Germany does not invade Belguim in 1914. What does Britain do?

[sloreck]

While you might see France go very right in the wake of losing (bienvenue Action Français) the reality is that while revanche may lurk in the heart of every Frenchman, it ain't happening. In this scenario France will end up with more losses than Germany, although not the devastation of a generation of OTL. Demographically France is behind and will be, and with a German dominated Mitteleuropa their economy/resources simply aren't there to build up a force that can take on Germany. Britain may be (somewhat) pro-French even if they go far right, but I simply cannot see Britain backing France to take on Germany 20-25 years down the line and what other allies would France have?

I don't see the conditions ITTL the same as OTL for a "round two".

 

[MichaelWest]

While you might see France go very right in the wake of losing (bienvenue Action Français) the reality is that while revanche may lurk in the heart of every Frenchman, it ain't happening. In this scenario France will end up with more losses than Germany, although not the devastation of a generation of OTL. Demographically France is behind and will be, and with a German dominated Mitteleuropa their economy/resources simply aren't there to build up a force that can take on Germany. Britain may be (somewhat) pro-French even if they go far right, but I simply cannot see Britain backing France to take on Germany 20-25 years down the line and what other allies would France have?

I don't see the conditions ITTL the same as OTL for a "round two".

If we are speculating upon the possibility of a second war then I am on the fence. Revanche France is as you observe, too weak to pull it off, OTL France could barely subjugate a neutered Germany and only through the 1920s and after that they got an increasingly malignant Germany. If anything I think the French move just as quickly to a defensive posture and turtle up, trying to simply ignore the reality, snub the Germans at parties and in bistros but otherwise the peace is preferred. Here Germany is battling internal issues but has more structure to its reforms. A non-belligerent Britain is moderating Germany and can effectively stand up to her in ways that wounded post-war Britain could not in OTL. I tend to see the appeasement actually less ill timed, the British will get more concessions and have promises made by those who will keep them, Britain will pursue trade that will entangle Germany into the international community, into the peace and gain more than a war well fought.

It should be a right leaning or crazy revanche Russia that upsets the balance, and that is playing the tune to a different pitch rather than score. Russia has a good chance to leap frog to reforms that make it more like post-WW2 Germany, shed of its old divisions, ready to get to business. Optimistic but far better than just a Slavic Hitler trope.

If anything the ost unstable places will be in Asia, the events there will unfold unknown, they certainly could get us a showdown over China.

 

[NoMommsen]

... as an argument ... : a rather eclectical selection of a clearly propagandistic speech/document and putting it above other and more numerous evidences.​

What British army studies are you referring to in the pre-war period that suggested the level of damage to the British Empire that actually followed?

The Boer War

... and beside the 'military' argument named by @BooNZ :
I was answering your call on Greys speech of 3rd August ... civilian politician AFAIR, so ... no 'military studies' actually needed.

I referred more towards the other civilian and esp. economic and industrial opinions IOTL about the upcomming war/danger of war ... which IMO was well reflected by the rather considerable surge of the London stock market in the week prior to the bank holiday (something ... well (to put it mildly) received as a breathing space by the head of HM Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer as well as the governor of the Bank of England) of 3rd August.

Their as well as of almost every economist at that time (on 'Entente'-side as well as 'CP'-side) knew well, that a war would be immensly costly - at least not 'worth the effort' in economical terms ... though they still underestimated the costs - in economical terms, not to speak of the 'human' costs - as well as their ability to ... bear it as long as it actually took.

 

[NoMommsen]

Spain was pro-CP during much of WW1, meaning that the defeat of France allows Germany to pursue an alliance with Spain via France.

Where do have this from ?

Spain was deeply divided after te outbreak of the war and was looking strictly after staying neutral.
The (at times on bothe sides very ... "loud") camps of pro-Entente as well as pro-CP canceled each other from any action taken by the goverment.

...

The forum sometimes seems to lose site of the fact that in August 1914 it was not realised how destructive and long the war would prove to be. The selling feature for British intervention was what Grey said in the House - entering the war would cost only a little more than standing aside. We know better, but they did not. AFATK, the war would be relatively costless, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to put paid to the HSF once and for all.

