Germany doesn't invade Belgium in 1914: What does Britain do?

Germany doesn't invade Belgium in 1914: What does Britain do?


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BooNZ

Banned
A bombardment and occupation of Belgrade? A hefty trade embargo? A demand to form an international commission to find the true killers? Any and possibly all of the possible solutions suggested to A-H at one time or another during the July Crisis short of going to War?

How exactly is the A-H military supposed to occupy the Serbian capital without going to war?

As the July crisis developed, French and Russian authorities made it perfectly clear to their A-H contemporaries that Serbia would not be held responsible for the assassination of FF. Coupled with the habitual German diplomatic flip-flopping, A-H had a vested interest to act while it still had the full support of Germany. From a A-H perspective Serbia needed to take a knee or get the bash.

Nothing happened in A-H without Franz-Joseph's permission, he always reviewed and approved diplomatic manoeuvres.

...and nothing much happened in A-H for decades. FJ was clearly the head of the empire, but I was responding to Aphrodite's claim Wilhelm and FJ were driving the CP diplomacy during the July crisis, when in reality, both were often out of the loop on holiday for most of July 1914.

Serbia acquiesced to all but surrendering her sovereignty, almost any other nation on earth at any other time would have been satisfied with the response. In fact, the Serbian response triggered a minor crisis in Berlin when many thought the "opportunity" for war had slipped past.

Could you clarify who those persons in Berlin were? The reason I ask is because the initial German support for A-H (i.e. the blank cheque) was in respect of A-H dealings with Serbia, not necessarily contemplating a widespread war. Further, people often cite the belligerence of military leaders, who ordinarily do not make the decisions in peacetime.

We aren't interested in your intepretation of what the germans could do. We are nterested in what the Germans and British thought. Here Zuber and everyone is clear: The Germans have no East first plan. The Kaiser makes it clear, Moltke makes it clear, Falkenhayn makes it clear. The Kaiser isn't sending his army East unless France turns over Verdun and Toul or the British guarantee French neutrality. Its not an option

In Moltke's own words “My protest that it would be impossible to maintain peace between France and Germany while both countries were mobilized made no impression. Everybody got more and more excited and I was alone in my opinion.” This does not paint a convincing picture of a consensus among the German decision makers that west was best.

The 1912/13 Aufmarsch II Ost plan was not an 'east first plan', but a deployment plan substantially based on well established German mobility/ counter attack doctrine. Wilhelm had wanted Moltke to go East if there was a reasonable chance Britain would remain neutral. General Von Staabs (head of German railway division) subsequently confirmed four German armies could have been deployed in the east within two weeks. Matthias Erzberger (German propaganda chief) claims Moltke himself confessed in January 1915 that heading west had been a mistake and Germany should have instead gone east.

Not relevant to the issues. The British are right in that the Austrians and Germans are the ones pressing for war not France, Russia and Serbia. The Austrians are so far out there that even the Kaiser is trying to reign them in. Trying to deny that it is Austria that is seeking the war is silly.
A-H was indeed determined to resolve the ongoing Serbian problem while it had the full support of Germany and military action was one potential tool to achieve such a resolution. At the same time the Kaiser observed "the Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, tricksters, and masters of evasion," and was advocating a temporary Austrian occupation, which goes beyond the parts of the ultimatum rejected by Serbia, so in context, the Serbian response was not actually acceptable to the Kaiser either.

Serbia spent money on its military. Really, everybody was spending on arms rather than other means. No, the Serbian govenrment wasn't behind the assassination and FJ didn't even allege it

Serbia was a small, poor and backward state, which borrowed heavily to maintain a military disproportionate to its size. This misplaced priority on military spending was illustrated in part by the total collapse of its health infrastructure in the opening months of the war.

On 1 July 1914 the French Ambassador to Serbia confirmed with Paris the Serbian military party were involved in the assassination of FF, so from the start of the French recognized the Serb hands were not clean.

How much FJ took part in it is clear: No such ultimatium could have been delivered without his ok. He was in on it and he was the one who started the war.

FJ Rubber stamping a decision he had limited involvement in formulating is very different from the picture you are attempting to paint of Wilhelm and FJ driving the July crisis. FF did not die of natural causes.

