Germany does not invade Belguim in 1914. What does Britain do?

I admittedly can't think of an example where a British PM wanted to go to war, but the Cabinet didn't, and the PM got forced out. Walpole got forced out in the opposite situation, the country entering into a war with Spain against his policies.

However, constitutionally the opposite situation is possible. A major movie just came out about Churchill fighting off a faction of the cabinet that wanted to explore peace in 1940. Parliament blocked the Cameron government from getting the British involved in the war in Syria, though in this case Cameron accepted the defeat and carried on. The PM isn't a dictator.
 
Ahhh, @Glenn239 , ... still the "stronck man Asquith" fan ... and still as it seems ignoring the then and today lived reality of politics.

The situation, not the PM, dictated the immediate decision for neutrality or intervention. Asquith alone was responsible for the decision. Given that Grey was Asquith's man (not the other way around), it would be intervention.

BUT, ... even today a PM has to be VEERY carefull in apponting his ministers, who are far from being depented drones of the PM, as you describe them.

The circumstances required a decision to be made, and quickly. The competence of cabinet as a group to speak on military matters simply did not exist. There, what mattered was the opinion of the Foreign minister, the naval minister, and the head of the army. As importantly - the professional Army staff, the Admiralty, the Foreign Office. All of those were in universal agreement for intervention. The others - Lord Privy Seal and such? They were completely ignorant of the topic and were just doing their due diligence, testing the premise of the expert ministers, before signing on. There was never going to be neutrality - it all got exaggerated out of proportions later, as all the countries involved started to shop around for reasons other countries were responsible for the decisions they had made.

At first they are choosen by the PM to - as you assume - fit his own positions on some things (like preserving the empire, preferrably without war-like actions), then - almost more important - to please the different factions of (at first) his own party to enable him to get approval of the parliament on whatever matter necessary to be brought before it, only then - sometimes - by some kind of "professional competence"

Grey certainly was a formidable minister of the type that had to have a major cabinet portfolio. But Foreign Office specifically? That was Asquith's choice.

All his political life he was a man of consent and not of "power politics".

The situation did not allow for Asquith's usual style. The decision had to be taken immediately according to the estimates of the professionals, and the decision was going to be for intervention.

He was NOT prepared to risk the party as well as his own political life to any political, especially foreign political matter.

Placing party politics above the interests and survival of the Empire? That would have been treasonous.
 
Asquith fully supported Grey's efforts to secure peace in Europe in the years prior to the war, but Grey's unconditional support for France in the event of war was simply not a priority shared by Asquith.

Asquith said if Grey was to resign, he would go too. Asquith's support of Grey was unconditional.

From the outset of the crisis, Asquith was led to expect the Germans to violate Belgium neutrality in the event of war, so his continued support for his Foreign Secretary should be put in context.

Asquith had two choices. First, to offer British neutrality on the basis of Germany's full respect for the neutrality of Belgium for the duration of the war. Second, with the knowledge that German war plans envisioned the violation of Belgium, to not offer Germany British neutrality so that the Germans would violate Belgium and serve pretext. Those were Asquith's actual choices, and since no neutrality offer was forthcoming, Asquith had decided on intervention.

Again, on 2 August 1914 Asquith told Lichnowsky Britain had no desire to intervene and advised him Britain would not do so if German did not violate Belgium territory or attack the Northern coast of France.

By August 1st Lichnowsky had advised the British government formally that Germany would require an actual neutrality offer from Britain for any assurances on anything, so when Asquith on 2 August refuses to make a neutrality offer, he's refusing the Germans and simply awaiting the start of hostilities in order to intervene.

I don't think we discussed it, but I understand it was Samuel, a junior non-aligned member of Cabinet (i.e. a waverer) who mooted the significant violation of Belgium criteria. I understand his core motivation was hold the Liberal Cabinet together during difficult times, which was the primary motivation of most members of Cabinet, including Asquith and Lloyd George. I have read nothing to support your conspiracy theories.

