Germany mistakes

You have a point, I didn't think of that.
Long term trade with the Soviets puts Germany in the same position as GB regarding the US. Germany can never be the senior partner. They don't hold the good cards. How long is that situation going to be tolerable.
I used to believe the full Mein Kampf kill the untermensch narrative, and that is still in the back ground. But once you see the barrel the Soviets had Germany over with the US looming in the back ground, invading Russia goes from crazy to essential, and that is all sorts of awful.
 
Gonna just put this one out there as a mistake

the genocide of the jews, LGBT, disabled etc etc etc. feel that should get a lil mention.
 
Plan Z or the German plan that resulted from the AGNA (Anglo-Germany Naval Agreement) while effectively giving Germany the Green light for Rearmament (which they were doing anyway) did create a situation where Germany strove to build a 'balanced fleet' at 30% parity with the UK in all things except Subs where it was 100%

This now we can look back at it was a very cunning bit of work by the British, even if it was seen as appeasement, as it prevented Germany from building the very type of force it needed to have a chance of successfully blockading the UK.

I would be happy for them to build a crap Aircraft carrier or 2 as it further detracts from the fleet they actually needed
 
Gonna just put this one out there as a mistake

the genocide of the jews, LGBT, disabled etc etc etc. feel that should get a lil mention.

Ugly as it is, none of that cause them to loose the war.

Lack of fully developed industry.
Lack of fully built up army, specially in logistics
Lack of a proper blue water navy.
Lack of a long range arm for the air force.
Lack of long term planning.
 

nbcman

Donor
Why would Stalin trade enough Oil to Germans to cover their all needs and to make himself disposable? Better to keep them dependent and short the oil so the prices spike. (1)Not every day you get to trade engineering for some crude. In fact Romania dropped their oil production from 8.7 million tons of oil in 36 to 5.2 in 41 in great part for political reasons and for better trade with Germans.(2) In 1939, peacetime Germany imports 60% of their domestic oil. By 1940 Germany uses up 9 558 000 tons of oil more than they produce or import. In 1941 Walther Funk has managed to curb oil consumption in the general economy to the point that Germany was using only 18% of its peacetime oil usage yet it wasn't even close to enough. When the October 1941 deadline was crafted it was stated that Germany could only sustain a two month offensive with the oil they have if they go on an offensive rather than let the opportunity pass by, stated by Eduard Wagner in March of 41. (3) In May of 41 Shell suggested immediate demotorization of Wehrmacht forces in order to curb oil consumption. And that was with 10 motorized Divisions that Germany fielded (4). All of this is in Wages of destruction.



See above.
(1) Because Stalin OTL was trading oil, grains, rubber and other raw materials to the Germans that powered, shod and fed the forces that invaded in June 1941. And there was no 'price spike' as the Soviets were sending goods to Germany in May and June 1941 which the Germans hadn't ordered. Eventually the supply spigot would have been turned off by the Soviets but not in 1941 based on OTL events.

(2) Romanian exports to Germany increased during that time frame regardless of oil production reduction in Romania as non-Axis oil deliveries from Romania virtually stopped in 1940 (which was noted in 'Wages'):
(3) The draw down in fuel stocks was not that dramatic in the early months of 1941 as can be seen from Aviation Fuel stocks and consumption:

Aviation fuel:
Entered 1941 219 M gallons
Used Jan-Jun 148 M gallons
Produced 1941 326 M gallons

If Germany continued to consume Aviation fuel at the rate prior to Barbarossa, Aviation fuel stocks would have increased in 1941 by approximately 30 M gallons. As noted upthread, Germany had, for them, a fairly large stock of oil in June 1941

In the case of the Luftwaffe, fuel expenditures for the Soviet campaign were significant. In the first half of 1941 prior to the invasion, the Luftwaffe used an estimated 148 million gallons of aviation fuel. From June through December that amount more than doubled to 307 million, just slightly less than the 309 million gallons of fuel used by the Luftwaffe for the entire year in 1940. Total German production of aviation fuel in 1941 was only 326 million gallons—a significant deficit in light of the 456 million gallons used for the year. As a result, Luftwaffe fuel reserves fell dramatically from 219 million gallons in January 1941 down to 91 million by December.