As an aside :
I'm still waiting for an evidence of the spanish position you've claimed.


About the 'costs' of a war ... see my post above.
Though I am fully prepared to agree with you, that noone was able to or had - in some detail at least - forseen how much it would actually cost IOTL.

About the underlined :
Once again you seem to fall to the propaganda of Grey and Churchill they used to lure others to their position ... they obviuosly succeeded so with you. ... didn't you called them

... Politicians in democracies ... were always playing politics and games on everything.
..., whereas in the West the real intentions were buried in the political games.

yourself ?

 

[NoMommsen]

...
WW1 naval power was geographical in basis, meaning that the primary advantages the RN and French navies had on the HSF was position and numbers. If Germany defeats France that goes a long way towards overturning both - new bases and the French fleet either ceases to count or switches sides. None of this required hindsight to see
....

...
WW1 naval power was geographical in basis, meaning that the primary advantages the RN and French navies had on the HSF was position and numbers. If Germany defeats France that goes a long way towards overturning both - new bases and the French fleet either ceases to count or switches sides. None of this required hindsight to see
....

This is it.
...
I) Don't declare war on Germany. Risks:
a) German domination of French, Spanish bases as mentioned above, although air power wasn't to 1940 standards yet the British were worried about blimps, planes, mines, torpedo boats in 1914, cheap alternatives to traditional naval power which would be very usable in this German victory scenario.
b) German acquisition or use of French colonial naval bases around the world.
c) Diplomatic isolation
d) No blockade on Germany increases likelihood of German victory over Britain and France
...

Not after Germany is hegemon of Europe.
...
First, a continental hegemon also has allied navies that the British need to worry about - in 1914 the British remembered that in 1805 Napoleon was able to use his continental influence to secure other navies to the French cause. Second, in the age of coal geography was a major factor in naval power projection. The biggest advantage the RN had on the HSF was not numerical, it was positional. If the HSF has major forces positioned in France or Spain, the RN cannot protect its own SLOC against either U-boats or surface forces and the situation is hopeless.

...​

IMHO you confuse the Germany of the Kaiser in 1914 with the Germany of Adolf Hitler in 1940.

In its foreign perception as well as in its own ... 'goals'.
(No, the 'September-program' never represented the opinion and/or position of the political leadership in Germany, neither before nor in the beginning of the war.)​

 

[Matteo]

The fact that Grey and Churchill and other British understood the cost of a general war in Europe would be catastrophic changed nothing to strategic realities and to ageless British vital interests.

No continental power should ever dominate the continent.

Belgium's invasion was but a circumstance. Grey had made it clear (cf. Lichnowsky’s telegram) that not attacking France was a non-negotiable demand for Britain’s staying neutral.

 

[NoMommsen]

...
No continental power should ever dominate the continent.

Belgium's invasion was but a circumstance. Grey had made it clear (cf. Lichnowsky’s telegram) that not attacking France was a non-negotiable demand for Britain’s staying neutral.

First part :
The 'domination' in the sense of 'hegemony Hitler-style' only by Willy II., as several times in not only this threat in case of a german victory postulated due to british non-participation - at least not right from the beginning - is and was not a given ... not even in the perception of its time by the british as well as the french.

A british military contribution on the continent was by everybody (british themself, french as well as germans) seen as a more or less 'symbolic gesture'. Having Britain 'on borad' for the soon to be expected (peace by X-mas) peace-treaty-negotiations (as politically perceived and against better knowledge by the militaries [on both sides] advertised) would ofc be a bonus. Even as the 'maritime support' (i.e. blockade) might not be of much weight, as the war wouldn't last long enough to be of major effect.



Second part
Something the politicians (Bethmann-Hollweg, Jagow, ... even Tirpitz) as well as the Kaiser were well prepared to fullfill on 1st August 1914 (after they received Lichnowsky's telegram).

 

[Matteo]

First part :
The 'domination' in the sense of 'hegemony Hitler-style' only by Willy II., as several times in not only this threat in case of a german victory postulated due to british non-participation - at least not right from the beginning - is and was not a given ... not even in the perception of its time by the british as well as the french.