LG was an interventionist. To conclude otherwise would require hard evidence of Lloyd George threatening Grey or Asquith, or engaging in heated arguments with them, during discussions or meetings, direct, sharp clashes by LG with Grey over intervention. What are your examples of LG doing any of this?

At a dinner party on the evening of 2 August 1914 LG stated clearly to those gathered, if Germany gave an undertaking in an unqualified manner for German warships not to enter the English Channel and Belgium neutrality was to be respected, then LG would not agree to war and would rather resign.

The Germans delivered their ultimatum in Brussels in the early evening of 2 August, meaning that later that evening any discussions along the lines of German respect for Belgium was a purely hypothetical matter with no practical application to British politics.

Memoirs of LG were extraordinarily critical of Grey's character and diplomatic performance before and during the July 1914 crisis, so I am deeply skeptical of this conspiracy theory of yours (among many).

The British were fully responsible for their decision to declare war on Germany because they were perfectly aware they could have offered neutrality on the basis of Belgium to avoid spreading the war in the West beyond border battles between Germany and France. They declined to repeat the 1870 policy because limiting the French to border battles was the way to help Germany win the war, not France.
 
The situation, not the PM, dictated the immediate decision for neutrality or intervention. Asquith alone was responsible for the decision.
... but this decision was imperativly demanded by ... the situation, so that Asquith was unable to decide different by using his own mind ?
Given that Grey was Asquith's man (not the other way around), it would be intervention.
So,... still Asquith the Hive-Quee...King with Grey as his serving drone without its own will ... ?
BUT, ... even today a PM has to be VEERY carefull in apponting his ministers, who are far from being depented drones of the PM, as you describe them.
The circumstances required a decision to be made, and quickly. The 1. competence of cabinet as a group to speak on military matters simply did not exist. There, what mattered was the opinion of the Foreign minister, the naval minister, and the 2. head of the army. As importantly - the professional Army staff, the Admiralty, the Foreign Office. All of those were in universal agreement for intervention. The others - Lord Privy Seal and such? 3. They were completely ignorant of the topic and were just doing their due diligence, testing the premise of the 4. expert ministers, before signing on. There was never going to be neutrality - it all got exaggerated out of proportions later, as all the countries involved started to shop around for reasons other countries were responsible for the decisions they had made.
Erhm ... and what has all this to do with what you've quoted from my post ?
However ...
  1. Fully agree with you regarding the cabinets 'competence' on military matters (including Grey, Asquith, Lloyd George etc. and ... though by office its head : Churchills 'competent knowledge' abaout naval affairs). ... Nevertheless it was the cabinets task to advise the PM in making a dicision about matters, that might lead to military actions.
  2. that interestingly was never asked about its opinion during the July-crisis - mainly the last week of July as before Grey simply rendered it unnecessary to inform cabinet - and the decision to go to war was finally - midnight 4th to 5th August - made.
  3. Ignorant ... rather 'uninformed' not at least due to Greys ... 'information politics' and overall : your doing all these men quite some injustice, reducing them to babbling baby-drones without an own will or mind.
  4. ... and what "expert minister" you talk about here ?
Grey certainly was a formidable minister of the type that had to have a major cabinet portfolio. But Foreign Office specifically? That was Asquith's choice.
Sure it was his choice. ... though ... Grey was a comfortable legacy from the foregoing cabinet of Campbell-Bannerman to free Asquith from dealing with foreign politics. What Grey extensivl did, making foreign politics his very own and very exclusive field of operations, his uncontested 'fiefdom'. And ... ofc he had 'earned' it to stay there by participating in the 'Relugas Act' to (re)move Campbell-Bannerman to the House of Lords.
The situation did not allow for Asquith's usual style. The decision had to be taken immediately according to the estimates of the professionals, and the decision was going to be for intervention.
Again :
What 'professionals' do you talk about ?
Placing party politics above the interests and survival of the Empire? That would have been treasonous.
Ofc it is the main interest of the party in charge to serve the interests as well as the survival of the empire (I render it highly debatable, that intervention or no-intervention was a question of survival ... contemporary as well as from hindsight).