With respect to your previous claim about the capture of Soviet fuel, the Germans couldn't use captured fuel since Soviet petrol was too low for German vehicles without adding an octane booster.

Moreover, during the eastern campaign German units were unable to utilize captured fuel, as they had during the campaigns of 1939 and 1940. This was because the octane content of Soviet petrol was too low for German vehicles. It could only be used after the addition of benzol in complex installations constructed specifically for that task.

(4) Germany had at least 15 motorized divisions as 15 motorized division invaded during Barbarossa.
 
... they had a functioning trade arrangement with China through the 1930s ; exchanging for Wolfram for armaments and trading Another 2500 aircraft sales in the late 1930s could have secured another 15,000 tons needed to consume 5000 tons per year through 1945. Going with Japan offered them little to help their European struggle. Going to war with USA & USSR was the biggest own goal in history.

did you mean going to war with US & USSR simultaneously? or going to war with either one?

Gen. Von Seeckt's plan was to cooperate with USSR and China, not an alliance but to reach across Eurasia for the resources, certainly they should not have abandoned it without some clear agreement with Japan.

also they built a little trading bloc of Poland, Finland, and the Baltics but dealt it away without thought to USSR? when they (likely?) could have struck a deal over just Poland? or Poland and Romania?
 
Gonna just put this one out there as a mistake

the genocide of the jews, LGBT, disabled etc etc etc. feel that should get a lil mention.

The question was about German mistakes which prevented them from winning in WWII, not an alternate history with a very different mid 20th century Europe, so presumably the issue is mistakes the Nazis made, and probably "being Nazis," as large a mistake as that is, is not in the spirit of the question as an answer.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Evidence this none sense please
In 1914 Britain was hands down the strongest financial power in the world - France being the second strongest. By the end of 1916 both Britain and France had more-or-less spent/used all their available liquidity and would have struggled to continue the war effort without the USA. This suggests there were systemic issues that disadvantaged Britain, again prima facie, the setup that had allowed the Britain to dominate the world economy for over a century was not so well suited to fighting a war on the continent.

Again, even before the fall of France in 1940 the British War Board (or similar) assessed the war could not be won without the USA, and by September 1940 were in dire financial straights and by November 1940 were cap in hand to the USA again.
 

Khanzeer

Banned
Gonna just put this one out there as a mistake

the genocide of the jews, LGBT, disabled etc etc etc. feel that should get a lil mention.
Dont forget millions of Christian slavs poles and Russians esp , not that communists were not responsible for similar horrendous crimes
 
did you mean going to war with US & USSR simultaneously? or going to war with either one?

Gen. Von Seeckt's plan was to cooperate with USSR and China, not an alliance but to reach across Eurasia for the resources, certainly they should not have abandoned it without some clear agreement with Japan.

also they built a little trading bloc of Poland, Finland, and the Baltics but dealt it away without thought to USSR? when they (likely?) could have struck a deal over just Poland? or Poland and Romania?

YES either or. All the prewar planning -not hijacked by Hitler - envisaged a European war , but BECK adopted Groener's guideline that any military action Germany takes will not go unchallenged by their neighbour's and could ultimately explode into a European wide war along the lines of WW-I. So Schacht /Groener argued for a pan Eastern European economic block to get out of GD, but beyond that something more was needed.

My idea was a pan-European anti Stalinist alliance, possibly military in nature, so Germany can barter arms for stockpiling resources.
 
Gen. Von Seeckt's plan was to cooperate with USSR and China, not an alliance but to reach across Eurasia for the resources, certainly they should not have abandoned it without some clear agreement with Japan.

also they built a little trading bloc of Poland, Finland, and the Baltics but dealt it away without thought to USSR? when they (likely?) could have struck a deal over just Poland? or Poland and Romania?

All the prewar planning -not hijacked by Hitler - envisaged a European war , but BECK adopted Groener's guideline that any military action Germany takes will not go unchallenged by their neighbour's and could ultimately explode into a European wide war along the lines of WW-I. So Schacht /Groener argued for a pan Eastern European economic block to get out of GD, but beyond that something more was needed.

