Germany Goes to War with France in 1887

CaliGuy

Banned
What if the Schnaebele Affair would have resulted in a Franco-German war in 1887?

How would this have have turned out and what would the post-war peace settlement have looked like? Also, how would this war have affected the geopolitics of Europe (including in the long(er)-run)?

Any thoughts on all of this?
 
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/schnaebele-war.136322/
To be fair, a war was close to coming -- the french council's decision to send an ultimatum to Germany was shot down by one vote.
France would have to be tough in order to defeat both Germany and Austria, considering that the Central Powers were already a thing by that time. They could persuade the british to go to war with them, if the british are disgusted enough at the idea of a single power dominating continental Europe, but this would cause Germany to be better off in the peace negotiations.
Regardless, i believe the odds are stacked up strongly on the CP's side. Russia was no longer interested in the Three Emperor's League by 1887, so that is one less burden for France.
 
Britain sits it out because Germany hasn't done anything to antagonize them yet and chalks the whole thing up 3rd Republic shenanigans. France gets thrashed, losing a tiny bit of territory and is nearly done as a major player. France might lose Tunisia out of the ordeal. Italy would be the one to watch because France would be quite isolated and Italy could nab all sorts of prizes for very little effort.
 
Britain sits it out because Germany hasn't done anything to antagonize them yet and chalks the whole thing up 3rd Republic shenanigans. France gets thrashed, losing a tiny bit of territory and is nearly done as a major player. France might lose Tunisia out of the ordeal. Italy would be the one to watch because France would be quite isolated and Italy could nab all sorts of prizes for very little effort.
True In terms of actual territory France didn't have much that Germany actually wanted, not true of Italy.
 
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/schnaebele-war.136322/
To be fair, a war was close to coming -- the french council's decision to send an ultimatum to Germany was shot down by one vote.
France would have to be tough in order to defeat both Germany and Austria, considering that the Central Powers were already a thing by that time. They could persuade the british to go to war with them, if the british are disgusted enough at the idea of a single power dominating continental Europe, but this would cause Germany to be better off in the peace negotiations.
Regardless, i believe the odds are stacked up strongly on the CP's side. Russia was no longer interested in the Three Emperor's League by 1887, so that is one less burden for France.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/dualalli.asp

ARTICLE 2.
Should one of the High Contracting Parties be attacked by another Power, the other High Contracting Party binds itself hereby, not only not to support the aggressor against its high Ally, but to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude towards its fellow Contracting Party.

Should, however, the attacking party in such a case be supported by Russia, either by an active cooperation or by military measures which constitute a menace to the Party attacked, then the obligation stipulated in Article 1 of this Treaty, for reciprocal assistance with the whole fighting force, becomes equally operative, and the conduct of the war by the two High Contracting Parties shall in this case also be in common until the conclusion of a common peace.


That does not require Austria to enter the war on the German side. Most likely Austria-Hungary would stay out of the war, maintaining benevolent neutrality as the alliance treaty text states unless if a third party such as Russia joins in. A war between France and Germany has no other sides interested in joining in except for Italy, and Italy has highly limited avenues for attacks into France and would have to be concerned about the superiority of the French navy maintaining a blockade and bombardment of their territory.

While the alliance between Russia and France isn't signed yet, their relations were warming rapidly, and if the situation develops poorly for France Russia would serve as an important balancing factors at negotiations.

Any war cannot be dismissed as simply a German win, until reliable information on what constituted the French and German armies is provided. Considering that the French army has a smokeless powder rifle which they were bringing into service and had completely re-equipped their armies with it within two years and the French artillery had larger numbers and greater performance according to the article on the Lebel, simply postulating a German win is inherently prone to possible error.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
Okay, so - weapons wise, the French have a pretty useful advantage in that they have the Lebel. The German service rifle of the time was certainly effective, but it wasn't smokeless and that could cause problems.
Another possible issue is that German infantry tactics suck at this time - their Old Prussian Drill style of doing things has basically wrecked the whole concept of skirmish (it was bad enough that platoons in skirmish formation were expected to use a rigidly defined frontage) and in the last war their artillery was their saving grace.
Now the artillery of the two sides is much more even. The French have the Hotchkiss autocannon and the de Bange artillery systems, and the Germans don't have anything especially distinct from this (while also appearing to lack the Hotchkiss or any kind of machine gun). I'm not even sure to what extent they've upgraded since 1871...

Overall, the result that comes out is that the French are equipped with rather more capable weapons. This means that, basically, the French can more easily stay hidden and thence win shootouts.


In army size terms, the German army expands in 1887 by 50,000 men to 491,825 (exact numbers happen to be available) - this means that they've got the extra men, but it may also impede extra mobilization as their officer count is also just through with an expansion. The French army size is hard to determine, but they used a Five Years Service law so will be fairly long service (hence highly skilled) and potentially outnumbered.

