Germany does not invade Belguim in 1914. What does Britain do?

[MichaelWest]

Yeah-nah. The East Prussion territory along the Russian advance(s) was not considered particularly valuable. German military doctrine ordinarily prioritised decisive battle (i.e. destroying enemy armies) ahead of territorial considerations, for example the OTL wargame resembling the actual Battle of Tattenburg. Further, I am not certain German rail infrastructure in East Prussia could have deployed two German armies any faster than it deployed one.

Why? The Russian armies on paper would still have a modest superiority in numbers, which the Russian leadership believed would being them victory. The Russian Armies are more likely to be engaged concurrently, or at least the second (1st) Russian Army engaged before the fate of the first (2nd) Russian Army is sealed. Something identical to the Battle of Tannenberg is not inevitable, but I think it is reassonable to assume the cumalative fate of the Russian 1st and 2nd armies is likely to be worse than OTL - to the extent those armies cease to be a consideration for the balance of 1914 (at a minimum).

Why would the Russians be any better at recognising a trap in this scenario. Prima facie, the Russian 1st Army would also be hit before any trap was fully recognised.
The unspectacular grind in the west will likely cost hundreds of thousands of German lives, but far more French lives. I also think the early Russian losses, coupled with an inabilty of the French to make significant impact on German defenses is likely to result in an early finish - before any major combatant is truely exhausted - obviously Serbia is screwed.

A lot depends upon the scale and speed of deploying German troops. My understanding is that rail capacity can get two "smaller" Armies (6 to 10 Divisions plus a Cavalry Division) fielded as timely as the Eighth was put into the field with added Corps coming on line as thing progress. The second Army will be further back likely centered near Allenstein. The battles will occur closer to the frontiers since Germany is no longer fighting a strategic defense in the East but moving to a strategic offense to break Russia. A certain amount of lure in will be conducted but part of how we get Tannenberg is the need to divide the Eighth between two Armies in detail and over all of Est Prussia, here each Army has its own enemy. I do not see enough units to fully encircle but the dismantling of both 1st and 2nd may be near complete. Effectively I would remove them from the war. Another Russian army should be as badly damaged if not destroyed by the Austrians. All rather rote.

I agree that the Russians are coming, but on two axis, not effectively coordinated, on thin logistic lines and meeting tactically superior German forces. If the battles open closer to the border there is better chance for the collapsing Russians to scatter and retreat into Russia, but as effective fighting units they are gone, able to mount some desperate defense at best as the Germans pursue, but it is Russia itself that will slow the Germans.

It is shades of gray, the Russians will be hitting the German forces they assumed from the beginning, some vague two Armies worth, the battles will unfold on bad ground, the Germans will prove most adept at fire and maneuver and all Russian weaknesses will be shown. Best case each General decided to save his army, worst case he tries to win points for honor, in the later Russia is losing those Armies. But Russia has vast territory to retreat into and is not effectively defeated, reeling from the defeats Congress Poland is poised to be overrun, the next big battles will be defensive and desperate, I give the Russians credit for bravery and the advantages of being on the defense. I think they suffer big bloody nose. I am uncertain if Nicholas can concede yet.

As you observe the West should be a mismatch in losses as Joffre doubles down in offensives, more so as Russia suffers, yet he will coalesce into a defense that is hard to break. France has effectively lost but can they admit it? Can we get peace feelers by Christmas or has Germany bitten the victory apple and gotten the disease? I like the scenario but the chorus of Germanwank is coming, their drums will try to get us back to Versailles.

 

[sloreck]

While the German Socialists may be fighting against further annexations in the west, essentially not taking any more French territory, Germany pushing Russia back in the east is another story. France is a republic with a strong legal socialist party. Russia, in 1914, is the poster child for absolutism and everything bad about the "old system".

 

[Glenn239]

While the German Socialists may be fighting against further annexations in the west, essentially not taking any more French territory, Germany pushing Russia back in the east is another story. France is a republic with a strong legal socialist party. Russia, in 1914, is the poster child for absolutism and everything bad about the "old system".

See Ring of Steel on this one. The 1914 Russian invasion of Prussia was a defining moment in that it was actually much more violent to the local populations than is generally known, to the tune of the same per capita (not total) levels of civilian murders and crimes as occurred in Belgium. Once Russia invades East Prussia, these types of crimes will occur and consequences for Russia when Germany gets the upper hand will follow.

 

[Catspoke]

Spain was pro-CP during much of WW1, meaning that the defeat of France allows Germany to pursue an alliance with Spain via France.

WW1 naval power was geographical in basis, meaning that the primary advantages the RN and French navies had on the HSF was position and numbers. If Germany defeats France that goes a long way towards overturning both - new bases and the French fleet either ceases to count or switches sides. None of this required hindsight to see.

The forum sometimes seems to lose site of the fact that in August 1914 it was not realised how destructive and long the war would prove to be. The selling feature for British intervention was what Grey said in the House - entering the war would cost only a little more than standing aside. We know better, but they did not. AFATK, the war would be relatively costless, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to put paid to the HSF once and for all.