And again, all of this doesn't matter. What matters is how the British saw the crisis

The British were disinterested in the Balkans and Serbia was more-or-less viewed as a rogue vassal of Britain's traditional rival, Russia. Britain would have been relieved if A-H had promptly crushed Serbia without the need for Britain to be dragged into a continental war.

Pathetic. Austria is not going to send the ultimatium to Serbia without fj approval. The "couldn't enforce" argument is crap as well. Both Grey and the Kaiser were advocating the stop in Belgrade formula. Autria rejected. The Kaiser also thought the Serbian response sufficient that all cause for war disappeared. Your attempt to excuse Austria is getting beyond convoluted

As outlined above, the Kaiser thought the Serbian response needed to be coupled with the occupation of Belgrade, to keep those Serbs honest. An assassination of a head of state (or similar) is a perfectly acceptable casus belli - certainly as robust as those used by the USA and/or Britain around 1900 with the Spanish and the Boers. How would the remaining parts of the ultimatum be enforced when Serbia inevitably reneged on its promises and commitments? Pinky swears?

What blank cheque? Serbia was told to comply with every demand as far as their sovereignty allowed. That's not a blank cheque, its telling them they are taking it on the chin. To say that Bosnia was the only "sign of pulse" for AUstria is untrue and dishonest. Austria had been heavily involved in the Balkans and limiting Serbian power was one of the prime objectives. That the Serbs would have to suffer horribly under the Turks mattered not to the Austrians.

The A-H empire extended into the Balkans, so to that extent it was heavily involved. By limiting Serbia's power I assume you mean formalizing existing A-H control of Bosnia Herzegovina and diplomatically thwarting an unprovoked Serbian invasion of Albania? The treatment of the Albanians, Bulgarians, Macedonians and Turks in occupied territories under the Serb rule even before WW1 was already horrific.

Do we really need to rehash Austro-Serb relations from the Pig War? To say that Austria had anything but the weakening of Serbia as objective is simply wrong.
On that we agree. Where we differ is on the need for A-H to address and correct the cause of state sponsored terrorism.
 

Deleted member 94680

How exactly is the A-H military supposed to occupy the Serbian capital without going to war?

They probably would have to go to War. But a swift declaration of War, a rapid bombardment and occupation of Belgrade, followed by enforcement of the Ultimatum is very different from a "final reckoning" some in Vienna had planned. Saying that, given the attitudes of the time, it is possible I suppose that if Vienna had accepted the Serbian response to the Ultimatum, an occupation of Belgrade to enforce the response would be acceptable. The key, obviously, is how quickly the Austrians respond to the Crisis. The quicker the response the more sympathetic the international reaction would be.

Could you clarify who those persons in Berlin were? The reason I ask is because the initial German support for A-H (i.e. the blank cheque) was in respect of A-H dealings with Serbia, not necessarily contemplating a widespread war. Further, people often cite the belligerence of military leaders, who ordinarily do not make the decisions in peacetime.

Mainly Bethman-Hollweg, Jagow and the diplomatic circle. Falkenhayn suggesting that there may be a coup to place the Crown Prince on the throne doesn't suggest harmony at the highest levels in Berlin either.

As outlined above, the Kaiser thought the Serbian response needed to be coupled with the occupation of Belgrade, to keep those Serbs honest. An assassination of a head of state (or similar) is a perfectly acceptable casus belli - certainly as robust as those used by the USA and/or Britain around 1900 with the Spanish and the Boers. How would the remaining parts of the ultimatum be enforced when Serbia inevitably reneged on its promises and commitments? Pinky swears?

It is my impression that the Kaiser thought the "Halt in Belgrade" option was a way of avoiding a general War.
 
But you are. Until I asked a few posts ago what would motivate your assertion of British policy, you suddenly introduced a change of government. You're saying out of nowhere that there had been a separate POD involving a new government (prior to German violation of Belgian territory I assume for your TL to hang together?) that moves for War a lot quicker than OTL. That isn't answering the OP's question, that's twisting it completely. Without German violation of Belgium the question is what does Britain do?
Under the British constitution* you don't need an election to have a change of government. You only need a new PM that can get a majority in the House of Commons. A minor party switching support from an incumbent PM to the leader of the main opposition party would do. While the loss of a vote of confidence could lead the outgoing PM to call an election it's not technically required. A monarch would be entitled to refuse a plea to dissolve Parliament as there is a government in waiting.

