soviet Union with an unfriendly but not blatantly hostile Germany; thus it won't be as pressured to scramble for allies as it did IOTL, first with the west and then with Germany. Even if it's assumed that Soviet foreign policy stays the same as OTL, several factors may kill the Pact in the cradle. First off the very offering of it. A "Neo-Nazi" Germany would likely not be interested in deals with the Soviet Union; Nazi Germany certainly wasn't until 1939. That decision certainly wasn't clear cut, and had much to do with the influence of Ribbentrop on Hitler along with Hitler's pragmatism; it's very much possible that the ruling generals in Germany won't be as inclined to carry out such a pragmatic betrayal of their values, or at least unanimously agree to it. There's also the fact that one major reason Stalin accepted that Pact was because he trusted Hitler to an unreasonable degree and saw him as almost a mirror image of himself. Stalin also saw Hitler as being someone in constant struggle with the generals in Germany, and that if anyone were to attack the Soviet Union it would likely be the generals. Even at the start of Barbarossa Stalin considered it likely that the attack may have been launched without Hitler's consent by his generals and that it still could be called off. Here a man like Stalin is unlikely to agree to what IOTL was an extremely risky proposition offered by men who he naturally distrusted and IOTL actually feared that they were more unlikely to attack him than Hitler himself! That speaks volumes about how a military-run Germany would be seen by the Soviet Union.
 

Eurofed

Banned
The problem with that is both Poland and the British and French were becoming more hostile to Germany and less likely to practice appeasement, especially once Chamberlain and his supporters are gone.

The end of appeasement was due to a combination of factors, including Germany's aggressive foreign policy and rearmament, right wing government, poor international standing, the annexation of Czechoslovakia, and a public much more supportive of war than it was in the early-mid 30s. Only one of those factors won't still be around.

As I mentioned above, while Czechoslovakia was an important turning point, even before that the public was increasingly hostile towards Germany and was only going to get more radical. By 1942 Britain and France would be capable of war and would have publics and cabinets willing to declare it in support of Poland. This would be less out of love for Poland and more to stop an expansionist and blatantly aggressive Germany, which would exist with or without Hitler and would be disliked by Britain and France.

Not really. I have to absolutely disagree that the end of appeasement was a foregone outcome by 1939, no matter the circumstances. The disillusionement of Entente ruling circles and public opinion with appeasement was not a process happening on its own for no good reason but in large part the reluctant realization that Hitler's aggressive plans went much beyond the revision of Versailles' settlement and satisfaction of Germany's long-standing irredentist claims (which the Western powers had generally come to regard as acceptable by the 1930s).

Since a non-Nazi Germany shall have no such grandiose imperial plans, and its irredentist goals shall match its stated intentions, it may push its claims on the Sudetenland and the Corridor in a rather more diplomatically moderate way than Hitler (to make a typical example, they may push for an internationally-monitored plebiscite in the Sudetenland and Danzig, which they would win by a landslide, instead of immediate military occupation like Hitler did). Moreover, the slower pace of German rearmament shall make the Western powers less alarmed (and make them rearm themselves at a slower pace too). Last but not least, Germany shall leave rump Czechoslovakia alone, showing itself to be trustworthy.

The combination of those factors shall in all likelihood make it so that appeasement remains the preferred foreign policy strategy and Germany's international standing shall be substantially better. The Entente public opinion shall remain mindful of the huge blood price that it paid to fight the Great War and unwilling to go that way again if it can be avoided at all, even if Britain and France get better prepared militarily. With a more moderate Germany, there is no good reason why the Western public should get more warlike. Ruling circles shall remain mindful of the bigger strategic picture, with the power of the USSR on the rise thanks to its industrialization and rearmament and eager to use a satisfied Germany as an anti-Soviet bastion. 1939 Germany plus the Corridor is in no way a threat for the European order at large, as long its foreign policy remains responsible.

In these conditions, Chamberlain's faction shall remain in control of the British foreign policy throughout the early 40s, no way Churchill and his ilk shall gain control of the UK government in lack of a general war. Likewise, there is no good reason why anti-German hawks should gain control of the French government. A non-Nazi right-wing regime shall be politically acceptable to Western public opinion. In the late 1930s, right-wing authoritarianism was pretty much the norm for most of the continent.

