Germany neither goes east OR west 1914

So essentially the question of WW1 was: Who's the idiot who invades Belgium first?

If the British were serious about its neutrality then Germany should not have invaded Belgium. If the British were posers, then Germany would be fools to fall for the trap. In either case, if Germany did the deed so much better for France, but if they did not then France must do so to drag the British in and get their whole army into the line.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The Russians can seize the initiative by attacking Austria- who is weakened by their sending so much force against Serbia. The Russians still have no real quarrel with the Germans and don't need to attack someone sitting in trenches The so called commitments of the Franco-Russian alliance are based on the assumption of a German attack on France which doesn't happen here

Russian preparation and infrastructure meant the Russians expected to strike first in the east, there would be no concept of waiting until the Germans caught up or were ready for war. This was a confident Russian military, which OTL updated its initial deployment plan to support a third Russian offensive, which would capitalize on the inevitable Russian success in east Prussia. After the Russian cherry was popped, the third offensive was abandoned and the Russian 9th Army was released to support the west flank of the Russian southern front.

An international military agreement with clearly defined requirements set out and agreed in writing by both parties are not "so called commitments". The Franco-Russian alliance was directed specifically at Germany, not A-H.

You do realize that the ideal outcome for Russia is the defeat of Austria and an intact Germany?

Not if Germany has occupied Warsaw, Brest, Minsk and is slouching towards Petrograd...

France isn't sitting on its hands- it is going to mobilize. But with the Germans digging trenches and not attacking the Russians either, there is no need to attack. The Russians aren't screaming for help against the Germans digging trenches either. The Russians would be pushing for delay

Please read the POD, the Germans merely mobilise and wait for the Entente to make the first move, which is the 15th day according to the military agreements under the Franco-Russian alliance - thereafter it's game-on. The deployment of an enhanced German army in east Prussia (the 1st) and a second German army in Silesia (the 8th) is consistent with OTL Russian expectations of 25-30 German divisions. Even if the Russians are somehow reading the German mail, the Russians will be seeing exactly what the want/expect to see and will proceed with their OTL plan. The German strategy in the east (which OTL was initially defensive), is also substantially unchanged except for the additional forces.

In this scenario, the additional German forces in east Prussia can do a more thorough job of demolishing the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies, while the German army in Silesia can immediately go to work on the Russian 9th Army (or similar). The Russians will be facing twice the OTL number of Germans, so if they are not screaming for help, it means they are already dead.

What you really mean is that you need France and Russia to totally disregard the military situation, not adopt to the most blatant change in German strategy and commit the most idiotic military blunders possible or else this scheme ends in the destruction of Austria

The transfer of a single German army from the west is actually quite subtle and if detected, is probably consistent with French and Russian expectations (i.e. the overwhelming majority of German forces remain in the West). OTL the French and German intelligence overestimated the speed of the opposite's deployment by 1-2 days, but neither abandoned their plans due to this minor discrepancy as you always suggest.

To quote the applicable French military doctrine:

"An energetic commander-in-chief, having confidence in himself, in his subordinates, in his troops, will never yield the initiative to his adversary under the pretext of awaiting better intelligence. At the beginning of the war, he will launch operations of such violence and fury that the enemy, weakened in its morale and paralyzed in its action, will be reduced, perhaps, to remaining on the defensive"

To recap, in the east, the Russians would see what they expect/want and proceed per OTL and in the west, the French will attack in accordance with French treaty commitments to Russia, French military doctrine and the proclivities of Joffre.

Contrary to common opinion around here, the French aren't really complete idiots when it comes to strategy. Plan XVII is based on a flawed estimate of German strength- if the French were right and the Germans didn't use their reserve divisions, it would have cut off the German advance into Belgium and won the war

Not complete idiots? In addition to the above quote, some additional extracts from the French doctrine introduced by Joffre include: "The French Army, returning to its traditions, accepts no law in the conduct of operations other than the offensive" and "only the offensive yields positive results". "The artillery does not prepare attacks, it supports them"; it emphasized the conservation of ammunition and stated "to force an adversary out of his cover, it is necessary to attack with infantry". The 1914 French infantry regulations asserted the supreme weapon of the infantry was the bayonet.