And ofc it is the partys and its leaders opinion, that this can be done the best by their party and noone else (that's what 'politics' is all about in systems where 'parties' exist).

Therefore : party politics IS the interest and survival of the empire



However :
You've completly missed, what I was trying to tell in my post #1112.
  1. Asquith was political dependent of his cabinet
  2. Asquith was political dependent of the party in parliament
  3. Asquith was NO autocrat and not the 'Hive-King' of the members of cabinet.
  4. british politics are far more complicated and dependent on persons, their view of things, life and esp. style of politics as you seems to be prepared to acknowledge
 
Asquith said if Grey was to resign, he would go too. Asquith's support of Grey was unconditional.
:closedeyesmile:So ... now who was the drone and the Hive-King ?

Where do you got this 'unconditional' from ? Simply from no condition mentioned ?

And for Greys 'demands' for staying :
intervening in favor of France (nothing about any kind of military action !)​
was actually served with taking the decision to secure the french channel coast.
 
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Asquith had two choices. First, to offer British neutrality on the basis of Germany's full respect for the neutrality of Belgium for the duration of the war. Second, with the knowledge that German war plans envisioned the violation of Belgium, to not offer Germany British neutrality so that the Germans would violate Belgium and serve pretext. Those were Asquith's actual choices, and since no neutrality offer was forthcoming, Asquith had decided on intervention.
If it's not white, it has to be black. ... regardless there are also things like blue, red, green, etc..

Wasn't the question to respect belgian integrety not alread an unspoken offer of neutrality (curbed by an unlucky to dull stupid choice of answer by Jagow as well as Bethmann-Hollweg) ?

Asquith could also have decided to do :
  • doing nothing at all, not even asking any body to respect belgian neutrality and sit out whatever 'silly storm' might happen on the continent to collect and rearrange their remnants to his/british delight
  • mobilizing and sending the BEF together with the RN on 31st July already ... or even earlier
  • setting up a remake of the Gladstone treaties of 1870 (Pls scroll down to appendix B and C)
... for example.
 
By August 1st Lichnowsky had advised the British government formally that Germany would require an actual neutrality offer from Britain for any assurances on anything, so when Asquith on 2 August refuses to make a neutrality offer, he's refusing the Germans and simply awaiting the start of hostilities in order to intervene.
Interesting ... I never came across this bit ... especially this 'formally' and rather demanding attitude by Lichnowsky you seem to paint here ... where do you got it from ?

Especially on the 1st August Lichnowsky was offering Grey almost everything on his own account, on the phone as well as later during their personal talk ... without any consultation or even approval from Berlin.
 
LG was an interventionist. To conclude otherwise would require hard evidence of Lloyd George threatening Grey or Asquith, or engaging in heated arguments with them, during discussions or meetings, direct, sharp clashes by LG with Grey over intervention. What are your examples of LG doing any of this?
HUH ?? :hushedface:
Not actively, hard fighting the interventionists means being on their side ??

... rather strange method of arguing and concluding ...
 
At a dinner party on the evening of 2 August 1914 LG stated clearly to those gathered, if Germany gave an undertaking in an unqualified manner for German warships not to enter the English Channel and Belgium neutrality was to be respected, then LG would not agree to war and would rather resign.
...taken out of context. The rest of the paragraph taken from :
This reflects Asquith's undertaking to Lichnowsky earlier that day, so perhaps LG and Asquith were co-operating quite closely, but in the pursuit of peace, not war.

The Germans delivered their ultimatum in Brussels in the early evening of 2 August, meaning that later that evening any discussions along the lines of German respect for Belgium was a purely hypothetical matter with no practical application to British politics.​
Lloyed-George learned of the ultimatum only the next day.

Might not have been of 'practical application', but shows quite well, what position LG was taking.
... and that was NOT an interventionists one ...

