Germany fights time

Mrstrategy

Banned
How much longer could germany fight if the military is allowed to fight without interference from the leadership
 
The question will quickly become moot in early August 1945. I can't see the professional German military continuing a war once it becomes apparent that the United States has nuclear weapons.
 
April 1940 would be a better start so that Dunkirk gets squeezed and less BEF and French troops escape to England so that the UK wouldn't have a reserve of experience troopers to send to both Africa and Asia & half enough experience men to man their Bomber Command in sufficient numbers to attack Germany from above until probably 1942 or early 1943...

The German Luftwaffe and Heer would avoid spending time and effort against Blitzing England so that their aircraft strength and pilots will still be available for Operation Barbarossa at a higher level of expertise and quantity so that the OTL attrition & wear and tear wouldn't worn out their combat strength until Winter of 41 instead of being heavily attrited in OTL by Oct 41.

maybe.
 
April 1940 would be a better start so that Dunkirk gets squeezed and less BEF and French troops escape to England so that the UK wouldn't have a reserve of experience troopers to send to both Africa and Asia & half enough experience men to man their Bomber Command in sufficient numbers to attack Germany from above until probably 1942 or early 1943...

Contrary to popular belief, the halt order at Dunkirk did not originate with Hitler. It was issued by the Military High Command. Hitler merely signed off on it. Even leaving aside that assaulting Dunkirk would not have been a sure fire thing nor was the British escape seen as a victory at the time, without Hitler's interference the halt order still goes through.

The German Luftwaffe and Heer would avoid spending time and effort against Blitzing England so that their aircraft strength and pilots will still be available for Operation Barbarossa at a higher level of expertise and quantity so that the OTL attrition & wear and tear wouldn't worn out their combat strength until Winter of 41 instead of being heavily attrited in OTL by Oct 41.

Leaving aside about the issue of whether Barbarossa even occurs if the Military is in control the entire time, there is little reason to believe this would happen. The Werhmacht in mid-1940 was still interested in beating Britain and believed it could be accomplished via air power. They did not have a good analysis of the Luftwaffes weaknesses and the RAFs strengths. They did not have future vision which lets them see the outcome of the Battle of Britain and it's consequences. There is no reason to believe they won't take the plunge for an air campaign against the British... and suffer for it.

Furthermore, additional aircraft in Barbarossa (assuming it even still happens) cannot undo it's fatal flaws. Leaving the military wholly in control will only compound this, as they'll try to ignore Kiev in favor of an immediate advance on Moscow. This would bog down on inadequate logistics and stronger Soviet defenses, then winter hits and the much bigger Red Army slices through AGC's exposed southern flank and cuts off a huge portion of it. No amount of aircraft can cover for terrible strategic-operational planning and an operational execution that will be, ITTL, even worse.

The reality is that the German High Command was actually even worse at strategy than Hitler. Hitler for all his flaws (which were legion) could still sometimes recognize a brilliant plan, or come up with an original concept himself. The German military strategists after 1938 were almost all devoid of even this imagination. The German military has a deserved reputation for tactical and some operational brilliance, but on the strategic level it had serious flaws which would ultimately doom it during the war. As a consequence of this, the Germans in WW2 owe more of its success to Hitler then it does it's professional military high command. By the time Hitler's interference becomes a consistent and concrete negative (that is, after Kursk), it's far too late for Germany.
 
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Leaving aside about the issue of whether Barbarossa even occurs if the Military is in control the entire time, there is little reason to believe this would happen. The Werhmacht in mid-1940 was still interested in beating Britain and believed it could be accomplished via air power. They did not have a good analysis of the Luftwaffes weaknesses and the RAFs strengths. They did not have future vision which lets them see the outcome of the Battle of Britain and it's consequences. There is no reason to believe they won't take the plunge for an air campaign against the British... and suffer for it.