My idea was a pan-European anti Stalinist alliance, possibly military in nature, so Germany can barter arms for stockpiling resources.

not sure how to put the 1000 pieces of that jigsaw puzzle together? it would take Bismarck (the person not the warship.) the so-called Phantom Alliance of Germany, Japan, and Poland was the great fear of Stalin but he divided it before it ever actually formed?

if you take the most critical resource of oil, the pre-war German plan for Nazis and before, was oil of Poland and Romania, oil shale of Estonia. the M-R Pact with USSR screwed that up by dealing away Poland and Estonia, then they allied with Romania, meaning they had to negotiate for the oil there.
 
In 1914 Britain was hands down the strongest financial power in the world - France being the second strongest. By the end of 1916 both Britain and France had more-or-less spent/used all their available liquidity and would have struggled to continue the war effort without the USA. This suggests there were systemic issues that disadvantaged Britain, again prima facie, the setup that had allowed the Britain to dominate the world economy for over a century was not so well suited to fighting a war on the continent.

Again, even before the fall of France in 1940 the British War Board (or similar) assessed the war could not be won without the USA, and by September 1940 were in dire financial straights and by November 1940 were cap in hand to the USA again.

First horseshit now gibberish. Sorry. What happened in 1916 is not relevant to what happened in 1940. ( and in 14 the US is actually the strongest financial power in the world, its just mainly domestic so not so noticeable).

What would have happened in in 16 without US funding is what happened in Germany in 1914, the CSA and USA in 1860, French republic in 1790s and Germany in 1936, They print money on the assumption that they will win and someone else pick up the tab before the bill comes due in the form of massive inflation. Its only noticeable because they actually have a choice about taking on debt or inflating currency ( or actually taking on debt in your currency then inflating it away if you can).

That btw is why Germany has hyperinflation in the 30s, the second part of the cause being he state paying out on war loans, pensions and immediate post war make work schemes funded through municipal bonds. That is the second part of the stab in the back, the impoverishment of the German middle and professional classes.

None of which helps buy stuff in the US ( although the collapse in Entente orders followed by the foreclosures across the Midwest, factories shutting down, breadlines in the great cities may focus congress minds) but it does not mean that two industrial nations with a combined output larger than Germany's even without the US suddenly cant fight any more.

Nor does it mean that in 1939 ( the war starts in 39 btw) where the Anglo French spending plan is on track to be running short of $ reserves by 43. That's short not out. And its a Wehrmacht and finance ministry assumption that war with Britain or France automatically means war with the US economy and probably the US. Which is born out in the cash and carry legislation without which NO US goods could be provided to a belligerent.

What happens is ofc the Fall of France which does three things. One is forced rerouting of shipping away from sterling zone areas to north American ( this is a time distance economy issue) because France is occupied. Two means that Britain picks up the large $ values of the French Orders for aircraft made before the Fall of France and Three with Italy in the war the easiest way to ship goods to Egypt is actually from North America. Note the initial orders are mainly by the French for Aircraft, UK aircraft orders come later under lend lease.

The actual British war planning does not require US assistance beyond some unique US produced items. But once it is available on the cheap it makes sense to use more of it. In fact the overwhelming majority of the debt and spend on US goods and services relates to the period 43-45.

Incidentally according to the Germans its the British Army that beat them in 1917/18 and apart from a fairly brief period over the winter of 44/45 most of the ground forces engaged in Western Europe are CW or CW supplied. After about feb 45 the French Army reappears.
 
Plan Z or the German plan that resulted from the AGNA (Anglo-Germany Naval Agreement) while effectively giving Germany the Green light for Rearmament (which they were doing anyway) did create a situation where Germany strove to build a 'balanced fleet' at 30% parity with the UK in all things except Subs where it was 100%

This now we can look back at it was a very cunning bit of work by the British, even if it was seen as appeasement, as it prevented Germany from building the very type of force it needed to have a chance of successfully blockading the UK.

