Germany Runs Out of Bombs & Bullets-Fall 1939

[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot] Hat tip to Blitzkrieg Legend, by Karl-Heinz Frieser. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]I knew that the Germans weren’t prepared for a long war at the start of World War II, but if Frieser is right, going to war in September 1939 was incredibly foolish. According to Frieser, at the beginning of October 1939 the German army had stockpiles of ammunition for 14 days of combat for one-third of their divisions. They had reserve stocks for another 14 days. The airforce had bombs for 14 days combat, after which they would have run out. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]I had read a few other places that the Germans almost ran out of bombs in taking down Poland, and that ammunition was in short supply, but this is the first time I’ve seen those shortages quantified.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Hitler and company were working on a shoestring as they rearmed. They had a little over five years to build up German military industry, train an army and airforce, build up a force of tanks, planes and artillery, and build a navy. They had to do that in the face of chronic foreign exchange shortages because the German Mark was overvalued and Germany started the rearmament process with low reserves of foreign exchange because of the depression and because of reparations for World War I that the Germans paid until the early 1930s.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Germany wasn’t self-sufficient in food or most raw materials other than coal and to some extent iron, though some of that had to be imported too. As rearmament heated up, they ran into labor shortages. There was a reason Hitler wanted ‘living room’. Germany was dependent on the rest of the world for raw materials, and couldn’t be an independent power long term without them. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]As Germany rearmed, the Nazi leadership shifted priorities in a chaotic and often irrational way that at one point assigned more steel than German’s total production to the navy. In that environment, low visibility items like ammunition and spare parts didn’t take the priority they should have, and it isn’t surprising that ammunition was in short supply.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]By the way, the Germans reacted to the ammo shortage by giving ammunition production top priority in the roughly seven and a half months between the fall of Poland and the start of the German offensive in the west. As a result they had ample stocks of ammunition for the campaign against France.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Assuming for the moment that Frieser is right about the numbers, let’s see if we can plausibly spin this out into the Germans running out of ammo before the Poles ran out of country, or the Germans suffering some other kind of humiliation that ended World War II abruptly.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Full-scale fighting in Poland lasted probably about twenty days, with large-scale mopping up going on another ten, and lesser scale fighting for another three or four days. To take the airforce to ineffectiveness we need to stretch that out another two weeks. To get the German army to sputter to a stop, would take somewhere between two and four weeks. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]That overstates the case a bit because there would be some ongoing production, and presumably the Germans would ration ammo and go on the defensive before they completely ran out. (more coming soon)[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
 
[FONT=&quot]Could the Poles Have Stretched Things Out A Few Weeks? [/FONT][FONT=&quot]Maybe. I’ve already discussed some ways the Poles might have done better in previous zines, but let’s look at it from the perspective of a rather modest stretching out of the campaign.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] Let’s look for single points of change that stretch things out. How about this: for several years ending in the summer of 1939 the Poles had been reading the German codes. They had two ways of reading the German Enigma traffic. They could break the codes on their own, but they were also getting settings from a spy inside Germany. They lost both of those ways into the code before the war. The Germans added a rotor or two rotors (can’t remember which) to Enigma, keeping the Poles out for most of the duration of the fall 1939 campaign. Their spy didn’t get caught. He just last access due to a routine transfer.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]So, no routine transfer. The Poles are able to read the German messages leading up to World War II. They know the German deployment even better than they did historically. They know for sure the Germans are planning to attack and approximately when, though the attack was postponed a bit historically. They know the direction and initial objectives of the German attack. They may even know that the Soviets are planning a knife in the back.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]What could they do with that information? That’s an interesting question. Information superiority versus superiority in almost every other category of military power.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Actually, I guess there are two questions here: (1) What could they have done? And (2) What would the historic Polish leadership have done with that information?[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Some key changeable factors in the speed in the Polish defeat: (1) The Germans were fully mobilized. The Poles only had a third of their army mobilized when the attack started and only had about a quarter of their army in position. A third of the Polish army never did get mobilized. (2) The Germans pulled off a strategic surprise by pushing through the Polish Corridor into East Prussia and then immediately swinging south to threaten Warsaw. The Polish reaction to that threat amplified their problems. They moved from Warsaw to a town without adequate communications and lost control of the battle, essentially self-decapitating the Polish army by September 6.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]So how much would having the German codes do to solve those problems? The Poles were under intense pressure from the Allies not to mobilize, and cancelled a general mobilization on the eve of the war, though they did secretly mobilize a significant part of their army before the war started. The problem was partly that the primitive Polish transportation system meant that mobilization was a very drawn out process, taking a month or two. They probably couldn’t get to full mobilization before the war started, but they might get a little closer to it. On the other hand, the main obstacle to full mobilization was political pressure from the Allies. The Poles were reasonably sure an attack was imminent. So: at best the Poles might get a little more mobilized.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]How about a better reaction to the German attack? That’s possible. Getting the limited Polish forces available into the most advantageous place for defense might help in the first few days of the war, giving the Poles more time to get troops mobilized and stretching things out to some extent. Keeping the Polish High Command in Warsaw where they had communication facilities longer would help a lot. [/FONT]
 