I disagree with your third paragraph because Nazi Germany had an extreme effect on Soviet foreign policy; prior to its genesis Soviet policy was almost totally isolationist beyond military cooperation with Weimar Germany, which was quickly becoming unnecessary, and trade with various nations. Nazi Germany forced it to seek allies in the face of an aggressive Germany which sought its destruction.

Prior to the late 1930s, the USSR was isolationist essentially because Stalin was well aware that Soviet Russia was woefully weak and not prepared at all to fight a major war with the other great powers to expand the Soviet sphere of influence. He was not any pacifist, just more opportunist and cautious than Hitler. By the late 1930's and early 40s, Soviet industrialization and rearmament was changing the picture and Soviet foreign policy was getting more aggressive because its leaders knew they could afford to be more forceful. E.g. see the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars, the Soviets were willing to fight them certainly not because of the existence of Nazi Germany.

it's very much possible that the ruling generals in Germany won't be as inclined to carry out such a pragmatic betrayal of their values, or at least unanimously agree to it.

True, nothing is completely certain. However, the strategic benefits of a temporary German-Russian alliance of opportunity to take down Versailles Poland remain evident regardless of whom is charge in Berlin and Moscow, as long as the ultranationalist Polish leadership remains hostile to both great powers. Those generals have managed covert military cooperation with Soviet Russia for a decade, so the idea of a limited pact with the Bolshevik devil is certainly not outside their mental horizon.

Even at the start of Barbarossa Stalin considered it likely that the attack may have been launched without Hitler's consent by his generals and that it still could be called off.

More than anything else, Stalin was unwilling to believe that Hitler would take the risk of attacking the USSR before defeating Britain. He was still expecting that Hitler would betray him in the end (and for that matter, Stalin was planning to backstab Hitler in the end himself), just he could not believe him so foolhardy. Anyway, this has little bearing on whether a non-Nazi Germany and the USSR may be willing to set up a partition deal of Poland. Such a pact causes little risk to both nations and benefits them greatly by ensuring the satisfaction of substantial irredentist claims.
 
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The problem with that is both Poland and the British and French were becoming more hostile to Germany and less likely to practice appeasement, especially once Chamberlain and his supporters are gone, Germany also lacks the rhetorical and negotiating ability of Hitler to bully opponents into making incredibly lopsided deals. Germany won't be ready for war by 1942, but by then it'll almost certainly face opposition from all three parties. Plus by 1942 Britain and France would be militarily much stronger than they were in 1939, while Germany would be similar to or weaker than it was in 1939. The end of appeasement was due to a combination of factors, including Germany's aggressive foreign policy and rearmament, right wing government, poor international standing, the annexation of Czechoslovakia, and a public much more supportive of war than it was in the early-mid 30s. Only one of those factors won't still be around.

Please explain why the Western Allies followed an appeasement policy with Nazis up until the Wehrmacht entered Prague, but wouldn't if a saner, less radical government is in place in Germany. Without the occupation of Prague, there's a decent chance that Hitler could have taken back Danzig IOTL, not to speak about a possible Schleicher government.

I also don't see why the western allies and the Soviets would go against Germany. That happened IOTL only due to Nazi politics after 1938 - which are completely butterflied away. Schleicher would want 1914 borders - at most. After that, Poland and the whole of Eastern Europe could rely on German help against the red hordes.
 
Schleicher would want 1914 borders - at most. After that, Poland and the whole of Eastern Europe could rely on German help against the red hordes.

Yes and no, I agree that his Germany would be content with 1914 + Austria and the Sudentland borders and would ignore that lunatics arguing for massive Lebensraum in the east. However the entire political, military, business elite were united on the desirability of a "German" eastern Europe. The little entente was to be re-oriented to Berlin with the markets and resources of Eastern Europe and Balkans integrated into Germany's "natural" economic sphere.
The Generals would prefer to achieve that without firing a shot, unlike Hitler who was pissed the Allies didn't fight over Czechia, and would wait until the military was ready. But by the mid 40's when the Wehrmacht was ready they would be willing to use it.
 
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