Plan XVII was only a deployment plan and perfectly functional - it was the ill conceived offensives thereafter than wrecked the French army.

You know there is a reason the Germans don't do this

Actually I don't. A discussion Glenn239 and I are having about German perceptions of Belgium intentions is my best guess, but much of this is speculation. My second guess is Moltke J preferred the structured nature of the schlieffen plan and feared the uncertainty/ complexity of alternatives i.e. the Germans adopting a re-active counter attack strategy per this thread would be a more challenging and less predictable operational environment. In the event, Moltke J was broken by the Kaiser before hostilities even commenced.

Which, if true, give the French and Russians even more incentive to leave Germany alone and let the Russians maul the Austrians. France would delay until all hope of British help is lost

That's not how team sports work. Per OTL France will do what it can to help Russia, which means initial catastrophic offenses will be followed by ongoing partial offensives to maintain the initiative. The net effect will be disproportionate losses continuing to drain the French manpower. If Britain has not joined by 1915, I think both Russia and France will be searching for an exit.
 

BooNZ

Banned
So essentially the question of WW1 was: Who's the idiot who invades Belgium first?
More-or-less yes, but in my opinion, Britain would be forced to invade a neutral Belgium if it wanted to fully participate in the war. A neutral Belgium makes a British blockade more difficult to implement and sell to neutral nations, and without Belgium territory, the British cannot make a meaningful contribution to the land war in western Europe.
 
More-or-less yes, but in my opinion, Britain would be forced to invade a neutral Belgium if it wanted to fully participate in the war. A neutral Belgium makes a British blockade more difficult to implement and sell to neutral nations, and without Belgium territory, the British cannot make a meaningful contribution to the land war in western Europe.

If war is raging in the Ardennes between Germany and France because one or the other moved in, then the Belgians first and foremost are terrified that fighting will spill over, north of the Meuse. To prevent that, given the complete inadequacy of their army against either France or Germany, they need British backing. The British, in stark contrast, need nothing from Belgium.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The French didn't need to use northern Belgium in 1914, only the Ardennes. It was the Germans that planned to cross the Meuse, triggering conflict in central Belgium. The situation could, presumably, have taken quite some time to work itself out.
A French invasion of the Belgium Ardennes would have resulted in a Belgium declaration of war on France. For Belgium to do anything else would be a breach of its obligations as a neutral power, which we know the Belgians had no intention of doing. As previously stated (repeatedly), Belgium would likely remain a co-belligerent and not join the CP unless the Entente threatened more vital Belgium interests outside the Ardennes.

The decision to contest or not contest or defend any part of the national territory - however big or small - is always a political one. Military factors come into play only when the basic course is set.
The relevant political decision is whether Belgium declares war on the invader or abandons its neutrality and principles. OTL it was rather staunch about maintaining its neutrality and principles, no matter the consequences.

Belgium would stick with Britain as the one guarantor that legitimately could be trusted to uphold Belgium's sovereignty. In turn, Britain would stick with Belgium. If Germany violates Belgium, Britain's job is easy. If France does so, the juggling gets more difficult. But the end state desired in London would be Britain, France and Belgium at war with Germany.

You are simultaneous saying Britain would "stick with Belgium" and support the French invasion thereof. In this scenario Germany has passed on the opportunity to invade Belgium and is in all likelihood defending Belgium honor in the Ardennes. Despite the unexpected and grevious betrayal by a British endorsed French invasion of the Ardennes, you state that Belgium would only trust Britiin. Not only are your conclusions mutually exclusive, they happily ignore the fact Belgium was a strictly neutral power and in no way aligned with Britain in the first place.