[FONT=&quot]One aspect of the Polish campaign: the more rapidly the Poles seemed to be folding initially, the more rapidly they fold later. That’s true for a variety of reasons. First, the French gave up on their rather feeble attempt at an offensive partly because they regarded the Poles as a lost cause after about September 6, and they feared that if they pushed strongly into the Saar, the Germans would rush through Belgium and trap the troops involved, essentially what the Germans tried to do at the start of World War I.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Second, the rapid folding of Poland forced Stalin to invade sooner than he planned to, and before he was really prepared to, because he was afraid the Germans wouldn’t give up territory they seized that was allocated to the Soviets. He may have been right about that, by the way. The Soviets had to hastily wrap up peace talks with the Japanese to settle the Nomanham mini-war, scramble to get a propaganda line together, and hastily mobilize troops, who were woefully unprepared, but good enough to push aside the disorganized remnants of the Polish army that opposed them.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Third, the rapid initial fold meant that the Germans overran sources of manpower before the Poles could mobilize them, which was part of the reason the Poles only got a third of the their army mobilized in the course of the campaign.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]So, if the Poles do better initially, the Germans face at least a little more French offensive activity, though the French would have been unenthusiastic in their prosecution of the offensive. At least it would have been drawing down German ammunition stocks to some extent. Stalin might hold off another couple of weeks, and possibly have difficulty moving until after the fall rainy season, which would push things back until November. And the Poles would get at least some additional troops mobilized. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]I’m not sure the continued flow of Enigma info would do all of that. It might not have much impact. There were plenty of instances of leaderships ignoring good intelligence in World War II.[/FONT]
 