If you still haven't got it :
we are here discussing the process of how the actors, human persons in Britain came from what positions under which personal conditions to their personal decisions in participating to make up a decision for the goverment of Her Majesty to take in the actual crisis.
What IOTL ended with the ultimatum sent to germany ending at midnight 4th to 5th August​
 
The British were fully responsible for their decision to declare war on Germany because they were perfectly aware they could have offered neutrality on the basis of Belgium to avoid spreading the war in the West beyond border battles between Germany and France. They declined to repeat the 1870 policy because limiting the French to border battles was the way to help Germany win the war, not France.
Well, mostly already answered ...
... boils again down to : "if not white it has to be black"



If, as you seem to assume, Churchill, Grey, Asquith, Lloyd George and almost everybody else in your perception was soo strongly pro-war with Germany - as it was such a survival-threatening force - why did they actually needed soo much time ? ... to come to their conclusion ? Why didn't they 'made' war upon Germany not alreayd earlier ?

There were plenty occasions after the assasination to force things.
There were plenty occasion in the years after the Triple Entente was 'finally' formed in 1907.
There were plenty occasions ... to be 'made easily' for a casus belli out of nothing ... as we have learned here.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Asquith said if Grey was to resign, he would go too. Asquith's support of Grey was unconditional.
No.

Grey's threats to resign and the support of Asquith relating thereto were in relation to two issues, the retrospective ratification of French naval discussions regarding the English Channel and the possibility Britain not declaring absolute neutrality in all circumstances (i.e. even in the case of Belgium neutrality being violated). To put things in perspective, OTL Grey confirmed to LG he would not demand (i.e. threaten resignation for) Britain intervene, if Belgium had acceded to German demands.

Asquith had two choices. First, to offer British neutrality on the basis of Germany's full respect for the neutrality of Belgium for the duration of the war. Second, with the knowledge that German war plans envisioned the violation of Belgium, to not offer Germany British neutrality so that the Germans would violate Belgium and serve pretext. Those were Asquith's actual choices, and since no neutrality offer was forthcoming, Asquith had decided on intervention.

The majority of the British Cabinet were in favour of a third choice - absolute neutrality irrespective of Belgium.

Most of July 1914 Asquith was focused on more important matters and preservation of the government and the Liberal Party continued to heavily influence his decision making. In that context, Asquith's options were very limited. His preference was for peace in Europe, but beyond that, he had more concern about preserving the Liberal Government than preserving the French.

To preserve the Liberal government, Asquith's only option was to muddle through the middle until a consensus was formed. In that respect, party unity was being prioritized ahead of international concerns.

By August 1st Lichnowsky had advised the British government formally that Germany would require an actual neutrality offer from Britain for any assurances on anything, so when Asquith on 2 August refuses to make a neutrality offer, he's refusing the Germans and simply awaiting the start of hostilities in order to intervene.

To provide us with context, please provide us with a reference supporting your claim. It is difficult to believe given the whole German western deployment almost ground to a halt on the merest hint of British neutrality.

LG was an interventionist. To conclude otherwise would require hard evidence of Lloyd George threatening Grey or Asquith, or engaging in heated arguments with them, during discussions or meetings, direct, sharp clashes by LG with Grey over intervention. What are your examples of LG doing any of this?

On this thread alone:
  • On 1 August 1914 a letter from Winston Churchill begging LG to change his mind regarding intervention;
  • Asquith noting LG's preference for peace, but welcoming LG's even handedness in discussions;
  • LG hosting multiple joint gatherings of the neutralists and doves; and
  • On 2 August 1914 LG stating he would rather resign than go to war with a Germany that respected Belgium neutrality and kept clear of the English Channel.
Further, most reputable historians recognize LG as the leader of the neutralist faction during the July crisis.

The Germans delivered their ultimatum in Brussels in the early evening of 2 August, meaning that later that evening any discussions along the lines of German respect for Belgium was a purely hypothetical matter with no practical application to British politics.