I believe they could have seen the flaws of the Luftwaffe, they suffered significant losses in the Polish and French campaign when they had the advantage of being on land. Enitirely avoiding an air campaign with Britain does seem unlikely, but the Battle of Britain could have been ended earlier and no Blitz could have taken place at all if they seriosuly looked at the flaws of the Luftwaffe.

Furthermore, additional aircraft in Barbarossa (assuming it even still happens) cannot undo it's fatal flaws. Leaving the military wholly in control will only compound this, as they'll try to ignore Kiev in favor of an immediate advance on Moscow. This would bog down on inadequate logistics and stronger Soviet defenses, then winter hits and the much bigger Red Army slices through AGC's exposed southern flank and cuts off a huge portion of it. No amount of aircraft can cover for terrible strategic-operational planning and an operational execution that will be, ITTL, even worse.

Why would an immediate march on Moscow, while ignoring Kiev be a bad idea? Logistics might be strained, but the Red Army's morale is terrible, and if the Germans can hold on to the city for a while then eventually, Leningrad might fall and we see there being a partial closing of the gap for the logistical problem for Germany since they can supply AGN and AGC through Leningrad.
 
I believe they could have seen the flaws of the Luftwaffe, they suffered significant losses in the Polish and French campaign when they had the advantage of being on land.

But the German military didn't see the flaws from those examples or even the example they were given in the Battle of Britain. Indeed, for the entire rest of the war, they would repeatedly fail to recognize their flaws not just in the Luftwaffe but in the Heer as well. Why would they suddenly be different ITTL?

Why would an immediate march on Moscow, while ignoring Kiev be a bad idea? Logistics might be strained, but the Red Army's morale is terrible, and if the Germans can hold on to the city for a while then eventually, Leningrad might fall and we see there being a partial closing of the gap for the logistical problem for Germany since they can supply AGN and AGC through Leningrad.

Because the logistics for a march on Moscow in August-September 1941 were not strained, they were non-existent. Hell, as events were to show, the logistics for a march on Moscow were non-existant in October as well, but that was even more so in August-September when the railheads were further west and the forward supply bases had not yet been established. Additionally, the Soviet forces defending the Moscow axis in August-September were actually much stronger then they were at the start of October, as the Soviets were expecting the Germans to immediately try and attack Moscow and, when the Germans failed to oblige, then expended a number of those forces in some ultimately fruitless counter-offensives. Had the Germans attempted to move immediately on Moscow, they would have found the Soviet defenses actually stronger then they would have OTL after mopping up the Soviets at Kiev. Finally, the elimination of nearly a million men from the Red Army's OOB not only critically weakened the Soviet army, but it also forced the Soviets to deploy a large portion of the forces they had raised during September to replace those losses. With no Kiev, the Soviets have as many as 10 additional armies in reserve they can deploy to block a German advance on Moscow, on top of more powerful Western, Reserve, and Bryansk Fronts.

Martin Crewald goes into the logistical problems in aching detail in his book on logistics, Supplying War, and David Glantz adds in his even more exhaustive analysis a look at the forces, conduct of operations, and casualties inflicted and absorbed by both sides in hid works on the Battles for Smolensk and Kiev.

The Germans taking Moscow in 1941 is pretty much only going to happen if the Soviets let them. Since counting on your enemy to just let you walk into his Capitol is generally a bad way of planning to wage war, the Germans would have been better off suspending major offensive operations after Kiev, reconstitute their forces, bring up supplies, repair the transportation network, and dig in preparation for the winter. Consolidation would still have allowed smaller local offensives to secure the immediate front (the Germans had a pretty aggressive interpretation of consolidation and security, and a very pro-active view of defense) that could inflict casualties amounting up to near-Typhoon. When the inevitable Soviet winter offensive breaks, it would have smashed into a well prepared Wehrmacht, rather than one strung out and exhausted by a desperate lunge for Moscow. But this all requires the Germans to not be committed to a short war like they were OTL and neither Hitler or the German High Command ever showed signs of being willing to give that up. They were constantly convinced that just this next lunge would finish the Soviets off and they paid for it.
 