This is it. British intervention makes too much sense from the view point of August 1914. The 3 choices: The option to not declare war on German involves much risk, the kind of things that appeared in all the German invasion novels at the time. Declaring war on Germany involves little risk, Britain will just commit to whatever level of effort she thinks she can afford (at a minimum a colonial naval campaign only). Britain might spend a couple of more days than OTL to enter the war if it needs to, to work through the harder politics of entering, but delaying longer adds to the danger. Just like in 1940 the British population understands the risks at a basic level too and will understand.

I) Don't declare war on Germany. Risks:
a) German domination of French, Spanish bases as mentioned above, although air power wasn't to 1940 standards yet the British were worried about blimps, planes, mines, torpedo boats in 1914, cheap alternatives to traditional naval power which would be very usable in this German victory scenario.
b) German acquisition or use of French colonial naval bases around the world.
c) Diplomatic isolation
d) No blockade on Germany increases likelihood of German victory over Britain and France

2) Declare war on Germany. Risks:
a) Lots of casualties in a ground campaign (but the British don't have to commit anywhere if the Germans go east).
b) A strait up naval defeat (seems unlikely as we know in OTL but in the unknown perhaps the Germans have some tech advantage the British aren't aware of)
c) A costly German campaign against trade. (seems unlikely but if the Germans can fit out 100 merchants before the blockade is imposed???)
d) Political issues, defeats from getting in an unpopular war (in Britain the general population is smarter than politicians and will understand)

3) A delaying middle ground, short of full war, position, with possible entry later. Risks.
a) Increases possibility of successful German colonial campaigns and campaigns against trade, with extra German prep time.
b) Germany crushes France and Russia before Britain can intervene effectively.
c) Even with French/Russian victory possible diplomatic isolation for not helping when it mattered.

 

[MichaelWest]

This is it. British intervention makes too much sense from the view point of August 1914. The 3 choices: The option to not declare war on German involves much risk, the kind of things that appeared in all the German invasion novels at the time. Declaring war on Germany involves little risk, Britain will just commit to whatever level of effort she thinks she can afford (at a minimum a colonial naval campaign only). Britain might spend a couple of more days than OTL to enter the war if it needs to, to work through the harder politics of entering, but delaying longer adds to the danger. Just like in 1940 the British population understands the risks at a basic level too and will understand.

I) Don't declare war on Germany. Risks:
a) German domination of French, Spanish bases as mentioned above, although air power wasn't to 1940 standards yet the British were worried about blimps, planes, mines, torpedo boats in 1914, cheap alternatives to traditional naval power which would be very usable in this German victory scenario.
b) German acquisition or use of French colonial naval bases around the world.
c) Diplomatic isolation
d) No blockade on Germany increases likelihood of German victory over Britain and France

2) Declare war on Germany. Risks:
a) Lots of casualties in a ground campaign (but the British don't have to commit anywhere if the Germans go east).
b) A strait up naval defeat (seems unlikely as we know in OTL but in the unknown perhaps the Germans have some tech advantage the British aren't aware of)
c) A costly German campaign against trade. (seems unlikely but if the Germans can fit out 100 merchants before the blockade is imposed???)
d) Political issues, defeats from getting in an unpopular war (in Britain the general population is smarter than politicians and will understand)

3) A delaying middle ground, short of full war, position, with possible entry later. Risks.
a) Increases possibility of successful German colonial campaigns and campaigns against trade, with extra German prep time.
b) Germany crushes France and Russia before Britain can intervene effectively.
c) Even with French/Russian victory possible diplomatic isolation for not helping when it mattered.

And what I cannot see is the "crushing" defeat of France and Russia in 1914. Was that genuinely the perception? And here the opening battle versus France is some 400 to 500 kilometers from Calais, the nearest Channel port in France, Belgium is safe, Antwerp is safe, the opening clash looks rather favorable as France is on the offensive and Germany on the defense. How do we sell the looming defeat of France under the scenario herein?

And even if the opening battles in East Prussia are a resounding defeat, the Russians likewise set back versus A-H, the next few weeks see the CPs move some hundreds of kilometers into Poland at best, is this a resounding defeat or Russia? Can we sell the doves that Russia is now doomed?

Are we talking the vision of Sedan and France folding cards, did Britain view France as that brittle? And who is forgetting that Napoleon found defeat in Russia after seizing Moscow? Who among the British Cabinet is so cowed by Germany, so fearful, so unsure of not just both France and Russia but Britain herself?

While I can agree that in OTL the break out into Northern France is panic worthy, but what am I missing in mid August as the Germans withdraw into A-L and fight a defensive war, only clawing back as the war progresses? And what am I missing in the Russian failure to crush Germany in the first week? Who here shat their pants in fright?