I would be happy for them to build a crap Aircraft carrier or 2 as it further detracts from the fleet they actually needed

have to disagree to a point, it certainly regimented them into proper classes of ships and away from Panzerschiffe that straddled classes, and of course it limited submarines (in numbers)

but the AGNA did not require the madcap building program they had with no torpedo boats and useless destroyers, no proper minelayers and light cruisers that could not risk the open Atlantic?
 
have to disagree to a point, it certainly regimented them into proper classes of ships and away from Panzerschiffe that straddled classes, and of course it limited submarines (in numbers)

but the AGNA did not require the madcap building program they had with no torpedo boats and useless destroyers, no proper minelayers and light cruisers that could not risk the open Atlantic?

Well I agree with you.

I think we can agree that they did try to build a balanced fleet and agree that they planned and designed it badly (as you say building or not building DDs and CLs capable of supporting a Kreuzerkrieg fleet) for the war that was subsequently fought!
 

BooNZ

Banned
First horseshit now gibberish.
I am sorry if you find it complicated - I will try and keep it simple for you.

What happened in 1916 is not relevant to what happened in 1940. ( and in 14 the US is actually the strongest financial power in the world, its just mainly domestic so not so noticeable).
No, I stated financial power, not economic power. Rapidly growing economies require capital, and I believe the US was still a net debtor in 1914 (or at a minimum, had better things to spend money on), whereas Britain and France were longest established and mature economies, with very substantial financial reserves i.e. financial powers.

What would have happened in in 16 without US funding is what happened in Germany in 1914, the CSA and USA in 1860, French republic in 1790s and Germany in 1936, They print money on the assumption that they will win and someone else pick up the tab before the bill comes due in the form of massive inflation. Its only noticeable because they actually have a choice about taking on debt or inflating currency ( or actually taking on debt in your currency then inflating it away if you can).
Printing money only has an effect if those who accept the fiat currency (domestic or otherwise) can provide/produce the goods required. Britain had no domestic oil fields, needed to import 60% of its calories and did not have the shipping available to transport sufficient war supplies from territories further away who would accept such a fiat currency. It's not just the fact Germany chose a loose monetary policy, it was the fact Germany was also relatively self sufficient, when compared to Britain, which remained dependent on global trade.

None of which helps buy stuff in the US ( although the collapse in Entente orders followed by the foreclosures across the Midwest, factories shutting down, breadlines in the great cities may focus congress minds) but it does not mean that two industrial nations with a combined output larger than Germany's even without the US suddenly cant fight any more.
No, the British OTL had to open their books to the US to prove they had pawned everything of value as a pre-requisite for lend-lease, which does essentially illustrate the British would have been unable to fight any more.

Nor does it mean that in 1939 ( the war starts in 39 btw) where the Anglo French spending plan is on track to be running short of $ reserves by 43. That's short not out. And its a Wehrmacht and finance ministry assumption that war with Britain or France automatically means war with the US economy and probably the US. Which is born out in the cash and carry legislation without which NO US goods could be provided to a belligerent.
OTL the British were declaring their poverty to the US (on a war ending scale) by the end of 1940, which the British had to prove for the purposes of lend lease.

What happens is ofc the Fall of France which does three things. One is forced rerouting of shipping away from sterling zone areas to north American ( this is a time distance economy issue) because France is occupied. Two means that Britain picks up the large $ values of the French Orders for aircraft made before the Fall of France and Three with Italy in the war the easiest way to ship goods to Egypt is actually from North America. Note the initial orders are mainly by the French for Aircraft, UK aircraft orders come later under lend lease.
As outlined above, lend-lease was only available after the British had proven (to the satisfaction of the US) Britain was already broke.

The actual British war planning does not require US assistance beyond some unique US produced items. But once it is available on the cheap it makes sense to use more of it. In fact the overwhelming majority of the debt and spend on US goods and services relates to the period 43-45.
Nope - refer above. Unless by unique items you are including to fuel and food...