In the 1914 situation it wouldn't even lead to a change in PM. Just a change in which parties and MPs supported his leadership.

* which is not so much unwritten as uncodified, there are documents and laws that lay out procedures. It's just very convenient for some to have it opaque.
 

Deleted member 94680

Under the British constitution* you don't need an election to have a change of government. You only need a new PM that can get a majority in the House of Commons. A minor party switching support from an incumbent PM to the leader of the main opposition party would do. While the loss of a vote of confidence could lead the outgoing PM to call an election it's not technically required. A monarch would be entitled to refuse a plea to dissolve Parliament as there is a government in waiting.

In the 1914 situation it wouldn't even lead to a change in PM. Just a change in which parties and MPs supported his leadership.

* which is not so much unwritten as uncodified, there are documents and laws that lay out procedures. It's just very convenient for some to have it opaque.

Agreed, but to get that new PM would require the Monarch to dissolve parliment and call on (Bonar-Law?) to form a new government. That would in turn require the sitting government to fail to function. Otherwise, the current government can continue as a minority.

All of this is, of course, possible but requires time to happen. There needs to be a period where either Asquith restructures his Cabinet as a coalition or rules as a minority and then loses a vote of no confidence and then the Tories are called to form a government. Whichever happens, it would delay any British action from OTL, not speed it up.
 

BooNZ

Banned
They probably would have to go to War. But a swift declaration of War, a rapid bombardment and occupation of Belgrade, followed by enforcement of the Ultimatum is very different from a "final reckoning" some in Vienna had planned. Saying that, given the attitudes of the time, it is possible I suppose that if Vienna had accepted the Serbian response to the Ultimatum, an occupation of Belgrade to enforce the response would be acceptable. The key, obviously, is how quickly the Austrians respond to the Crisis. The quicker the response the more sympathetic the international reaction would be.
The military occupation of Belgrade exceeds anything demanded in the ultimatum, which the Serbs would have had little choice but to accept without the blank cheque offered by Russia/French. On the other points I agree more immediate action by A-H would have more likely resulted in A-H achieving satisfaction before France and Russia could co-ordinate and settle on their unconditional support of Serbia. That said, I'm not sure what the A-H objective(s) would have been.

Mainly Bethman-Hollweg, Jagow and the diplomatic circle. Falkenhayn suggesting that there may be a coup to place the Crown Prince on the throne doesn't suggest harmony at the highest levels in Berlin either.
Curiously in early 1914 Falkenhayn was lamenting that Moltke alone among the decision makers was pushing for a more belligerent foreign policy, so what you are suggesting is a paradigm shift within Germany's diplomatic circle. I also understood Bethman-Hollweg himself had instincts of a dove, rather than a hawk. Tell me more about this purported threat of a coup - I'm intrigued...

It is my impression that the Kaiser thought the "Halt in Belgrade" option was a way of avoiding a general War.
I understand the idea originated from Grey and was initially promoted by Bethman-Hollweg as a means to keep Britain out, but yes it later featured in correspondence between monarchs.
 
Agreed, but to get that new PM would require the Monarch to dissolve parliment and call on (Bonar-Law?) to form a new government. That would in turn require the sitting government to fail to function. Otherwise, the current government can continue as a minority.

All of this is, of course, possible but requires time to happen. There needs to be a period where either Asquith restructures his Cabinet as a coalition or rules as a minority and then loses a vote of no confidence and then the Tories are called to form a government. Whichever happens, it would delay any British action from OTL, not speed it up.
It doesn't require Parliament to be dissolved as Asquith can simply invite the Tories to take posts in the cabinet and support him in a vote of no confidence. Any delay will be a week at most.
 

Deleted member 94680

It doesn't require Parliament to be dissolved as Asquith can simply invite the Tories to take posts in the cabinet and support him in a vote of no confidence. Any delay will be a week at most.