And a Germany respecting the scraps of paper hardly looks ready to unleash some dastardly trade war. OTL the HSF barely moved from port at all, certainly in the opening weeks it was resoundingly absent. I concede that the Grand Fleet, perhaps the mightiest Naval force in history was steaming to safety as far from the war as possible, but when do the Admirals and Cabinet decide the war at sea was now lost? Lost tomorrow. Lost once those devious Huns finally put to sea. Just watch!

These do not yet pass the giggle test. I am not finding the British lion so cowardly on August 4.

 

[BooNZ]

A lot depends upon the scale and speed of deploying German troops.

The scale and speed of deployment dictates what decisions might be made, but does not unduly influence those decisions. Assuming a 1 August POD, I would expect the German 1st and 2nd armies to be initially deployed on the Belgium frontier around 15 August 1914, before being re-deployed and arriving in East Prussia around 22 August 1914, one day before the arrival of H&L and the initial phases of the Battle of Tattenburg. I just don't see von Prittwitz initiating combat with the German 8th Army en masse before he is reinforced, if indeed he is given that discretion.

The difficulties of a Russian advance into east Prussia due to the terrain and logistics was well known to everyone, even Joffre speculated the Russians would be walking into a trap. Even if the Germans had the time, it makes no sense for the Germans to surrender the opportunities offered by the Russians advancing deeply into East Prussia. With the OTL risk of the German 8th Army being double teamed being removed, the Germans would instead be striving to trap both Russian armies.

I recognize declaring a double Tattenburg is unacceptable from a story telling perspective, but that is far more likely in this scenario than the Russians somehow doing better in east Prussia than OTL

My understanding is that rail capacity can get two "smaller" Armies (6 to 10 Divisions plus a Cavalry Division) fielded as timely as the Eighth was put into the field with added Corps coming on line as thing progress. The second Army will be further back likely centered near Allenstein. The battles will occur closer to the frontiers since Germany is no longer fighting a strategic defense in the East but moving to a strategic offense to break Russia.

The deployment assumptions I have used do not give the Germans sufficient time to meaningfully shift the engagement closer to the border. Do you have an alternative deployment timeframes?

A certain amount of lure in will be conducted but part of how we get Tannenberg is the need to divide the Eighth between two Armies in detail and over all of Est Prussia, here each Army has its own enemy. I do not see enough units to fully encircle but the dismantling of both 1st and 2nd may be near complete. Effectively I would remove them from the war. Another Russian army should be as badly damaged if not destroyed by the Austrians. All rather rote.

The concept of decisive battle was about destroying enemy armies using the maximum force available - not merely giving them a good thrashing...

I agree that the Russians are coming, but on two axis, not effectively coordinated, on thin logistic lines and meeting tactically superior German forces. If the battles open closer to the border there is better chance for the collapsing Russians to scatter and retreat into Russia, but as effective fighting units they are gone, able to mount some desperate defense at best as the Germans pursue, but it is Russia itself that will slow the Germans.

Again, allowing the Russians to scatter and later regroup is something the Germans would be desperately trying to avoid. This is reflected in German doctrine and intelligence reports on both the west and the east.

It is shades of gray, the Russians will be hitting the German forces they assumed from the beginning, some vague two Armies worth, the battles will unfold on bad ground, the Germans will prove most adept at fire and maneuver and all Russian weaknesses will be shown. Best case each General decided to save his army, worst case he tries to win points for honor, in the later Russia is losing those Armies. But Russia has vast territory to retreat into and is not effectively defeated, reeling from the defeats Congress Poland is poised to be overrun, the next big battles will be defensive and desperate, I give the Russians credit for bravery and the advantages of being on the defense. I think they suffer big bloody nose. I am uncertain if Nicholas can concede yet.

In respect of the advance into East Prussia, when exactly do the Russian Generals recognize the fight is lost? How do they react and how is the decision distributed to the lower ranks? Again, unless an ASB puts Paige Tico in command of the German forces, I don't see the Germans rushing to the border to avoid inconveniencing the Russians.

In any case, by the third week of September 1914 the Germans have at least three armies looking for work in the east, while the Russians have only 4th and 9th Armies (each with 3 corps) available to keep the Germans at bay. The Russian prowess on defense simply means those Armies are out maneuvered, enveloped and destroyed by overwhelming force. To substantially save the Russian 1st, 2nd, 4th and/or 9th armies from the Germans you need the Russians to immediately abandon their offensive plans and doctrine, abandon their commitments France, abandon even their defensive doctrines, abandon Poland and immediately retreat eastward. OTL the change of mindset took about a year.

 

[MichaelWest]

The scale and speed of deployment dictates what decisions might be made, but does not unduly influence those decisions. Assuming a 1 August POD, I would expect the German 1st and 2nd armies to be initially deployed on the Belgium frontier around 15 August 1914, before being re-deployed and arriving in East Prussia around 22 August 1914, one day before the arrival of H&L and the initial phases of the Battle of Tattenburg. I just don't see von Prittwitz initiating combat with the German 8th Army en masse before he is reinforced, if indeed he is given that discretion.

