Germany invents the tank during WWI?

BlondieBC

Banned
a good question, to me, is, sans WWI to accelerate development, when does the military powers realize mechanized is the wave of the future? the world is reletively new to the notion of horseless carriage vs the horse&buggy, so a bit of a pass can be given in 1914. But, how much longer afterward would people start to say "ya know, an armored gun with mechanical locomotion might be a good idea"?

Same thing for aircraft. 1914 is only 11 years after the first recognized flight. People had already prophecied that they would be offensive weapons. how long before they start being designed as such.

It's a guess to me, but to me, 1925 is a reasonable timeframe.

The Great Powers were already using armoured cars, and had some tanks on the drawing board, so early 20s seems likely.

The 1920's seem reasonable. It will likely be a much more of an evolution process than the giant leaps of OTL. The dates are a bit off since from memory, but the German military asked for more trucking battalions in the 1908 bill (or nearest date). The received less than half of what they asked for. Without WW1, I would expect another boost in the first big bill after 1914. Then again in early 1920. Armored cars had obvious usage, especially in colonial warfare against poorly armed natives. Easy to see them being used. The missing piece is engine to move heavier machines that we would call tanks. Again no reason this can't be done. Slow evolution.

The harder part is when they get the total package done. Easy to see armored cars, trucking regiments, better airplanes, bombing from air, need for encirclement. But with the way large organizations work, it could be quite a while before we see the true combined arms doctrine at a corp level or bigger. For some of the bigger gains, you just have to have large size units.
 
Blondie.

In 1914 the german army had ~39 wireless sets operational, one was in a truck, the OHL used it. Its only in 1907 that a purpose built radio factory exists, in Chelmsford. These are sets for communicating with army from is scouting divisions which actually had 22 of the 39 in use and up to higher command. Introducing comms to lower formations is entirely feasible, provided you have the sets. Both the Navy and airships have a demand on the very limited number of sets available.
A set would consist of a wagon or truck load, with a hand powered generator and an 85 foot mast. Its neither tactically mobile nor particularly easy to set up and use. At regimental level given the technology of the day the sets are likely to jam each other more often than not- see the Falklands island trying to communicate with Von Spee’s squadron in the vicinity.
And you are wrong about the importance of communication down. Regiment/Brigade was the level at which comms were possible in ww1, they had buried phone lines. The problem is for that HQ to communicate with its subordinates. Unless there is a line of sight the HQ is entirely dependent on information coming in from the lower formation. Once in contact that comms is going to be by runner, visual signal or shouting, radio sets down to individual company or vehicle are ww2 technology and it is that that makes coordinated mobile operations possible. Until then a defender, static with a phone line can call for reinforcements and fire.
Not so sure about trucks. The major problem though is that outside very specific areas there is no infrastructure to support a motorised force. That infrastructure is both the manufacture but mostly the driving, servicing and maintenance of a transport fleet. Its not a matter of voting credits for more truck companies (and it would be companies not regiments) its acquiring the personnel to operate what in 1914 terms is very advanced technology, it would be like the current Germany voting for its own personal space industry. Sure they could do it, but its not easy.

To give an example in 1903 Mercedes lost a quarter of its annual production in a fire – 93 vehicles. The German (well everyone except Ford from 1912) industry was operating on a handbuilt basis. Taking out the very limited truck production, just how many mechanics do you think are available.

There is actually some serious scholarly discussion about whether the French use of MT was by choice or forced on them because of a shortage of horses.

It does require an advance in technology to make the number of sets, trucks and especially the infrastructure to use them available at much above the level actually achieved. It requires an ASB to make that technology available to one power only in the 1900- 1914 world. (and much more likely that the power would be English speaking given where the developments were occurring).
 

BlondieBC

Banned


Falkenhayn disagrees with you. Radios were in his mind the limiting factor in deep penetration operations, although he does not use the precise terminology. Now to your points.