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ObssesedNuker said:
But the German military didn't see the flaws from those examples or even the example they were given in the Battle of Britain. Indeed, for the entire rest of the war, they would repeatedly fail to recognize their flaws not just in the Luftwaffe but in the Heer as well. Why would they suddenly be different ITTL?

Well this is a what if forum, so maybe if Goering had actually questioned himself then they would perhaps have seen the flaws, or if some officers had stood him up and told him what was wrong, then he might have saved those aircraft.

ObssesedNuker said:
Because the logistics for a march on Moscow in August-September 1941 were not strained, they were non-existent. Hell, as events were to show, the logistics for a march on Moscow were non-existant in October as well, but that was even more so in August-September when the railheads were further west and the forward supply bases had not yet been established. Additionally, the Soviet forces defending the Moscow axis in August-September were actually much stronger then they were at the start of October, as the Soviets were expecting the Germans to immediately try and attack Moscow and, when the Germans failed to oblige, then expended a number of those forces in some ultimately fruitless counter-offensives. Had the Germans attempted to move immediately on Moscow, they would have found the Soviet defenses actually stronger then they would have OTL after mopping up the Soviets at Kiev. Finally, the elimination of nearly a million men from the Red Army's OOB not only critically weakened the Soviet army, but it also forced the Soviets to deploy a large portion of the forces they had raised during September to replace those losses. With no Kiev, the Soviets have as many as 10 additional armies in reserve they can deploy to block a German advance on Moscow, on top of more powerful Western, Reserve, and Bryansk Fronts.

Martin Crewald goes into the logistical problems in aching detail in his book on logistics, Supplying War, and David Glantz adds in his even more exhaustive analysis a look at the forces, conduct of operations, and casualties inflicted and absorbed by both sides in hid works on the Battles for Smolensk and Kiev.

The Germans taking Moscow in 1941 is pretty much only going to happen if the Soviets let them. Since counting on your enemy to just let you walk into his Capitol is generally a bad way of planning to wage war, the Germans would have been better off suspending major offensive operations after Kiev, reconstitute their forces, bring up supplies, repair the transportation network, and dig in preparation for the winter. Consolidation would still have allowed smaller local offensives to secure the immediate front (the Germans had a pretty aggressive interpretation of consolidation and security, and a very pro-active view of defense) that could inflict casualties amounting up to near-Typhoon. When the inevitable Soviet winter offensive breaks, it would have smashed into a well prepared Wehrmacht, rather than one strung out and exhausted by a desperate lunge for Moscow. But this all requires the Germans to not be committed to a short war like they were OTL and neither Hitler or the German High Command ever showed signs of being willing to give that up. They were constantly convinced that just this next lunge would finish the Soviets off and they paid for it.

Didn't Glantz himself write an essay saying the Germans could have captured Moscow(though that this would provide a grave disaster for the Germans) showcasing this example in If the Allies had fallen: Sixty Alternate scenarios of World War 2. I know citing a book on what ifs maybe losing some credibility but since you brought up Glantz with the logistics and how the Wehrmacht couldn't capture Moscow but Glantz himself states that it was possible.

Also what if as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact Germany had offered to build Russia modern railroads, as a trade off for military weapons in the trade in the event, and this eliminates Germany's need to convert the Russian railroads to the appropriate gauge. Might Germany's emphasis on building railroads in Russia for the pact from Germany to some cities have helped with the logistics for Barbarossa.

Also another question(separate scenario from one before) I have is could Germany have been aware of the conditions of the poor roads, and maybe have gone into a total war economy after the fall of France and Norway and start focusing on building Raupenschlepper Osts to partially improve logistics since they could carry the weight of three-four horses and move three times as fast and preformed well cross country. They wouldn't have enough to improve the logistics as a whole, but could that total war effort between June of 1940 and June 1941 may have provided a significant push to hold onto Moscow.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Well this is a what if forum, so maybe if Goering had actually questioned himself then they would perhaps have seen the flaws, or if some officers had stood him up and told him what was wrong, then he might have saved those aircraft.
If Goering really cared about that stuff you mean and wasn't his historically self. He had people stand up to him repeatedly and he beat them back down, the guy was a bully and didn't really do his job, just bitched about his underlings failing him despite purposely putting his incompetent buddies in positions of power so he could control them.

