Germany Doesn't DOW US After Pearl Harbor AND Ceases All U-boat Operations

Edit #2:
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2012/09/raf-strength-medmiddle-east-1941-43.html
It would seem that in the entire Medditerranean Command area (including Sudan and the Middle East) there were some 1700 RAF aircraft in May 1943 out of over 3000 aircraft in the overall Allied Mediterranean aircraft total around then. 1,115 were in North Africa/Malta

I think you may have misinterpreted that link: the Middle East Command, North West Africa and RAF Malta are all separate RAF components within the Mediterranean Air Command eg
For air operations, Tedder reported to Eisenhower for NAAF and to the British Chiefs of Staff for Middle East Command, Air H.Q. Malta, RAF Gibraltar, and No. 216 Group.
ie the RAF has over 3000 aircraft across the region in May 1943, including over 1000 Spitfires, under Tedder's command.
 
Last edited:
Looking through these from September 1942 and then on January 1st 1943 the RAF did not have extra strength to send to the Mediterranean from Britain without severely impacting their defenses in Britain or their strategic bombing campaign against Germany.

:rolleyes:

Apart from 242 Group under Sir William Welsh deployed in support of First Army...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Welsh_(RAF_officer)

and the 3000 aircraft they had there OTL.

Rommel rushed his invasion of Egypt in 1942 on the presumption that with the US in the war it was a matter of time until they either attacked French North Africa or reinforced Egypt

Evidence please - Rommel did what he had always done, kept attacking (even against orders) until he over-extended himself.

French wouldn't resist very hard due to their friendlier relations with the US compared to the Brits.

Evidence please - the most extended fighting was in Casablanca with no British in sight.

Rather than risk the French fighting a hard campaign even if hopeless in the long run (Syria-Lebanon and Madagascar),

Evidence already presented that the extended resistance in Madagascar was pro-forma to ensure extra pay for the French troops, rather than a hard campaign.

Britain lacks the ability to do Torch on its own.

Evidence please - Operation Gymnast and Super-Gymnast planning tells a different story.

In fact Rommel could hold out again as IOTL in 1941-42 and in 1943 drive Monty back again

Evidence please - from the second half of 1942 onwards the Germans had only very minor successes against the British; with widespread use of the 6pdr anti-tank gun, and better command and control, German attacks usually got stopped dead.

At that point I don't see an invasion of Italy actually

In which case you don't understand Britain's peripheral strategy.
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

I think you may have misinterpreted that link: the Middle East Command, North West Africa and RAF Malta are all separate RAF components within the Mediterranean Air Command eg
ie the RAF has over 3000 aircraft across the region in May 1943, including over 1000 Spitfires, under Tedder's command.
Then the Wallies combined had over 6000 aircraft, as the USAAF made up half the squadrons in theater in mid-1943 and that 3000 total for the RAF also included things in the Middle East, Sudan, and what stayed in Egypt. What was actively engaged in combat operations in Tunisia and Italy were the Northwest Africa Air Forces, which for the RAF in May 1943 was 1115 aircraft according to the link. At the same time Malta had 187 combat aircraft. The Middle East Forces don't seem to have been engaged in combat at that time, though perhaps they let forces be rotated out, so acted as a replacement pool?

:rolleyes:

Apart from 242 Group under Sir William Welsh deployed in support of First Army...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Welsh_(RAF_officer)

and the 3000 aircraft they had there OTL.
Got a link with numbers to support what you say here? That's not in that wikipedia article. Also how many of those aircraft were American?


Evidence please - Rommel did what he had always done, kept attacking (even against orders) until he over-extended himself.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany_and_the_Second_World_War
VI The Global War (Der globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel zur Initiative 1941 bis 1943)
They discuss the German planning behind this and Rommel get permission from the German general staff and the Italian Commando Supremo based on the thinking that they had a ticking clock due to US entry.