A Germans decision not to use Belgium as a thoroughfare is going to be a very pleasant surprise for the Belgians. In the following weeks the Germans will instead be thrashing Russians in the east and punishing French offensives in the west. In this scenario Belgium is not threatened by Germany and knows the Entente is incapable of dealing with its modern fortresses on a timely basis. In this scenario, any Entente advance into the Ardennes will be seen as an act of desperation against an ascendant Germany. Why would Belgium abandon its safety, its status as a neutral and its principles, to join a losing Entente team?

Use Joffre's memoires, which is what Doughty drew from in large part, as with the Schlieffen Plan, the topic is actually quite murky.
The author occasionally both refers to and ridicules Joffre's memoires - Joffre's plans regarding Ardennes are murky, because he shared those with no-one. Given the "success" of his other plans, his decision to destroy such plans along with the rest of his private papers was probably prudent.

The book can say whatever it wants. There is no British document in existence of a formal nature, from officials with the authority to do so, issuing mandatory guidance in writing to the French concerning military planning. On the contrary, Grey preferred to suggest he knew as little as possible. On the French side, Poincare verbally vetoed the automatic violation of Belgium during mobilization, such as the scheduled attack as part of concentration as built into the German plan. He didn't veto the planning for the use of Belgian soil outside that condition. He didn't want embarrassing leaks.
France was a sovereign nation and I'm not sure the French would have accepted any guidance from the British (mandatory or otherwise) on army matters. More importantly, everyone was aware (including the Belgians) the British knew nothing about fighting a modern war on the continent (there was even some truth to those pre-conceived ideas). More relevant is the fact there is no record of any planning or plans for a French invasion of the Ardennes. Nor is there any record of first hand accounts of such plans being produced or the destruction thereof. It's almost as if those plans only ever existing in your imagination (and/or Joffre's private papers).

Wilson is irrelevant. As just stated, the formal British position was given in the Grey-Cambon exchange of notes of November 1912. The French Army's plans would not be reviewed until war was breaking out, and then Britain may or may not agree to a joint course of action. No Belgium, no restrictions on planning. Just a straight yes/no.

It was cabinet, not Grey, that approved the key decisions we are talking about. First, in late July 1914 that a minor violation of Belgium would not influence British policy. Second, in the naval pledge, (subject to approval in the House). Are you suggesting Cabinet did not have the authority to bind Britain? Yes, it did.

Wilson was merely reflecting the mood and opinion of the British public and its elected representatives. Conversely, Grey was already on notice about conflating British foreign policy with his private fascination with all things French. The British Cabinet were not fully aware of the exact nature of the Grey-Cambon exchange of notes of November 1912, which is why the disclosure of the details became a potentially serious issue for Grey in August 1914. Grey and his fellow francophiles routinely concealed the full extent of pre-war discussions with France from Cabinet.

Churchill was also concerned a minor violation of Belgium by Germany would also not influence British foreign policy. This does not reconcile with your repeated representation of Britain as the one true defender of the Belgium people...
 

BooNZ

Banned
Belgium was small and the Entente and CP were big. That's how it was Belgium's problem.

Belgium may have been small, but it had big modern fortresses. The Entente may have big, but it only had a tiny... ...collection of siege equipment - and really had no idea how to use it.

Conversely, everyone knew the Kaiser had a huge... ...mustache and collection of siege equipment, which his army had been playing with constantly.

Given the above, I can understand your empathy for the Entente, but if Germany has already passed on invading Belgium, the Entente has no leverage to intimidate or interest Belgium.

If war is raging in the Ardennes between Germany and France because one or the other moved in, then the Belgians first and foremost are terrified that fighting will spill over, north of the Meuse. To prevent that, given the complete inadequacy of their army against either France or Germany, they need British backing.

OTL Belgium was not intimidated by Germany and in this scenario that threat has passed. In this scenario the Entente position is growing weaker by the day and if the Entente make any unwanted advances, Belgium can simply release the Hun.