That can happen, but would Asquith go there this early in 1914? With the Tories having the majority of Parliament seats by this point (IIRC), he risks becoming sidelined in his own government. OTL it took the first year or so of the War for him to take the step.

Otherwise, yes perfectly true. But it would result in a delay in the British decision making process. I'd challenge "week at the most" as there'd be a fair bit of wrangling over who gets what post, but it wouldn't necessarily result in governmental paralysis.

It also requires Asquith to be so set on intervention that he ditches the majority of his Liberal colleagues in the Cabinet to jump into bed with the Tories. Without Belgium, I believe it would require something else "big" to bring Asquith to the interventionist side.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
You need over 100 Liberals to defect to form a majority. Based on the development trend of the Liberals and the fact that the Imperialists were a small minority, the number would not reach 100, not to mention that Asquith was actually very partisan.
That can happen, but would Asquith go there this early in 1914? With the Tories having the majority of Parliament seats by this point (IIRC), he risks becoming sidelined in his own government. OTL it took the first year or so of the War for him to take the step.
Distribution of MPs in the House of Commons after the Dec. 1910 election :
Labour : 42
Liberals :272
Irish Parl. : 74
All-f-Ireland : 8
Indep. Nationalist : 2
Indep. Conservative : 1
Tories+Unionists : 271
Votes needed for a majotity : 336

Therefor it would need at least 68 Liberals to switch towards the Tories (if we assume the independant conservative would go with the Tories AND really every Tory would go interventionist. Given the position of industry and fonance [strictly AGAINST military intervention] debatable IMO.), exactly a quarter of the Liberal MPs.
Morley, Lloyd George and Churchill assumed about 2/3 to 3/4 of the "backbenchers" at least to be "Anti-interventionist".
But even if we assume an "interventionist" Asquith would be able to rally around 100 of the MPs, as Stenz has said his position in any goverment would be more than precarious, aka he can start to count his days in office.

Otherwise, yes perfectly true. But it would result in a delay in the British decision making process. I'd challenge "week at the most" as there'd be a fair bit of wrangling over who gets what post, but it wouldn't necessarily result in governmental paralysis.

It also requires Asquith to be so set on intervention that he ditches the majority of his Liberal colleagues in the Cabinet to jump into bed with the Tories. Without Belgium, I believe it would require something else "big" to bring Asquith to the interventionist side.
Asquith is soo often counted within the "pro-interventionist" camp.
Why ?
But despite several times questioned, noone could give me an explanation/evidence/source for that so far and I didn't came across one either.

As I said already, IMO Asquith was AT FIRST interested in the Liberal partys unity to hold on power. Everything else came second to that.
Showing around Bonar Law letter, was IMO NOT intended to gear inner cabinets members toward intervention, but towards taking a unified, common position as the only way to fight off the Tories longing for power by whatever means.​
In that respect he supported - to some degree - Grey NOT for his interventionist position, but for his importance for him as foreign secretary and member of the Liberal goverment. Up until the night of 2nd August Grey was the only cabinet member, who had clearly stated (a possible resignation of Burns and Morley were "just" guessed at that moment) to resign in case support (however this might look, not necessarily by sending the BEF) for France would not be given.
During the night of 2nd/3rd August and the morning of 3rd August Asquith was extremly busy to convince/talk into these four to withdraw their resignation. With success only or at least with two of them.

I still lack evidence for Asquith to be pro-intervention by his own conviction to this cause.
 
That can happen, but would Asquith go there this early in 1914? With the Tories having the majority of Parliament seats by this point (IIRC), he risks becoming sidelined in his own government. OTL it took the first year or so of the War for him to take the step.

Otherwise, yes perfectly true. But it would result in a delay in the British decision making process. I'd challenge "week at the most" as there'd be a fair bit of wrangling over who gets what post, but it wouldn't necessarily result in governmental paralysis.

It also requires Asquith to be so set on intervention that he ditches the majority of his Liberal colleagues in the Cabinet to jump into bed with the Tories. Without Belgium, I believe it would require something else "big" to bring Asquith to the interventionist side.