The difficulties of a Russian advance into east Prussia due to the terrain and logistics was well known to everyone, even Joffre speculated the Russians would be walking into a trap. Even if the Germans had the time, it makes no sense for the Germans to surrender the opportunities offered by the Russians advancing deeply into East Prussia. With the OTL risk of the German 8th Army being double teamed being removed, the Germans would instead be striving to trap both Russian armies.

I recognize declaring a double Tattenburg is unacceptable from a story telling perspective, but that is far more likely in this scenario than the Russians somehow doing better in east Prussia than OTL


The deployment assumptions I have used do not give the Germans sufficient time to meaningfully shift the engagement closer to the border. Do you have an alternative deployment timeframes?

The concept of decisive battle was about destroying enemy armies using the maximum force available - not merely giving them a good thrashing...

Again, allowing the Russians to scatter and later regroup is something the Germans would be desperately trying to avoid. This is reflected in German doctrine and intelligence reports on both the west and the east.



In respect of the advance into East Prussia, when exactly do the Russian Generals recognize the fight is lost? How do they react and how is the decision distributed to the lower ranks? Again, unless an ASB puts Paige Tico in command of the German forces, I don't see the Germans rushing to the border to avoid inconveniencing the Russians.

In any case, by the third week of September 1914 the Germans have at least three armies looking for work in the east, while the Russians have only 4th and 9th Armies (each with 3 corps) available to keep the Germans at bay. The Russian prowess on defense simply means those Armies are out maneuvered, enveloped and destroyed by overwhelming force. To substantially save the Russian 1st, 2nd, 4th and/or 9th armies from the Germans you need the Russians to immediately abandon their offensive plans and doctrine, abandon their commitments France, abandon even their defensive doctrines, abandon Poland and immediately retreat eastward. OTL the change of mindset took about a year.

And I shall concede that with such a late POD we likely do see the bulk of both First and Second detraining opposite Belgium and some remainder halting in rail junctions to the rear but still oriented Westward. You likely have it right as Prittwitz is more inclined to want to wait for the other Army to arrive before taking risks. I will sideline both Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the former is redundant and Prittwitz has likely not proven a castrate, the latter is in the staff pipeline but might be committed to the stroke versus French fortresses anticipated by Moltke?

My thought is that Wilhelm is meddling, I tend to doubt he has the intestinal fortitude for the withdraw and then encircle hat trick, the Crown Prince barely begun it before getting victory disease. Ideally they in fact do use doctrine and in fact annihilate both Russian Armies, I am just leaving the window open for butterflies. Can Moltke focused East steel Wilhelm or curb his desire to protect Prussia at all costs?

Narrative be damned then, let us predict the demise of both 1st and 2nd, the Russians are utterly defeated. Will the Germans counter invade Russia?

I have not marched through it in detail, but without the panic that gives use the planned retirement, would the opening battle against the 1st be a more determined defense at Gumbinnen? And the 2nd being held further from Allenstein? I am purely guessing but the Germans appear to have enough troops to hold and await reinforcements, merely adding two more Corps might give the two sketched in Armies men enough to be more forward and aggressive in defense?

Or do you argue the Germans will go for a double envelopment and annihilation? That will be what I put my amateur mind to gaming out as I agree it is how the Germans thought. How much of the redeploying First (or Second) do you predict is online when the Russians cross the border? I am using August 17 as my deadline to have both Armies deploying in East Prussia.

And you ask a tough question. I will assume that pride goes before destruction, here both Russian Generals are confident and have no real reason to simply give up. Given the poor coordination between both the real question mark is Zhilinsky. When does he see the invasion fail and attempt to salvage the remains of his armies? I vaguely se him staying in it too long, thus I tend to agree with your prediction, the two Armies get destroyed. Unless we have either General disobey and withdraw. Is this not the blame that befell Rennenkampf? And thus I do agree, the disaster is immense. But Russia has the space to trade and here the rails combined with horses really slows Germany in exploiting it. So Poland is in CP hands by end 1915? Some greater progress towards Petrograd too? Is Russia out by 1916?

 

[BooNZ]

Spain was pro-CP during much of WW1, meaning that the defeat of France allows Germany to pursue an alliance with Spain via France.

Why? An alliance or understanding with Britain would be a far more valuable thing.

WW1 naval power was geographical in basis, meaning that the primary advantages the RN and French navies had on the HSF was position and numbers. If Germany defeats France that goes a long way towards overturning both - new bases and the French fleet either ceases to count or switches sides. None of this required hindsight to see.

No. The British still had a more established ship building industry, being able to build more capital ships faster and cheaper than their German equivalents. The British (and even French) economies also had far more liquidity available for discretionary spending on naval matters.

The forum sometimes seems to lose site of the fact that in August 1914 it was not realised how destructive and long the war would prove to be. The selling feature for British intervention was what Grey said in the House - entering the war would cost only a little more than standing aside. We know better, but they did not. AFATK, the war would be relatively costless, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to put paid to the HSF once and for all.