The British, in stark contrast, need nothing from Belgium.

But, clearly any fool would know...

If Belgium remained neutral, Russia will lose the war.

The issue was getting the bulk of the French army into the war. To do that, it required more front. This could only come in Belgium.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
The British, in stark contrast, need nothing from Belgium.
Well, "need" might the the wrong wording ...

As pointed out on other places on this forum, Grey in his famous speach to the House on 3rd August made it quite clear, that it was almost vital to britains interests, that the channel coast and with it the belgian coast and harbours were not available to anyone BIG, aka Germany or France, else.

Though, in contrats to other on this boars, I personnally don't see this "need" strong enough, that the Brits would "offer poor littlie Belgium" their also military help - aka occupying the belgian harbours - even against its will.
 
As pointed out on other places on this forum, Grey in his famous speach to the House on 3rd August made it quite clear, that it was almost vital to britains interests, that the channel coast and with it the belgian coast and harbours were not available to anyone BIG, aka Germany or France, else.

Grey had defined the British sphere of interest in Belgium. The French would never go there, the Germans might. Between Belgium and Britain, that still leaves Belgium far more in need of Britain than vice versa.
 
A French invasion of the Belgium Ardennes would have resulted in a Belgium declaration of war on France.

I think the Belgians keep clear of the Ardennes, remain neutral and armed in the north, and fall back on British diplomatic support. The British very well may extend their neutrality into the fall in this case.

You are simultaneous saying Britain would "stick with Belgium" and support the French invasion thereof.

The Belgian Treaty was signed in 1839 during the period of Splendid Isolation while the Entente Cordiales came in 1904 and 1907. The Ententes were with two of the guarantors of Belgium and aimed at the other two guarantors of Belgium. This is our first hint that the 1839 Treaty and the Entente policy were mutually exclusive. So, when you say, "stick with Belgium and France", what that means practically is Belgium with the Entente, against Germany.

In this scenario Germany has passed on the opportunity to invade Belgium and is in all likelihood defending Belgium honor in the Ardennes. Despite the unexpected and grevious betrayal by a British endorsed French invasion of the Ardennes, you state that Belgium would only trust Britain. Not only are your conclusions mutually exclusive, they happily ignore the fact Belgium was a strictly neutral power and in no way aligned with Britain in the first place.

Germany has three strikes against it. First, Britain is the leading European power and dominant at sea with Belgium having a colonial empire and needing sea trade, (the fact that Belgium even had an empire in the Congo is indicative of some long ago British calculation on how best to control Belgium). So, between Germany and Britain, big advantage to Britain. The second strike was that the Kaiser was seen as untrustworthy and unstable, where as the British king and government were a bedrock of political stability. The third strike was that Germany was on the cusp of hegemony in Europe, where Belgium could fully expect to be swallowed into its orbit, if not annexed outright, after a German victory. Net these three together and you have a strong Belgian predisposition towards Britain.

In terms of the violation of the Ardennes by France, the British could, (and would) adapt the position that the French had acted unilaterally. A German violation was easier diplomatically for Britain's interests, but a French violation had the potential of a better military outcome. No violation at all would be a catastrophe, as the Franco-Russian alliance would not survive.

In this scenario, any Entente advance into the Ardennes will be seen as an act of desperation against an ascendant Germany. Why would Belgium abandon its safety, its status as a neutral and its principles, to join a losing Entente team?

If Germany deploys 6 armies in the West and 2 in the East and awaits the French, and Belgium north of the Meuse is inviolated, the net effect as of December is stalemate on all fronts. The Western Front will see the French defeated along the common border and soon losing steam. The front will run through Metz-Thionville up into the Ardennes to the Meuse. On the Eastern Front the Austrians have done better. But this war too is what the war was - a stalemate settling into a long conflict. Belgium's reality will be that their territory is in the front line and the war is not ending anytime soon.