LG's declaration on the evening of 2 August 1914 illustrates LG's position was entirely consistent with what Asquith told Lichnowsky earlier the same day. It debunks any peculiar notion LG was an interventionalist.​

The British were fully responsible for their decision to declare war on Germany because they were perfectly aware they could have offered neutrality on the basis of Belgium to avoid spreading the war in the West beyond border battles between Germany and France. They declined to repeat the 1870 policy because limiting the French to border battles was the way to help Germany win the war, not France.

So were are back to the generic "the British"?

The reality was the Liberal government was fractured and the Conservatives in opposition were not much better. There was no consensus in Britain in 1914. Grey's machinations, made it difficult to move against French interests without risk to British reputation, while the vast majority of the British Cabinet were firmly against war with Germany without good cause. Asquith simply did not have a free hand if he wanted retain anything he held dear.
 
The British ultimatum to Germany on 4 August read,


(35798) No. 594.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.
Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.
Tel (No. 270.)
D. 2 P.M.


We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram No. 266 of this morning(1) be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports and to say that His Majesty's Government felt bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a Treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

At the point this ultimatum was issued the British mention one report of one violation at Gemmenich. They had the German ultimatum and could see that it demanded passage and that Belgium had denied it, but at the point of the ultimatum, no major violation of Belgium had yet occurred. This is why I concluded that "major" meant "German" and "minor" meant French.

Well, if the Germans violated the Belgian border at Gemmenich, this was surely not to cut a corner through Southern Luxembourg, wasn’t it ? Or the German HQ really cannot read a map.... It’s pretty clear the Germans are going for Liège. And if the violation had been only limited to a small sliver of Belgian territory, don’t you think the German ultimatum would have indicated that, to facilitate at least a tacit acceptance by the Belgian government or a more lenient response by the British government ?

Anyway, that this was indeed a major violation has been proven by the subsequent facts. The whole point is moot.


I have been following the arguments unfold for more than 50 pages without intervening so far, and it has been extremely instructive. Thank you to all contributors ! Glenn, I would suggest you step back a bit and reconsider the entire picture. Your increasingly acrobatic intellectual contorsions and highly selective use of facts don’t lend much credibility to your side of the argument...
 
Just read page 2...

...Intrigued. Some entrenched positions emerged. Sad.

Think it likely that the battleships would have been seized - a fear of a reinforced Ottoman Empire being able to stop a Dardenelles attack and attack Sevastopol.

Declaration of BEF deployment to Belgium not needed - Britain could have been more successful exporting munitions to France and controlling the seas. See my 'The Great Raid' - sorry, my Kindle makes link insertion difficult - re the possible effect of no BEF on the Marne. However, I concur that Germany and A-H could wreck Russia in the West and the Japanese might seize the moment, Tsingtao and Northern Manchuria.

Got to go to the allotment, will try to look in on this, but still reading 'Azure Main' for the first time.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The British ultimatum to Germany on 4 August read,

...

At the point this ultimatum was issued the British mention one report of one violation at Gemmenich. They had the German ultimatum and could see that it demanded passage and that Belgium had denied it, but at the point of the ultimatum, no major violation of Belgium had yet occurred. This is why I concluded that "major" meant "German" and "minor" meant French.

I understand the significant violation of Belgium neutrality as a cause for war was mooted by Samuel and approved by Cabinet on 2 August 1914.

The circumstances required a decision to be made, and quickly. The competence of cabinet as a group to speak on military matters simply did not exist. There, what mattered was the opinion of the Foreign minister, the naval minister, and the head of the army. As importantly - the professional Army staff, the Admiralty, the Foreign Office. All of those were in universal agreement for intervention. The others - Lord Privy Seal and such? They were completely ignorant of the topic and were just doing their due diligence, testing the premise of the expert ministers, before signing on. There was never going to be neutrality - it all got exaggerated out of proportions later, as all the countries involved started to shop around for reasons other countries were responsible for the decisions they had made.