No, most military leaders prior to the war (even Moltke) are on record as believing the next war would be long and require the wider mobilization of entirety of nations.

While the communication of this message to civilian leadership was mixed, Britain had recently had the onerous experience of funding a mere colonial conflict in South Africa, A-H budgets had been strained by the cost of mere border tension with Russian, while I understand Germany had taken legal steps towards funding a future war. With specific reference to Britain, Churchill begged LG to change his non-interventionist position, Churchill suggested British involvement in the war be limited to naval matters and therefore affordable. So no, the leading hawk and the bloke responsible for the British economy were aware of the potential cost of war.

Further, if no-one of the time recognized the destructive potential of war, why were the vast majority of the British Cabinet firmly against war without good cause? ​

 

[BooNZ]

My thought is that Wilhelm is meddling, I tend to doubt he has the intestinal fortitude for the withdraw and then encircle hat trick, the Crown Prince barely begun it before getting victory disease. Ideally they in fact do use doctrine and in fact annihilate both Russian Armies, I am just leaving the window open for butterflies. Can Moltke focused East steel Wilhelm or curb his desire to protect Prussia at all costs?

I cannot see Wilhelm involving himself to such detail, nor do I see any Prussians placing such a high value on such marginal German land. I see some equivalence in Belgium deciding to defend the Ardennes against all comers.

Narrative be damned then, let us predict the demise of both 1st and 2nd, the Russians are utterly defeated. Will the Germans counter invade Russia?

Whether the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies are knee-capped or destroyed, I expect the German priority would continue to be the destruction of Russian military forces. To that extent the Germans might pursue knee capped Russian forces into Russia, but I believe the Germans would rapidly refocus on the annihilation of Russian forces in Poland.

I have not marched through it in detail, but without the panic that gives use the planned retirement, would the opening battle against the 1st be a more determined defense at Gumbinnen? And the 2nd being held further from Allenstein? I am purely guessing but the Germans appear to have enough troops to hold and await reinforcements, merely adding two more Corps might give the two sketched in Armies men enough to be more forward and aggressive in defense?

Or do you argue the Germans will go for a double envelopment and annihilation? That will be what I put my amateur mind to gaming out as I agree it is how the Germans thought. How much of the redeploying First (or Second) do you predict is online when the Russians cross the border? I am using August 17 as my deadline to have both Armies deploying in East Prussia.

I am very much reading the tea leaves, but the absolute German first priority would be the destruction of Russian forces. To that extent, I think it is easy to underestimate what the Germans might achieve on home turf, numerical parity and solid intelligence against unsuspecting enemies. I usually limit things to the OTL destruction of the Russian 2nd army and an earlier and far more severe thrashing of the Russian 1st Army, a result undoubtedly below any German aspirational goal.

If the opportunity presented itself, I am certain the Germans would attempt a double encirclement (or similar) and battle of annihilation, but without making some subjective assumptions regarding additional deployments, the opportunity may or may not present itself. Your deployment deadline of 17 August 1914 appears to me a bit ambitious for the scenario, but my calculations were mere back of the envelope.

And you ask a tough question. I will assume that pride goes before destruction, here both Russian Generals are confident and have no real reason to simply give up. Given the poor coordination between both the real question mark is Zhilinsky. When does he see the invasion fail and attempt to salvage the remains of his armies? I vaguely se him staying in it too long, thus I tend to agree with your prediction, the two Armies get destroyed. Unless we have either General disobey and withdraw. Is this not the blame that befell Rennenkampf? And thus I do agree, the disaster is immense. But Russia has the space to trade and here the rails combined with horses really slows Germany in exploiting it. So Poland is in CP hands by end 1915? Some greater progress towards Petrograd too? Is Russia out by 1916?

I see both Russian armies being engaged or at least committed, prior to anyone contemplating defeat. So, I assume at some point Rennenkampf will need to extract the Russian 1st Army from another battle engineered by the Germans. For Rennenkamf, a kobayashi maru scenario.

In my opinion, events on the ground will take precedence and determine outcomes before Zhilinsky can influence events in East Prussia. In my opinion, with the removal of the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies, Zhilinsky's instincts will be to utilize the Polish fortress line and still seek to hold Poland. Essentially that is the correct decision made too late. Without the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies, the Russians simply do not have the numbers to hope to hold the Germans. With the Russians in static defensive positions, the text book German response is to envelop and destroy.​

 

[Glenn239]

Why? An alliance or understanding with Britain would be a far more valuable thing.

Not after Germany is hegemon of Europe.

No. The British still had a more established ship building industry, being able to build more capital ships faster and cheaper than their German equivalents. The British (and even French) economies also had far more liquidity available for discretionary spending on naval matters.

First, a continental hegemon also has allied navies that the British need to worry about - in 1914 the British remembered that in 1805 Napoleon was able to use his continental influence to secure other navies to the French cause. Second, in the age of coal geography was a major factor in naval power projection. The biggest advantage the RN had on the HSF was not numerical, it was positional. If the HSF has major forces positioned in France or Spain, the RN cannot protect its own SLOC against either U-boats or surface forces and the situation is hopeless.