A british military contribution on the continent was by everybody (british themself, french as well as germans) seen as a more or less 'symbolic gesture'. Having Britain 'on borad' for the soon to be expected (peace by X-mas) peace-treaty-negotiations (as politically perceived and against better knowledge by the militaries [on both sides] advertised) would ofc be a bonus. Even as the 'maritime support' (i.e. blockade) might not be of much weight, as the war wouldn't last long enough to be of major effect.

Nothing more than a limited German victory against Russia was acceptable for Britain.

It may have been acceptable for Britain that Germany took all of Russian Poland. But this would have turned Britain into a more open and frontal opponent of Germany after the war.

It was not necessary for one continental country to dominate the whole European continent (like Germany did in WW2 or napoleonic France in 1806-1812) to incur irreconcilable British enmity. This was the essence of Britain’s vital National interest and of Britain’s diplomacy since the end of 17th century.

 

[NoMommsen]

Nothing more than a limited German victory against Russia was acceptable for Britain.

It may have been acceptable for Britain that Germany took all of Russian Poland. But this would have turned Britain into a more open and frontal opponent of Germany after the war.

It was not necessary for one continental country to dominate the whole European continent (like Germany did in WW2 or napoleonic France in 1806-1812) to incur irreconcilable British enmity. This was the essence of Britain’s vital National interest and of Britain’s diplomacy since the end of 17th century.

Sry, but ... IMO pure guesstimation. ... on almost every point you mention above.

 

[Matteo]

Sry, but ... IMO pure guesstimation. ... on almost every point you mention above.

I never hid the guessing part. That’s why I used the verb “may”.

The other part stands on constant British diplomacy for 2 centuries. And as Palmerston had summarized : States have no permanent friends or enemies. They have but permanent interests.

And Britain had the clearest idea on what was its permanent interest regarding continental Europe.

 

[NoMommsen]

This is it. British intervention makes too much sense from the view point of August 1914. The 3 choices: The option to not declare war on German involves much risk, the kind of things that appeared in all the German invasion novels at the time. Declaring war on Germany involves little risk, Britain will just commit to whatever level of effort she thinks she can afford (at a minimum a colonial naval campaign only). Britain might spend a couple of more days than OTL to enter the war if it needs to, to work through the harder politics of entering, but delaying longer adds to the danger. Just like in 1940 the British population understands the risks at a basic level too and will understand.

I) Don't declare war on Germany. Risks:
a) German domination of French, Spanish bases as mentioned above, although air power wasn't to 1940 standards yet the British were worried about blimps, planes, mines, torpedo boats in 1914, cheap alternatives to traditional naval power which would be very usable in this German victory scenario.
b) German acquisition or use of French colonial naval bases around the world.
c) Diplomatic isolation
d) No blockade on Germany increases likelihood of German victory over Britain and France

2) Declare war on Germany. Risks:
a) Lots of casualties in a ground campaign (but the British don't have to commit anywhere if the Germans go east).
b) A strait up naval defeat (seems unlikely as we know in OTL but in the unknown perhaps the Germans have some tech advantage the British aren't aware of)
c) A costly German campaign against trade. (seems unlikely but if the Germans can fit out 100 merchants before the blockade is imposed???)
d) Political issues, defeats from getting in an unpopular war (in Britain the general population is smarter than politicians and will understand)

3) A delaying middle ground, short of full war, position, with possible entry later. Risks.
a) Increases possibility of successful German colonial campaigns and campaigns against trade, with extra German prep time.
b) Germany crushes France and Russia before Britain can intervene effectively.
c) Even with French/Russian victory possible diplomatic isolation for not helping when it mattered.

Some comments of mine on this post :

To start with:
You seem to compare kinda "apples with oranges" in that you list 'risks' or possible consequences of different time levels like in point 1) and its subpoint already alone :

ad 1)a) and b) "Domination" of french and spanish (still noone has given me evidence for this) bases ... obviously something AFTER the war has ended, after a peace-treaty.
​

And under the same point you mention "fears" of the Brits (who ? evidence for ?) of 1914 of things, that will play an important role ... 25 years later.