[FONT=&quot]Here’s another option: the Poles were hoping for an early start to the fall rainy season, which turned much of sparsely roaded central Poland into a mud lake. Let’s say they get just a little taste of the rainy season about three days into the campaign, just a couple of days of heavy rain. It doesn’t stop the German attack for those two days, but it slows and channels it, forcing motorized vehicles toward the few and inadequate roads..[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]It also for the most part grounds the Luftwaffe, which was a fair weather airforce. That’s important because the Luftwaffe historically almost paralyzed Polish troop movements during daytime. That meant that even foot-marching German forces could bypass and cut off Polish infantry. Give the Poles two days to extract troops who were on the verge of being cut off, to bring up reserves, and to get at least some additional troops mobilized and/or to the front, and when the skies cleared on day five the Poles would be in considerably better shape than they were historically.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]So, does that just postpone the defeat by a couple of days? Soggy fields would slow down the panzers for a day or two, but the Luftwaffe would be back in action on day five. As noted earlier, one key variable would be how early the French and Soviets started to write the Poles off.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]The French have been criticized, and rightly so, for their half-hearted effort in attacking the Germans in September 1939. Part of the problem was the French army’s lack of offensive drive. Part of it was the fact that the Poles were defeated so quickly. The French had promised before the war that they would close up to the German lines as soon as possible and then launch a major offensive fifteen days after start of French mobilization. That would have put the start of it at September 16th. That wasn’t unreasonable given that the French had to mobilize, which meant that almost every French active division split into three divisions (Active, Series A, and Series B), and then had to incorporate reserves into the unit, draw equipment and head to the front. The key problem was that they waited too long to start mobilizing, with partial mobilization in late August and full mobilization on September 1.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]The French started the closing up phase of the operation on September 7th. By September 12th the situation is Poland looked irretrievable to the allies and they postponed and later cancelled the major offensive. That made sense in the context of Poland being beyond the stage where a French offensive could do much good by that time. If the French had known how precarious the German ammunition supply was, that might have changed that decision, with interesting results.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]For now, let’s assume that the two-day pause translates into about three days of slower German advance due to the rain and the resulting soggy fields. That doesn’t quite set the campaign back those three days from the weather alone, but by giving the Poles time to reorganize and mobilize more troops it probably adds somewhat more than that to the delay. Does it add a week? That’s probably the most you could hope for. Historically, Poland’s situation was weak enough to discourage friends from taking chances and encourage enemies by September 10 at the latest.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]That means that delaying things a week would put France at the point where they had promised to start a major offensive with Poland still in the game. Would France do a major offensive in those circumstances? My guess that they would have maybe concentrated more forces and increased the tempo a bit, but the French army wasn’t designed to make rapid pushes. They would have probably advanced the rest of the way to the German West Wall fortifications and started a ponderous ‘methodical battle against them. That would force the Germans to expend more ammunition, but probably wouldn’t force them to move forces away from Poland in the short term.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]If we assume that the Soviets hold off a week longer before they invade, the Poles get to organize their resistance in the east until September 24th, and the Germans get to reduce their ammo stocks by that week, leaving them to choose between spending themselves perilously close to out of ammunition with a French offensive underway or taking the pressure off the Poles when they were on the ropes. I’m guessing they would take the chance and take the Poles the rest of the way out. I’m guessing that the French offensive would fizzle after the Poles fell. So nothing much would change other than the Germans being a week closer to running out of ammunition and heaving a collective sigh of relief when the French stopped their offensive. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]As I noted, that’s the most likely pattern. A few things would change. The French army would probably learn a few things by being in actual combat, but it would be against second rate German divisions on the defensive, so the lessons learned probably wouldn’t have much impact later in the campaign. Some French soldiers would have combat experience, which probably would help a bit.[/FONT]
 
[FONT=&quot]Is there any way to actually run the Germans out of ammo? The only way I could see to do that would be for the French and the Poles to both start a general mobilization about two weeks before they did it. The late mobilization was an overreaction to the fact that in the lead-up to World War I mobilizations arguably forced the diplomats’ hands and kept them from cooling down the situation.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]At the start of World War II, the Germans were already mobilized before the French or Poles started full mobilization, though both had done secret partial mobilization. That early edge in mobilization made the German job much easier. Look at it this way: Historically the Poles had approximately 600,000 of a possible 2.5 million man army mobilized and in position when the Germans invaded. Now the Poles probably couldn’t have armed and equipped all of those men as effective units, but they could have more than doubled the number of men armed and ready to oppose the Germans given full mobilization.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Let’s say France and Poland go for full mobilization as soon as the Germans do, or at least by early August. On September 1, most of the Polish formations are armed and in place. The French are fully in place for an immediate advance into Germany. In that case, Germany either stands down or takes a mad chance that the French will stay passive and the Germans can take down a fully mobilized Polish army before they run out of ammunition. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]As you’ve probably figured out, I’ve been trying to figure this out in my own mind as I write. It’s one of those situations where the seemingly hopeless underdog could potentially come out okay with a little tweaking, but for the life of me I can’t come up with a tweak that I consider likely to happen given the leadership of Britain and France and that still leads to the Germans running out of ammunition.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Part of the problem is that it’s hard to wrap my mind around the idea of the Germans losing in the second or third month of the war, which seems to be the logical outcome of them running out of ammunition by the middle of the second month. Most likely scenario in that case: the German army uses what little ammo they have left to overthrow Hitler, and then bluffs by offering a peace that gives Poland back most of the country except for the Polish corridor and parts of Silesia. The Poles probably wouldn’t go for that, but if the Germans were smart they would unilaterally cease offensive actions and start withdrawing, announcing a set of stages which would get them back to near the original border, while frantically making ammo in case the Allies decide not to buy into the offer. They could hold onto some hunks of Polish territory to exchange for a peace treaty, as well as large numbers of Polish prisoners of war to add to the pressure on Poland to accept the treaty. They might even demand the return of German colonies in exchange for full withdrawal from Poland minus the corridor.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]The Nazis would probably scream “Stab in the back 2.0” and the army wouldn’t be able to officially say anything until they (a) got a peace treaty, or (b) got the ammunition supply situation straightened out.[/FONT]
 