Evidence please - the most extended fighting was in Casablanca with no British in sight.
And since all the other places where there was no Brits in sight had much less fighting Casablanca was a major outlier. According to the US army monograph that was posted 2-3 pages ago the French signaled they would not accept a British invasion, but would a US one. I've already provided that evidence; if the Brits either invade without warning or do it after clandestinely talking to French authorities they will get another Syria-Lebanon campaign; they will win in the end, but only after a lot more effort than they'd want to give in the process, perhaps naval fighting, and a long delay in being able to get behind Rommel allowing him time to escape.

Evidence already presented that the extended resistance in Madagascar was pro-forma to ensure extra pay for the French troops, rather than a hard campaign.
They fought pretty hard over the defended port. And Syria-Lebanon:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria–Lebanon_Campaign#War_on_land
Fighting went on for over 1 month and thousands of casualties were suffered on both sides.

Evidence please - Operation Gymnast and Super-Gymnast planning tells a different story.
You mean the operations planned IOTL with the Americans? That's a radically different planning situation than ITTL.

Evidence please - from the second half of 1942 onwards the Germans had only very minor successes against the British; with widespread use of the 6pdr anti-tank gun, and better command and control, German attacks usually got stopped dead.
In Egypt when the Brits were on the defensive at El Alamein on top of their supply lines and a very constricted field of battle where Rommel had to frontally charge prepared British defenses, rather than outflank them as he did at Gazala or Mersa Matruh. Turns out getting bogged down in trench warfare when you're very far from your supply heads and the enemy is less than 100 miles from his and is connected by a rail line while you have to mostly drive your supplies by truck is not something that's going to work out in your favor. Yet it took the Brits until November to finally break him and drive him out of Egypt....

In El Agheila the Brits were way ahead of their rail supply lines and were so cautious in chasing down Rommel due to that fact. Rommel was enfeebled due to not receiving replacements and reinforcements, as those had been directed into North Tunisia with the 5th Panzer Army, so even the weak 8th army spearhead in December-January were able to shove the depleted Rommel backwards. A Rommel with all the supplies and replacements he needed from Tripoli would be a totally different animal than IOTL and the situation MUCH similar to the situation in early 1942 than in late 1942 in Egypt or IOTL during the Tunisian campaign.

In which case you don't understand Britain's peripheral strategy.
No I got it just fine and it makes complete sense IOTL where the US manpower, equipment, and most important of all logistics are all available to make it work. By 1944 ITTL though with Italy much stronger and solidly in the fight against just the British, while stiffened by the Germans is harder nut to crack than France ITTL in 1944 given that the RAF can be mustered at home to a MUCH greater degree than in Africa. Plus they can change up the fortitude deception plan to make the Axis think the invasion is coming in the Mediterranean while they pull out men and material for France.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Deleted member 1487

BTW point for ObsessedNuker:
"Red Phoenix Rising" one of the few books in English about the Soviet air force during WW2, specifically states at the end of it's Kursk chapter that the Soviet offensive successes of the latter half of 1943 and in 1944 was directly attributable to the actions of the VVS in their ground support operations. Starts p.267 and continues on into the 1944 chapter. The VVS was critical for breaking up German counterattacks before they could be conducted, as well as hitting supply lines near the battle area and suppressing or destroying German artillery and identified AT guns. It also provided vital support to the exploitation forces that outran the artillery. It would seem the authors are of the opinion that without the VVS being able to do its job the Soviet ground forces would have been far less successful from 1943 on. They also attribute much of the success of the VVS to the enormous weakness of the Luftwaffe from 1943 on, saying that the Soviets were routinely able to get 10:1 numerical superiority over the battle area and the lack of German fighters due to transfers west enabled the Soviets to build up their air power and overwhelm the remaining Luftwaffe forces. Though sometimes locally the Luftwaffe was able to concentrate to contest the air space in certain areas, by and large they didn't even try so as to husband their very limited and declining combat forces for critical efforts here and there.

ITTL with the Luftwaffe being able to keep much more air units in the East beyond 1942 and potentially add even more in then the VVS would have some very serious problems from 1943 on and potentially be unable to fill their critical role in Soviet combined arms operations, which then in turn would enable the German army to actually conduct counterattacks to stop Soviet break ins before they became breakthrough operations and have enough bombers with enough air cover to attack Soviet spearheads and smash them up before counterattacks dispersed them.
 

