Germany offier decent peace to Russia spring 1917

Well, if this was going to happen, Britain might have been more inclined to deal more moderately with the Germans, and not listened to the French so much at Versailles. Even though some territory would have been taken I think, as that is how peace terms usually went. However if the rule of this is to allow no annexations, no reparations or penalties, you might have a stronger Russian Empire to deal with the Bolsheviks. The Poles would revolt no matter what. I think the Germans would let them and just leave, while not specifying exactly how Poland was to be dealt with in the treaty. There is no way in hel you could turn the Russian Army around to face a Polish uprising, as they would refuse.
 
So this is provisional government Russia then? Probably too much flux in March for this to happen then, by April USA is in the war.

For the Russians to be willing to make peace I think you would have to have the USA still be neutral, Falkenhyn still in charge and the Germans to have done a bit better in 1916 (which likely is the only way Falkenhyn is still in charge). Russia might now have much choice then but to make peace.

In any case in the short term it would have been a great deal for all of Russia, Germany, Turkey, Austria.

In the short term. Italy would surely suffer, Greece maybe too as Austria and Turkey have much less commitments now.

If Britain and France then commit to the defensive at that point I still see them being able to hold out at some defensive line. If the USA is in they (France and Britain) still ultimately win, if USA is out France has to make peace at some point.

I can never see Britain making peace in a situation where Germany gets her colonies back and her navy intact though. I would think the threat of victorious Germany at some future date building submarine bases in her colonies all over the world would keep Britain fighting indefinitely even if there were no British armies left on the continent. Britain might accept some deal where Germany still loses her colonies and agrees to a naval construction limit.
 
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Yes, but why would they though?

It certainly would have taken a Germany far more perceptive of her (poor) position and the long term strengths and weaknesses (time is against Germany) than seemed to be present OTL. Falkenhyn might have figured that out Ludendorf probably never.
 
The offiical reason for war with Russia was Austria being able to deal with Serbia which had happened.

Being able to use all their forces in the West would certainly have helped Germany in its war with Britain and France.

In otl Germany claimed to be willing to talk terns generally around this time,#

i accept that the German government was not that perceptive but?
 

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It certainly would have taken a Germany far more perceptive of her (poor) position and the long term strengths and weaknesses (time is against Germany) than seemed to be present OTL. Falkenhyn might have figured that out Ludendorf probably never.
It's not like Ludendorf, Hindenburg and Kaiser Willy would ever accept peace with Russia without a real victory (i.e. Germany becomes stronger).
 
In otl Germany claimed to be willing to talk terns generally around this time,#

They would have discussed terms with Russia - but what you propose is a peace without any terms for Russia without any previous discussion. I can't see this happening. But for the sake of the argument this shouldn'T do the Germans any good. It is too late, Russia is to weak to be used to circumvent the blockade and the US will enter the war/have entered the war.

And then there's Catspoke's argument that time is going against Germany with respect to Russia economically and demographically. Thus such a peace treaty means that Germany effectively accepts to fall behind Russia in the years after the war - I can't see this happening.
 
And then there's Catspoke's argument that time is going against Germany with respect to Russia economically and demographically. Thus such a peace treaty means that Germany effectively accepts to fall behind Russia in the years after the war - I can't see this happening.

Of course the status quo peace might be denounced on some excuse or other in the event of victory in the west. Once the Russian army had gone home its remobilisation would have been next to impossible.
 
Of course the status quo peace might be denounced on some excuse or other in the event of victory in the west. Once the Russian army had gone home its remobilisation would have been next to impossible.

Restarting a war with Russia would be next to impossible as well. The average German soldier wanted the war to be over by this point. A peace treaty with Russia would be pretty popular with the average grunt infantrymen. Once you secured peace you will risk a revolt if you restart the war.
 
It certainly would have taken a Germany far more perceptive of her (poor) position and the long term strengths and weaknesses (time is against Germany) than seemed to be present OTL. Falkenhyn might have figured that out Ludendorf probably never.

What this means is that I think a 1917 peace on a pre war Russian boundry would be great for Germany, but that OTL German leadership would not be able to figure that out.

If Germany uses the peace to put the Balkans, Turkey, Italy and France in order and reach some reasonable peace with Britain, Germany does not have to worry about Russia for a long time. Austria and Turkey would still be firm German allies, Western Russia has had considerable damage. Germany still would lead Russia in the high tech of the time industries (electronics, chemicals, diesel engines, etc...). The Baghdad railway is almost complete which should help Turkey.

If you add the population of Germany, Austria and Turkey its a big number. I never really understood even why Germany was worried about Russia pre war, it never made sense.
 
If you add the population of Germany, Austria and Turkey its a big number. I never really understood even why Germany was worried about Russia pre war, it never made sense.
Um, because of vast numbers, increasingly competent officers, rapidly developing industry (something the war itself stimulated even further), and the generally accepted orthodoxy that Russia was invulnerable to attack?

The fact that the tsarist government squandered these unbelievable advantages historically does not mean that it would squander them in another go. I don't think Germany doesn't have to worry about Russia after any potential peace with no annexations. As with France in 1871, many Germans calculated that the Russians would loathe them regardless of what they did or did not take from them; might as well get a proper buffer zone and new colonies into the bargain.
 
Um, because of vast numbers, increasingly competent officers, rapidly developing industry (something the war itself stimulated even further), and the generally accepted orthodoxy that Russia was invulnerable to attack?.

Those things would make a German war of agression against Russia impossible after a point. But Russia would never be strong enough to try a war of agression against Germany (or a closely allied Austria), in a war where Germany would still be able to trade with the world.
 