But both are an ... "argument" in a belligerency consideration in 1914 ... ??

ad 1)d) Again an argument, that might be valid in 1914 ... but in a "no-Britain-belligerency" would affect ... only France, not Britain ;-)
​

About the 'risk' of diplomatic isolation you mention twice :

How ? How do you 'isolate' the biggest, farest reaching, global empire diplomatically ? ... in near, middle as well as as the far East ? ... north, middle, south America ?​

IMHO simply not possible. ... neither for a victorious Germany and its 'satellites' nor a victorious franco-russian alliance.

And reagrding you "middle ground" :

if comming to war in 1915/16 only ...
with the french and russians already heavily beaten (not to say smashed on several occasions) ...
they would rather kiss any british feet/toe to help them at all.​

German 'colonial campaigns' :

What timescale do you talk about ?

During the war ?

With what 'colonial forces' should Germany threat or attack british positions/colonies/dominions ? IOTL there simply WEREN'T any. East-Africa with Lettow-Vorbeck was exeptional.​

After the war ?

It would take Germany quite some time to build such a colonial force, weighing enough to actually represent a threat. ... at least enough time for Empire and Commenwealth to react and prepare.​

A 'German campaign against trade' :

Again I would like to ask about your timescale.

During the war ?

Again ... with what ? Germany simply lacked the naval muscles (cruisers) to represent a to-be-considered threat to imperial trade overall. ... regardless how many merchants raiders you (rather ASBish number) see possible for Germany to convert. ... beside - as part of a british 'belligerency consideration' - these being not acknowledged as a naval threat by the RN at all in 1914.
The Emden was an exception.​

And after the war ?

Who can ignore or conduct a 'cold' trade war against a global empire that had the potential to be completly self-sufficient ?
Beside Germany having to 'pay' economically for its victory, however 'fast' it might be achieved and for what it would need a functioning and rather 'cheap' global trade ... quite the opposite a trade war with the Commenwealth would represent.​

 

[BooNZ]

The fact that Grey and Churchill and other British understood the cost of a general war in Europe would be catastrophic changed nothing to strategic realities and to ageless British vital interests.

No. Around 1 August 1914, when Churchill [being the only genuine hawk in the British Cabinet] wrote correspondence to Lloyd George*, begging him to change his non-interventionist position, Churchill was suggesting British involvement could be limited to naval matters alone and therefore not a substantial burden on British finances. So the most hawkish member of the British Cabinet, who should have had a resonable grasp on economic/budgetry matters, saw affordibility as a key barrier of entry for the British. As has been established earlier in the thread repeatedly, the vast majority of the British Cabinet were against war of any discription - even if it was cheap.

*Again the back story, Lloyd George was the British Chancellor who had generally been against British military interventions since the Boer War, because of the strain such adventures placed on British finances.

What catestrophy or strategic realities are you referring to? Since the unification of Germany, Europe had endured over 40 years of peace during a period of prolonged British isolationism. In this scenario the Germans are threatening neither France, nor the low countries - nor Britain.

No continental power should ever dominate the continent.

As outlined above, Imperial Germany was not seeking to dominate western europe and never looked like doing so unless the war became a protracted matter, which is only possible if Britain enters the war.

Belgium's invasion was but a circumstance. Grey had made it clear (cf. Lichnowsky’s telegram) that not attacking France was a non-negotiable demand for Britain’s staying neutral.

No. The British PM had told Lichnowsky in person that Britain did not want war and if Germany remained out of Belgium and the Channel, there would be no reason for Britain to enter the war. The Germans already knew Grey was dishonest, due to his earlier efforts to conceal the nature of Anglo-Russian naval talks, when the Germans were being informed of events via their spy in the Russian admiralty. As an aside, Lichnowsky was kept in the dark regarding Grey's attempted duplicity regarding Russian naval talks and continued to hold Grey in high regard.

Nothing more than a limited German victory against Russia was acceptable for Britain.

No. No one of any importance in Britain gave a shit about despotic Imperial Russia. The most senior pro Russian voice was probably Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. who had previously been the British Ambassador to Russia.

It may have been acceptable for Britain that Germany took all of Russian Poland. But this would have turned Britain into a more open and frontal opponent of Germany after the war.

