Insurrectionary warfare is not commonly associated with German military thought. Nor is the idea of the levee en masse considered part of the Prussian military tradition or, for that matter, of the German way of fighting war. Yet,there it is: the call for all-out war in the defense of the nation, for a levee en masse, issued on October 7, 1918, and debated at some length by the war cabinet of Prince Max von Baden, the last imperial government and the first quasi-parliamentary one. To be sure, the appeal referred to a Volkserhebung (popular insurrection) rather than a leve ́e. But the reference to the French original was used interchangeably in political deliberations during October 1918.
That is, the possibility of “going French” as a last resort for imperial Germany was well understood, with no irony intended. The appeal is especially curious if we consider that it was issued by Walther Rathenau, the industrialist and intellectual, against the objections of the guiding spirit of the Third Supreme Command, General Erich Ludendorff. Of course, Rathenau had been involved in the war effort all along. He had insti- gated or, in any case, helped to create a Department of War Raw Materials (Kriegsrohstoffamt) in 1914. But it is one thing for a leading industrialist to mobilize industry at the beginning of the war. It is an entirely different matter to plead for a popular uprising to continue war in the face of defeat—against Ludendorff who had come to Berlin in order to plead for an armistice and allegedly used “these moving words to the most German of all German Jews”: “Two sons of my wife have fallen in the air war, and as you know, I loved them like my own children. As long as I believed in victory, I was at liberty to lead every division against the enemy. Since the moment I lost this faith, I no longer have the right to let any son of any German mother die.” Need we recall that, in 1922, Rathenau was murdered by right-wing assassins for be- traying Germany and delivering the nation to the French, while Ludendorff had become a valiant hero struck down, albeit metaphorically, by an evil con- spiracy of Jews and Freemasons?
Everything seems upside down with Rathenau’s appeal for an “insurrection of the people.” The high priest of corporate management calling for an insurrectionary people’s war? A German-Jewish civilian firing up a furor teutonicus? A revolutionary French call to arms to defend an imperial monarchy? All this sounds surreal. It is not surprising, then, that Rathenau scholars are mildly embarrassed by his call to arms, while military historians tend to brush it aside. The goal of this essay is to find out how and to what effect the German government, the military, and a national public came to debate the issue of a popular insurrection or a levee en masse in 1918 and what, if anything at all, this Franco-German hybrid of ideas was about.