Asquith said if Grey was to resign, he would go too. Asquith's support of Grey was unconditional.
No.
Grey's threats to resign and the support of Asquith relating thereto were in relation to two issues, the retrospective ratification of French naval discussions regarding the English Channel and the possibility Britain not declaring absolute neutrality in all circumstances (i.e. even in the case of Belgium neutrality being violated). To put things in perspective, OTL Grey confirmed to LG he would not demand (i.e. threaten resignation for) Britain intervene, if Belgium had acceded to German demands.
Asquith had two choices. First, to offer British neutrality on the basis of Germany's full respect for the neutrality of Belgium for the duration of the war. Second, with the knowledge that German war plans envisioned the violation of Belgium, to not offer Germany British neutrality so that the Germans would violate Belgium and serve pretext. Those were Asquith's actual choices, and since no neutrality offer was forthcoming, Asquith had decided on intervention.
The majority of the British Cabinet were in favour of a third choice - absolute neutrality irrespective of Belgium.
Most of July 1914 Asquith was focused on more important matters and preservation of the government and the Liberal Party continued to heavily influence his decision making. In that context, Asquith's options were very limited. His preference was for peace in Europe, but beyond that, he had more concern about preserving the Liberal Government than preserving the French.
To preserve the Liberal government, Asquith's only option was to muddle through the middle until a consensus was formed. In that respect, party unity was being prioritized ahead of international concerns.
By August 1st Lichnowsky had advised the British government formally that Germany would require an actual neutrality offer from Britain for any assurances on anything, so when Asquith on 2 August refuses to make a neutrality offer, he's refusing the Germans and simply awaiting the start of hostilities in order to intervene.
To provide us with context, please provide us with a reference supporting your claim. It is difficult to believe given the whole German western deployment almost ground to a halt on the merest hint of British neutrality.
LG was an interventionist. To conclude otherwise would require hard evidence of Lloyd George threatening Grey or Asquith, or engaging in heated arguments with them, during discussions or meetings, direct, sharp clashes by LG with Grey over intervention. What are your examples of LG doing any of this?
On this thread alone:
- On 1 August 1914 a letter from Winston Churchill begging LG to change his mind regarding intervention;
- Asquith noting LG's preference for peace, but welcoming LG's even handedness in discussions;
- LG hosting multiple joint gatherings of the neutralists and doves; and
- On 2 August 1914 LG stating he would rather resign than go to war with a Germany that respected Belgium neutrality and kept clear of the English Channel.
Further, most reputable historians recognize LG as the leader of the neutralist faction during the July crisis.
The Germans delivered their ultimatum in Brussels in the early evening of 2 August, meaning that later that evening any discussions along the lines of German respect for Belgium was a purely hypothetical matter with no practical application to British politics.
LG's declaration on the evening of 2 August 1914 illustrates LG's position was entirely consistent with what Asquith told Lichnowsky earlier the same day. It debunks any peculiar notion LG was an interventionalist.
The British were fully responsible for their decision to declare war on Germany because they were perfectly aware they could have offered neutrality on the basis of Belgium to avoid spreading the war in the West beyond border battles between Germany and France. They declined to repeat the 1870 policy because limiting the French to border battles was the way to help Germany win the war, not France.
So were are back to the generic "the British"?
The reality was the Liberal government was fractured and the Conservatives in opposition were not much better. There was no consensus in Britain in 1914. Grey's machinations, made it difficult to move against French interests without risk to British reputation, while the vast majority of the British Cabinet were firmly against war with Germany without good cause. Asquith simply did not have a free hand if he wanted retain anything he held dear.