Incidentally according to the Germans its the British Army that beat them in 1917/18 and apart from a fairly brief period over the winter of 44/45 most of the ground forces engaged in Western Europe are CW or CW supplied. After about feb 45 the French Army reappears.
The French did the heavy lifting in the first world war, while the soviets did the heavy lifting in the second - while the US resourced both. The British battled bravely in both, but those were scarcely a one-on-one cage fights.
 

nbcman

Donor
I am sorry if you find it complicated - I will try and keep it simple for you.

No, I stated financial power, not economic power. Rapidly growing economies require capital, and I believe the US was still a net debtor in 1914 (or at a minimum, had better things to spend money on), whereas Britain and France were longest established and mature economies, with very substantial financial reserves i.e. financial powers.

Printing money only has an effect if those who accept the fiat currency (domestic or otherwise) can provide/produce the goods required. Britain had no domestic oil fields, needed to import 60% of its calories and did not have the shipping available to transport sufficient war supplies from territories further away who would accept such a fiat currency. It's not just the fact Germany chose a loose monetary policy, it was the fact Germany was also relatively self sufficient, when compared to Britain, which remained dependent on global trade.

No, the British OTL had to open their books to the US to prove they had pawned everything of value as a pre-requisite for lend-lease, which does essentially illustrate the British would have been unable to fight any more.

OTL the British were declaring their poverty to the US (on a war ending scale) by the end of 1940, which the British had to prove for the purposes of lend lease.

As outlined above, lend-lease was only available after the British had proven (to the satisfaction of the US) Britain was already broke.

Nope - refer above. Unless by unique items you are including to fuel and food...

The French did the heavy lifting in the first world war, while the soviets did the heavy lifting in the second - while the US resourced both. The British battled bravely in both, but those were scarcely a one-on-one cage fights.

That import figure for food / calories is a snapshot at the start of WW2 prior to rationing being implemented and not what occurred during the entire war. By 1945, the UK was producing 75% of the food they consumed.

Germany was 'self-sufficient' in food up until about 1942 for three reasons: 1) extensive plundering / requisition of food in occupied countries, 2) extensive use of poorly fed POWs to boost domestic food production & 3) Trade with the Soviets which came to a crashing halt on 22 Jun 1941.
 
No, I stated financial power, not economic power. Rapidly growing economies require capital, and I believe the US was still a net debtor in 1914 (or at a minimum, had better things to spend money on), whereas Britain and France were longest established and mature economies, with very substantial financial reserves i.e. financial power

And the UK national debt stands at 30% of GDP at the beginning of the 20th century and the US is also a net debtor but actually has much lower government expenditures. I am not sure what distinction you are trying to make between financial and economic power. The source of financing for growth and investment in the very mature US economy pre WW1 was US citizens savings and production. You seem to be confusing the idea of cash in hand being equal to economic potential. Its not because all the states on entering the war immediately start to issue debt to finance the war.

The UK goes from spending 8.1% of GDP on government spending in 1913 to a peak of 37% in 16 and 17. Germany from 9.8% to 50%+ in 1916 (59% in 16) the French from 10% to the high 40s. All had a large amount of slack for military spending in their economies. The US has a government spending of a larger economy that any of these with a higher per capital GDP rate of under 2% rising to 16% of GDP.

However all of that ignores this, Your basic contention is that while Germany can continue a war indefinitely the British reach economic collapse in 1916 without the US being involved.

Germany has (1913) a GDP of 244 bn USD @1990 levels.

The British Empire alone ( excluding the French) has a total GDP output of around 540bn. even exc the colonies (low GDP per head but lots of heads) its around 300bn. The US exc dependencies is 511b with a higher GDP/Capita than any of the Europeans.

So as I said, If the British and French have significant economic slack compared to Germany at all points, The price of using that is debt. Its really just a question of who you owe it to.

Printing money only has an effect if those who accept the fiat currency (domestic or otherwise) can provide/produce the goods required. Britain had no domestic oil fields, needed to import 60% of its calories and did not have the shipping available to transport sufficient war supplies from territories further away who would accept such a fiat currency. It's not just the fact Germany chose a loose monetary policy, it was the fact Germany was also relatively self sufficient, when compared to Britain, which remained dependent on global trade.