Didn't Glantz himself write an essay saying the Germans could have captured Moscow(though that this would provide a grave disaster for the Germans) showcasing this example in If the Allies had fallen: Sixty Alternate scenarios of World War 2. I know citing a book on what ifs maybe losing some credibility but since you brought up Glantz with the logistics and how the Wehrmacht couldn't capture Moscow but Glantz himself states that it was possible.
I don't know if he said that he could, but I did see an interview where he said that if they had he thinks the Soviets would have either beaten them back or continue to fight. The potential for a greater disaster is there, but I think he's seriously discounting the enormous problems that would have been caused by Moscow falling, such as the loss of rolling stock, rail lines, commuincations, and the flight of probably over 1 million Muskovites East, which would disrupt mounting a counter offensive, the morale consqeuences of losing the captial, and the problems caused by the evacuation of STAVKA and Stalin further East. If you only consider the problems the Germans had and look at the historical Soviet counteroffensive then sure there could have been worse consequences to a German capture of Moscow due to the lines being more extended than IOTL, but that leaves out the enormous consequences to the Soviets that would come from losing Moscow that would make the OTL counteroffensives impossible and freeing the Germans of the problems of continuing to attack in really bad circumstances. Likely the Soviets are tossed off balanced and their counter offensive is delayed by a month more than IOTL, which gives them time and resources to mount a much more stable defense than IOTL. Hell the loss of the heated airfields of Moscow alone would be a huge loss to the Soviets and major gain to the Luftwaffe.
 
Well this is a what if forum, so maybe if Goering had actually questioned himself then they would perhaps have seen the flaws, or if some officers had stood him up and told him what was wrong, then he might have saved those aircraft.

As Wiking said. A good solid example of Goering's habits can actually be found in the lead-up to Barbarossa: after a tour in Russia, a senior Luftwaffe officer submitted a report discussing the massive Soviet aircraft factories under construction beyond the Urals, noting how they were larger and more sophisticated then any such aircraft facility the Luftwaffe had or was planning to build and the consequences of this in a potential war.

Goering threw the report in the trash.

Didn't Glantz himself write an essay saying the Germans could have captured Moscow(though that this would provide a grave disaster for the Germans) showcasing this example in If the Allies had fallen: Sixty Alternate scenarios of World War 2.

I have that book somewhere around here. I recall he makes it quite clear that he did not regard the Germans taking Moscow in '41 as possible so long as the Soviets resisted but discussed it as a "sake of arguement" sort of thing.

By foregoing Kiev for an immediate attack on Moscow, the Germans basically taking everything that hindered the OTL Typhoon (including weather: in mid-September there was a week long spat of rain that, pre-saging the imminent raputitsa, turned the ground to mud and washed out railways. OTL this heavily delayed the sealing and reduction of the Kiev pocket, IATL it would help further ruin German momentum on top of everything else), worsening the supply situation, and imposing two additional challenges: the first challenge is that of the far stronger Soviet forces dug in along multiple defensive lines along the Moscow axis and, the second, having to guard against immensely large Soviet forces massed along AGC's woefully over-extended southern flank. OTL, the AGC barely avoided encirclement and destruction in December-January against 4.1 million, how are they supposed to avoid that fate against a force in excess of 6 million?

Likely the Soviets are tossed off balanced and their counter offensive is delayed by a month more than IOTL, which gives them time and resources to mount a much more stable defense than IOTL.

A month would be quite inadequate for the Germans to recover their strength given their horrendously overstretched logistical lines and they would have been (were, in fact) grossly weakened just getting to the Moscow outskirts, never mind the subsequent protracted city battle the Soviets were prepared for.
 
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