How and why? The German industry and economy was dependent on exports and Britain was Germany's largest trade customer before the war and one of the few proponents of free trade. You appear to be conflating Willhelm with Hitler - actually, it's even doubtful if even Hitler was very keen on having Britain as an opponent.

It was not necessary for one continental country to dominate the whole European continent (like Germany did in WW2 or napoleonic France in 1806-1812) to incur irreconcilable British enmity. This was the essence of Britain’s vital National interest and of Britain’s diplomacy since the end of 17th century.

You are continuing to ignore the fact the majority of the British Cabinet, the ones actually responsible for making the decisions, were on record as being clearly against any kind of war without a significant and genuine cause. The only members of 1914 British Cabinet known to reflect your thinking are Grey, a known francophile, and Churchill, a relatively junior Cabinet member known to be a party hopping hawk. In contrast, there were at least five radical doves and at least two neutralists in the British Cabinet, including Lloyd George, who firmly opposing any unprovoked intervention - with the balance of Cabinet being generally against war without good cause.

The default position for British diplomacy since Napolian had been isolationist. British national interests were limited to keeping channel ports out of the hands of major continental powers and (I guess) prefereably keeping France as a significant/great power. If there is any pattern of British diplomacy over the previous centuries it was that France and/or Russia were ordinarily on the opposing side. Suggesting support for Grey's infatuation with the French, or support for Russian adventurism in the Balkans was somehow consistent with British long term diplomacy/ interests is neither credible nor logical.

And Britain had the clearest idea on what was its permanent interest regarding continental Europe.

Yes, and according to Asquith on 1 August 1914, the majority of the British Cabinet held the opinion there was nothing on continental Europe worth fighting for. Those members of Cabinet were the ones making the decisions.

 

[Matteo]

It was not a matter of hawks and doves. It was a matter of obvious and objective national vital interest.
I don’t mean that in never happened that a country’s rulers sacrificed its national interests, willingly or unwillingly. But usually they end badly, such as Peter III of Russia.

The most decisive factors are always long run and structural ones. The circumstantial ones at best cause an inflexion in structural policy. British-German rivalry had been growing for a generation by 1914.

The fact that the liberal cabinet was reluctant to go to war and would rather avoid doing so if possible did not mean that Britain would not go to war if, finally, the balance of powers risked being upset by one continental power.

It is sane for a country that is so dependent on trade to try to find any possible to protect its vital national interests without resorting to war.

Dominating Central Europe, Poland including, from the Baltic and North seas to the Adriatic Sea, was already too much for Britain to swallow.

Dominating this area anyway implied dominating western continental Europe. It can’t be ignored that Germany in its 1914 borders numbered 24 million people more than France, and Austria-Hungary 10 million more, with a far higher proportion of young mobilizable men than in France. You can’t miss that an 80 million (with the foreseeable moderate annexations in the east) Reich that already was an industrial and trade juggernaut, would be dominant in all Europe.

Italy was at best neutral and would probably have rekindled with Germany and Austria-Hungary if Britain and France stayed aside and let Germany and Austria-Hungary fight and (no doubt) win a limited war against Russia.

That’s why Germany’ taking its chance in 1914 against Russia meant almost certain general war. Because not going to war in support of Russia would mean acquiescing to Germany becoming continental Europe’s hegemon.

 

[NoMommsen]

(continuation to post #1391)

I should not always only criticize. Therefore I've made a 'risk-list' similar to the one of @Catspoke , a list that might or could have played a role in the minds and thoughts of the politicians responsible for the decision of british belligerence - or its non-belligerence.
Far from claiming it to be complete I would also like to remind that it's only about risks and does not mention any IMO also present opportunities the several possible course of events offered.

This ofc assumes, that the casus belli of OTL, the german invasion/threat of invasion of Belgium, does not happen - to stay within the conditions of the OP.