Deleted member 1487

Evidence please - Operation Gymnast and Super-Gymnast planning tells a different story.
Looking into Gymnast, which was a landing in French Morocco, i.e a landing at Casablanca, that would have been radically different than what you say the Brits were suggesting; in fact they were the ones suggesting a move against Morocco first.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Torch#Allied_plans
Planners identified Oran and also Algiers and Casablanca as key targets. Ideally there should also be a landing at Tunis to secure Tunisia and facilitate the rapid interdiction of supplies travelling via Tripoli to Rommel's forces in Libya. However, Tunis was much too close to the Axis airfields in Sicily and Sardinia for any hope of success. A compromise would be to land at Bône, some 300 miles (480 km) closer to Tunis than Algiers. Limited resources dictated that the Allies could only make three landings and Eisenhower — who believed that any plan must include landings at Oran and Algiers — had two main options: either the western option, to land at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers and then make as rapid a move as possible to Tunis some 500 miles (800 km) east of Algiers once the Vichy opposition was suppressed; or the eastern option, to land at Oran, Algiers and Bône and then advance overland to Casablanca some 500 miles (800 km) west of Oran. He favoured the eastern option because of the advantages it gave to an early capture of Tunis and also because the Atlantic swells off Casablanca presented considerably greater risks to an amphibious landing there than would be encountered in the Mediterranean. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, however, were concerned that should Operation Torch precipitate Spain to abandon neutrality and join the Axis, the Straits of Gibraltar could be closed cutting the entire Allied force's lines of communication. They therefore chose the Casablanca option as the less risky since the forces in Algeria and Tunisia could be supplied overland from Casablanca (albeit with considerable difficulty) in the event of closure of the straits.[4] Eisenhower in accepting this pointed out that the decision removed the early capture of Tunis from the probable to only the remotely possible because of the extra time it would afford the Axis to move forces into Tunisia.[5]
It would seem that the Allies in planning realized they must take Casablanca in the initial landing AND that Tunis was too close to Axis bases to work. So Aber your entire premise about Torch is totally incorrect. Eisenhower was the one pushing for the Eastern option IOTL, but was forced to accept securing Casablanca to keep the threat of Spain contained. I also want to point out then that IOTL there were limited resources for landings, which meant that the US+UK could only do three landings. The Brits alone have even less resources, so that means 1 or at very best two landing sites, one of which would have to be Casablanca because of the OTL concerns of Spanish entry being magnified without the US in the war and their extra resources.

Original British planning indicated they were going to go after Casablanca first with 1 landing if they were all by themselves and that was in 1941 during Op. Crusader. Clearly they didn't think they had the resources for that and in 1942 without the US they probably aren't going to be sanguine about it either. Assuming they opted for that ITTL they do one landing with all their resources to make sure it sticks at Casablanca and fight a hard battle against the French. Then Vichy is given a choice, either join the war on the side of the Axis and continue to fight as a nominal independent power or be occupied by Germany and turn over everything it had while the Axis forces then move into Algeria and Tunisia. Then Britain is putting 1st army and a bunch of resources into fighting in Morocco and Algeria, always keeping an eye on Spain, while the Axis uses French and Italian shipping and naval forces to supply and sustain their forces in Algeria, perhaps with French forces fighting the Brits, while Rommel pulls back through Libya and into Tunisia. German troops in France can be cleaned out somewhat then reinforce Africa.

Vichy French forces weren't exactly pushovers in North Africa either:
The Vichy French had around 125,000 soldiers in the territories as well as coastal artillery, 210 operational but out-of-date tanks and about 500 aircraft, half of which were Dewoitine D.520 fighters — equal to many British and U.S. fighters.[1] These forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria.[2] In addition, there were 10 or so warships and 11 submarines at Casablanca.