No, most military leaders prior to the war (even Moltke) are on record as believing the next war would be long and require the wider mobilization of entirety of nations.

I'm going with what Grey said on 3 August 1914, which was that if the British intervened it would cost them about as much as if they stayed neutral. The French and Russians would do most of the dying, you see. The British would cover the finances, propaganda, and naval stuff.

Further, if no-one of the time recognized the destructive potential of war, why were the vast majority of the British Cabinet firmly against war without good cause?

They weren't. They were just politicians doing CYA, going along with the war while at the same time broadcasting enough reluctance that later on they could claim they were against it if it proved a tar baby. This is one thing that skews understanding of WW1. Politicians in the monarchies did not face elections so tended to be more direct and open in recording their thoughts and intentions. Politicians in democracies did face elections so were always playing politics and games on everything. This causes a feeding frenzy of documents in the Central Powers establishing intent, whereas in the West the real intentions were buried in the political games.

 

[NoMommsen]

Spain was pro-CP during much of WW1, ...

Where do have this from ?

Spain was deeply divided after te outbreak of the war and was looking strictly after staying neutral.
The (at times on bothe sides very ... "loud") camps of pro-Entente as well as pro-CP canceled each other from any action taken by the goverment.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

To answer the question of what Germany gets out of a limited, as compared to what we got, two year war with a Central Powers operational victory and a compromise peace, actually quite a lot. Their strategic situation is improved because Russia gets pushed back away from the 1914 German frontier, and actually this happened in the OTL war and it did improve Germany's strategic situation. Russia also gets slapped down over its adventurism in the Balkans. The war also shows everyone that France is not getting Alsace-Lorraine back without German agreement, even in alliance with Russia.

Two more points about the peace in this scenario. I think many of the problems with Austria-Hungary at this time was due to having an elderly Kaiser, at the end of a long reign and its not like he was that great a monarch in his prime. The situation will get better when Franz Joseph dies and they are not at war. Russia, on the other hand, is still on track for the 1917 revolution. There was considerable unrest in 1914 and in fact a key reason the government seems to have opted for war is that they thought they would not survive politically making any diplomatic concessions. In this scenario they would have just lost another war on the scale of the Russo-Japanese war. But you probably won't get Lenin, the Germans ITTL have no incentive to help him return and you don't have the situation where he is the only politician who wants to make peace.

 

[NoMommsen]

...I'm going with what Grey said on 3 August 1914, ...

... as an argument ... : a rather eclectical selection of a clearly propagandistic speech/document and putting it above other and more numerous evidences.

And ... taking/accepting it as a valid argument ... somwehow contradictory to :

... whereas in the West the real intentions were buried in the political games.

 

[Glenn239]

... as an argument ... : a rather eclectical selection of a clearly propagandistic speech/document and putting it above other and more numerous evidences.

And ... taking/accepting it as a valid argument ... somwehow contradictory to :​

What British army studies are you referring to in the pre-war period that suggested the level of damage to the British Empire that actually followed?

 

[sloreck]

If Britain is not in the war what the German Navy will be doing is:
1. Supporting the Army along the Baltic coasts and eliminating the Russian Navy.
2. Commerce raiding against the French, being careful about neutral traffic. In 1914 and in to 1915 this will be surface vessels except clost to French waters so cruiser rules apply.
3. As part of (2) making life difficult for French colonial possessions and force the MN to spread itself thin. While France had fewer possessions than the UK, they were just as widespread and they have fewer naval assets to protect them.

Germany will not be making any significant moves against French colonies except with whatever local forces are available. While the Germans are doing this, the AH Navy, assuming Italian neutrality, will be keeping the MN busy in the Med especially protecting trade to/from North Africa.

 

[BooNZ]

This is it. British intervention makes too much sense from the view point of August 1914. The 3 choices: The option to not declare war on German involves much risk, the kind of things that appeared in all the German invasion novels at the time. Declaring war on Germany involves little risk, Britain will just commit to whatever level of effort she thinks she can afford (at a minimum a colonial naval campaign only). Britain might spend a couple of more days than OTL to enter the war if it needs to, to work through the harder politics of entering, but delaying longer adds to the danger. Just like in 1940 the British population understands the risks at a basic level too and will understand.

Because after 40 years of peace, the Kaiser was essentially Hitler and you understand the minds of the 1914 electorate far better than their elected representatives?

I) Don't declare war on Germany. Risks:
a) German domination of French, Spanish bases as mentioned above, although air power wasn't to 1940 standards yet the British were worried about blimps, planes, mines, torpedo boats in 1914, cheap alternatives to traditional naval power which would be very usable in this German victory scenario.

