Germany doesnt invade Belgium 1914

So, how do you guys think history would turn out if Belgium was not invaded?
How/why? They aren't stupid: if they didn't that would be because they have another plan which they hope to win quickly (or, possibly, just easily, but those go hand in hand) with. They wouldn't just not invade Belgium, they'd want an alternative plan. Now, going east could do that, but, well, that'd have other effects, too, so...
 
Leaving aside the tactical questions, Britain stays out. Other than that, not a clue.
Well, Britain stays out at first. Many would say that they would still look for a casus belli to enter, any casus belli at all... though I suppose Irish Home Rule could screw up things a bit (some politicians wanting to sort out internal problems before even considering entering the European War, etc).
 
Well, Britain stays out at first. Many would say that they would still look for a casus belli to enter, any casus belli at all... though I suppose Irish Home Rule could screw up things a bit (some politicians wanting to sort out internal problems before even considering entering the European War, etc).
The Cabinet was divided as it was in OTL about the declaration of war. Irish Home Rule dominates the landscape for the next five years in Britain, after which time the war is over. (Remember Home Rule passed in OTL but was never implemented.)

The only other possible route I can see for British entry to the war is the Ottomans declaring war on the Empire. Why would they do that in ttl though?
 
The Cabinet was divided as it was in OTL about the declaration of war. Irish Home Rule dominates the landscape for the next five years in Britain, after which time the war is over. (Remember Home Rule passed in OTL but was never implemented.)

The only other possible route I can see for British entry to the war is the Ottomans declaring war on the Empire. Why would they do that in ttl though?
There's quite a number of people here insisting that Britain would seek a way to enter the war (sort-off like the USA in the Second World War), regardless of other matters.
I myself certainly hope that wouldn't have been true, as my TL would have been totally impossible if it was:rolleyes:. I'm not really disagreeing with you, to be honest: I do, however, know that others do.

The Ottomans wouldn't declare war on the Empire: they weren't that suicidal, so they wouldn't just add a second front like that.
 
I've wondered about this myself. The Germans were afraid of a two-front war as well as potentially massive but slow Russian mobilization. So they decide to go after France first? Wouldn't it have made more sense to go after Russia first, taking advantage of their slow mobilization to smash them fast? All those big forts in A-L probably could have held the French off indefinitely while the German Army marches to St. Petersburg, and their is no need to go through Belgium.
 
I've wondered about this myself. The Germans were afraid of a two-front war as well as potentially massive but slow Russian mobilization. So they decide to go after France first? Wouldn't it have made more sense to go after Russia first, taking advantage of their slow mobilization to smash them fast? All those big forts in A-L probably could have held the French off indefinitely while the German Army marches to St. Petersburg, and their is no need to go through Belgium.

But wasn't capturing French territory a major reason for the War? Russia only got involved because it was allied with France.

WWI wasn't like WWII, about racists taking over the world. It was about how proving that Germany was the strongest country in Europe, and gaining unimpeded control over Alsace-Lorraine.
 
But wasn't capturing French territory a major reason for the War? Russia only got involved because it was allied with France.

WWI wasn't like WWII, about racists taking over the world. It was about how proving that Germany was the strongest country in Europe, and gaining unimpeded control over Alsace-Lorraine.

Russia drew France in by supporting Serbia.
 
Russia drew France in by supporting Serbia.

And Germany got drawn in by Austria-Hungary. Doesn't change the fact that Germany wanted to go to war with France. They had plans for mobilization that had been part of their doctrine for a decade. More than anything else, they were ready for war with France.
 
And Germany got drawn in by Austria-Hungary. Doesn't change the fact that Germany wanted to go to war with France. They had plans for mobilization that had been part of their doctrine for a decade. More than anything else, they were ready for war with France.

I was pointing out that Russia didn't get involved in the war because of the French alliance, it is the other way around.
 
The irony of the Schlieffenplan is, that it was made to maybe beat one major power (France) , but would certainly draw another major power (GB) into the war.

If Germany had just stopped at their border to France and let them do the fighting, it would have been in a much stronger position.

a) France would be seen as the agressor, while Germany could send out peace notes all the time

b) No attack on Belgium --> no British entry. In fact. GB might even enter the war on CP side if France decides to attack through Belgium. The British-French alliance, the Entente, had no offensive character.

c) Defense > Offense in WWI ; spared a lot of troops

d) These troops could be used in Russia, an area so big that static trench warfare could be evaded.

e) Germany would win in the east, like in OTL.

f) Since the war in the west would be nothing else as a stalemate, giving its even smaller area of combat than in OTL, the French would probably give in at some point.
 