1) Britain declares war on Germany within the first week of August
Risks in the forseeable future (duration of war) :

a) Political issues like split of the Liberal Party due to the no-war-'doves', Liberal Goverment ending shortly (by coalition with Toties with shortly following complete take-over by Tories), defeat at the next ballot due to paerty-split as well as entering an at least not clearly 'popular' war.​

(@Catspoke Your 'faith' in the british electorial to take your position seems to me rather unrealistic, beside again comparing "apples with oranges" as the electorials of the pre-war as well as a possible 1915 electorial are of a VERY different composition compared to 1935 or what it might have been in 1940.
Btw : The 1935 'electorial' was so ... forseeing, that it cheered Chamberlain after the Munich conference in 1938 almost as a 2nd Jesus, preserving peace.)

b) financial and economical drawbacks ... as feared IOTL by almost every economist and already indicated by the IOTL stock market. ... not at least due to blockdes and counter-blockades
c) lots of casualties (BEF in France) without them having much of an impact if any at all (as feared and assumed by british limitaries as well as politicians as well as french militaries and politicians as well as german militaries and politicians
d) some mediterranian ... 'troubles', not at least the behavior of Italy unknown yet
e) Some naval defeat ... though as you pointed out a rather unlikely event, at least by the Brits as very unlikely perceived in 1914. ... everything else would IMO be strongly ASBish.​

Risks in a guessed-upon farther future (beside the IMO rather forseeable Liberal 'defeat' as mentioned above) :

a) still loosing due to i.e. the 'continental' character of the war and the inadequate BEF for such a war, the 'Schlieffen-plan' becomming a success (comtemporary seen as possible)
b) having post-war a trade-war at hand with the economical power, that was already ... diminuishing british profit considerably before the war (the crippling nature of "victory" IOTL not forseeable in 1914)
c) having a new, even more powerfull 'dominator' of the continent, than Germany would have been able to become : the franco-russian alliance (most likely to be ... 'lead' by its 'heavier' part : the russians) ... which was much more of a potential threat of the british empire than Germany ever had or could have been.​

2) Britain does NOT declare war on Germany at all (... for whatever 'own reasons' or because Germany 'wins' faster against France and Russia than Britain is drawn in)
Risks in the forseeable future (duration of war) :

a) Political issues ... Home Rule Crisis keeps going ... maybe some more suffragette-incidents ...
b) France as well as Russia being/feeling pissed ...
(Can't see any consequences affecting Britain in any feelable way.

-'Refraining' from british markets (with and for whatever goods) to ... 'hurt' the biggest trading economy worldwide ?
-French or russian cruisers in the North-Sea ... or elsewhere on the globe (indian as well as asian seas, the Med, ...) 'controling' british merchants for contraband ?
-Declare and make ... war against Britain and/or its global assets ??​

... let's stay serious ... okay ? )
c) no blockading Germany due to no participation might increase the chance of Germany to defeat France and Russia due to its access to world market raw materials (... if the war lasts long enough for a blockade to have any effect on the Central[Europe-controlling]Powers and their also possible 'mediterranian' route [behavior of Italy unknown yet])
d) financial and economical drawbacks ... as feared IOTL by almost every economist and already indicated by the IOTL stock market. ... not at least due to blockdes and counter-blockades ... (though less than above and likely to be turn around due to 'buisness' with belligerents as well as no/less 'affection' of (esp.) british sea-trade (might even benefit from the belligerents merchants-competitors' occupied' by other duties)​

Risks in a guessed-upon farther future

a) CP-victory :

a)a)Germany might come back for another 'naval race' ...

(Which IMO would due to economic restrains after having to rebuild after/pay for the war would take about at least 5 Years, a decade very likely much longer to become a 'threat' for the RN. Pls don't forget the 'naval race' of OTL ended 1912. Even the 'rebuild' and/or adapting of eventually captured former russian and french battleships would take that long. ... if the germans would render this as desireable at all.)​

a)b) Germany becomes a bigger 'colonial' player' ...