1) Sure, the radios did not exist in OTL. But we are talking about an ATL. The German military budget was 2,000,000,000 marks per year, more than enough to build a factory, license the radios, and/or just buy them from other countries. A lot of equipment in the years leading up to WW1 was exported. Why is building a few hundred radio trucks so hard? Why is it hard to see that with additional funding the Germans could have figure out how to make smaller/faster/better than OTL?

2) The Germans had great awareness and ability to build radio networks if the need was seen. They had radios in Africa that could cover all of South America. It just has to be seen as a pressing need.

3) The thread is about can Germany bring in tanks, not whether they are a war winner. I would not guarantee they actually help the Germans. I can write a TL either way. It all depends on if I get more funding, and if I don't get more funding, what I defund. I can even write a TL where the units is additional funding and men but squander is some useless attack.

4) While far from perfect, the Germans did have the communication functional at the Brigade and lower level for mobile units such as cavalry. It was keeping up with higher commands and resupply that made it impossible. Or put another way, the Germans could have easily sent a cavalry corp deep (200 hundred plus miles) into Russian lands. They would just lose communication with the higher HQ the first day or so, and then run out of supplies, and then be destroyed. So it was not done since there were better usage of the men.

5) On the voting, you are wrong. The Reichstag approved additional Battalion years before WW1. The army asked for multiple regiments when you add up the units requested. It is way more than companies. It is simply changing the sausage making of the Reichstag, and we can easily fund a few more trucking regiments. Go read the actual bill.

6) It does not require ASB technology. It requires funding. Now the units funding will be much, much less capable than the WW2 versions. It is not even the best use of the money for trucks, which would be simply adding them to the mobilization and attack plans to bring simple supplies to foot infantry. It may or may not help win the war. You really need either a luck or visionary leader to find a quality use for them. The main reason I did not write this TL was not the technical issues. I can find the pre-existing technology. I can find where it was done by 1917, so the mental leaps are not unbridgable. It was I could find no indication that the Germans felt an need to interdict (slow) the Russian mobilization. This makes it a mental gap. I can find no indication that the Russian seriously defended it.

To give an indication of what could be done. In 1916 OTL, a pilot and gunner decided to blow a major bridge on their own. The pilot land his gunner plus supplies for the gunner one day in a nearby field. He destroyed the bridge and was pickup the next day. So you don't even need tanks to be decisive in this area. The Germans could have built a few dozen planes for this type of usage or simply retasked a few dozen fighters to a combat raid for a day. Obvious in hindsight, but apparently unthinkable in the day.

And it is this type of thinking that hold backs the POD. Nothing technical. Only vision and funding of existing technologies. If a TL author can put together a POD that provides a leader who like technology and can get the funding, it becomes easy to write TL. And this TL can go to many locations, both bad and good for Germans. Many stranger things happened IOTL.

Now again, what is the most likely outcome to a German GHQ with a more mechanical focus? More funding for trucking regiments. Using these regiments to speed attack in Belgium. Funding for a small group of armored cars with an unfocused mission. Funding for even smaller group of track vehicles. Use could be almost anywhere, with Eastern front being a bit more likely than west. Probably slight buff to Germans in WW1. It can be decisive if the extra supplies allow extra major victories in the West in the first few months. Or if Armored cars are used effectively in east or west. Both are far from a given.
 
Hm, what about a converted artillery tractor (originally to tow the 21 cm Mörsers or other heavy artillery and carry ammunition, but drop the towing and up-armour it instead)?

That's exactly what the A7V was, two sets of Holt Tractor treads under an armored box
 
Now again, what is the most likely outcome to a German GHQ with a more mechanical focus? More funding for trucking regiments. Using these regiments to speed attack in Belgium. Funding for a small group of armored cars with an unfocused mission. Funding for even smaller group of track vehicles. Use could be almost anywhere, with Eastern front being a bit more likely than west. Probably slight buff to Germans in WW1. It can be decisive if the extra supplies allow extra major victories in the West in the first few months. Or if Armored cars are used effectively in east or west. Both are far from a given.