I've wondered about this myself. The Germans were afraid of a two-front war as well as potentially massive but slow Russian mobilization. So they decide to go after France first? Wouldn't it have made more sense to go after Russia first, taking advantage of their slow mobilization to smash them fast? All those big forts in A-L probably could have held the French off indefinitely while the German Army marches to St. Petersburg, and their is no need to go through Belgium.

German plan for actions against France and Russia

from Robin Niellands ‘The Great War Generals’

Britain was also concerned to maintain the ‘balance of power’ in Europe and in particular to maintain the neutrality of Belgium something which had been guaranteed by all the major European powers – France, Prussia, Austria, Russia and Britain – by the Treaty of London in 1839. Germany, the heir to Prussia, had accepted that neutrality after 1871 and maintained the guarantee. There were, inevitable, other reasons for the British support of Belgium. Nations are not so altruistic that they fight wars only over matters of principal or to guarantee the territory of other nations. Quire apart from the demands upon national honour made by this commitment to Belgium neutrality, Britain would not permit a large, hostile, and expansionist power like Germany to gain possession of ports in the Channel coast, close to the British shore.

This was undoubtedly a possibility, for Belgium neutrality was under threat. While these various alliances were being established at the end of the nineteenth century, Germany was preparing a war plan to combat the problems of ‘encirclement’, a scheme masterminded by the then Chief of the German Imperial Staff, General Count Alfred von Schlieffen. Schlieffen believed that in the event of war – and he regarded war as inevitable – Germany would have to fight on two fronts, in the West against France and in the east against Russia.

His plan was based on the theory that thanks to her well-developed network of modern rail communications and the fact that she possessed the strategic advantage of interior lines of communication, it would be possible for Germany to fall on France in great force and defeat her before the vast but obsolescent Russian Army could be mobilised and move to help. With France defeated, the full might of the German Army would then turn on Russia to win a second victory. Given the size and professional skill of the German Army, which stood at around 850,000 men by 1914 and could be rapidly expanded by the recall of reserves, and the construction of railways, which spanned Germany from the Ardennes to the Odder, this plan was feasible.

The Schlieffen Plan required that the bulk of the German Army should be massed in the west and on the right wing to sweep into France from the north-east – through Luxembourg and Belgium – and, hooking round west of Paris would hustle the French Army up against its own fixed defences along the Franco-German border. The French had their own plan, the well-honed Plan XVII, which dictated a thrust east into Germany immediately on the outbreak of war with every man horse and gun. The effect of the Schlieffen Plan, however, would be like that of a swinging door, catching the French from behind as they surged east to the Rhine. This strategy would require great speed and mobility – as well as the violation of Belgium neutrality – and contained two snags. The first was that speed and mobility were not adequately available in the marching armies of 1914 with their largely horse-drawn transport. The second snag was that invading Belgium would bring Great Britain and her empire into the war.

The Schlieffen Plan adopted in 1905 dictated that Germany must mobilise and strike first, to defeat France in six weeks, before the Russian armies could take to the field.

With matters so delicately poised in the west and east, it is time to look at the situation developing in Germany’s principal European ally, Austria-Hungary. By the start of the twentieth century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was beginning to crumble, but although the cracks were there, the structure generally appeared solid. The exception lay in the ever-turbulent Balkans, and in particular with Serbia, an independent state outside the Austro-Hungarian Balkan hegemony.

However, a large number of ethnic Serbs lived within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, especially in the newly annexed provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary had taken over in 1908. These ‘ethnic Serbs’ wished to join those provinces with Serbia to create a ‘Greater Serbia’ and were agitating for their freedom with demonstrations and acts of terrorism inside Austria-Hungary. A further complication was that Tsarist Russia, which always regarded herself as the ultimate protector of Slav interests in the Balkans, had offered guarantees of support to Serbia in the event of Austro-Hungarian intervention. If for any reason, Serbia and Austria-Hungary came to blows, Russia would not stay on the sidelines.

That reason was supplied 28 June 1914, by a young Bosnian Serb student, Gavrilo Princip, when he fired two shots at the Austrian heir, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Austria-Hungary issued demands for the prompt investigation of the assignation and punishment of the assassins in a language no sovereign nation could accept to give an excuse for a war in which Austria-Hungary could absorb Serbia and thereby stamp out nascent Balkan independence once and for all. The Serbs duly appealed to the Tsar and Russia warned that she would protect Serbia’s interests in Austria’s demands went to far. This in turn required Austria to call on its German ally and on 5th July, Germany assured Austria of her faithful support in the event of war.