The U Boat menace came as a complete surprise to both the British and the Germans - before the war both focused on soon to be obsolete dreadnaughts.

c) Diplomatic isolation

If the British have not fought a losing war against Germany, how is Britain diplomatically isolated? For the time being Britain remains the preeminent global naval and economic power and Germany's export focused industry remains dependent on the British Empire continuing to support the concept of free trade.

d) No blockade on Germany increases likelihood of German victory over Britain and France

I'm assuming you meant Russia rather than Britain. If Germany changes its focus to the east, the war is likely to be decided for the CP before a blockade starts to bite

2) Declare war on Germany. Risks:
a) Lots of casualties in a ground campaign (but the British don't have to commit anywhere if the Germans go east).

Where would this ground campaign be?

b) A strait up naval defeat (seems unlikely as we know in OTL but in the unknown perhaps the Germans have some tech advantage the British aren't aware of)
c) A costly German campaign against trade. (seems unlikely but if the Germans can fit out 100 merchants before the blockade is imposed???)

OTL the British were losing the naval/economic war up until the intervention of the USA

d) Political issues, defeats from getting in an unpopular war (in Britain the general population is smarter than politicians and will understand)

To clarify, you think Britain entering a war without just cause, surrendering its global economic leadership (per OTL), surrendering its global naval dominance (per OTL), losing the best part of a generation of young men (per OTL), jeopardizing its hold on its global empire (per OTL): - would be the smart move?

 

[BooNZ]

What British army studies are you referring to in the pre-war period that suggested the level of damage to the British Empire that actually followed?

The Boer War

 

[MichaelWest]

While the German Socialists may be fighting against further annexations in the west, essentially not taking any more French territory, Germany pushing Russia back in the east is another story. France is a republic with a strong legal socialist party. Russia, in 1914, is the poster child for absolutism and everything bad about the "old system".

Overall I see the annexations scale back, linger then evaporate, there really is nothing worth taking, build a German dominated trade zone, awesome, occupy the better part of Europe, lose the peace and worse, lose the vote.

Relations between Germany and France certainly were not great but improving, trade was blossoming, the memory of 1871 was weakening, before 1914 the long term held not just detente but rapprochement. The war proved that Socialist internationalism was trumped by nationalism, but it still lingered, pre-war the Socialists held to the belief they could surmount the divide. The war will re-open old wounds and craft new ones, but I feel the Socialists are gaining political sway in post-war Germany, reforms will come, slowed a bit but difficult not to concede to given the sacrifices of the masses. Since I do not foresee a "Fall of France", but rather a bitter armistice and cold peace, it will be tense for decades more. The Socialists will rebuild the links to France and as Germany eases towards more genuine democracy, rekindles its commercial appetites, and balances all its balls the rapprochement begins anew.

That will be aided by the British discovering a German hegemony is far less monolithic or demanding. Germany is still highly dependent upon trade and Britain is still a massive trade Empire. Britain will keep France afloat and temper German ambitions, the balance in Europe is more two sided but nothing Britain cannot handle. Unless France swings to the revanche right, then it gets weird again. And complicated if Britain ever gets protectionist.

Russia is the basket case. I am uncertain that Communism can prevail but the pposite side is too much a shit circus to fully predict. Best case scenario the Czar survives and humiliated submits to yet more reforms, middle ground the PG emerges but more influence from the moderates and cooperation from the right to cobble up a functioning government of peace, worst case it is civil war, intervention, no winners among the Russian people.

Overall I think we get nothing worse than we saw OTL, the next twenty years are cold, bitter, tense and broken, but the surviving Imperial Germany is more solidly on the path to reforms, the SPD is going to emerge as the electoral strongman, the far right is edged out by the usual right who are too aligned with industry to bother with crack pots, anti-Semites, warmongers or protectionists. Or you get a Socialist "revolution."

 

[MichaelWest]

To answer the question of what Germany gets out of a limited, as compared to what we got, two year war with a Central Powers operational victory and a compromise peace, actually quite a lot. Their strategic situation is improved because Russia gets pushed back away from the 1914 German frontier, and actually this happened in the OTL war and it did improve Germany's strategic situation. Russia also gets slapped down over its adventurism in the Balkans. The war also shows everyone that France is not getting Alsace-Lorraine back without German agreement, even in alliance with Russia.

Two more points about the peace in this scenario. I think many of the problems with Austria-Hungary at this time was due to having an elderly Kaiser, at the end of a long reign and its not like he was that great a monarch in his prime. The situation will get better when Franz Joseph dies and they are not at war. Russia, on the other hand, is still on track for the 1917 revolution. There was considerable unrest in 1914 and in fact a key reason the government seems to have opted for war is that they thought they would not survive politically making any diplomatic concessions. In this scenario they would have just lost another war on the scale of the Russo-Japanese war. But you probably won't get Lenin, the Germans ITTL have no incentive to help him return and you don't have the situation where he is the only politician who wants to make peace.

If Britain is involved as some argue, the war is drawn out, it effectively breaks everyone but here Germany is not the obvious villain. I think with the POD offered herein the likelihood of the USA getting involved drops to improbable, in fact any British blockade will do more harm to Anglo-American relations than given credit, the Germans will be in a different place with both Belgium and the Netherlands open to sidestep the blockade. Britain starving the neutrals? That looks like a shit sandwich on a dirty plate.