The French plans for war with Germany at this time were essentially defensive, reflecting this expected inferiority in numbers. This plays into their own strengths, as it happens.

So... my conclusion on that one is that it's going to be very bloody. Not nearly as one-sided a campaign as the Franco Prussian War, and probably even bloodier for the Prussians than the opening phases of that war.
 
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Okay, so - weapons wise, the French have a pretty useful advantage in that they have the Lebel. The German service rifle of the time was certainly effective, but it wasn't smokeless and that could cause problems.
Another possible issue is that German infantry tactics suck at this time - their Old Prussian Drill style of doing things has basically wrecked the whole concept of skirmish (it was bad enough that platoons in skirmish formation were expected to use a rigidly defined frontage) and in the last war their artillery was their saving grace.
Now the artillery of the two sides is much more even. The French have the Hotchkiss autocannon and the de Bange artillery systems, and the Germans don't have anything especially distinct from this (while also appearing to lack the Hotchkiss or any kind of machine gun). I'm not even sure to what extent they've upgraded since 1871...

Overall, the result that comes out is that the French are equipped with rather more capable weapons. This means that, basically, the French can more easily stay hidden and thence win shootouts.


In army size terms, the German army expands in 1887 by 50,000 men to 491,825 (exact numbers happen to be available) - this means that they've got the extra men, but it may also impede extra mobilization as their officer count is also just through with an expansion. The French army size is hard to determine, but they used a Five Years Service law so will be fairly long service (hence highly skilled) and potentially outnumbered.

The French plans for war with Germany at this time were essentially defensive, reflecting this expected inferiority in numbers. This plays into their own strengths, as it happens.

So... my conclusion on that one is that it's going to be very bloody. Not nearly as one-sided a campaign as the Franco Prussian War, and probably even bloodier for the Prussians than the opening phases of that war.
Two things to consider:
  • The French population was fairly stable 1850-1890 so the French recruit pool would be similar in term of number of young men
  • The French have been very very active militarily in that time period. Whereas the French didn't have any major war in the years just before 1870 but in 1883, they're in a couple colonial conflicts. Indochina pacification is still going on, we're just about to go to war with China, making advances in Africa, Tunisia just became a protectorate (even if it was militarily limited) so there is more experience
  • There was a MAJOR revolt in 1871 Algeria, involving 200.000 rebels and 86.000 French soldiers (+indigenes). I do realise it's a bit before 1883, but revolts don't disappear just like that, it often has a lingering effect, meaning "pacification" probably lasted a while
  • On top of that, being just before colonial conflicts shows that France had projection power and a fairly efficient and flexible army.
Of course those were colonial conflicts so the enemy is not the same and the troups are a bit far away but that also shows "military awareness". I don't recall Germany doing anything similar since 1870. Drilling is fine, real combat experience is better.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Of course those were colonial conflicts so the enemy is not the same and the troups are a bit far away but that also shows "military awareness".
Actually, since Algeria is pretty much where the French foreign legion et al invented then-current light infantry tactics (IIRC in the 1840s or -50s) they're pretty formidable enemies as it goes.


  • On top of that, being just before colonial conflicts shows that France had projection power and a fairly efficient and flexible army.
True. OTL they had a bit of a case of "Systeme D" with regard to mobilization in 1870-1, but I suspect they'd at least partially fixed that.
 
Actually, since Algeria is pretty much where the French foreign legion et al invented then-current light infantry tactics (IIRC in the 1840s or -50s) they're pretty formidable enemies as it goes.
Yes, but my point is also that tactics aren't the same between "set battles" with a large number of people on one battle field and counter-insurgency tactics.
Counter-insurgency/light infantry tactics would probably be more useful in a WWI style war than a big set piece battle. I have to say I don't know where we are on the scale by 1883. I would be able to find sources about the Franco-Chinese war but the context and terrain is completely different.
North East France is a big flat plain, so would the special skills of the Legion be as useful as they could be?

True. OTL they had a bit of a case of "Systeme D" with regard to mobilization in 1870-1, but I suspect they'd at least partially fixed that.
Being curbstomped in a couple months tends to do that to you.

Wikipedia does say that the army was aging by 1870 due to "replacement" laws where you could pay someone to take your place in conscription, this has been abolished as far as I understand in 1872.
By 1883 you also have better fortifications (Système Séré de Rivières).