Frankly I don't think the Brits would do Ops. Gymnast or Torch on their own. As it was it seems that IOTL it was a Roosevelt initiative anyway:
https://books.google.com/books?id=0...AF#v=onepage&q=operation Gymnast 1941&f=false

A landing in Casablanca would mean that while French Morocco could be taken after a hard fight, it would be contained there.

Really it would seem the only realistic option in 1942 is just let Monty chase Rommel back into Libya and try and run him down. That's unlikely to happen, as moving that far forward that quickly with reinforcements able to get to Rommel before the forward elements of the 8th army could even get to El Agheila leads to a protracted Western Desert campaign and the Axis using their air power to once again suppress Malta once it falls back on/is reinforced in Sicily. Of course that assumes that Rommel goes with OTL rapid attack on Egypt and Goering and Mussolini want to risk that move in mid-1942.

Assuming so then as Rommel gets his replacements in late 1942/early 1943 he pushes Monty back thanks to being able to fight a fraction of the 8th army and DAF that far west in Libya and due to being able to maneuver against open flanks. The Brits will hold at Gazala of course, there is no replay of the 1942 Gazala battle being possible in 1943, but the campaign drags out again and there is no Tunisgrad here. Probably by late 1943 Monty builds up for another push to El Agheila again and grinds Rommel back to an evacuation at Tripoli in late 1943-early 1944.
 
Then the Wallies combined had over 6000 aircraft, as the USAAF made up half the squadrons in theater in mid-1943 and that 3000 total for the RAF also included things in the Middle East, Sudan, and what stayed in Egypt.

No; check your definitions of the Mediterranean theatre, they mean different things to the British and US. For Husky the US provided up to half the squadrons for the NorthWest Africa air forces - the British Middle East command falls outside this.

It would seem that the Allies in planning realized they must take Casablanca in the initial landing AND that Tunis was too close to Axis bases to work. So Aber your entire premise about Torch is totally incorrect. Eisenhower was the one pushing for the Eastern option IOTL, but was forced to accept securing Casablanca to keep the threat of Spain contained. I also want to point out then that IOTL there were limited resources for landings, which meant that the US+UK could only do three landings. The Brits alone have even less resources, so that means 1 or at very best two landing sites, one of which would have to be Casablanca because of the OTL concerns of Spanish entry being magnified without the US in the war and their extra resources.

You are still not getting it. Eisenhower based in London was convinced by the British arguments for the eastward option for landings inside the Mediterranean; US planners in Washington insisted on Casablanca.

The US Navy provided the western task force - the others were RN.

Frankly I don't think the Brits would do Ops. Gymnast or Torch on their own. As it was it seems that IOTL it was a Roosevelt initiative anyway:

:rolleyes: Only after Churchill had convinced Marshall and King that Sledgehammer was not feasible in 1942, and that Torch was the only sensible option to get the US Army into action against the Germans. Even then Roosevelt had to pull rank on Marshall and King.

A Rommel with all the supplies and replacements he needed from Tripoli would be a totally different animal than IOTL and the situation MUCH similar to the situation in early 1942 than in late 1942 in Egypt or IOTL during the Tunisian campaign.

Possibly on the German side (although they were able to withdraw stronger forces post Crusader), but this time the British Army and RAF are stronger and are not pulling units out to deal with the Japanese threat and have competent commanders in place

Assuming so then as Rommel gets his replacements in late 1942/early 1943 he pushes Monty back thanks to being able to fight a fraction of the 8th army and DAF that far west in Libya and due to being able to maneuver against open flanks.

Rommel attacked Montgomery with armour 3 times - Alam Halfa; Medenine; D-Day (21st panzer). Each time he lost.
 

Deleted member 1487

No; check your definitions of the Mediterranean theatre, they mean different things to the British and US. For Husky the US provided up to half the squadrons for the NorthWest Africa air forces - the British Middle East command falls outside this.
So that units in actual combat in 1943. The US was half of that.

You are still not getting it. Eisenhower based in London was convinced by the British arguments for the eastward option for landings inside the Mediterranean; US planners in Washington insisted on Casablanca.

The US Navy provided the western task force - the others were RN.
Got a source that supports your claims?


