Conservatism caused German officers to misinterpret the Franco-Prussian War, the single most influential experience for German offensive tactics, and to ignore that close control and "old Prussian drill" had outlived their usefulness on the modern battlefield. The Prussian army entered the war with offensive tactics that were an excellent example of reform conservatism because they included innovative changes that retained conservative principles. Before the 1860s, the Prussian attack involved battalion columns preceded by skirmishers who softened up the enemy before the main force deployed into close-order line to fire volleys and then charged with the bayonet. Officers attempted to keep soldiers in close order as long as possible and viewed deploying them into skirmishers as a necessary evil. During the 1860s, technology forced conservative officers reluctantly to change their tactics. The Prussian army adopted the breechloading needle-gun that a soldier could load and fire from a prone position, while other armies adopted rifled muskets. Arming skirmishers with rifles, possessing increased range, accuracy, and eventually rate of fire, made them superior in a fire fight to soldiers in close order and presented a crisis to an army that believed in the need for close order to carry out an effective attack.
As an answer, the General Staff suggested company column tactics, which increased the use of skirmishers, while remaining true to conservative military principles, including the use of close order. They divided the battalion columns into less-vulnerable company columns that could deploy a platoon as skirmishers over a one-hundred-meter frontage and follow with the remainder in column, as support. In this way, the unit led with skirmishers, because they realized that enemy skirmishers would wreak havoc on close-order formations, and at the same time kept the majority in close order. If the skirmishers needed to generate more firepower, company commanders deployed their other platoons, either by feeding them into the existing skirmish line or preferably by ordering the skirmishers to make room for a united skirmisher development. Nevertheless, conservative officers held little faith in skirmishers to assault or decisively crush the enemy with fire and continued to rely on reserves in company or half-battalion columns to advance into the skirmish line, fire volleys, and then charge to overcome the defense. These new tactics remained true to the old conservative military philosophy because honor-bound officers still exerted close control through "old Prussian drill"-based strict discipline.
These tactics proved costly in 1870 against the French, who usually chose defensive positions fronted by wide, open fields of fire and possessed deadly breechloading chassepot rifles, mitrailleuse gatling guns, and rifled artillery. While often these plains possessed almost imperceptible cover that could hide a few skirmishers, they exposed to French firepower units in close-controlled formations (close-order columns, lines, or dense skirmish lines—skirmish lines with two-pace or less intervals between the men). Prussians could not silence this fire with their needle-guns because the chassepot had triple the range. While the Prussians overcame these problems in the early battles with ad hoc tactics, concentrated close range rifle fire, artillery support, and French lack of ammunition, losses in battles such as St. Privat, Woerth, and Vionville were appalling. Stunned to tears by the results, King Wilhelm I ordered his officers to respect enemy weapons and disperse their men, which they did with great success.
Several lessons emerged during the Franco-Prussian War. First, close-order formations or dense skirmish lines could not appear in even long rifle range (twelve hundred to eighteen hundred meters) much less the front line. This danger included supports and reserves, which followed behind the skirmish line through exposed terrain. At Vionville, a half-battalion column attempted to reinforce a skirmish line and lost 159 out of 400 men from rifles about one thousand to twelve hundred meters away. Almost every time officers attempted to lead close-order formations through the "beaten zone" (the area behind the skirmish line swept by "misses") and into the skirmish line to fire volleys and then charge, enemy rifle fire annihilated these forces, and soon officers learned to avoid this prewar maneuver.