Britain non-belligerent and the blockade is a wonky affair, Germany will easily skirt it, most neutrals are annoyed at Britain here. USW is but a dream now. It will be old fashioned cruiser warfare, Germany versus France. And I agree the war can plausibly wrap up a year or two early. Economic weaponry is reduced to footnotes, the war was decided by force of arms and resolved by diplomacy, likely championed by the USA with some back door British facilitation.

Best case we salvage Russia before it implodes. A separate peace is humiliating but Wilhelm and Nicholas had enough friendship that I think it gets quite moderated, by the standards of the day it is mildly humiliating. If anything it is chalked up to France being the instigator and Russia losing Poland may be a blessing in disguise. I regard the Bolshevik take over implausible.

France can only be defeated by a full redirection of the German war machine West, that occurs as early as 1916, the reality should be obvious, peace is going to be far cheaper. The Alsatians are Germans really and Lorraine has hardly any French left, France can seethe but would it go extinct for this cause? Again, I simply cannot see the fall of France a generation early here. France is going to be the British pilot fish on the continent at best, at worst they need to learn to play nice with the German kids on the playground alone.

A-H will weather the storm but needs to refocus inward. OE might have avoided the thing. Italy is unreliable but flirted with anew, it might be the new British pilot fish in the Med yet. The Empire is quite secure and blessed to have dodged the firestorm, Europe itself is hurt but not broken, all roads lead back to the petty politics of Kings with commoners voicing more and more.

 

[BooNZ]

See Ring of Steel on this one. The 1914 Russian invasion of Prussia was a defining moment in that it was actually much more violent to the local populations than is generally known, to the tune of the same per capita (not total) levels of civilian murders and crimes as occurred in Belgium. Once Russia invades East Prussia, these types of crimes will occur and consequences for Russia when Germany gets the upper hand will follow.

The key word(s) is per capita. On a per capita basis, the German atrocities in Belgium were comparatively mild and the Russians were advancing through the least developed and sparsely populated regions of the German empire (at least in Europe). As far as atrocities go, none of the major European powers approached the bar set by the belligerents during the Balkans wars.

Not after Germany is hegemon of Europe.

So where exactly is this hegemon expected to sell its manufactured goods and how does it keep its export focused economy afloat?

First, a continental hegemon also has allied navies that the British need to worry about - in 1914 the British remembered that in 1805 Napoleon was able to use his continental influence to secure other navies to the French cause. Second, in the age of coal geography was a major factor in naval power projection. The biggest advantage the RN had on the HSF was not numerical, it was positional. If the HSF has major forces positioned in France or Spain, the RN cannot protect its own SLOC against either U-boats or surface forces and the situation is hopeless.

OTL by 1914 the Germans had already abandoned the possibility of including France in its Mitteleuropa concept and the inclusion of Belgium was subject to the British approval - that was when the vast majority of Belgium was occupied by Germany, which was in the grip of victory disease. Your Franco-German assumptions rely on the absolute subjugation of the French, which OTL the Germans could not even imagine. And again, the POD in this scenario has a Germany's focus in the opposite direction.

I'm going with what Grey said on 3 August 1914, which was that if the British intervened it would cost them about as much as if they stayed neutral. The French and Russians would do most of the dying, you see. The British would cover the finances, propaganda, and naval stuff.

Grey did not have a grounding in economics or finance. Grey was merely talking shit to support his own position, which is probably something you can empathise with. In contrast, both LG and Churchill had gained a reasonable grasp of economic reality during their joint efforts to review/introduce the welfare state to Britain. Churchill understood the probable cost of war was one of the key reasons LG opposed British intervention.

They weren't. They were just politicians doing CYA, going along with the war while at the same time broadcasting enough reluctance that later on they could claim they were against it if it proved a tar baby. This is one thing that skews understanding of WW1. Politicians in the monarchies did not face elections so tended to be more direct and open in recording their thoughts and intentions. Politicians in democracies did face elections so were always playing politics and games on everything. This causes a feeding frenzy of documents in the Central Powers establishing intent, whereas in the West the real intentions were buried in the political games.

So Asquith was wrong when he assessed the majority of the Liberal Party were opposed to war in all circumstances? So Churchill had no reason to conspire against his own party (again) because he feared the Liberals would avoid war at all costs? So Grey gave Cambon the distinct impression Britain might be sitting out the war, because Grey had a great sense of humour? So LG lied when he told colleagues at a private gathering he would rather resign than support a war without cause? So Asquith lied to Lichnowsky when he said Britain did not want war and there would be no war if Germany kept out of Belgium. So Asquith lied to his cabinet colleague when he said privately he had been in favour of reconciliation with the Germans? So LG after spending over a decade publicly opposed to war and military interventions was merely concealing his true identity as a Sith lord? ​