If I may add one more point: it would also be political suicide for the leader of a political party to essentially defect. The Tories aren't going to trust the man, after the decades of pressure he'd put on them and all the policies he pushed through that they disagreed with, and the Liberals would take this as a giant slap to the face. And with his Ministership (and, since he probably can't get a position beyond back-bencher again if he takes this route) dependent on keeping the Conservatives on his side you can bet they're going to wring some wartime concessions out of him.

Obviously, Asquith knows this, which means he's very unlikely to sideline his own party from the Government.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
Morley, Lloyd George and Churchill assumed about 2/3 to 3/4 of the "backbenchers" at least to be "Anti-interventionist".
And they knew that most of them were social liberals, which mean they could defect to Labour: RIP Liberals
the Liberals would take this as a giant slap to the face
A Radical coup led by Lloyd George inside the Liberals would certainly occur, and Lloyd George in this case would get the full backing from his own party.
 
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Had A-H acted quicker and as soon as they had evidence that the assassination was a broader conspiracy abetted by Serbia then I think the war might have been contained or spread to include Russia and Germany and then France but potentially leaving the British on the sidelines. As the A-H response slowly came the heat of the moment let everyone think towards their interests and not the reaction to an assassination aimed at the ruling class and order. That is where A-H lost it opportunity to deal Serbia a fatal blow and secure the Balkans as its back yard, only Russia truly cared, the debate would be its response. As we know the Russians began to mobilize as soon as they understood Serbia was going to be given an ultimatum and Germany had to be ready to react should A-H and Russia threaten war to preserve Serbia and Russian influence (as well as obscure its own complicity). I think Russia assumed Germany would be distracted by France so the war would open better as the attack into East Prussia would preempt her and the remainder of the effort could defeat A-H. Obviously Germany did far better against the Russians and the broad sweep into France nearly upended the assumptions that this war would be a violent clash to get to the bargaining table. Again, to avoid that strategic offensive Germany needs to be more fearful of Russia and feel its best course is to put enough forces East to either defend itself or launch its own preemptive strike, this gets us no Belgium. So either we push A-H up on its schedule and the Crisis is not end of July but hot on the heels of the assassination itself. I think we need Russia to get up and warlike right then and the war unfolds in a more panicked twilight of peasants killing prince(s), the orderly world set afire, Britain hoping to quell the storm and Germany reacting to Russian mobilization now rather than attempting to have an overarching plan for an interlocking war of alliances primed.
 

Deleted member 94680

If I may add one more point: it would also be political suicide for the leader of a political party to essentially defect. The Tories aren't going to trust the man, after the decades of pressure he'd put on them and all the policies he pushed through that they disagreed with, and the Liberals would take this as a giant slap to the face. And with his Ministership (and, since he probably can't get a position beyond back-bencher again if he takes this route) dependent on keeping the Conservatives on his side you can bet they're going to wring some wartime concessions out of him.

Obviously, Asquith knows this, which means he's very unlikely to sideline his own party from the Government.

The obvious allegory is Churchill: he "crossed the floor" from the Liberals to the Conservatives and many MPs never forgave him. Or at least until he became a successful War PM.

In this rump "Interventionist Liberal" Party bolted onto the Conservative Unionists, Asquith is a leading backbencher or some token Cabinet post at best, IMHO. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, perhaps?
 

Thomas1195

Banned
In this rump "Interventionist Liberal" Party bolted onto the Conservative Unionists, Asquith is a leading backbencher or some token Cabinet post at best, IMHO. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, perhaps?
The difference is that Asquith was the current party leader. Doing so would be a political suicide both for him and the party as a whole. Besides, you know that Asquith was pretty partisan, and IOTL this became clearer during and after the war. He included the Tories into the Coalition but denied them all the major tasks, and gave them unimportant posts. During the post-war period, he refused any kind of Coalition.

Well, finally, he wanted no less than a PM post, thus he would not defect
 

Perkeo

Banned
It certainly helps that but British entry would have happened without it. Probably if its a German-Russian War definitely if Germany strikes at France
I wonder what interest the British are trying to defend in this case.
If Belgium isn't invaded, the Channel stays British. A limited invasion of France alone won't try, let alone succeed, to change that. OTOH a devastating defeat of Germany means French hegemony in Western Europe, which the British don't want either.
 