I think a big difference would be morale. In 1870, you had a whole army surrendering even though they could have fought on. A lot of the country lost heart quite fast. I do not see that happening at all in a potential 1883 war.
The IIIrd Republic is well entrenched at this point and the IIIrd Republic is based on one thing: Fuck the Prussians. Everybody has been indoctrinated for Revenge for the last 13 years and I do believe it would be a war to the death, similar to 1914 in term of morale. No fat emperor committing suicide by battlefield here and no entrenched nobility preferring dishonnour and defeat to socialism.
The whole country would be aligned against Germany. That was the key point against colonialism throughout the political spectrum: that's not good because we need all the men in the famous Ligne Bleue des Vosges
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Counter-insurgency/light infantry tactics would probably be more useful in a WWI style war than a big set piece battle. I have to say I don't know where we are on the scale by 1883. I would be able to find sources about the Franco-Chinese war but the context and terrain is completely different.
OTL in the Franco Prussian war it turned out that company column was too large a formation to be on the move in the open, at least against French chassepots. We're into the skirmish era by quite a long way.


I think a big difference would be morale. In 1870, you had a whole army surrendering even though they could have fought on. A lot of the country lost heart quite fast. I do not see that happening at all in a potential 1883 war.
The IIIrd Republic is well entrenched at this point and the IIIrd Republic is based on one thing: Fuck the Prussians.
While I'd argue that the Prussian artillery had a lot to do with it, this is still a fair point - the Prussians were getting strained before the fortresses started to fall and another big army not surrendering would have delayed them considerably.

But I very much like your description of La Troisième République.
 
OTL in the Franco Prussian war it turned out that company column was too large a formation to be on the move in the open, at least against French chassepots. We're into the skirmish era by quite a long way.
Good to know! Would you have any decent paper on the subject (FR/EN)?


While I'd argue that the Prussian artillery had a lot to do with it, this is still a fair point - the Prussians were getting strained before the fortresses started to fall and another big army not surrendering would have delayed them considerably.
Of course the artillery didn't help but you see the amount of dissenssion at the top with the Versaillais, the Commune and Gambetta...
It's always a tad much to say "oh they would never surrender, it's not in the spirit!" but if you compare with Late 2nd Empire or late IIIrd Republic, I'd expect to see a much more united front. The Bonapartist are discredited, the Monarchist are out by this point and the Republic has been around for ten years. Plus it's before the big scandals like Panama so I woud really expect a united front.

But I very much like your description of La Troisième République.
Well, thank you!
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Good to know! Would you have any decent paper on the subject (FR/EN)?
It was discussed recently in the Myth Of Intervention thread, but I can point you at

The Journal of Military History 68.1 (2004) 73-104
Shoulder to Shoulder:
Close Control and "Old Prussian Drill" in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914
Steven D. Jackman

which covers in part how brutal the losses taken by Prussians in column were.


Conservatism caused German officers to misinterpret the Franco-Prussian War, the single most influential experience for German offensive tactics, and to ignore that close control and "old Prussian drill" had outlived their usefulness on the modern battlefield. The Prussian army entered the war with offensive tactics that were an excellent example of reform conservatism because they included innovative changes that retained conservative principles. Before the 1860s, the Prussian attack involved battalion columns preceded by skirmishers who softened up the enemy before the main force deployed into close-order line to fire volleys and then charged with the bayonet. Officers attempted to keep soldiers in close order as long as possible and viewed deploying them into skirmishers as a necessary evil. During the 1860s, technology forced conservative officers reluctantly to change their tactics. The Prussian army adopted the breechloading needle-gun that a soldier could load and fire from a prone position, while other armies adopted rifled muskets. Arming skirmishers with rifles, possessing increased range, accuracy, and eventually rate of fire, made them superior in a fire fight to soldiers in close order and presented a crisis to an army that believed in the need for close order to carry out an effective attack.

As an answer, the General Staff suggested company column tactics, which increased the use of skirmishers, while remaining true to conservative military principles, including the use of close order. They divided the battalion columns into less-vulnerable company columns that could deploy a platoon as skirmishers over a one-hundred-meter frontage and follow with the remainder in column, as support. In this way, the unit led with skirmishers, because they realized that enemy skirmishers would wreak havoc on close-order formations, and at the same time kept the majority in close order. If the skirmishers needed to generate more firepower, company commanders deployed their other platoons, either by feeding them into the existing skirmish line or preferably by ordering the skirmishers to make room for a united skirmisher development. Nevertheless, conservative officers held little faith in skirmishers to assault or decisively crush the enemy with fire and continued to rely on reserves in company or half-battalion columns to advance into the skirmish line, fire volleys, and then charge to overcome the defense. These new tactics remained true to the old conservative military philosophy because honor-bound officers still exerted close control through "old Prussian drill"-based strict discipline.

These tactics proved costly in 1870 against the French, who usually chose defensive positions fronted by wide, open fields of fire and possessed deadly breechloading chassepot rifles, mitrailleuse gatling guns, and rifled artillery. While often these plains possessed almost imperceptible cover that could hide a few skirmishers, they exposed to French firepower units in close-controlled formations (close-order columns, lines, or dense skirmish lines—skirmish lines with two-pace or less intervals between the men). Prussians could not silence this fire with their needle-guns because the chassepot had triple the range. While the Prussians overcame these problems in the early battles with ad hoc tactics, concentrated close range rifle fire, artillery support, and French lack of ammunition, losses in battles such as St. Privat, Woerth, and Vionville were appalling. Stunned to tears by the results, King Wilhelm I ordered his officers to respect enemy weapons and disperse their men, which they did with great success.