Germany is even more limited in Petroleum Fuel in 1914 than they were in 1945.

Gear would probably need to be Steam Powered, via coal.

But given State of the Art in IC technology, this isn't that much of a drawback.

But as with all things, building one thing takes the resources from another.

What doesn't Germany build in place of trucks?
 
But as with all things, building one thing takes the resources from another.

What doesn't Germany build in place of trucks?
Depending on when it comes, they could easily stop some rather useless (surface) naval programs, pull the resources from there.
 
Seeckt however agrees with me, as does Guderian the allied command of 1917/18 and all of subsequent history.

German military budget is 2,000,000,000 less pay, pensions, food, fuel, fodder, depreciation, etc etc. The number you are looking for is new equipment and in the period we are looking at the bulk of the new equipment budget goes on the artillery re-equipment programme.

Before handwaving into existence what would be the second factory of its type in the world, together with a skilled workforce at the Diktat of the GrosserGeneralStabs you may wish to consider that Marconi would not in fact license it, It took the Titanic disaster to prevent them from seeking a total monopoly on all radio equipment worldwide.

A few hundred Trucks, the standard WW1 Germsn truck was manufactured to the vast number of 3000 during the entire course of the war, a few hundred pre war is a step change in the german motor industry. Incidentally at this time – even for the military (well colonial police) when you bought a car the factory provided the driver mechanic – the skill was that rare.

You might want to consider that it is not only a matter of funding, it is also a matter of time. The basic inventions and applications occur on a specific timeline, by all means change this timeline but you change it for everyone. The proposition is that two leading edge technologies of the day Motor Vehicles and Radio are accelerated in One country that OTL was not the leading player in either technology. It is that not the acceleration that it ASB.

Radio distance is a function of the ionosphere not technology. Far greater challenge is to get a message 5km quickly of a radio that a batallion commander can take with him and use under fire without being jammed/intercepted.


Sure, how do you get the economic increase while maintaining the political structures that led to the wars in the first place? In this context the pre war german Tax regime, and spend policy is a consequence of it meeting the interests of primarily Prussian/Junker needs. Any alternative means they are no longer the dominant force.

Comms down from Division in all forces in 14 was visual or by messenger. They are fine on a march, but fail in combat.

Your comment on the raiding corps is semi correct. While Germany could, Germany would not without a major change to 1914 doctrine. The function of the Cavalry Division in 1914 in all major armies (possible exception being the british) was recon and screening. Why this would be I do not know given the abysmal record of all horse cavalry to fulfill the function in the previous 30 odd years but it was. Setting up a raiding corps, or deep penetration corps, or Operational Manoeuvre Group is actually bringing forward, in particular German, interwar doctrine by 20+ years.

Actually it is companies the issue is not the total number of troops it’s the organisation, the proposition is not to increase the M/T capacity but to motorise combat troops. Simply substituting trucks for carts in supply columns does not speed up the rate of march of the infantry.

Presumably in this you have worked out the fuel requirements of the regiments of trucks, the ability of the transport net to sustain them, refuelling requirements of the supply columns on the march,attrition rates, training and so forth. I mean it’s not like there will be any petrol stations in Belgium, and damn few metalled roads and in Russia!

The level of motorisation needed to make a difference to whole of the German army proved impossible for Germany in 1940. Increase motorization changes a proportion of the German army, great. How does a motorised corps fare vs a couple of French or Russian armies when it’s a hundred or so miles from its nearest support?

The Germans felt no need to slow the Russian Mobilisation because they were totally surprised by the speed of the Mobilisation. The rationale for the attack on France was to defeat France prior to Russian Mobilisation. If you cannot do that, whole of the German pre war planning falls apart, as indeed it did, but there is a chance to replan. Probably removing British intervention in the first instance.

Err, how big was the bridge and how long was the delay. Experience of the ACW, and ww2 is that small railway breaks are repairable in a matter of hours and make no significant difference. Cute story operationally meaningless- unless we are introducing the vertical envelopment concept 50 years early.