I wonder what interest the British are trying to defend in this case.
If Belgium isn't invaded, the Channel stays British. A limited invasion of France alone won't try, let alone succeed, to change that. OTOH a devastating defeat of Germany means French hegemony in Western Europe, which the British don't want either.

Let's start with the obvious- Grey's speech to Parliament. It lays out the reasons for going to war and is plain as day

If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself -- consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often [Loud cheers.] -- still, if that were to happen and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any power?[Loud cheers.]

It is simple. If France is beaten, then Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands fall completely under the sway of the Germans. why is he worried about the Netherlands and Denmark? Neither has been threatened? Because even if they were to keep their nominal independence they could no more follow an independent foreign policy than Bavaria. There is no keeping the Channel British

And your right- Britain doesn't want to see the French dominant either. That is why the British want peace. They came forth with many proposals to solve the crisis- the four power mediation, the stop in Belgrade formula Grey is desperately trying to find some formula to keep the peace only to see each offer rejected by Vienna. The Austrians even tell him that Serbia's accepting the entire note would no longer be acceptable to Vienna. if that's not belligerence, then what is?

And what do you mean a "limited invasion of France"? The French and Germans are playing for all the marbles
 

Perkeo

Banned
Let's start with the obvious- Grey's speech to Parliament. It lays out the reasons for going to war and is plain as day

If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself -- consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often [Loud cheers.] -- still, if that were to happen and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any power?[Loud cheers.]

It is simple. If France is beaten, then Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands fall completely under the sway of the Germans. why is he worried about the Netherlands and Denmark? Neither has been threatened? Because even if they were to keep their nominal independence they could no more follow an independent foreign policy than Bavaria. There is no keeping the Channel British

I'm a bit confused, because you not only refer to the speech that I think confirms that Sir Grey shares my view, you quote even contains the very sentence where he does so (I took the feedom to highlight it).

Do correct me if I'm wrong, but sir Grey stated two demands that - in this timeline - all are fulfilled by the Germans:
1) No German ships in the Channel (the Germans agreed to that even IOTL)
2) No country bordering the Channel is turned into a German vassall
For the second point there are two clarifications:
2a) If Belgium allows German passage, she is being turned into a vassal since that isn't done voluntarily.
2b) France under attack does not necessarily mean that France is becoming anyones vassal since she's too big to be swallowed by Germany.

And your right- Britain doesn't want to see the French dominant either. That is why the British want peace.
Specifically peace in Western Europe. That's why it does matter who makes the DOW and who fires the first shot.
They came forth with many proposals to solve the crisis- the four power mediation, the stop in Belgrade formula Grey is desperately trying to find some formula to keep the peace only to see each offer rejected by Vienna. The Austrians even tell him that Serbia's accepting the entire note would no longer be acceptable to Vienna. if that's not belligerence, then what is?
True but irrelevant. Grey said it:

The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question.... It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence -- no government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria than the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian alliance. We do not even know the terms of the alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

It was Germany's hilarious grip on the channel that brought Britain into the war, them not making that mistake will mean that they don't suffer the consequences - for the time being.

And what do you mean a "limited invasion of France"? The French and Germans are playing for all the marbles
IOTL, but ITTL Germany doesn't. They can't without Belgium and they won't try. There probably won't even be a DOW on France. OK, the OP demands an invasion, but that can only be some sort of counterattack since - once again - the Germans know that a full scale knock-out blow cannot be accomplished without Belgium.

Depending on when the Gemans decide not to attack Belgium, Greys speech either enters the history books as the one that prevented British entry, or is replaced by him announcing of British neutrality - in both cases, for the time being.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Let's start with the obvious- Grey's speech to Parliament. It lays out the reasons for going to war and is plain as day
... as if Grey had ever been - esp. in public - been "plain" about something ...