Thus encouraged, on 23 July Austria-Hungary issued her final ultimatum, ordering Serbia to stamp on the people demanding independence for the Austrian Serbs and requiring Serbia to admit Austrian officials to supervise the investigation into the Archdukes murder.

Although it seemed the Serbs reply gave into Austrian demands, the Austrians rejected the response and on 28 July declared war on Serbia.

On that date Russia mobilised its forces on the Austrian border, which at the time was on Russia’s southern frontier. This alerted and alarmed the German General Staff, whose entire strategy was based on the theory that Russia would still be mobilising while her Western ally, France, was crushed. If the Schlieffen Plan was to be implemented successfully, the Russians must not be given time to mobilise. Austria then mobilised her forces along the Russian frontier, and on 31July both she and Russia ordered total mobilisation. On that day Germany ordered Russia to halt the drift to war and demobilise within 12 hours. The Russians ignored this and on 1 August, Germany ordered general mobilisation with the aim of declaring war on Russia at 1700 hours that afternoon and implementing the Schlieffen Plan.

At 2300 hours that night, a telegram form the German Ambassador in London revealed that the British Foreign Secretary had offered to keep France neutral if Germany promised not to go to war with either France or Russia, while a solution was sought to the conflict between Austria and Serbia. It was, however too late for that. The Russians were already mobilising and refused to stop and the telegrams ordering the German Army to advance on Luxembourg and Belgium were going out and the troops staring to march.

On Saturday, 1 august, Germany declared war on Russia, and Belgium mobilised her army. At 0800 on 1 August the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, went to the Minister of War and asked permission to begin a general mobilisation of France’s reserves at midnight.

Britain had not yet declared her intentions, and the French were frantic for some sign of British commitment, believing, or rather choosing to believe, that those military ‘conversations’ between the two staffs amounted to a firm commitment on the part of Britain to deploy a 160,000-stong British Expeditionary Force on the French left flank, immediately on the outbreak of war. Britain had made plans for such a deployment but had made no commitment to do so.

On Sunday 2 August, the German Ambassador in Brussels presented an ultimatum to the Belgium Government demanding unopposed passage though Belgium for the German Army. Belgium rejected this and all eyes now turned to Britain, which was still deciding on a course of action, and was under pressure from both France and Germany.

On 3 August, the day on which Belgium rejected the German ultimatum, Germany declared war on France. The British Government therefore ordered general mobilisation and recalled all reservists before sending an ultimatum to Germany, requiring an assurance that the latter would respect Belgium neutrality. Germany refused to give such an assurance and at 2300 hours 4 August, Britain declared war on Germany.

The Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, explained Britain’s reasons for entering the war in a conversation with the American Ambassador on the afternoon of 4 August.

The neutrality of Belgium is assured by Treaty. Germany is a signatory power to that Treaty and it is upon such compacts that this civilisation rests. If we give them up or permit them to be violated what becomes of civilisation? Ordered society differs from mere force only by such solemn agreements or compacts. But now Germany has violated the neutrality of Belgium. That means bad faith. It means the end of Belgium independence and it will not stop with Belgium. Next will come Holland and after Holland, Denmark. This very morning the Swedish Minister informed me that Germany had made overtures to Sweden to come in on Germany’s side. The whole plan is thus clear; this one great military power means to annex Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian States and to subjugate France.

Britain would be forever contemptible if it should sit by and see this Treaty violated, and its position would be gone if Germany were thus permitted to dominate Europe. If Germany’s position on Belgium neutrality is not reversed, Britain will declare war.



















 

Redbeard

Banned
GB did not enter WWI because of Belgium or the Belgians, the British govrenment couldn't care less about an obscure country too small to swing a cat around in.

The Belgian neutrality was the casus belli that was created by events and used - all in order to stop Germany from becomming a threat to the Empire by being the dominant force on the European continent.

So if Germany is still a threat to the Empire, but Belgium isn't in danger, some other casus belli has to be found - that is what you have foreign offices for.

From this also follows, that hadn't Germany expanded her navy, colonial ambitions and anti-British retorics, GB would have been much less worried about what Germany did to who on the continent.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
So if Germany is still a threat to the Empire, but Belgium isn't in danger, some other casus belli has to be found - that is what you have foreign offices for.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

A very good point. Historically, I believe that the French declared war upon Austria-Hungary on the grounds - as they notified Vienna - that an Austro-Hungarian aircraft or AH cavalry were spotted with the German forces in Alsace-Lorraine.
 