However the British Empire of 30% of the whole world, and Sterling zone has very significant oil fields, Caribbean, Burma, the Middle East, all of it then in production not to mention most of world rubber supply and large reserves of aluminium, . Its actually 70% of calories but that ignores the repatriation of calorie production - so UK grains go from 4.2mT in 1939 to 5.2, 5.9, 7.1, 7.7. in each following year, potatoes from 4.3 to 5.3, 6.7 8mT+ which in term of cargo space is 2mT freed up in year 1. And around 25% of total calorie intake is sugar. UK shipping arrivals do fall from 13,000 pa in 39 - 6-8k on the other hand just about every category of UK domestic production rises annually through the war. Primarily because the coastal trade is heavily curtailed on the east coast. US oil imports for example are a consequence of Lend Lease without that the imports would have come from another source and without the US being the source convoy patterns would have differed.

But at no point, except for a few months after the fall of France after do things get particularly serious. While there are issues of rerouting and delay these are unanticipated problems that were solved and problems because they were unanticipated.

Germany was in no way self sufficient, its was dependent on oil and grain imports from outside, and having to give away whole battleships just to get them. and on slave and forced labour for production and did not have access to critical materials at all.

But in terms of German mistakes, they planned for non of this. They entered the war with no plan to defeat France in a single campaign, no expectation of Italian involvement, a dependency on the USSR for foodstuffs and oil and in general no strategy as to how to win.

No, the British OTL had to open their books to the US to prove they had pawned everything of value as a pre-requisite for lend-lease, which does essentially illustrate the British would have been unable to fight any more.

No it indicates that they would not have been able to buy goods in the US for dollars. And you are incorrect the determining factor in the US supply - according to Morgenthau was the 1940 US election in November and then inauguration, prior to that it was all aid short of war. The US position according to US documents was not british impoverishment and 'opening the books' they had known of this since May 40. The British Planning assumed in part that the US would enter the war eventually but the spend was on the basis that it would not and cash and carry would continue therefore had to be limited to affordable critical issues. And there would always be a USD income.

As outlined above, lend-lease was only available after the British had proven (to the satisfaction of the US) Britain was already broke.

No not according to the US of UK contemporary sources.

The French did the heavy lifting in the first world war, while the soviets did the heavy lifting in the second - while the US resourced both. The British battled bravely in both, but those were scarcely a one-on-one cage fights.

Well the French did the heavy lifting in 1914-17 ( And Russians) but after 17 the lead is by the British. In terms of WW2 yes its the USSR, if you ignore anything to do with aircraft, or that around 40% and normally the best 40% of German mobile formations fought in the west. Your original point was that Britain was not well suited to fighting a war on the Continent, well fighting the main army of a major power is a bad idea even if you win so something to be avoided. But in terms of not well suited, that's another issue.

Incidentally you keep repeating assertions, not evidencing them.
 
...then they allied with Romania, meaning they had to negotiate for the oil there.

For some values of "negotiate", i.e. those that provide for a big stick and a small carrot. The Romanians' views on the initial German negotiation approach was such that, a fact often forgotten by many, the British were contacted, and they offered to Romania the same kind of guarantee they offered, more famously, to Poland. Romania then turned the offer down.
 
if you take the most critical resource of oil, the pre-war German plan for Nazis and before, was oil of Poland and Romania, oil shale of Estonia. the M-R Pact with USSR screwed that up by dealing away Poland and Estonia, then they allied with Romania, meaning they had to negotiate for the oil there.

For some values of "negotiate", i.e. those that provide for a big stick and a small carrot. The Romanians' views on the initial German negotiation approach was such that, a fact often forgotten by many, the British were contacted, and they offered to Romania the same kind of guarantee they offered, more famously, to Poland. Romania then turned the offer down.

my view they could never barter for enough Romanian oil, the pre-war planning (not just Nazi planning, the entire inter-war period) calculated on the oil, with no concern as to payment.

under any M-R Pact Germany loses the Polish oil region? my speculation they could have probably struck a deal over Poland and Romania as the two were in a defensive pact, with plans to withdraw to Romanian Bridgehead? in a three-way invasion (including Hungary), they would have no choice but being reduced to borders of WWI Kingdom?

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