[FONT=&quot]What do you think? Am I missing anything? Assuming things played out this way, what happens next? Do the Germans resign themselves to being a second rate regional power chronically short of foreign exchange, or do they continue the military buildup, though presumably at a more rational pace? Without the loot from Poland and ruthless exploitation of Polish manpower and agricultural resources, the Germans would have to cut back military spending pretty drastically, and much of what they did spend in the short term would have to be on ammunition and repairing damaged vehicles (about half of the German truck fleet was temporarily out of commission by the end of the Polish campaign.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]If the Germans were able to trade parts of Poland for some of their colonies—most likely Cameroon and Togo but not Tanganyika or Southwest Africa—we would probably see some nasty stuff going on there, even with German militarists as opposed to Nazis. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Would the Nazis come back to power? Depends on how the army played it. Getting your army into a World War when you only have enough ammo to take down a minor power like Poland and then only if you catch them before they mobilize and get perfect weather is embarrassingly bad leadership. Historically Hitler got away with it, but it was still stupid[/FONT]
 
I read [?one of your newsletters?] that the pole had a good anti-tank Rifle, but [mobilization problems] lots of them where still in Storage, as the Germans overran the armories.
So I see a more mobilized Poland doing better. However ...

IIRC Poland started full Mobilization, but then Slowed it down, under pressure from Britain/France.
IIRC Poland was worried about the Allies holding back, if they went ahead with Mobilization, in the face of allied pressure.

possible tweak
The French had agreed to send their D-400?'s to Poland as they moved too the new D-500?'s.
?Would a slight speed up with this Help Poland hold out.?
 

Orry

Donor
Monthly Donor
What if the Poles learn of the ammunition shortage through their spy and tell the Allies?

If, and its a big if, the French believe the information they might go for a broad front advance to maximise the german use as ammunition and keep pushing even after Poland has fallen.

Oh our allie has been defeated - Yes but the Germans are nearly out of bullets another week or two and victory is ours....
 
Perhaps have Marshal Foch be still alive?

He was, after all, only 4½ years older than Petain, who lived until 1951. And he would have outranked him.
 
Last edited:
Yeah, Petain's continued influence didn't help France. I think Gamelin and Georges were probably the weakest links. Gamelin was a pretty good officer in World War I, but spent too much time dealing with politicians and took on many of their bad habits, including accumulating power while avoiding responsibility and tough decisions. Can't run a war against the likes of Rommel doing that. Georges had been a pretty good officer, but he was badly injured by a bomb set by Croatian nationalists in the mid-1930s and his actions during the fall of France may have reflected some emotional trauma from his injuries.

Polish anti-tank weapons: Their big secret anti-tank weapon was actually just an anti-tank rifle with special bullets that had a tungsten core. They were considerably more effective than standard anti-tank rifles, and were actually pretty effective against the light armor of early World War II tanks. As I recall it, the rifles were so secret that the Poles had never trained with them, though functionally they were just bolt-action rifles with special ammo (and probably extra-hard recoil).
 
Using Polish anti-tankt rifle (kb Ur wz. 35) was actually very easy, pretty much the same as using a regular rifle. Problem was that because of secrecy there had been no tactics prepared for them, not instructions how to e.g. carry them. At the eve of war Polish soldiers were simply given those weapons and the officers had to improvise how to integrate them into their combat plans.
 

Caspian

Banned
From what I've read about the French military leadership, there was simply too much fear of a second Great War, and too little political support to be able to mount a large-scale offensive against Germany. Gamelin was constantly trying to come up with some excuse to avoid an attack, from the Rhineland on, and the Poles holding on for a few more days and looking much better to start the war doesn't seem like it'll have much of an effect on French plans. I don't know if the French command would even believe intelligence reports of ammunition shortages, but would instead view it as a planted message or some ilk.

More informed individuals should correct me, of course, but the information I have indicates too much indecision and fear to allow a real French offensive.
 
Top