Actually you need neither luck nor a visionary leader. The whole mobility issue fits squarely into mainstream German military thinking and would be adopted. What you need to do is advance the introduction of the technological infrastructure by several years. And if you do that everyone gets it and there are some fundamental changes to basic war planning as a result. The fighting around Antwerp gives examples of what an armoured car could do on a small scale btw.

What you end up with at some point is a meeting engagement between a german formation of indeterminate size and an allied formation. If you don’t have tanks or tactical radios (and if you have tanks they are broken down just over the German Border, or still unloading from the advance railhead), that goes the way we know it goes in 1914. Allied interior lines allow for rapid concentration by rail of reserve forces and eventually fire superiority in the west, distances in the east cause the advance to peter out in a bog somewhere or be called off because down the line the Russians have launched another offensive and the troops are needed there.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Germany is even more limited in Petroleum Fuel in 1914 than they were in 1945.

Gear would probably need to be Steam Powered, via coal.

But given State of the Art in IC technology, this isn't that much of a drawback.

But as with all things, building one thing takes the resources from another.

What doesn't Germany build in place of trucks?

Not true on fuel. A-H was 10% of world. Plenty of fuel for few tank regiments in prewar planning.

On trucks, it is funding issue prewar. So you can either get more funding for POD or take out of another budget. More funding generally helps Germans in small marginal ways. Switching funding depends on what you get rid of. So for example, not funding a 1905 predread is net gain for Germany. It gets useful item for not useful item in WW1. And it might lower tensions with UK. Eliminating some machine gun funding would be a disaster. Other choice fall in between these two extremes.

I think we see I/C engine, but people build odd, odd things in military budgets so I would not rule out some steam engine monster in a POD.
 

BlondieBC

Banned

Sure you have supporting sources. If all people agree on topic, it is not fun to discuss. Napoleon launches Apollo thread is not fun to do. You production issues in the war result from shortages in war. These will not exist in peace time. On the patent, the Germans had radios in WW1, so there is obviously a way around the patent issue. Now on the time issue, as you can see from my TL, i prefer gradual POD's to dramatic ones right before the war. So I could have had another naval bill for my TL where Germany orders another 50 U-boats in 1913. Instead I took a gradual workup on the Germany U-boats where to an outside observer of the day, the Germans U-boats might look less capable than OTL. And the big effects don't kick in for the first 6 months of war. On Jamming, never said it was perfect. Never said it destined to win war. But it does likely work. Germany spent less of GDP on military than other nations. Easy to find funding for few million marks per year of extra military spending. Also easy to juggle funds between categories. On the cavalry as scouts, I state that Germany would be more likely to go the infantry to mobile infantry to panzer type route. It is just the other is also possible.

Now to you point of how does a German mobile/panzer division fare against a full army is good point. So lets take hypothetical attack. I have not looked at maps, but lets take little scenario. Germany does a major attack out of east Prussia towards west of Grodno to cut RR lines into Poland. Now you have to find gap in Russian lines which is likely easy. You have to get there to destroy the RR hub. (whichever one you pick). You have delayed at least part of the Russian mobilization plan by weeks. Now what a good commander with good mobility does when faced with 10 to 1 odds do? He retreats back to Germany. Now if he can't, they yes the unit is lost. But even if the unit is lost, we have given the attack on France a couple extra weeks to win the war for the cost of division (closer in size to infantry Brigade in head count). We may have save a couple of A-H armies.

Now I know it is a big leap, mentally. This is the challenging part of POD. Putting together TOE for panzer/mobile divisions is easy. Funding = Easy. Finding target to use = Easy. (Think faster Belgium or messing up Russian mobilization. The hard part is getting it in the ballpark of right in first attack. But stranger things happen in war IOTL.




Note, we are talking about what can be done in an ATL if the German High Command or Emperor decide to do it. Over a long period of time. Or if they change plans during the war. IMO, unless you have working models prewar, you will not get heavy funding in war since Germany could do with infantry what the UK had to have tanks to do. Create local breakouts.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
On the radios. Came across reference about 1915.