The author occasionally both refers to and ridicules Joffre's memoires - Joffre's plans regarding Ardennes are murky, because he shared those with no-one.

Which of Doughty or Joffre commanded the French army in 1914?

France was a sovereign nation and I'm not sure the French would have accepted any guidance from the British (mandatory or otherwise) on army matters. More importantly, everyone was aware (including the Belgians) the British knew nothing about fighting a modern war on the continent (there was even some truth to those pre-conceived ideas). More relevant is the fact there is no record of any planning or plans for a French invasion of the Ardennes.

550,000 French troops were ordered mobilized north of Metz-Thionville on 2 August for a picnic? The French advance commencing around the 23rd into the Belgian Ardennes was totally unplanned? This is what you believe?

Wilson was merely reflecting the mood and opinion of the British public and its elected representatives. Conversely, Grey was already on notice about conflating British foreign policy with his private fascination with all things French. The British Cabinet were not fully aware of the exact nature of the Grey-Cambon exchange of notes of November 1912, which is why the disclosure of the details became a potentially serious issue for Grey in August 1914. Grey and his fellow francophiles routinely concealed the full extent of pre-war discussions with France from Cabinet.

Wilson is irrelevant for reasons already explained. Grey didn't want Britain to have any part of French planning. The RN would guard the coast and the Cabinet would look after the BEF as the war was breaking out. The British literally had no interest in discussing the Ardennes with the French. Whatever France would decide or do, because Germany was the threat the British would back them, but only after the fact. Not before it. I don't know where the confusion is coming from, because the terrain is clear. Belgium was subordinate to the Ententes, but that doesn't mean Britain was going to be the one to force the act.

Churchill was also concerned a minor violation of Belgium by Germany would also not influence British foreign policy. This does not reconcile with your repeated representation of Britain as the one true defender of the Belgium people...

If Germany invaded the Ardennes the British would go to war with Germany. If France invaded the Ardennes the British would go to war with Germany. What's the confusion on that concept? You believe British politicians a bunch of angles, incapable of wearing the daddy pants when it came to hard realpolitik choices?
 

BooNZ

Banned
I think the Belgians keep clear of the Ardennes, remain neutral and armed in the north, and fall back on British diplomatic support. The British very well may extend their neutrality into the fall in this case.

A Belgium declaration of war against an invader would be mandatory if it was serious about maintaining its neutrality.

The Belgian Treaty was signed in 1839 during the period of Splendid Isolation while the Entente Cordiales came in 1904 and 1907. The Ententes were with two of the guarantors of Belgium and aimed at the other two guarantors of Belgium. This is our first hint that the 1839 Treaty and the Entente policy were mutually exclusive. So, when you say, "stick with Belgium and France", what that means practically is Belgium with the Entente, against Germany.

You are ignoring the fact Belgium as an independent sovereign nation. You are ignoring the fact Belgium neutrality was recognized and protected by international treaty. You are ignoring the fact Belgium was not aligned with Britain, let alone a puppet of Britain. You are ignoring the fact there was no obligation compelling the British to come to the French rescue in the event of a German attack - let alone a German cold shoulder.

Germany has three strikes against it. First, Britain is the leading European power and dominant at sea with Belgium having a colonial empire and needing sea trade, (the fact that Belgium even had an empire in the Congo is indicative of some long ago British calculation on how best to control Belgium).

What would be the legal basis of a British blockade of a neutral Belgium? OTL, Britain did not declare a formal blockade of Germany, but instead relied on a doctrine of retaliation. OTL you are claiming Belgium would be intimidated by the Royal Navy, when OTL the better part of the Imperial German army failed to do the same.

So, between Germany and Britain, big advantage to Britain. The second strike was that the Kaiser was seen as untrustworthy and unstable, where as the British king and government were a bedrock of political stability.