GB did not enter WWI because of Belgium or the Belgians, the British govrenment couldn't care less about an obscure country too small to swing a cat around in.

The Belgian neutrality was the casus belli that was created by events and used - all in order to stop Germany from becomming a threat to the Empire by being the dominant force on the European continent.

So if Germany is still a threat to the Empire, but Belgium isn't in danger, some other casus belli has to be found - that is what you have foreign offices for.

From this also follows, that hadn't Germany expanded her navy, colonial ambitions and anti-British retorics, GB would have been much less worried about what Germany did to who on the continent.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
Thats just not true.

Britain entered the war due to the German invasion of Belgium. Even then the Cabinet were totally divided on whether or not the UK should or should not declare war. Several members resigned over the issue.

I don't deny for one minute that there was a lot of anti-german rhetoric going about, but at the same time that does not equate to a declaration of war.

I truly believe that Britain and the Empire would have been neutral in 1914 had Germany avoided Belgium. If you can find a direct official document stating otherwise then show me it.

Also, you seem to be giving the British Government a far more Machiavellian face than they had. I doubt they that devious as to find a direct cassus belli which would have the support of the Liberal Cabinet.(which was divided with a totally clear casus belli in OTL)
 
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The irony of the Schlieffenplan is, that it was made to maybe beat one major power (France) , but would certainly draw another major power (GB) into the war.

If Germany had just stopped at their border to France and let them do the fighting, it would have been in a much stronger position.

a) France would be seen as the agressor, while Germany could send out peace notes all the time

b) No attack on Belgium --> no British entry. In fact. GB might even enter the war on CP side if France decides to attack through Belgium. The British-French alliance, the Entente, had no offensive character.

c) Defense > Offense in WWI ; spared a lot of troops

d) These troops could be used in Russia, an area so big that static trench warfare could be evaded.

e) Germany would win in the east, like in OTL.

f) Since the war in the west would be nothing else as a stalemate, giving its even smaller area of combat than in OTL, the French would probably give in at some point.

That's all true, but it requires Germany to know what OTL WWI turned out like. The british weren't a problem because the war would be over fast, like every other war since 1812, and the Brits couldn't possibly raise troops fast enough, nor would the blockade have time to take effect. Nobody knew trench warfare was coming and there's no way the Germans would possibly agree to such a plan, absent time-travelling documentation of the war. You could maybe get them to agree to a limited defensive in the west, but only on the condition that France gets the stuffing knocked out of them the moment Russia is defeated. There's simply no way Germany and France are going to come to any terms less than total surrender.
 
GB did not enter WWI because of Belgium or the Belgians, the British govrenment couldn't care less about an obscure country too small to swing a cat around in.

The Belgian neutrality was the casus belli that was created by events and used - all in order to stop Germany from becomming a threat to the Empire by being the dominant force on the European continent.

So if Germany is still a threat to the Empire, but Belgium isn't in danger, some other casus belli has to be found - that is what you have foreign offices for.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

Absolutely true.
 
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GB did not enter WWI because of Belgium or the Belgians, the British govrenment couldn't care less about an obscure country too small to swing a cat around in.

The Belgian neutrality was the casus belli that was created by events and used - all in order to stop Germany from becomming a threat to the Empire by being the dominant force on the European continent.

So if Germany is still a threat to the Empire, but Belgium isn't in danger, some other casus belli has to be found - that is what you have foreign offices for.

From this also follows, that hadn't Germany expanded her navy, colonial ambitions and anti-British retorics, GB would have been much less worried about what Germany did to who on the continent.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard



Sir Humphrey: Minister, Britain has had the same foreign policy objective for at least the last 500 years: to create a disunited Europe. In that cause we have fought with the Dutch against the Spanish, with the Germans against the French, with the French and Italians against the Germans, and with the French against the Germans and Italians. Divide and rule, you see. Why should we change now when it's worked so well?


Jim Hacker: That's all ancient history, surely.


Sir Humphrey: Yes, and current policy. We had to break the whole thing [the EEC] up, so we had to get inside. We tried to break it up from the outside, but that wouldn't work. Now that we're inside we can make a complete pig's breakfast of the whole thing: set the Germans against the French, the French against the Italians, the Italians against the Dutch. The Foreign Office is terribly pleased, it's just like old times.


Jim Hacker: But if that's true, why is the foreign office pushing for higher membership?


Sir Humphrey: I'd have thought that was obvious. The more members an organization has, the more arguments it can stir up. The more futile and impotent it becomes.


Jim Hacker: What appalling cynicism.


Sir Humphrey: We call it diplomacy, Minister.
 
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