However, for your quote of the speach :
If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself -- consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often [Loud cheers.]
At this point the honorable members of the parliament cheer to the "... the power to defend herself with all energy and ability and patriotism ..." -> means : they agree, that France actually doesn't need Britains help to fight the germans.
But Grey quickly senses his ... wee error and immediatly returns to Belgium ...
-- still, if that were to happen and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any power?[Loud cheers.]
... and Belgiums "keystone" position in the "common" - aka british - interests.
(What - btw - didn't happened, the claimed "domino"-effect, rather the opposite : the neutrals, Netherlands, Denmarck, rest of Scandinavia also were quite pressed by the british reaction -> blockade of the continental trade.)

Other than that : I can only second @Perkeo
 

NoMommsen

Donor
... So much for the Austrians being victims.
Who ever called or depicted the Austrians as a "victims" ?

Like maybe the "Stop in Belgrade" formula that Grey and the Kaiser (off and on) had suggested? Seriously
This ... was the compromise proposed, I agree.
But ... seriously, you still owe me the "guarantee", you claimed.
... or do you mean the earlier proposed 4-power-talks ? ... without Austria ?


Most importantly for our discussion,the interventionists are clearly in the majority of the liberal party. There can be little dout that with the Tories, intervention is coming
Just out of curiosity (tainted in the sense of "strange") : where the heck did you get this ... impression from ? ... prior to 3rd August ?
 
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Deleted member 94680

Just out of curiosity (tainted in the sense of "strange") : where the heck did you get this ... impression from ? ... prior to 3rd August ?

Probably in his "Tory government pre-WWI alt-POD" that he concocted.
 
For argument's sake we have Germany respecting Belgian neutrality and that eliminates the prime cause for Britain to enter this war in favor of France. Am I correct from the British contributors that Asquith favored non-intervention as did much of the Liberal party in power? So without Belgium the Liberals stand at least non-belligerent towards Germany. Within the approximate year before an election is to be called would the Liberals be able to hold to this position? For example, I assume that Italy is not joining unless Russia obviously opens hostilities against Germany and/or A-H. And I assume the British release the Ottoman battleships as they are completed and ready to sail. Further I assume Germany respects the Channel but otherwise uses it Navy against the French as best it can. All of these offer new flashpoints.

So the war opens with Germany and A-H at war with France and Russia, or vice versa if you prefer. Serbia is being hard hit and no matter how well it does will fall. Germany has not been defeated in the East, more likely it is gaining victories. The French and Germans stalemate in the West with France losing many men in fruitless offensives. The A-H navy harasses the French and Germany tries to blockade the French Atlantic ports.

Is it safe to assume Italy will not join the French unless Britain joins the war (or Germany is obviously being beaten)? I assume Italy steers clear of war but freely lets trade slip through to the CP. Britain and Italy have strong trade links and I assume Britain increases trade with Italy. Some of that must filter to the CPs at war. Do the British embargo the CPs and trade freely with the Entente, or do they go strict neutral? I think both Liberal and Tory would turn a blind eye to free trade and the opportunity afforded by the war to improve market share, earn some war profits and sell to whoever has the gold. Is that unfair?

Does Greece intercept the Ottoman battleship and unravel peace in the Aegean, Eastern Med and/or Balkans in turn? I know this has been discussed as a separate cause for war in 1914, but here would it drag Britain into war. Greece has affinity for Germany (at least the King) and Britain, Britain adores Greece (at least culturally) and runs it Navy through its naval mission but France has poured a lot into her. Everyone has huge debts owed by the Ottomans, the British again run her navy but the army is deeply connected to Germany, and I think the French are rather hated. I assume the OE goes CP and Greece falls into the Entente here but that might be too simplistic.

Does Romania jump on A-H if Russia can show some staying power? Or does she stay neutral until either Russia collapses or the end? I think Romania can be bought with offer of Bessarabia.

Does Bulgaria steer neutral unless Greece, Romania or OE join the war? I see no reason for Bulgaria to join the war unless A-H is offering pieces of Serbia or Albania.

These all seem the "what next" the OP asks for. We discuss the path to neutrality but fall short of this. And how does British neutrality, assuming none of this gives intervention the cue, effect the election? My read is that the Liberals were going to lose power to the Tories. Were the Tories more inclined to continue the neutral path or were they more interventionist (reckless)? At bottom I think this is the biggest "what next". Obviously I think a neutral British Empire has a brighter future ahead.
 
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