Belgium was not a party to the British hysteria arising from the Anglo-German naval rivalry. Belgium had amicable relations with Germany, despite the expectation Belgium would become a thoroughfare in the event of a war between Germany and France. In this scenario, Germany passing on the opportunity to invade Belgium likely gives the relationship a further boost.

The third strike was that Germany was on the cusp of hegemony in Europe, where Belgium could fully expect to be swallowed into its orbit, if not annexed outright, after a German victory. Net these three together and you have a strong Belgian predisposition towards Britain.

Western Europe had endured over forty years of peace following the German/Prussian defensive victory of 1871. The rise of Germany, coupled with British isolationism had coincided with unprecedented peace and prosperity in western Europe. How do you get to Belgium being annexed by Germany?

In terms of the violation of the Ardennes by France, the British could, (and would) adapt the position that the French had acted unilaterally. A German violation was easier diplomatically for Britain's interests, but a French violation had the potential of a better military outcome. No violation at all would be a catastrophe, as the Franco-Russian alliance would not survive.

The British did not share a hive mind. The majority of Britons did not share Grey's fascination with the French, nor Crowe's hatred of the Germans. The British hawks are going to struggle to get Britain into the war without a German violation of Belgium's neutrality. Not impossible, but its going to be increasingly more difficult to justify British involvement if the Germans remain on the defensive in the west. Unilateral French action in the Ardennes will sink the Belgium and Britain public opinion of the French and cause the hawks in Britain to lose whatever credibility they were clinging to.

The preservation of the Franco-Russian alliance is not something Belgium or Britain would lose any sleep over.

If Germany deploys 6 armies in the West and 2 in the East and awaits the French, and Belgium north of the Meuse is inviolated, the net effect as of December is stalemate on all fronts. The Western Front will see the French defeated along the common border and soon losing steam. The front will run through Metz-Thionville up into the Ardennes to the Meuse. On the Eastern Front the Austrians have done better. But this war too is what the war was - a stalemate settling into a long conflict. Belgium's reality will be that their territory is in the front line and the war is not ending anytime soon.

Whatever the initial deployment, there will likely be at least 4 German armies in the east before winter. The position of the Russians will be either dire or catastrophic depending on their reaction to the initial defeats - immediately abandoning equipment and territory being their best, but least likely choice. Any pause in the east would be attributable to either logistics or the weather - not the ability of the Russians to resist.

In the west, heavy French offensive losses mean Joffre will eventually have to resort to OTL partial offensives, which means the French losses will continue to be disproportionately higher than the German defenders. Even if the French attempt an offensive into the Ardennes in 1914, it will not be enough to put the Germans under any serious pressure. The Russians would be in far worse shape than OTL and the French would (appear to) be doing nothing.

Meanwhile, Belgium is sitting pretty. The expected German invasion never came and the Germans are now defending Belgium honor in the Ardennes - although close observers might note the Germans appear to be luring the French further into the Ardennes rather than expelling them. The Belgium military will be sitting safely behind a chain of modern fortresses, defending the Belgium heartland from the fracas, which was the purpose of their construction.

Which of Doughty or Joffre commanded the French army in 1914?

Was it the same one who thought destroying his private papers (including any record of an Ardennes offensive plan) was the best way to preserve his legacy?

550,000 French troops were ordered mobilized north of Metz-Thionville on 2 August for a picnic? The French advance commencing around the 23rd into the Belgian Ardennes was totally unplanned? This is what you believe?

As previously stated and ignored by you, the above deployment was defensive and planned in response to an expected German invasion of Belgium. As previously stated and ignored by you, a deployment to defend against a German invasion of Belgium is very different from a French invasion of the Ardennes with an expectation of reaching the other side. The defensive nature of the French deployment is reinforced by the missive sent to Joffre by the Messimy (French Minister of War) in Aug-1914, reminding Joffre (in writing) he was not permitted to cross the Belgium border before the Germans. In the event, confirmation the Germans had crossed into Belgium reached Joffre before the missive.