(A 'risk' at all ?? Even if it would be able to take over all of french colonies on the globe (rather ASBish, no resources at all for this), it would only 'replace' another though better and longer known 'competitor' in the global game.
And with 'only' parts of the french colonial empire : also a question of resources, though a wee bit smaller than in the case above.
To make this new german colonial empire 'work' it would take at least another 20 years. Pls don't forget against about 400 years of 'colonial experience' the germans are in this buisness for just about 40 years.)​

a)c) Loss of 'diplomatic partners' due to the submission of France and Russia

As said : the germans of 1914 were NOT Hitler. They were/would have been happy with beeing 'just' acknowledged as the 'Big Boy' - at least regarding executable power - it was. Whoever would be ruling in Paris or St-Petersburg/Moscow after a german victory would be happy to have someone else than only Berlin to turn to. ... And though Berlin would try to keep british diplomatic 'leverage' as low as possible but due to british ... still 'ruling the waves' be unable to keep them out.
Oh, and there's also the ITTL 'sleeping giant' across the Atlantic as a possible further 'player' around . ... at least for diplomatic 'games'.​

a)d) Trade and economical war

See above​

a)e) Only 'informal' say in peace-treaty-negotiations

(leverage : colonial questions [acknowledged domination of Britain], global trade being in need of for 'rebuilding')​

b) Franco-Russian-victory :

b)a) France as well as Russia being/feeling pissed ... (and now unfortunatly there isn't a 'german deterrence' anymore)

b)a)a) An imperial nightmare possible. With their combined power they can now contest british positions else- and everywhere on the globe, Ottoman empire, Mediterranian, near, middle, far East, central asia, south-east asia, Caucasus, ...
b)a)b) NOW the threat of an - again after 1066 - 'french' invasion across the channel would become 'pressing' (in 1914 the 'hindsight' of experience of 1940 is NOT KNOWN or even forseeable, an invasion IS regarded as possible comtemporary)​

b)b) If ... the franco-russians refrain from 'active' punishing Britain and go for diplomatic as well as economical 'cold war' they would hit the same wall as Germany in a CP-victory :
the british empire is simply too big to be ignored. ... What might lead back to thoughts on the franco-russian side as mention in b)a)a)
b)c) Another 'naval race' ... now 'only' against France as well as Russia ... with the probable resources of german industry and shipbuilding also at their hands (at least easily available)
b)d) Only 'informal' say in peace-treaty-negotiations ... though even less than in the case above, as combined the 'colonial' quations is much less ... clear.​

3) Britain does not declare war against Germany right from the beginning but later after (whatever 'incident') a few months in the war (maybe about beginning of winter ? ... or even later ?) with the french as well as the russians already heavily being beaten and looking at least near to 'fold' (at least the russians ?)
Risks in the forseeable future (duration of war) :

a) some losses of men and material, but less than in the first case, probably only for 'naval' assets (but the RN is rather ... optimistic about its possibilities, isn't it ? ... and only, if Germany suffers from 'victory disease' and does not agree to come to the negotiation table.)
...
... can't see any further risks, only advantages ... or 'draws' (as some situations/issues might stay as they were)​

Risks in a guessed-upon farther future :

maybe some of the for the former case mentioned ... but on much smaller scale ... if at all (see the comments above as well as Britain being also officially the main player on the negotiation table, able to 'form' the post-war world almost to its taste alone, as all participants would 'owe' something to Britain. ... beside its now immense economical power compared to all participants (debts and world market access).​

As said : this 'list' does not claim to be complete ... and as also said it does not explicitly mention any ... opportunities.

edit:
And ... sorry for this wall of text but ... trying to be comprehensive can have such effects.

 

[NoMommsen]

It was not a matter of hawks and doves. It was a matter of obvious and objective national vital interest.
...

It was exactly that : a decision to be made by men who were divided into 'hawks' and 'doves'. Men responsible for the 'national interest' they thought to be best served by their (party) views on these matters.
As they had done so for almost 10 years so far. IMO ample time to 'tune' into the 'national interests'.

And : No
I still don't believe there's a lady in shining armor linving hidden in the tower of London, whispering at night (?) or whenever the british politicians its 'needs 'n deeds' into their ears since ... let's say Henry VIII ?


And ... about 'dominating Europe' ...