Germany would never do this under the Kaiser, they were intent on an imperial sphere in Eastern Europe of a realpolitik/brute force sort, as opposed to killing all the Slavs to Germanize Eastern Europe which is what the second version was about. The Germans won't offer a white peace, the Russians might want it, but they aren't getting it.
 
What this means is that I think a 1917 peace on a pre war Russian boundry would be great for Germany, but that OTL German leadership would not be able to figure that out.

If Germany uses the peace to put the Balkans, Turkey, Italy and France in order and reach some reasonable peace with Britain, Germany does not have to worry about Russia for a long time. Austria and Turkey would still be firm German allies, Western Russia has had considerable damage. Germany still would lead Russia in the high tech of the time industries (electronics, chemicals, diesel engines, etc...). The Baghdad railway is almost complete which should help Turkey.

If you add the population of Germany, Austria and Turkey its a big number. I never really understood even why Germany was worried about Russia pre war, it never made sense.

The Russian military had made enormous improvements in logistics and manpower potential since the 1905 Revolution and was in the middle of an improved logistical peacetime manpower coupling that would have given it a peacetime army sufficient to swamp the Germans in the opening offensive, rendering the Schlieffen Plan impossible.
 
The Russian military had made enormous improvements in logistics and manpower potential since the 1905 Revolution and was in the middle of an improved logistical peacetime manpower coupling that would have given it a peacetime army sufficient to swamp the Germans in the opening offensive, rendering the Schlieffen Plan impossible.

Industrially, Russia is still rather disappointing though. Absolute figures for production are mediocre.

Still...a more prepared Tsarist army might be able to deal. :eek:
 
Industrially, Russia is still rather disappointing though. Absolute figures for production are mediocre.

Still...a more prepared Tsarist army might be able to deal. :eek:

Eh, the only thing that could help any Russian army is to focus on field artillery and field guns, not fortifications. Germany was prepared in all the right ways for WWI as it developed more than the other powers were, if Russia had put a fraction of the sheer ludicrous quantity of ammunition in the historical forts into actual field guns, the Germans would have needed all their skill to limit Russian incursions into Germany and would never have gotten near Warsaw.
 
Those things would make a German war of agression against Russia impossible after a point. But Russia would never be strong enough to try a war of agression against Germany (or a closely allied Austria), in a war where Germany would still be able to trade with the world.
Why wouldn't it? Sukhomlinov's Great Program was supposed to improve the Russian army to the point that literally everybody before the war on both sides thought that Russia would be capable of pulling off a massive offensive into eastern Germany and pancaking the Krauts. Furthermore, the Russian military was not a defensive instrument any more than it was an offensive one. Why can it only have succeeded on the defensive and not on the offensive?
Germany would never do this under the Kaiser, they were intent on an imperial sphere in Eastern Europe of a realpolitik/brute force sort, as opposed to killing all the Slavs to Germanize Eastern Europe which is what the second version was about.
I agree, but with the caveat that this war goal only came up after the war actually started. But it definitely drove the way the negotiations went in 1918.
The Russian military had made enormous improvements in logistics and manpower potential since the 1905 Revolution and was in the middle of an improved logistical peacetime manpower coupling that would have given it a peacetime army sufficient to swamp the Germans in the opening offensive, rendering the Schlieffen Plan impossible.
Yeah, the "Great Program". It terrified pretty much everybody in Berlin. By the way, the "Schlieffen Plan" didn't exist. :p
Eh, the only thing that could help any Russian army is to focus on field artillery and field guns, not fortifications. Germany was prepared in all the right ways for WWI as it developed more than the other powers were, if Russia had put a fraction of the sheer ludicrous quantity of ammunition in the historical forts into actual field guns, the Germans would have needed all their skill to limit Russian incursions into Germany and would never have gotten near Warsaw.
The fortifications weren't a terrible idea by themselves, so long as they were actually used properly. In the event, they weren't; everybody knows the story of the fortress of Novogeorgievsk, which, when captured by the Germans in 1915, contained well over a million artillery shells in its bunkers. Even the lowly Austrians put their fortresses at Lemberg and Przemysl to better use.

What Russia's biggest problem was was its army's failure to decide on a single course of action. Some officers wanted to rely on a strategic defensive to take advantage of Russia's terrain and fortress system, a strategy that had excellent precedent in 1812. Others pointed to the French alliance and noted that they were committed to an invasion of Germany. Ultimately, all of Russia's war plans split the difference between these two options, as did Russia's military budget. Furthermore, the Russians, as did the French, failed to distinguish between the tactical defensive or offensive and the strategic defensive or offensive. Nobody seriously considered a offensive-defensive thrust into Germany or Austria, for instance. All of the imagery of the "attack" factions gravitated towards "cold steel" and "bayonet charge". The strategic defensive was usually connected to "artillerists" who preferred to keep the guns inside the fortresses; although there were some young Turks who argued for the field guns, they were few and far between and made no serious impact on budgetary discussions.

The result was something called "institutional surprise", something that crippled the Russians even more than did their failure to complete the Great Program by the start of the war. (It affected the French and Germans as well, but in rather dramatically different ways.) Russia's army was caught in a period of flux, which made it uniquely unprepared for waging war against Germany in the short run.
 
Eh, the only thing that could help any Russian army is to focus on field artillery and field guns, not fortifications. Germany was prepared in all the right ways for WWI as it developed more than the other powers were, if Russia had put a fraction of the sheer ludicrous quantity of ammunition in the historical forts into actual field guns, the Germans would have needed all their skill to limit Russian incursions into Germany and would never have gotten near Warsaw.

Agreed. But being better industrialized would make making up for such things, and handling the kind of heavily-demanding war WWI was a lot easier.

What did the Russians expect those fortresses to do?
 
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