Wilson is irrelevant for reasons already explained. Grey didn't want Britain to have any part of French planning. The RN would guard the coast and the Cabinet would look after the BEF as the war was breaking out. The British literally had no interest in discussing the Ardennes with the French. Whatever France would decide or do, because Germany was the threat the British would back them, but only after the fact. Not before it. I don't know where the confusion is coming from, because the terrain is clear. Belgium was subordinate to the Ententes, but that doesn't mean Britain was going to be the one to force the act.
Wilson was reflecting the opinion of the British population and cabinet, which you appear to claim is irrelevant. There was extensive military co-operation/ liaisons between the British and French before the war on a variety of matters. The Belgium territory was not discussed because the violation of Belgium neutrality was repugnant to both the British and French politicians. In 1914 Britain was bound by treaty to protect Belgium's neutrality, but it owed France sweet nothing.

If Germany invaded the Ardennes the British would go to war with Germany. If France invaded the Ardennes the British would go to war with Germany. What's the confusion on that concept? You believe British politicians a bunch of angles, incapable of wearing the daddy pants when it came to hard realpolitik choices?

The true masters of diplomacy in the decades leading into WW1 were not the British, but the French. From being a diplomatic pariah in 1871, France gathered Russia and then Britain under its wings and convinced them France's causes were their own. French diplomacy recognized the British were not ready to contemplate the violation of Belgium neutrality, as did Wilson. Ultimately the French and British ended up fighting for Russia's cause in the Balkans.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
You believe British politicians a bunch of angles, incapable of wearing the daddy pants when it came to hard realpolitik choices?
I don't think anybody on this board renders the Brits "angels".
GB has shown often enough in history its ability for "real politics", aka to ignore treaties or "interprete" them as it fits, up to outright betrayel of former "allies". Was it one of the Pitts or Disraeli who said :
"Briatin has no allies, Britain has interests." (or similar).

However, whatever "Britain" did or did not and what was defined as "Britains interest" depended on the unity of its leading politicians aka cabinet or at least between PM and King, what often enough also depended on cabinets unity.


And that's, where :
If Germany invaded the Ardennes the British would go to war with Germany. If France invaded the Ardennes the British would go to war with Germany. What's the confusion on that concept?
this "concept" of no-matter-what-GB-goes-to-war-against-Germany-IMMEDIATLY get "confused", as you name it.
The cabinet was highly and strongly divided upon the necessity for GB/"interest" for GB going to war AT ALL, even if belgian neutrality/integrity would be violated by whoever. Something Grey (more than) and Churchill had a damn hard time to turn the cabinets position.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Grey had defined the British sphere of interest in Belgium.
When ? ... and esp. when had he told this the french to unconditionally accept it ?
The French would never go there, the Germans might. Between Belgium and Britain, that still leaves Belgium far more in need of Britain than vice versa.
How do you know ? Any sorces on that ?

And perhaps even more important : how did the belgians know that for sure ?

In the belgian history also beyond the foundation of the modern belgian state) there were many more french attempts to seize this "low country", than from the german side.

All about "german interests" in Belgium was IIRC one of Kaiser Bills numerous boastings, this time in 1912, about a possible german "run" over Liege, if another german-french war might happen.
But as said : Kaiser Bill made a lot and often noisy statements without any consequences ... and without backing by his his own diplomats, when they were asked afterwards.
 
The British response would seem to have a butterflies based on the more political options of such a conflict that doesn't explode all at once.

Initially Austria is attacking Serbia
Germany mobilizes in response to Russia.
France mobilizes.
Britain is probably tolerant of the Austrians occupying northern Serbia, so asks for assurances from Austria, asks for a Conference of Nations.

weeks later... (mid to late August, even early September, depending on how the diplomacy goes and Russian mobilization goes)

Russia declares war on Austria, occupies the most exposed Northwest corner of Austrian Galacia, maybe doesn't really press the Austrians who are backed up from the frontier a bit.
Germany declares war on Russia, has to make a decision on strategy, occupy a chunk of western Poland as a bargaining chip perhaps, or directly assisting the Austrians in defense of Galacia, regardless this means battling the Russians on the frontier, the Russians might attack themselves hopefully.
France declares war on Germany. Starts prodding Britain to get in.
Decision time for Britain. If Austria maintains the position of a temporary occupation of Serbia and Germany maintains the she is supporting Austria, Britain may stay out for a while, pushing a diplomatic solution.

more weeks later....