Well, with the victory of the franco-russian alliance you would have a 'hegemon' dominating Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural - well ... to the Pacific actually - and from the Arctic to the Aegais :

• Russia ... with its tail, that tries to wiggle the bear : France

 

[MichaelWest]

Once again the brick wall that is British vital interests and my curiosity how a Franco-Russian hegemony serves Britain versus a German hegemony? And how is Germany becoming the hegemon in 1914 facing the Franco-Russian juggernaut? At every turn the predictions for German are dire, the Russian steam roller will crush the Germans, both Germany and France plan to invade Germany yet Germany is clearly winning the war and going on to destroy the British Empire. It must have been pure terror on August 1, every British subject sweating bullets as the Germans stood at the very gates to Buckingham ready to take down that Union Jack. I have yet to have anyone explain how the British became so cowardly and frightened of Germany by 1914 as on one hand they are the nearest global super power and on the other looking under the bed for Germans. It sounds so convenient that they need to go to war against the greatest threat ever because they are the greatest power yet if they do not go to war they are reduced to nothing and so weak they cannot even defend Orkney from the Huns? I see too much 1940 in this panic.

 

[corditeman]

To be honest...

...The arguments put forwards are on the level of The First Cuckoo in 'The Times' letters page. This infuriating TL is not a TL, just a discussion-group that goes in ever-decreasing circles and is losing interest.

Please can we have
Either : 1. A proper TL story, expressing the OP's ideas.
Or : 2. A moderator shutdown.

I would applaud an end to the current mess.

 

[BooNZ]

To be honest...

...The arguments put forwards are on the level of The First Cuckoo in 'The Times' letters page. This infuriating TL is not a TL, just a discussion-group that goes in ever-decreasing circles and is losing interest.

Please can we have
Either : 1. A proper TL story, expressing the OP's ideas.
Or : 2. A moderator shutdown.

I would applaud an end to the current mess.

Sorry for any inconvenience, but at what point was this thread ever a Time Line? It's more of a faith v facts discussion...

 

[MichaelWest]

Returning to the question at hand, "what does Britain do?" The POD is a decision by the Kaiser to honor Belgian neutrality and commit to a more defensive war with France and a more offensive war towards Russia. Grey has entangled Britain with both France and Russia, and at least as France is concerned has committed to supporting her effort to re-take A-L. At minimum the British are expected to cordon the Channel and keep the HSF from attacking the French coast or its coastal shipping. It can be expected to provide monetary and logistical support to both France and Russia. And lastly it is hoped the BEF will contribute to the offensive against Germany and with casualties will get Britain fully into the war to add manpower and resource to the depths of her ability.

France wants A-L returned to her control. She likely wants to humiliate Germany and gain something more, the Saar, the Rheinland, colonies, something? The Russians want East Prussia and Posen, the polish lands in Germany. Both want huge reparations monies. And what does Britain want? A balance of power in Europe? A continent too weak or distracted to attack her? A continent that will feed her trade?

On August 5th the Germans are not in Belgium. On August 7 the French have launched their first offensive into Alsace. Launching their main offensive beginning the 14th. The Russians are not attacking until August 17. Somewhere in here the bulk of two German Armies are redeploying from near Belgium towards East Prussia.

In addressing the OP I have butterfly netted events other than the POD itself on August 1, we have the back and forth, the ultimatum of August 2, the deploying German troops with the anticipation they will cross into Belgium, the British ultimatum of August 4. Somewhere in here the British response does not provoke Wilhelm to unchange his mind and release Moltke to pursue his plan. But what does the Cabinet do on the morning of the 5th with no reports of massed German troop movements into Belgium? What do they do when Joffre opens the war on August 7? And the Russians on August 17? (Assuming the butterflies have kept Germany busily preparing for war but not attacking).

Can we hold to schedules or does the German inaction re-open peace feelers? Does France move ahead and Russia stay on course? Does Grey resume his efforts to mediate and deflate the situation or throw more dust into the eyes and confuse everyone to go to war?

We know Grey wants to aid France and Churchill is a true hawk, Asquith supports Grey but has no feelings either way, LG is opposed without casus belli, and we have some prominent doves both in and outside the cabinet exerting their pressure. Is the vague rationale enough to get a vote for war?

Arguments galore persist herein, at some 70 pages and almost 1400 posts the jury is still hung. I am willing to throw out everything I have drafted and have a war open on the POD, I am willing to tact between events to keep Wilhelm looking East and the war begin as above. The coin toss is Britain the belligerent or not. I have a Sovereign to flip.

 

[corditeman]

No need for a gold sovereign...

...Flip a penny and start writing !