Possibly on the German side (although they were able to withdraw stronger forces post Crusader), but this time the British Army and RAF are stronger and are not pulling units out to deal with the Japanese threat and have competent commanders in place
The issue is that once you look at the forces that were in place in early December at El Agheila the British were weak and had open flanks; had Rommel gotten reinforcements and turned to attack he had a window of opportunity to fight a maneuver battle against weaker or at best equal forces and defeat them before turning on other parts of the 8th army still straggling. Rommel is not going to make it past Gazala for the reasons you mention though, but that far west Rommel had the chance to beat parts of the 8th army in detail and maneuver against the British who were still experiencing a lag in their logistics. By February it was catching up to the front line of the 8th army, but in November-January it was lagging.

Rommel attacked Montgomery with armour 3 times - Alam Halfa; Medenine; D-Day (21st panzer). Each time he lost.
In all three of those cases you cite Rommel was outnumbered and out gunned with worse supply in the first two cases; in the situation I'm talking about its Monty with the worse supply and with reinforcements/replacements Rommel could at least equal the forces he'd face at El Agheila in December in a maneuver environment he excelled at and Monty did not do well with (which is BTW the reason he kept such a anemic pursuit of Rommel into Libya). It was also a far less restrictive battle area than the three cases you cite.
 
Got a source that supports your claims?

d'Este, Eisenhower p343

The British preferred a series of landings as far east as Bone (now known as Annaba) to enable the Allies to quickly seize Tunis, thus depriving Hitler of the primary port required to reinforce his North African forces. Eisenhower concurred but was effectively overruled by his own chiefs of staff in Washington, who insisted on a landing at Casablanca to avoid the heavier commitment in the Mediterranean represented by landings near Tunisia. The U.S. chiefs were concerned that there be an Allied presence in Morocco to discourage Spain from entering the war on the side of Germany or from allowing its use as a springboard to bottle up the Straits of Gibraltar and attack the Allied rear in North Africa. This was the first and only time Eisenhower was overruled on an operational matter.

The best source on Allied grand strategy is:
Roberts, Masters and Commanders
 

Deleted member 1487

d'Este, Eisenhower p343



The best source on Allied grand strategy is:
Roberts, Masters and Commanders
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/001/1-3/CMH_Pub_1-3.pdf
The US official history on planning that I have already cited contradicts this and presents the case for why Casablanca was so necessary, namely that there were serious fears of Spanish entry cutting off the invasion of Algeria. They only had resources (US+UK) for three landings, so that meant Casablanca needed to be taken as one of them. That was the opinion of the joint planning committee, not just US planners. The British without the US only could do 1 landing on their own in the face of the French statement that they would resist the British, but not the US, again already cited in this thread. So the Brits are going to be seriously concerned that with one landing moving into Algeria then potentially having the Spanish shut down the Straits and their supply lines when they were engaged in a major battle against Vichy was not an option. Gymnast initially was about invading Casablanca in early 1942 anyway, as a single landing in North Africa and shelved because it was unlikely to result in much other than a diversion of resources.
 
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/001/1-3/CMH_Pub_1-3.pdf
The US official history on planning that I have already cited contradicts this and presents the case for why Casablanca was so necessary,

p285 for the British view
The disagreement over the target date for TORCH was symptomatic of disagreement over the scope of the operation, its objective, and the risks to be taken. The British planners envisaged initial landings on a wide front in the Mediterranean, eastward at least as far as Algiers, to be followed by forces strong enough to advance into Tunisia.68 They estimated that the TORCH ground forces would finally amount to between ten and twelve divisions. The operation would be timed and aimed to secure the coast of Algeria and Tunisia before the coming of winter on the Eastern Front should have eased German needs for troops in Russia. According to this plan, landings on the Atlantic coast would not come at the same time as the landings inside the Mediterranean, but about three weeks later. The British doubted that forces could land against opposition on the Atlantic coast, where there was usually a heavy surf. And they doubted that the forces landed on the Atlantic coast would be of much help to the "main" operation for some time, since they would be held back by limited port facilities and poor land communications with the Mediterranean coast.