Germany wins the battle of the Russian frontiers
Germany repulses French attacks (regardless if these extend into the Ardennes, Britain still neutral regardless too)
Austria defeats Serbia, its was a hard grind though, maybe a little embarassing.
Britain insists that Germany and Austria stop fighting and make peace upon this new, favorable to them reality.

Decision point.

A) Germany/Austria makes peace, much blood and treasure spent, however the encirclement around her has been weakened, Austria has been propped up. A win but a small one. German relations with Britain improve. The effect on Russian politics of this embarrassment would be interesting. France is left feeling nervous.

B) Germany defeats the Russians and French easily on the frontier battles. Germany has spent the last 6 weeks crash importing strategic supplies and dumping arms in the colonies (where reservists have been trickling in). Has outfitted a number of extra raiders from merchants and old cruisers. Germany decides to give a complete military victory a chance. Britain declares war. However without a clear need anywhere for a British army in the traditional British manner focuses on clearing the seaways, taking German colonies, picking on Turkey if she comes in with the Central Powers.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The British response would seem to have a butterflies based on the more political options of such a conflict that doesn't explode all at once.

...

Your scenario is logically put together, but the system of alliances will likely accelerate matters far more swiftly. France abandoning Russian Balkan aspirations would be a significant POD from French foreign policy from 1912. Russia initially going it alone against both A-H and Germany is also unlikely. In my opinion it would more likely resemble the following:
  • Austria initiates partial mobilization against Serbia and Russian starts "pre-mobilization, mobilization" around the same time
  • Within a week Germany starts full mobilization and Austria changes partial mobilization to full mobilization
  • Within 48 hours Russia and France order full mobilization
  • Austria starts offensive against Serbia (exact timing uncertain)
  • Within 15 days of mobilization, Russia and France launch offensives against Germany
  • Russia starts invasion of A-H (exact timing uncertain)
The most significant uncertainty is whether or not Britain joins the fray. If Germany is on the defensive in the west, it will be exceedingly difficult for the British hawks to assert a sense of urgency to enter the war. The longer the war continues without British participation, the more difficult the task of getting Britain into the war becomes.

...
more weeks later....

Germany wins the battle of the Russian frontiers
Germany repulses French attacks (regardless if these extend into the Ardennes, Britain still neutral regardless too)
Austria defeats Serbia, its was a hard grind though, maybe a little embarassing.
Britain insists that Germany and Austria stop fighting and make peace upon this new, favorable to them reality.

Decision point.

A) Germany/Austria makes peace, much blood and treasure spent, however the encirclement around her has been weakened, Austria has been propped up. A win but a small one. German relations with Britain improve. The effect on Russian politics of this embarrassment would be interesting. France is left feeling nervous.

B) Germany defeats the Russians and French easily on the frontier battles. Germany has spent the last 6 weeks crash importing strategic supplies and dumping arms in the colonies (where reservists have been trickling in). Has outfitted a number of extra raiders from merchants and old cruisers. Germany decides to give a complete military victory a chance. Britain declares war. However without a clear need anywhere for a British army in the traditional British manner focuses on clearing the seaways, taking German colonies, picking on Turkey if she comes in with the Central Powers.

The outcome in your scenario is ultimately similar to what I would expect. However, if the CP powers are firmly in control of the battlefields in the east and the west, there is limited pressure the British can apply. Instead, the British may use its leverage to encourage the French to make peace (with or without Russia) to preserve the status quo in the west.
 
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