Why the rush? In this scenario British interests in western Europe are not immediately under threat and vague imagined threats of hegemony in Europe apply equally to Germany or a Franco-Russian alliance.

Grey certainly was a formidable minister of the type that had to have a major cabinet portfolio. But Foreign Office specifically? That was Asquith's choice.

Apparently not in the estimations of LG

The situation did not allow for Asquith's usual style. The decision had to be taken immediately according to the estimates of the professionals, and the decision was going to be for intervention.

Again, why the rush? Would the estimations of your 'professionals' be exactly the same in entirely different circumstances - that would not be very 'professional' now would it?

Placing party politics above the interests and survival of the Empire? That would have been treasonous.

How do events in the Balkans and eastern Europe pose an imminent threat to Empire?
 
The BEF may go (more likely) or may stay in Britain (less likely) for a while. Joffre is going into the Ardennes with 3rd, 4th, 5th French armies no matter what the Germans or British do.

Historical deployment unless the British can pull off permission to land in Antwerp in support of the French advance in the Ardennes. In that case, land the BEF at Antwerp and advance to Liege to reinforce the Belgian garrison there. In 1915 once Entente forces are adequately built up, actively contemplate the violation of Dutch neutrality to flank the German defenses at Aachen. In any case, more investment in the aerial arm for air attacks into the German industrial heartland of the Ruhr and along the Rhine.

If the French run into the full German strength I assume the Germans will defeat them and chase them across the Ardennes unless they pocket them. Other than that, I have no idea.

LG will survive just fine and the Liberals will eventually go down in flames no matter what. The war will go on in any case. There is one facet of allowing the French the initiative in the West not yet discussed - the length and terrain of the Western Front. The front line is much shorter and the terrain is better for the defense. Even with Belgium and the Netherlands in the war the number of divisions the Germans need in the West is considerably less.

Then I will accept that the BEF is deployed to France and here the BEF will be six Infantry Divisions and five Cavalry Brigades that were arranged into the two Corps per OTL. And I will gladly accept that Joffre is violating Belgium to get at Luxembourg with the 5th Army. If France violates Belgium Luxembourg than Germany has won the propaganda war longer term and the post war peace will be highly favorable. In any event I put the BEF on the flank of the 5th stretched along the Franco-Belgian frontier. If they are as far away as Maubeuge they are useless until the German Third (and/or Second) moves to flank the 5th. I think Joffre wants then to join the 5th and be part of the offensive, a thing French was eager for but must be cautious with Kitchener's warning and orders to preserve the BEF.

I will hold Belgium to its stated neutrality and have it refuse any British landings, a position that is not only affirmed but reinforced by the German failure to violate her neutrality on August 4 and 5. After that I regard Belgium as defending itself versus any country violating its neutrality. For me the only way to get British boots in Antwerp is a forcible landing, otherwise Belgium will be invaded by Germany and be consumed in the war without mercy or regret.

Agreed, I think the real potential is for the BEF to join the offensive and take heavy casualties in the forests until the German Third moves to flank the 5th and likely it is still the BEF who defends her. I see the BEF crumbling faster as French's mood swings and he begins the retreat under fire. If I concede your argument that Joffre is violating Belgium then I will entertain that the Germans halt the transfer of forces to the East. Here we see the bulk of the First and some of the Second already on the move but perhaps enough left to reform a smaller First and now employ it is a limited thrust with the Third through Belgium south of the Meuse (just as Joffre assumed it would be). It might be heavy on reserve units and newly formed units but if we get the more aggressive Kluck instead of sending him to Silesia then Moltke has forces to flank, encircle and maul the BEF and 5th closer to Sedan, maybe break out and strike into the French rear if the 5th succumbs. We might rob the East of a faster move against Poland from Silesia but I think we get a Western front nearly as exciting in these opening battles. Not a decisive victory but Germany is not the villain, Belgium is equally violated by each side, the western front will become a grinder and the war can end in a white peace more weighted to Germany's advantage.

