FillyofDelphi
Banned
Interesting - In an earlier post I focused on the dangers getting into logistical trouble why pursuing *too much*, but your remark points out the danger in not pursuing *enough*
It seems it is a fine balance.
Let us assume that Britain declares war on Germany anyway and conducts a blockade.
If the Germans are trying to crush the Russians first, how far can and should they advance in the 1914 campaign.
If the opt to continue the offensive in the east in 1915 to knock out the remaining Russian army, are territorial objectives like St. Petersburg, Smolensk, Kiev or even Moscow getting in reach?
Well, if the Germans decide to seriously pursue the Russians there's a big question of if they're going for a "Decisive Battle"/crush the forward field armies grand strategy (In hopes of destroying/capturing/rendering ineffective enough Russian formations to cut down on the power of the "steamroller" they're still assuming to be mustered) or are seeking to set up a strong geopolitical position for future campaigns. In the former case, they'll likely try to pursue the Russians as far as is logistically tenable, which depends on just how efficent their pioneers/railroad engineers are at connecting and making compatable the rail systems of the German States and Poland (and just how much the Russians slash and burn on the way back). If its the later, than as others have suggested they probably try to seize full control of the Bug watershed (Warsaw fortresses and rail hub position is key) and into Lithuania, perhaps with Austria trying to make a show of force along Bukovina in hopes of shaking Romania into a pro-CP position
However, Petrograd is hardly a viable target; 1915 would probably see a strong push up the Baltic coast into Livonia/Courland and efforts to concentrate CP firepower/artillery along Russian defensive positions in hopes of creating a "hole" they can exploit and disrupt the Eastern front hoping to trigger yet another round of retreats.