p286 for the US view
They realized that the strategic aim of the operation would be correspondingly more ambitious—"Eventual establishment of bases and additional forces for offensive operations against LIBYA and ITALY." But they still thought of Casablanca as the "principal port of debarkation during the early stages of the operation." 71 By relying on Casablanca, the American staff hedged against the risk of heavy losses in ships and escort vessels that might be incurred in supplying the expedition entirely through Mediterranean ports and against the risk of a military debacle in case of rapidly developing strong opposition. As a corollary, both the speed and scale of operations in Algeria and eastward into Tunisia would initially be sharply restricted by the limited port facilities on the Atlantic and the slender overland communications. British staff members conceded that an operation planned on these terms might be sounder— given a defensive purpose

Can you point out any contradiction with what I posted earlier?
 

Deleted member 1487

p285 for the British view


p286 for the US view


Can you point out any contradiction with what I posted earlier?
Again all of that was in the context of OTL when the US was in the war and provided all the forces against what was thought to be negligible French resistance to US forces in three landings. Without the US in the war the French said they'd fight back against a British landing and the Brits only have resources for one opposed landing. On the other thread we are discussing this you say they'd just land at Bone and race to Tunis. That didn't work IOTL and will be even less successful ITTL given the far greater French resistance compared to OTL, lack of US support, focus on one landing site enabling the Axis to fixating on interdicting that one place, the lack of Operation Anton freeing up much more forces to react than IOTL, and the hostiility of the French navy to the Brits in North Africa after the British had attacked the French navy in 1940:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Mers-el-Kébir
 
Again all of that was in the context of OTL when the US was in the war and provided all the forces against what was thought to be negligible French resistance to US forces in three landings. Without the US in the war the French said they'd fight back against a British landing and the Brits only have resources for one opposed landing. On the other thread we are discussing this you say they'd just land at Bone and race to Tunis. That didn't work IOTL and will be even less successful ITTL given the far greater French resistance compared to OTL, lack of US support, focus on one landing site enabling the Axis to fixating on interdicting that one place, the lack of Operation Anton freeing up much more forces to react than IOTL, and the hostiility of the French navy to the Brits in North Africa after the British had attacked the French navy in 1940:

I assume that you couldn't find anything in your source to contradict what I've posted on the planning for Torch as you claimed?

You are now falling back on the 'this timeline is different' argument, and simply relying on the US intelligence assessment of French resistance; I can highlight examples where the French did not resist the British strongly, and did resist US forces. I could just as easily claim that the landings would take place earlier if the US are not involved, Darlan would not be in North Africa, the French forces came over much easier, and resisted German landings in Tunisia.;)
 

Deleted member 1487

I assume that you couldn't find anything in your source to contradict what I've posted on the planning for Torch as you claimed?

You are now falling back on the 'this timeline is different' argument, and simply relying on the US intelligence assessment of French resistance; I can highlight examples where the French did not resist the British strongly, and did resist US forces. I could just as easily claim that the landings would take place earlier if the US are not involved, Darlan would not be in North Africa, the French forces came over much easier, and resisted German landings in Tunisia.;)
The British did not operate indiependently during Torch, they were combined with US forces for it and it was an overwhelmingly US operation and the French opted after some initial resistance to give up to the US. The history of the Vichy forces was to fight the Brits hard and as long as possible as they had in other colonies, so a British only attack would not faced such little resistance.
Also it wasn't only a US intelligence assessment that was the French statement, something the British accept too, which is why they were even thinking about having their soldiers wear US uniforms during the initial invasion to avoid the French resisting them as doggedly. Since we are talking about an ATL, not OTL it really doesn't matter what OTL planning was at a certainly point when it is based on a radically different strategic picture. The French would bitterly resist the French, they didn't the US. The Anglo-US forces could do 3 landings, the British alone just 1. The Brits didn't invade prior to US entry because of their lack of forces and won't here unless they build up a lot more, which means 1944 for a Torch style invasion.
 
Top