Several lessons emerged during the Franco-Prussian War. First, close-order formations or dense skirmish lines could not appear in even long rifle range (twelve hundred to eighteen hundred meters) much less the front line. This danger included supports and reserves, which followed behind the skirmish line through exposed terrain. At Vionville, a half-battalion column attempted to reinforce a skirmish line and lost 159 out of 400 men from rifles about one thousand to twelve hundred meters away. Almost every time officers attempted to lead close-order formations through the "beaten zone" (the area behind the skirmish line swept by "misses") and into the skirmish line to fire volleys and then charge, enemy rifle fire annihilated these forces, and soon officers learned to avoid this prewar maneuver.
But the lessons did not persist:

In German thought, science bolstered spirit and so erroneous theoretical arguments about modern firepower justified the resulting offensive tactics. Thus, the artillery would keep the enemy's cannon too busy to threaten the infantry, while enemy guns would have trouble hitting company columns at longer cannon range (beyond twelve hundred meters). The artillery or a little accurate skirmisher fire would eliminate the ineffective mitrailleuse gatling gun. But most of all, the officers denied the danger of modern breechloading rifles as clearly illustrated by the war. Boguslawski claimed that French rifle fire had not been effective until the five-hundred-pace range and had not forced the soldiers to take cover until four hundred paces, even though St. Privat and Vionville disproved this claim. Part of this attitude stemmed from their view that discipline was the spiritual soul of an army and all other armies had weaker souls because they used less drill. According to this theory, once under artillery and rifle fire, poorly disciplined defenders would shoot without aiming, and results that appeared so dangerous on the target range would evaporate. But even under heavy fire, French riflemen had still exacted a heavy toll. The most realistic attitude was that the attackers would suffer "serious losses" and must bear them through iron discipline and constant reinforcement.

Also, officers forgot their initial postwar concerns about the company column and justified it with an argument that skirmish lines drew the enemy's fire and protected columns outside the "beaten zone." They discredited counter-examples from the Franco-Prussian War or the Russo-Turkish War by arguing that the skirmish lines had not been strong enough to draw enemy fire, a point Boguslawski used to explain why Russian company columns at Plevna suffered so intensely. The debate over the proper distance for supports to stay behind the skirmishers reflected this belief that only the "beaten zone" threatened the following forces.

Overall, the officers' conservative military attitudes remained prevalent into World War I despite an extensive increase in modern firepower. In the early 1870s, reformers criticized the gulf between tactical training and modern combat, angering Kaiser Wilhelm I, who grumpily complained that young officers should spend less time criticizing the drill regulations and more time studying them. Finally, in 1876 Wilhelm did rewrite the regulations and accept the changes made in 1873, while still retaining many anachronistic ideas, which remained dominant among line officers. Although the company column replaced the battalion column in the front line, the old drills remained, including three-rank formations, shifts from two- to three-rank formation, the square, and others.

Reformist tactics with their own conservative ideological basis became accepted only twelve years later in the 1888 drill regulations.


All this paints a picture of an army which in 1887 would suffer almost as badly as in 1870 on the attack - and in 1870 the Prussian Guards were torn apart at long range, refusing to advance due to poor morale on account of having lost about half their starting strength before coming within ~500 yards of the French positions.


It's always a tad much to say "oh they would never surrender, it's not in the spirit!" but if you compare with Late 2nd Empire or late IIIrd Republic, I'd expect to see a much more united front. The Bonapartist are discredited, the Monarchist are out by this point and the Republic has been around for ten years. Plus it's before the big scandals like Panama so I woud really expect a united front.

Yes, and in 1887 (which I understand is when the thread is talking about!) it's more like fifteen, so most of the men in the army (expected age 18-25?) would have grown up under the Republic.
 
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All this paints a picture of an army which in 1887 would suffer almost as badly as in 1870 on the attack - and in 1870 the Prussian Guards were torn apart at long range, refusing to advance due to poor morale on account of having lost about half their starting strength before coming within ~500 yards of the French positions.




Yes, and in 1887 (which I understand is when the thread is talking about!) it's more like fifteen, so most of the men in the army (expected age 18-25?) would have grown up under the Republic.
Oh I misread it as 1883 for some reason.
Well, trust in the Republic is still high as the Panama Scandal is two years later. And by that time, a lot of the French army, including conscripts, has a lot of military experience, fighting overseas.
They'd be trained in skirmishing and maintaining tough supply lines
 
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