In my opinion the Liberals needed the war to distract from how Ireland was going to tar them, but not going to war, call an early election and dump it on the Tories with a thin majority. Be patriotic coalition partners, if we win the war we can run on that, if we lose we were not in charge, win-win. The Liberals died when they followed Grey on his personal crusade for France. LG was likely the best politician in the group and I think he saw that, thus I see his position as trying to not get in charge or lead the party into war.

I think we still see some big offensive swings and Germany gobbles up territory but here the German lines might be far better, France will retain her industrial North but likely have lost more men, and Russia has been pushed to the defensive hoping to recover. A war subtle in differences but set up to truly be different.
 

marathag

Banned
After that I regard Belgium as defending itself versus any country violating its neutrality. For me the only way to get British boots in Antwerp is a forcible landing, otherwise Belgium will be invaded by Germany and be consumed in the war without mercy or regret.

Or the King allows German troops in, joining the CP for as long as Entente forces are on Belgian territory.
How well do you think Franc-Tireurs taking potshots at BEF troops looks to other Neutral nations
 
Or the King allows German troops in, joining the CP for as long as Entente forces are on Belgian territory.
How well do you think Franc-Tireurs taking potshots at BEF troops looks to other Neutral nations

A possibility. It certainly undoes the British reputation. Britain soft talking France violating Belgian neutrality I think is more destructive than is given credit and Britain doing so directly would be unbelievably bad. I think this is why we often gloss it, it is regarded too unlikely but I never fully discount folly, the temptation is great and in the moment looks too slight. Belgian partisans shooting at the BEF will be disaster. I think Britain is wiser but it might put expediency before reason. If you ever wanted the USA to join the CPs I would think this is the butterfly. It really was the poison well for Germany, it spoils any victory and makes any peace hollow, worse it likely makes peace unthinkable. Britain will hand the post-war world to Germany in such a scenario, a strange backwards timeline.
 
A possibility. It certainly undoes the British reputation. Britain soft talking France violating Belgian neutrality I think is more destructive than is given credit and Britain doing so directly would be unbelievably bad. I think this is why we often gloss it, it is regarded too unlikely but I never fully discount folly, the temptation is great and in the moment looks too slight. Belgian partisans shooting at the BEF will be disaster. I think Britain is wiser but it might put expediency before reason. If you ever wanted the USA to join the CPs I would think this is the butterfly. It really was the poison well for Germany, it spoils any victory and makes any peace hollow, worse it likely makes peace unthinkable. Britain will hand the post-war world to Germany in such a scenario, a strange backwards timeline.
In this post-war world however, will Britain have utterly exhausted her economy in this more limited war, ceding the initiative to Germany (and the US)?
 
One thing is that the scenario here isn't even a repeat of 1870, since the German army is moving away from France. The British national interest, more in accord with traditional British policies, is to get a diplomatic settlement and limit the gains of the winning side. ITTL they tried to soften the terms of the 1919 settlement, more so than the Americans. So you probably really need to have the German army in Belgium and northern France to get the British all in.
 
Well, if the Germans violated the Belgian border at Gemmenich, this was surely not to cut a corner through Southern Luxembourg, wasn’t it ? Or the German HQ really cannot read a map.... It’s pretty clear the Germans are going for Liège.

The policy was a significant violation, which meant that the violation had to have actually have occurred and be significant. An unverified violation at Gemmenich does not rise to the level, meaning that the original criteria of minor violation was not meant for Germany. By process of elimination, that leaves France.

Anyway, that this was indeed a major violation has been proven by the subsequent facts. The whole point is moot.

The British did not communicate to the Germans what sort of minor violation of Belgium would be tolerated, then acted like the first small town taken was a major violation. Now, don't get me wrong - I agree with what Grey did because the logic of the Anglo-French Entente is clear. But that logic also said that if France had invaded Belgium it would have been called a "minor" violation.

UOTE]
 
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