On 12 January, in East Prussia, the Russians captured several villages near Rosog. German Commander in Chief Erich von Falkenhayn visited Oberost HQ at Posen.

On the Southwest Front, the first wartime use of air-to-ground wireless to direct artillery fire, as an Austro-Hungarian Flik 1 Albatros B.I successfully spotted battery fire on Russian railway supply lines at Tarnow.

From 12-14 January 1915, in the Baltic Sea, Russian warships laid almost 300 mines in three separate barriers.

http://www.warchron.com/grandDukeAlekMikCommandAirFleet.htm
 

Deleted member 1487

Not true on fuel. A-H was 10% of world. Plenty of fuel for few tank regiments in prewar planning.

On the Conrad Waits thread we had a discussion about A-H oil, which was rapidly declining in the immediate years before the war. It had been badly mismanaged, so was drying up prior to the war; during the war even had the Russians not captured and sabotaged it, there is no way it could have provided for the necessary fuel of the Central Powers' fleets, their automobiles, and tanks. As it was IOTL they didn't have enough fuel for the trucks they did have, which didn't have rubber wheels anyway by 1918.
So the expectation could be that there would be fuel from A-H and Romania, but wartime would limit fuel dramatically. I know the Germans managed to field several dozen captured Allied tanks and a few of their own IOTL, but I don't know if that even qualified as a single regiment's worth of tanks.
 
Not true on fuel. A-H was 10% of world. Plenty of fuel for few tank regiments in prewar planning. POD.

The problem is, it takes away from U-Boats and the HSF, or Aeroplanes.

World Oil Production in 1913

United States 248,400,000 barrels
Russia with 69,000,000 barrels
Mexico with 26,000,000 barrels
Romania with 13,500,000 barrels
Dutch East Indies with 12,000,000 barrels
British India (Burma) with 8,000,000 barrels
Austria(Galicia) with 7,800,000 barrels
Persia with 700,000 barrels(but ramping up fast at this point)
British West Indies (Trinidad) with its 500,000 barrels

everywhere else, 11,900,000 barrels

With Romania, 5.5% without, 2%

After 1916 when Romania declares war against the CP, that goes away, as the British wrecked Romania's Oil infrastructure, so by late 1917, Romania under German control was only able to produce a bit over 7M bbl before the Armistice.

Cracking was in its infancy, as was Hydrogenation. Alkylation was in the next world war, so its mostly straight run refining. Crude contains around 10 to 40 percent of hydrocarbons that are 'gasoline' Use Kerosene? people work in the Dark with cold lamps. Diesel? Uboats don't sortie. Distillate? HSF has a reason to stay in port. Tradeoffs remain

The USA shipped over 48 million Gallons of Petroleum over all the year of 1918, to help fuel the around 100,000 vehicles that the US had sold to the Allies since 1915, and over 25,000 of them were four wheel drive, able to be used off road.

Before the War, German Truck Production was around 3000 annually, and was pushed via subsidy and direct payments to having 15,000 more in 1917

Germany was out of Oil in 1918, with the few Trucks they were using.
 
Unprincipled peter's right. The Entente only started caring about tanks after the minority of elites that cared about reality on their side started noticing why lines weren't moving. And Germany stayed unenthusiastic IOTL and only grudgingly responded to the Entente successes.

WWI-style trench warfare dated back to our Civil War, where it was invented in Stonewall Jackson's unit. My Civil War history said it was because firing rates had gotten high enough that a unit couldn't make it across a field, oppposed, without ending up too dead to be any good, especially with even the lightest trench in that could be done in the night.

But, given their 'tudes, there's no way they'd pay attention to long buried reports from a front they despised, especially given their absurd luck trivially taking Paris the previous war, in 1870.

BlondieBC, but there's no way anybody could've won the early tank battles, because the obvious things to try with tanks were fail. Too space bat, sorry. Like the first tries of ANYHING new and good.
 
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